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NOTE BY TRANSLATOR.

WITH the kind permission of the author the translator has mentioned in the notes in this volume some works bearing on mythology and early religions which have appeared since the date of the last German edition.

The fourth and concluding volume of the work is already in the Press, and will be issued shortly.

The following *errata* have been found in Vol. II. :—

P. 90, line 6, *for* have *read* leave.

P. 114, line 9, *for* in need *read* in no need.

SECTION I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.

CHAPTER I.

THE BEGINNINGS OF RELIGION.

THE question of the origin of religion, and of the nature of primitive religion, was not, as a rule, seriously taken up by the early philosophy of religion, nor made the subject of any thorough investigation; in recent times, however, it has come to the front, and has become one of the burning questions of religious science. And this is as it should be. For the nature of a mental phenomenon such as religion, is only unfolded in the totality of its development in history, and can only be understood as a whole when its origin has been traced, and its springs laid bare.

Thus we are met at the very threshold of our task by the necessity of combining a historical and a philosophical inquiry. The different religious traditions do not reach back to the primitive age of mankind, nor in consequence to the primitive age of religion; and we are therefore compelled to proceed by a comparison of the most ancient traditions of different races, inferring from such a comparison what may be supposed to have been the first beginnings of the religious consciousness. In this process we are assisted on the one side by the results of the comparative study of language, and on the other by what may be observed of the civilised peoples of the present day. But important and valuable as are these aids

to the investigation of the primitive history of religion, the wide divergence of the views now held on the subject shows sufficiently that no certain result is to be attained by means of them. The question is not one of fact, but of the various fragmentary hints and traces which mythology, language and ethnology afford as to the proper interpretation and combination. But this will always depend on the view which is taken of the manner in which the various forces and impulses of the human soul come into play in the production of religious states and activities. And this psychological question transfers us at once to philosophical ground. It is observation of self, reflection on the experiences of our own religious life, and of that around us, that gives us the Ariadne's clew to the labyrinth of primitive religious history. It is always taken for granted that wide as the difference may be between the undeveloped beginnings and the highly developed present, the laws at least, according to which the activities of the human mind are successively called forth, and a particular reaction set up by the presentation of a particular stimulus, always remain the same in the human species; and the grounds of this presupposition are only to be found in a definite and rounded philosophical view of the world.

That theory therefore will come nearest to a solution of the problem of the beginnings of religion, which possesses the highest degree of psychological probability, and which, at the same time, explains in the most natural way the various facts of primitive history. I shall show, in the first place, that these conditions are not met by either of the principal theories which, as clear alternatives to each other, still occupy the forefront of the battle, neither by the pure depravation-theory which makes religion begin with its most perfect form, monotheism, and gradually sink down to idolatry, nor by that theory which makes religion set out from its lowest form, fetichism, and rise up gradually to the highest. The latter is often called the "evolution" theory, but the designation is somewhat inaccurate, as the true notion of development does not imply an advance from the most particular to the more general, but rather the development of the undetermined general to its particular determina-

tions. I might therefore justly claim the title for the view I prefer, which lies halfway between these two extremes.

The oldest answer to the question as to the origin of religion—oldest because most obvious to the religious consciousness—is that which refers it to a *primitive divine revelation*. This view contains an element of unquestionable truth, because man's God-consciousness, which is unquestionably a part of the constitution of his higher nature, undoubtedly declares its community of essence with its creative source, and therefore comprises a revelation of God. But how do we conceive of this revelation? If it is to be thought of as brought about inwardly by natural means, then it contains the principle that man was capable of arriving at the consciousness of God; but the question is still unanswered, by what historical event, and under what psychological conditions, the consciousness of God of which man was capable, was actually realised. But this, and nothing else, is the subject of the present inquiry. On the other hand, the problem would have met with a solution if we saw our way to regard the revelation of God as a purely supernatural and miraculous act or doctrinal communication of God, coming to man *ab extra;* and this is the usual view when the question is answered in this way. But though this appears to be the simplest solution, it is at once encumbered with the most serious difficulties. If the revelation of God be of this nature, how are we to explain the fact that the belief in God varies so greatly with different peoples, or the fact that the further back we trace it in most peoples, indeed, to speak accurately, in all peoples, the more impure, the more inconsistent with the truth is it found to be? Must not a belief which sprang from direct divine instruction be the same among all peoples, and perfectly true and pure? To meet this difficulty an ancillary hypothesis is often resorted to, to the effect that while God revealed himself in pure truth to man at the beginning, and primitive man thus possessed in the common primitive religion a perfect belief in God, yet men afterwards fell from this height by sin, and turned from their true faith to false gods, thus giving rise to the multiform and impure religions of the historical age. But if God could once communicate the true

faith to man by a primitive revelation, could he not as easily, or even more easily, have provided that this valuable acquirement of the youthful race should not be immediately lost? Would it have been worthy of his educating wisdom to leave the inexperienced pupil to himself when the instruction had just begun, only to bring him right again after long long wanderings, by a new revelation?

These objections cannot but make us suspicious of this hypothesis; and it has to be added that the whole idea of a communication of divine knowledge to primitive man in the way of instruction is surrounded by great difficulties. Not to speak of the extremely anthropomorphic view of God when thus represented as a teacher, it must not be forgotten that no instruction, not even the most perfect, can be of any avail if it be not met by a corresponding faculty of learning or power of comprehension on the part of the pupil. But how could primitive man, with his quite undeveloped mental powers, have been able to grasp the difficult thought of one infinite God, who is a pure Spirit? All learning is an appropriation of new ideas by means of the stock of ideas already acquired, and the faculty of comprehension which has learned by practice how to deal with them. To appropriate higher, more general, ideas thus requires no small degree of preparation, and in the case of primitive man this is neither psychologically possible, nor from the point of view of history can it have been really the case. It is one of the most assured results of the comparative science of language that the roots of those words which later thought employs as designations for abstract mental and moral notions, originally denoted purely material phenomena and acts, and only by degrees received a more refined and spiritualised significance. From this we may certainly conclude that in the primitive time, when the human mind was forming the roots of language, it was still incapable of supersensuous notions, and lived, it and all the ideas it possessed, in the world of phenomena alone, as children in their early years are observed to do. The advance to intellectual notions, compressed in the education of our children into years, because they possess the inheritance of the past which thought for them, must, in the infancy of humanity, have required centuries

and millenniums to accomplish. A complete communication of the knowledge of God by a primitive revelation is thus shipwrecked on the very incapacity of primitive man to receive such instruction. Some still seek to escape the force of these simple considerations by pointing to the religion of Israel, in which the true belief in God maintained itself from the primitive period of our race as the traditional inheritance of the family of Abraham. But as to this we may remark that the true faith in God ascribed to the patriarchs has long been recognised by historical criticism as one of those mythical products which are to be explained from the habit so common in religious tradition, of carrying back the belief of later into earlier times (*hysteron-proteron*). We shall afterwards see more particularly in the case of the Israelites how the original natural basis of their belief in God admits of being traced, while the gradual elevation of it to a more exalted mental and moral level was only secured by slow degrees, and at the cost of severe struggles. Thus, instead of testifying in favour of a primitive revelation, this instance contradicts such a hypothesis. The theory may therefore be regarded as exploded.

But is it necessary to represent the primitive revelation in the repellent supernaturalistic form of a communication of doctrines? Can it not be conceived as a natural revelation, given to the human mind from the first as a part of its endowment, an "innate idea"? This naturalistic modification of the theory appears to possess the advantage of being more natural; but on closer examination it is found to succumb to the same difficulties, both psychological and historical. Nothing that man's consciousness contains as a definite, developed product is innate: least of all his highest spiritual ideas, which, on the contrary, are the most elaborately prepared products of the long process in which the growing spirit actively appropriates the objective world-reason, and thus forms itself to subjective rationality; there is nothing inherent in human nature from the first but the capacity; the real possibility and the inward impulse thus to develop its own reasonableness. How this potency comes to be realised in the individual is far from being explained by merely

referring to the innateness of the general possibility of it. It was the radical error of the unhistorical Illumination of the eighteenth century (Deism or Rationalism) that it regarded reason not as a thing becoming, developing itself out of the natural capacity in conformity with the conditions imposed by nature and civilisation (nationality, country, mode of life, etc.), but as an accomplishment of reasonable thinking, inborn in man from the first, as a total of fixed and clear notions, that it in fact conceived its own illuminated reason, or rather the formal abstract rationality which it called reason, to have been that of the first men (*vide supra*, vol. i. p. 107). The Illumination thus shut itself out from understanding history in general, and particularly the history of religion. Presupposing a "rational" manner of thinking to have been present at all times and to all men alike, it debarred itself from explaining the changeable and manifold religious ideas and practices of mankind in a natural way, *i.e.* as the product of a natural and immanently necessary process of development. Recourse was therefore had once more to the unnatural explanation of the positive religions which even the old Sophists employed; they were set down to human caprice and human ordinance: the deceit of priests and the design of statesmen were supposed to have invented and introduced all the "superstition," *i.e.* all the peculiarities of the historical religions, which did not square with the abstract "faith of reason" of the eighteenth century. And in fact this rationalistic view of the history of religion was no more than the exact counterpart of the orthodox ecclesiastical view: to the latter all the religions outside of the Bible were the result of the conscious God-denying revolt of the heathen nations from the true religion of the primitive revelation in Paradise, while to the Illumination all the positive religions, that of the Bible not excepted, proceeded from conscious and malicious perversion and corruption of the true and universal religion of reason. The two theories are quite on a level in point of being unhistorical and psychologically unnatural. The great advance of the nineteenth beyond the eighteenth century is that it has outgrown such a view, and attained to better insight into the historical development of the

mental life of mankind. The chief credit of this great step is due to one who is properly regarded as the genial prophet of the profounder modern view of history in general, and in particular as the founder of the religious science of the present day, namely Herder (*cf.* vol. i. p. 204 *seqq.*). He it was who first applied to the interpretation of history, in a pregnant style by no means superseded to this day, the notion of "development," a notion which Leibniz had helped to bring forward, and which, foreign to supernaturalism and to rationalism alike, far transcends them both.

But if we are to regard the beginnings of religion from the point of view of development, the question now presents itself whether the only way, or even the most correct way, of doing this is to be found in the theories of fetichism and animism which have hitherto been considered as *par excellence* "theories of evolution"? I feel myself obliged to answer this question in the negative, and that both on historical and on psychological grounds. I willingly allow to the representatives of these theories the credit of having drawn attention to important points of the history of religion, which were far too much neglected by the idealistic philosophy of religion which formerly prevailed. But I consider that the origin of religion is not satisfactorily explained by either the fetichistic or the animistic theory, or by both combined. It may be said, however, that it is a somewhat difficult matter to judge of theories which make use of notions so elastic and so little defined.

The word "Fetich," "feitiço," which was brought into currency by the Portuguese in speaking of the idols of savage races, is derived, as is well known, from the Latin *factitius*, and thus denotes first an artificial image, then a wonder-working magical object, amulet, idol. But in the theory of fetichism as represented by F. Schultze, Peschel, Caspari, Hellwald, Tylor, Lefèvre, and others, this simple and limited notion has received a measureless extension, and is applied not only to trees and mountains, rivers and lakes, but even to sun and stars, heaven and earth, indeed to everything superhuman and divine—objects which surely have little in common with an amulet or a

wonder-working idol! This confusion of notions is arrived at through the following reasoning. The belief in the gods was due originally, it is said, to man's natural tendency to look for a cause for every phenomenon. This vague feeling of causality in men who were restricted to material objects, attached itself at first to the nearest object of observation which in any way aroused his interest, his curiosity, or his fear or hope. Thus he first made stones, mountains, springs, rivers, animals, or men his objects of reverence, or his fetiches. His gaze then rose to supra-mundane objects, to the sun, moon, and stars, and at last the heavens became his supreme fetich. But his feeling of causality was not satisfied at this the limit of the visible. His worship of spirits had in the meantime made him acquainted with a supersensuous being, and ultimately he placed above the highest visible fetich a supreme God as the Author of all, so that at last the crossing of fetichism and spiritism gave rise to monotheism.

This arbitrary extension of the notion of the fetich to the great phenomena of nature is a serious confusion. But to this confusion a second is at once added. According to this theory (set forth in this form especially by Schultze and Peschel) spirit appears as an object of worship at the culmination of a long ascent from one material object of worship to another, and yet spirits (of the dead) are said to have been worshipped previously. How can these two positions be reconciled together? Why must the whole long ladder of material objects be traversed if the higher notion is already known? And how little likely is this hypothesis, that the objects at first worshipped as fetiches were partly mere material things, and partly were bodiless spirits! How could purely material things, in which no knowing and willing soul was thought to reside, ever come to be objects of worship at all? And how could men ever come to attribute superhuman, divine qualities and powers to dead things such as stones, birds' feathers, images constructed by man, from which no visible influences whatever proceed, had not this idea been previously drawn from other objects, namely, from the striking effects put forth by the great phenomena of nature? It is easy to understand how

the notion of miraculous divine powers, if once attained, could be *transferred* to dead things, and these powers thought to reside in them and act through them ; but it quite passes comprehension that that notion should have proceeded originally out of such dead things. This difficulty is somewhat lessened for those who assume that the fetichistic mode of view was not combined with the spiritist or animistic view at the end of the process but at the very first, each fetich being regarded as the residence of a spirit, and the thing containing the spirit being made an object of worship for the sake of the spirit dwelling in it. But this culmination of the fetichistic and the animistic view, which is held principally by Tiele and Tylor, by no means makes an end of the difficulties. It explains correctly enough the reverence paid to the fetich from the idea of a spirit dwelling in it which can do magical acts, a spirit which is not one with the material object, nor always bound to it, but dwelling in it for the time. But to conceive of spirits as incorporated in dead things it must obviously have been necessary to possess beforehand the notion of spirits not attached to bodies, and before attributing magical powers to these spirits the notion of supersensuous, mysteriously operating powers must first have been formed. These two entirely abstract notions have thus to be presupposed as the necessary basis of the fetichistic belief. Can we accept such a presupposition as the starting-point of the religious consciousness ?

The *animistic* theory maintains that we can, and thus undoubtedly assumes too high a view of the primitive human consciousness, as the fetichistic theory (in the narrowest sense) assumes too low, too rudely materialistic a view of it. According to the latter, the earliest gods were this or that material object man observed in his narrow and limited surroundings : according to the former, religious consciousness began with the abstract ideas of spirits without bodies, and of mysterious powers, ideas which certainly could never be familiar and natural to the naïve thought of the childhood of humanity, being as they are the products of advanced abstraction and reflection. Which would be more obvious to primitive man : the worship of the moving, shining, heat-giving sun, of the stormy sky, the tempestuous sea—

phenomena, the life and power of which impressed themselves irresistibly and immediately upon his eye and ear and heart; or the worship of souls without bodies, of which he could see nothing, and the moving power of which rested on a mere fiction he had formed for himself? The question only needs to be put clearly to receive a confident answer. The question is obscured and rendered difficult to answer by the indefiniteness of the notion "animism," under which, *e.g.*, Tylor comprehends both the worship of the natural objects which are represented as beings with souls, and that of the spirits by themselves, conceived as independent of these objects, and finally the worship of the departed souls of men, or of the spirits of ancestors. We need not hesitate to concede that these various ideas soon passed into each other and became mixed up and connected; but in considering the problem of the origin of religion we must not forget their essential difference from each other. The "Nature-souls," as we may call them for the sake of brevity, are originally nothing but the livingness and the active power of the phenomena of nature conceived after the analogy of animal and man as willing and feeling living beings (not exactly as persons). They are not independent souls brought into a mere accidental connection with the phenomena; originally they are not distinguished from the latter at all, far less separate from or independent of them. They are thus in their essence and their operation a perfectly definite magnitude, perceived by experience, and the characteristic traits of which impress themselves too deeply from the first on the childlike mind ever to be quite obliterated by the most arbitrary fancy. The greatest of these living nature-beings, moreover, and those which affect the mind earliest and most powerfully, are mighty powers, the superior force of which was so obvious to man that while he might hope to influence them he could never dream of compelling them or subjecting them to his own rule. And finally, they are universal powers, they do not exist for individuals merely, they cannot be made the private property of individuals; they exist for all and say the same things to all, and thus form a bond which connects together the minds of all their worshippers, a social cement of the human community. Quite otherwise

is it with the idea of the innumerable spirits flitting freely about and taking up their dwelling where they will, among whom the spirits of ancestors also are to be reckoned. This great army of spirits has none of the objective clearness of sense-perception, and they are therefore relegated helplessly to arbitrary fancy and to the egoistic desires of men to determine their character. Their power does not come under outward observation, and is therefore mysterious, but possesses no irresistible ascendency; on the contrary, a man may hope to get them into his power and make them subject to himself, and as they are only individual, limited beings, the individual can take up a special exclusive relation towards them, they can become a private affair, the personal property of individuals, and therefore a means of separation between them. The two ideas being so essentially different—and the mental states of the worshippers differ in a corresponding way—it will conduce to the clearing up of the question of primitive religion, if we distinguish with A. Réville[1] between the worship of animated nature (Naturism)—which must certainly be placed first as the earliest in time—and the belief in spirits (animism, spiritism) developed out of the former; and reckon as a subdivision of the latter the worship of the spirits of ancestors (soul-worship in the narrower sense of the worship of Manes).

The theory of the rise of religion out of soul-worship is by no means new: in fact it is one of the oldest, and, it must be said, the most naïve hypotheses of religious science. The Greek free-thinker, Euhemerus, it is well known, was the first to declare the gods to be men of old times deified, their heroic deeds or their distinguished wisdom having procured for them this honour. Zeus, for example, was originally nothing but a king in Crete, where his grave was still pointed out: the myths of his amours, in which we recognise so distinctly the different variations of the primitive nature-myth of the life-producing relation of heaven to the earth, were in that theory simply anecdotes of the *chronique scandaleuse* of the Cretan Court. Danae was not the earth fertilised by the golden rays of the sun in spring, but a mistress whom the king had purchased with gold; the

[1] *Prolegomena to the History of Religions*, 1884.

cloud which Ixion embraced instead of Hera was not the rain-cloud encircled with the splendour of the setting sun, but a coquettish court-lady called Nephele,—and other bêtises of the same kind. We can understand how a theory which gave such sensible explanations of obscure matters of all kinds created a considerable sensation when it was first broached in ancient times; and we can also understand very well how it recommended itself to the mythologists of the 17th and 18th centuries, for its wooden pragmatism was quite according to the taste of the Illumination; but it is hard to comprehend how such a shallow theory should have once more attained to prominence and weight in our own day, and been defended with great expenditure of learning by such serious investigators as Herbert Spencer and Julius Lippert. These scholars wisely guard themselves indeed from the earlier application of the theory to the detail of mythology, but as to the substance of their view, which is the derivation of the belief in gods from the worship of the souls of ancestors, they occupy precisely the old position of Euhemerus. The only explanation of this remarkable phenomenon that I can think of is that the Positivist,[1] abstractly rational style of thinking,[2] completely fails to understand the unconscious poesy of that view of the world, so full of fancy and of feeling, which was natural, and still remains natural, to the human mind in its period of childhood. This state of mind, so simple and natural, and at the same time so entirely illogical, the Positivist cannot regain, and he therefore declares it to be impossible, and gives himself the greatest conceivable trouble to replace it by hypotheses which, meant to be in the highest degree exact, are in fact in the highest degree unnatural. Hence those strange assertions which we often hear, that the mythical animation of nature or personification

[1] Mr. Herbert Spencer has written protesting against Professor Pfleiderer's apparent classification of him as a disciple of Aug. Comte in the second volume of this work. Prof. Pfleiderer willingly acknowledges that Mr. Spencer is not a direct disciple of Comte, but states that he must regard him as a Positivist in the wider sense in which he uses that term.—TRANSLATOR.

[2] What A. Réville says of Euhemerus (*Prolegom.* p. 146), viz.:—"He was one of those too ingenious minds who understand everything except the simplicity of those ages which were governed by spontaneity," applies with perfect accuracy to the Positivists of to-day.

of natural phenomena was beyond the power of the first men, because it requires a highly developed aesthetic sense or even a speculative natural philosophy! Well, it may be hard to prove to one to whom the faculty has been denied of imagining the way in which children, savages, and poets look upon nature, that the view they take is original and naïve. But still less could the Positivists ever prove to us that it could ever have happened that primitive men considered the spirits of their ancestors to be the cause of sunshine and rain, of storm and thunder, and of other similar phenomena of nature. These all nature-religions, the more exclusively the further back we go, regard as specifically divine manifestations.

But this brings us to the question of the historical proof of the theory of soul-worship or the worship of manes. When there was no comparative science of language, and the study of mythology was all but confined to the myths of the Greeks and Romans, it might not be so difficult to deal with the legends of heroes, and with the local features of many myths of the gods in this way, and to explain them with more or less plausibility from the worship of ancestors. But matters are on a different footing since the science of language proved beyond the possibility of doubt that the names of the gods of different religions all alike refer to natural phenomena. Since we know that the names of Zeus, Jupiter, Zio, are etymologically identical with the Indian Dyaus, which means heaven, that Deus and Divus are the same word as Deva, which means "shining," and that Phaeton, Perseus, Bellerophon and Herakles, no less than Samson, Sandon, Adonis, Osiris, and Melkarth, are sun-gods, whose deeds and sufferings, in whatever various fashions they have been framed and dramatised by the poetry of legend, yet all have for their basis neither more nor less than the simple contemplation of the sun's daily and yearly course in its changing relations to the earth's vegetation; since all this has been established we cannot seriously be called to see in all these figures the kings and heroes of old times who by a remarkable chance all met with precisely similar fortunes! When the modern euhemerists undertake, as they rarely do, to explain these facts, they have recourse to hypotheses of the most

questionable nature. Herbert Spencer, for example, goes back to "Totemism," the well-known custom of the American redskins, according to which some particular animal is regarded as the guardian spirit of the family or tribe, which in many instances traces its descent to that animal. This custom he explains, and the explanation is certainly erroneous, from the supposed fact that the ancestor of such a stem was distinguished by the name of the animal, which he resembled in strength or swiftness, or by whatever quality, as his permanent title of honour, and that his spirit is therefore worshipped under the name of the same animal as the guardian spirit of the tribe. He then proceeds to argue that ancestors may have been compared not only to animals, but to other phenomena, to lightning, storm, wind, cloud, sun and sky, and their wives to the dawn, the moon, the evening star, etc., and that these *epitheta ornantia* were then given to their spirits also as standing titles of honour and of worship. In this way, he supposes the names of natural objects were taken up into the worship of ancestors, and it is a mere mistake of philologists if they argue from this fact to the original natural character of the gods. How wonderful that this "misunderstanding" should have befallen all the students without any exception who have examined the mythology of any people, and sought for its roots in language! How wonderful that the heroes of every land who were distinguished by the title of the sun, all the heroines who were named after the moon, should have met with fortunes so strikingly similar that they might have been held for the doubles of each other under different names! And how wonderful, finally, that the further back we trace the traditions of antiquity the less do we discover any consciousness that the names of the gods derived from nature are merely figurative; that, on the contrary, from the very earliest times, most of all indeed in the earliest times, the gods and the phenomena of nature appear to be identified to such an extent that not only do the former receive the names of the latter, but conversely also the natural phenomenon is described under the name of the god (Zeus rains, Jupiter *pluvius*, *sub* Jove, etc.). How difficult it is to explain this on the supposition that Zeus and Jupiter

were originally human heads of tribes, and had nothing in common with the sky but the figurative title of honour! Looking at all these improbabilities, we may not be wrong in assuming that though the prevailing tendency of the day, and the illustrious name of its author, may bring it for the time into vogue, Herbert Spencer's hypothesis in support of the euhemerist theory has little prospect of permanence.

But those who maintain the euhemeristic, and generally speaking the animistic theory, usually seek historical support for it less in the developed mythology of the old civilised peoples than in the rude religious life of the uncultivated races still surviving; they take it for granted that we see in these peoples a true picture of primitive life, and that in their religion we have before us primitive religion as it actually was, without change. But this supposition is by no means beyond the reach of doubt. The most thorough investigators in this field, Waitz and Gerland, have formed the impression with regard to the so-called "nature-peoples" of Australia and Africa, that their present state of culture in every respect, in politics, in language, and specially in religion, points back to an earlier higher stage, the faint echoes of which may still be heard in their present degraded condition. Granting that the actual religion of savages is for the most part no more than a belief in spirits and in magic, the fact must not be overlooked to which witness is borne from many quarters, that side by side with the belief in spirits there is generally to be found a real, if somewhat pale, idea of higher deities, the names and attributes of which point for the most part to the sky, and the sun and moon, but which are partly distinguished from these elements, and regarded as the independent creative causes of the whole world. The fact that these high deities are of far less practical importance in the actual religion of savages than the spirits and fetiches they believe in, or even all but disappear before the latter, is explained by the savages themselves by the significant legend which occurs with many variations in Australia, Africa, and America, that the superior gods were near men in old times, but afterwards withdrew to a distance in the sky, and left the guidance of earthly

affairs to the inferior spirits, so that now no consideration need be paid to any but the latter. I should think it hasty to regard this legend, as the champions of the theory of a primitive revelation do, as a proof of the existence at the first of pure spiritual monotheism; but on the other hand, I consider that the fetichistic and animistic theory is unable to explain the fact, that with the Polynesians "the worship of the high gods has been expelled by that of ancestors;"[1] that in China the worship of ancestors is based on an older nature-mythology which still maintains itself by the side of that worship in the official state-religion; that in Egypt the worship of ancestors, though it there attained a high degree of importance, yet always remained subordinate to that of the general deities, and that even where the belief in spirits is most prominent, as among the negroes and the redskins, a faint memory still survives of the predominance of the higher gods at an earlier time, and of their being gradually thrust out by the army of the lower spirits. In the presence of these facts the "evolution-theory," as hitherto stated, which finds the beginnings of religion in fetichism and animism, appears to me to be as much wanting in historical evidence as it is psychologically improbable.

The solution of the problem of primitive religion is not, we thus see, to be found in either of the extreme positions, either in the theory of depravation by itself, nor in the theory of evolution by itself. We shall have to seek it at an intermediate point between the two extremes, and this has been attempted by Max Müller, Happel, Eugen v. Schmidt, Ed. v. Hartmann, Alb. Réville. These scholars differ in many ways in detail, but they agree in refusing to regard as original either monotheism or fetichism. Max Müller especially assails the latter position with trenchant force.[2] It seems to me that

[1] Waitz-Gerland: *Die Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vi. 244. Here a number of proofs may be found of the statements in the text; I have put them together in my essay *Zur Frage nach Anfang und Entwicklung der Religion:* Prot. Jahrb. 1875, 1st part. They are also to be found in Roskoff: *Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*, and in Steude: *Ein Problem der allgemeinen Religions-wissenschaft.* [The English reader will consult Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, and A. Lang's recent work, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, 1887, where the new theory of the rise of the gods from savage modes of thought, is fully stated.—TRANSLATOR.]

[2] Hibbert Lectures on the *Origin and Growth of Religion.* 1882. Second Lecture.

those who believe in a primordial fetichism have taken that for granted which has to be proved. They have taken for granted that casual objects, such as stones, shells, the tail of a lion, a tangle of hair, or any such rubbish, possess in themselves a theogonic or god-producing character; while the fact that all people, when they have once risen to the suspicion of something supersensuous, infinite or divine, have perceived its presence afterwards in merely casual and insignificant objects, has been entirely overlooked. They have taken for granted that there exists at present, or that there existed at any time, a religion entirely made up of fetichism, or that, on the other hand, there is any religion which has kept itself entirely free of fetichism" (p. 130). And Happel, in his work on The Religious Disposition of Mankind (*Die religiöse Anlage der Menschheit*), states, and clearly demonstrates the same view.

Max Müller's theory of the origin of religion is as follows. He finds the roots of religion in the feeling of the infinite which is placed in us along with that of the finite, and is awakened in us in greater or less degree from the very first perceptions of our senses, though it is only much later that it develops itself into actual consciousness, into the idea of the infinite. He then traces in the most interesting way the various steps of the road, showing how man, under the vague desire to seek the infinite, rose from semi-tangible though relatively incomprehensible (unlimited) objects, such as mountains and rivers, to objects intangible but yet visible, such as the phenomena of the sky, then to beings no longer visible and only to be apprehended in their effects, such as the storm-wind; and how at length all of these were comprehended in the notion, "the shining ones" (deva), the "living ones" (asura), the "immortal or unaging ones" (amarta or agara), at which point the notion of the divine was reached. "We have in such words as deva or *deus* the actual vestiges of the steps by which our ancestors proceeded from the world of sense to the world beyond the grasp of the senses. The way was traced out by nature herself, or if nature too is but a deva in disguise, by something greater and higher than nature. That old road led the ancient Aryans, as it leads us still, from the known to the unknown, from nature to nature's

God" (p. 220). Considering how in these beginnings of religious belief the Godhead was invoked, as the longings of the heart turned in one direction or another, now under this character and name and now under that, but on each occasion the deity then invoked appeared to be the highest, no thought of other gods by whom that deity was limited entering into the mind of the worshipper, Max Müller calls this, the oldest form of belief in the gods, by the name of "Henotheism," to distinguish it both from monotheism proper and from developed polytheism.

Eugen v. Schmidt[1] objects to this theory that the fundamental notion of the divine is not that of the infinite, but that of the power which governs the world, and moreover that the gods of any mythology are not to be explained from the effort of language to find a suitable figurative expression for the notion of the infinite, but from an advance of the notion of God itself, the world-governing power having first been thought to be the natural phenomenon itself, the whole, that is to say, of nature, then the soul in the phenomena, and then the spirit above them. But the two first of these stages must certainly be united in one, since the natural phenomenon is never anything else in primitive mythology but a being with a soul in it; nor does the separation of the soul or the acting subject from the element of the phenomenon yield the pure notion of spirit; it only initiates the process of the anthropomorphification of the divine, which may be a step towards the spiritualising of the notion of God, but is far from being that spiritualised notion itself. We may say generally of Schmidt's objections to Müller, that they are rather directed and more in place against earlier statements of that scholar, than against the latest expression of his views, which is contained in his Hibbert Lectures above cited. Here Müller himself says: "The gods would not be called infinite, but rather unconquerable, imperishable, undecaying, immortal, unborn, present everywhere, knowing everything, and at the very last only should we expect for them names of so abstract a nature as infinite" (p. 232). Müller has also expressly guarded himself against the misconception that he presupposes the

[1] *Die Philosophie der Mythologie und Max Müller.* Berlin, 1880.

conscious idea of the infinite as the root of the belief in the gods; it is only a presentiment of that idea that he holds to have been there. And it was certainly the rational instinct in man, the supersensuous, infinite or divine in him, that led him from the first to suspect the presence, behind the appearance of the world to the senses in space and time, of a higher being, spirit of his spirit, not confined in these limits. On the other hand, I regard it as a defect in Max Müller's theory, that while dwelling on the influence of seeing and language-forming forces, he attaches too little weight to the other great factor of the religious process, the practical motives of the heart, which led to the setting up of relations with the higher powers in the way of worship.

This want is made good by E. von Hartmann,[1] who shows very clearly how, while the childlike poetic view of nature of the first men provided them with religious objects, these only became gods when men, led thereto by a practical need, took up the attitude of worship towards them, so that while in one aspect *cultus* presupposes the belief in the gods, in another it first confers reality upon them. These ideas are certainly correct, but the effect of them is impaired by Von Hartmann's finding the motive of the attitude of worship to be egoistic eudæmonism. In this he is at one with the positivists, who make religion start from fetichistic magic: and it is a matter of surprise that he should take up this position, as he agrees with M. Müller in regarding fetichism and the belief in spirits as not original, but a late product of the decomposition of an original "Henotheism." Under this term he scarcely seems to mean the same as M. Müller does; he wishes to suggest, by using it, that the original nature-religion was an indifference of mono-, poly-, and pan-theism, none of these as distinctly different from the others; he also uses the expression, "identity of essence of all the gods."

Whether the term "Henotheism" is a happy one for this Protean indefiniteness and changeableness of the earliest belief in the gods, may perhaps be doubted; I should think it much simpler to describe it as A. Réville does, as "Naturism," as by Nature we understand the one life in its manifold appearances, unity and multiplicity in one.

[1] *Das religiöse Bewusstseyn im Stufengang seiner Entwicklung* (1882), pp. 11-39.

The term Henotheism could then be kept for that form of monotheism which rises above polytheism in a national limitation, as we find it doing or preparing to do among all the Semites; in Israel it even becomes the germ of a universal monotheism. I cannot but see a most erroneous and misleading confusion in the proposal of Asmus to comprehend under the term Henotheism the developed polytheistic religions of the Indo-Germans, because their gods pass into each other and are used indifferently one for the other, which is far from being the case in fully formed mythological polytheism.[1] In making religion start from fetichism, I think Asmus has yielded too far to the influence of a traditional mode of construction; and this is the more to be wondered at, as the Indo-Germanic religions which he chose for his subject least of all afford any support for his hypothesis. Albert Réville's estimate of fetichism, on the other hand, agrees with those of M. Müller, Happel, E. v. Schmidt, and E. v. Hartmann; he regards it as a secondary phenomenon, and considers that it must have been preceded by animism, which also cannot have been the original form of religion. Réville does not go so far with Von Hartmann as to declare fetichism to be a product of decomposition from the decay of the primitive religion; he sees in it, on the contrary, one of the principal factors in the development of the "naturistic" primitive religion, in which perhaps he may not be far wrong.

In spite, however, of all these differences in details, the scholars I have named are in the main agreed in the view they take of the beginnings of religion, and I consider their view, subject to some modifications to be afterwards stated, to be essentially correct. My convictions on the subject were published in my first work (*Geschichte der Religion*, 1868) *before* those of these scholars, who at that time had either not spoken on the question at all, or had not brought their views into the present definite form. Even Max Müller in his earlier writings, with which alone I was then acquainted, appeared

[1] Asmus: *Die Indo-Germanische Religion in den Hauptpunkten ihrer Entwicklung*, i. § 1. Compare the very pertinent remarks of E. v. Schmidt: *Die Philosophie der Mythologie*, p. 65, *sq.*, where he says that Asmus allows too much for the influence of caprice, thus depriving of all demonstrative cogency the philosophical development which he traces.

to see in primitive mythology a conscious symbolic dressing-up of purely spiritual (monotheistic) ideas. I am the more rejoiced to see that the view which from the very outset of my studies in the science of religion appeared to me to be the truest, is now shared by him and by other inquirers, the clearness of whose vision is not dimmed by the prepossession either of dogma or of positivism.

In seeking to understand the beginnings of religion, it is first of all necessary to determine what is the correct statement of the problem. The question is generally asked how men at first thought of God, what they represented to themselves under that term, what attributes they assigned to him, why these and not others? But this is to take it for granted that men from the beginning possessed the notion of "God" or of "divine" as a matter of course—from what quarter they derived it, who can tell?—and as we cannot help connecting with this notion the idea now currently associated with it (even if perhaps somewhat generalised), we are placed at the very outset face to face with an insoluble problem, viz., to explain how, God being such a being as we are accustomed to think of in connection with the term, men came to frame ideas of him and to assign predicates to him which appear to be entirely inapplicable to him. But this difficulty disappears at once when the question is properly put, as thus: How did men originally arrive at the idea of "God," "divine"? On what paths, from what germs, and through what processes was there developed in their minds an idea of those beings to whom they applied the designation of "God," "divine"? So put, the question of the origin of religion no longer refuses to take its place in the field of scientific investigation; it is possible to us to reconstruct for ourselves with a fair measure of probability that process of consciousness; only we must not expect that the ideas with which primitive man associated the name of God will correspond with what we think of under this notion. We must remember that in proportion to the distance between the whole mental position of primitive man and ours, must necessarily be the distance between his idea of God and ours.

The roots of the consciousness of God lie in the manner in which primitive man regarded nature, and the emotions with which nature affected him. The view of nature, of primitive man is not that of cultivated reason but that of childlike fancy, such as we may observe at any time in children, uncivilised men, and poets. Poets are aware that their poetic giving a soul to Nature has no actual but only a symbolical meaning, that the living, feeling, and acting beings they see into Nature are not real. But primitive man does not know this; his poetising view of nature is quite naïve, believing, firmly persuaded of the reality of the images it has formed. And this is just what distinguishes mythology from mere poetry, and makes it the root of the religious representations which are the objects of faith. The fancy of infant humanity fills the whole of nature with life, *i.e.* it regards all phenomena, and specially those which have motion, after the analogy of human or animal life (between these two, moreover, it draws no distinction), and thus sees in every occurrence the working of a conscious soul which acts from motives. It cannot understand the external world in any other way, than that it at once translates all the perceptions of the outward senses into the form of the inner experience which is immediately known to it, and thus transfers to the objects of outward experience the emotions and desires, the affections and the motives, which it knows in its own soul as the cause of external activity. In the same way it interprets objects at a distance after the analogy of the world of experience immediately surrounding it; whatever takes place in heaven, atmospheric phenomena or the movements of the heavenly bodies, it can only understand as a repetition of similar terrestrial phenomena magnified to gigantic size. It sees in the lightning at one time the darting of a gigantic fire-serpent, at another the spear or hammercast, or swordblow of a heavenly warrior concealed in the thunder-cloud. In the thunder it hears now the voice, the battle-cry, the snorting, of this warrior, again the rattling and lumbering of his chariots and horses, and again the bellowing of celestial lions or oxen. In the rushing wind it hears the howling of the dogs of a hunting-party rushing along the heavens; the passing

clouds are—according to the occupation of the men who observe them—either the milch kine or lambs on the pasture of the shepherd (sun), who takes charge of them, or the ships of the heavenly fisherman, or the fishes, dragons, swans, of the upper waters. The storm is—according as it is regarded in its fructifying or in its destructive aspect—the marriage between the life-engendering heaven and the conceiving, life-producing earth, or war between the bright and friendly heaven and the monsters of darkness, the enraged elements of the deep, the hostile giants and dragons who are seeking to storm it. The sun is at one time the shining eye of heaven, at another a hero traversing his heavenly course on a golden chariot, who daily sinks into the under world, daily to uplift himself again, who every autumn dies or wanders to a distance, and every spring rises again or at least returns home, and in all these changes of his supra-mundane life, is the pattern of the changing fortunes of the life of heroes, the prototype of all human tragedy.

These " shining living ones " (devas, asuras, as-es), about whom all the primitive myths revolve, are they real gods? Yes and no—according as we take it. They are not yet free personal forms which rule over the nature-element, and subsist and act independently of it, or who would actively interfere in human life; in their being and working they are still bound entirely to the element, they are still as indivisibly one with the natural phenomenon as to the consciousness of a child the human soul is one with its body. Hence also the forms under which they are apprehended by fancy are not yet fixed nor permanent; they are not even always represented like men, but vary between human and animal forms, and then again between the forms of dwarfs and those of giants; one easily passes into another; they change or even melt into each other, they pass away and arise anew each day or each year, as is suggested by the outward appearance of the natural phenomena in question. It accords with this that their actions do not as yet directly bear upon the affairs of men: the celestial beings follow the same occupations as men do: they hunt and fight, they make love and marry, but they do so for their own sake. They form a world by themselves, which, while it

is a mirror of the world of men, does not revolve about it, but has its centre of gravity in itself. It is for their own existence that the powers of life and light have to carry on the ever-renewed struggle against the powers of darkness and death.

Whether these nature-beings of primitive mythology deserve to be called gods in the true sense of the word, may certainly be doubted. Yet there can be no doubt that it was just out of those "shining, living ones" that the original gods of all religions took their rise. The question therefore can only be: How did the gods of religious faith and worship grow out of these nature-beings? Several factors may have contributed to this result, but the principal one must have been the practical motive of worship itself. Here, it is true, a new difficulty seems to arise: how, it may be asked, could those mere nature-powers ever become objects of worship? And it would not be easy to explain this, if by worship we meant a religious adoration of the gods in the later sense. But it may be surmised, and every indication in the study of primitive history points to this, that the first beginnings of worship, or rather the earliest forms in which primitive man placed himself in practical religious relations with the higher powers, were of an extreme simplicity, which adapted itself exactly to the primitive mythological consciousness, and yet at the same time was quite fitted to lead him beyond this lowest stage, and to furnish a transition to what could be truly called a belief in the gods.

The oldest religious usages of all were not, as is generally supposed, sacrifice and prayers, in which men bring before the heavenly ones definite wishes which they entreat them to grant; even this presupposes a more developed God-consciousness than we are entitled to assume in primitive mythology. The oldest usages were much more naïve, but at the same time, if I may say so, less selfish; acts, in fact, which imitate the doings of the higher powers, or are meant to accompany and assist these doings.[1] Thus the marriage customs of the most various peoples consist from the most ancient times of imitations of the "holy marriage" of heaven, as it was seen

[1] The credit of having drawn attention to this important and little-noticed point belongs to Schwartz (*Ursprung der Mythologie*, xvi. 10, 24, and elsewhere).

to pass by in the storm—(the German Polter-abend[1] is a distinct reminiscence of this),—and in the same way customs were in use among many peoples about the seasons of the summer and winter solstices, which represented symbolically the disappearance and the return of the deity of light and life. These observances were not originally a mere empty symbolism, but were considered to be a real participation in the fortunes of the deities, or even an active assistance to them in their struggle for existence. (Popular German customs in the "sacred twelve nights"[2] still point to this.) The spring feasts of all nations, then the celebration of the mysteries of the Greeks, and even the religious beginnings of the drama, rest entirely on these fundamental views of primitive worship, which also provide an explanation of the magic of the rudest religions; the magic for obtaining rain, for example, imitates the acts symbolically, which the rain-god is to do actually. The idea of assisting the deity by human actions not only is at the root of the Persian as well as of the German religion, it comes up again in the custom of many savages at an eclipse, to come to the aid of the threatened god with warlike noise and the shooting of arrows. When we are told of the Samoyedes that they bow to the sun every morning and every evening, and say, "When thou arisest I also arise, when thou settest I also betake myself to rest," this naïve act of worship distinctly expresses that which underlies and prompts all worship from the beginning: man desires to connect his own life with the higher life of the world-ruling power. The original meaning of sacrifice must also, it will be found, be traced to this: sacrifice was not in primitive times a bribe or a ransom, it was a common meal of man with the gods, in which the solidarity and communion of the life and endeavour of gods and man was sealed by an act of eating and drinking together; the idea of strengthening and encouraging the gods for their world-

[1] "Polter-abend" is the evening before a marriage: "poltern" is to romp, to racket; and some noisy and rough ceremonies were, and in remote parts of Germany may be still, practised on that evening. The Scotch have a similar observance called "feet-washing," in which the bridegroom is the victim, and his bachelor friends the celebrants.—TR.

[2] Compare the English "Bean-king festival."—TR.

preserving struggles against the evil powers, being by no means excluded (*cf.* the Indian Soma-offering).

If every historical indication leads us to think in this way of the earliest acts of worship, then two things are at once made clear, first, that there could not enter into them any conscious moral motives, such as the stirrings of conscience and the need to quiet them, the strengthening of the moral personality, or aspiration to moral ideals. Such ideas as these are obviously quite out of place in connection with the nature-gods, no less than the nature-men. But no less erroneous is it to seek the origin of religion purely in egoistic eudæmonism, which regards and makes use of the divine only as a means for obtaining the satisfaction of selfish wishes. In fetichistic magic indeed this is certainly the case; but we now know that this was by no means the primary form of religion, and we shall yet see that it is to be explained from the decay of religion. Any one who grants this position is guilty of a manifest inconsistency if he still looks for the root of religion in pure egoism. And on such a presupposition it would be difficult to explain how the "moralisation of the religious relation" could ever have taken place; morality could not develop itself out of immorality. In all "development" that which is to come out at the end must be present in some shape, however imperfectly, even in the germ; a development which finally results in the very opposite of the beginning, would require a miracle to explain it. He who places the beginning of religion in pure egoism must, to be consistent, make its development consist simply in a refinement of egoism. If we will not and cannot do this because we see that the value and the dignity of religion are entirely destroyed by such a view of it, then we must seek to interpret its beginning too as a manifestation, not of the irrational in man, but of his reason. And for this end it is by no means necessary to idealise the primitive simplicity; all that is necessary is not to caricature it, to allow it to continue, and to seek to comprehend it, as it originally was.

The beginning of religion is to be sought not in moral, nor yet in immoral motives, but simply in religious motives, *i.e.* in a mood

of the human temperament which, though naïve, yet contains the essence of those feelings which go to make up the piety of a more developed God-consciousness. If the common kernel of religion in all its forms is that *reference of man's life to the world-governing power which seeks to grow into a living union with it*, this is actually present at the very lowest stage of the primitive mythical consciousness. True, the object of the religious relation is not spirit as definitely other than the world of sense or of nature; the object is the living nature-power itself in the totality of the appearance it presents to man; but as little is it a mere thing of sense, a material phenomenon in our sense of the word; to the primitive, mythical consciousness and its religious acts, the natural phenomenon is an animated, feeling, and acting being, of essentially the same nature as primitive man feels himself to be, only with superior power. But even its power is by no means reckoned as yet as an unconditioned, "absolute," almighty power: inasmuch as it still coincides with the natural phenomenon, it is subject to all the limitations of the latter; it is opposed and resisted by those powers, hostile to life, against which the powers of life have to keep up a constantly renewed struggle for their existence, and, what is implied in it, the continuance of the world. But for all this, primitive man sees in the heavenly beings, the bright and living ones, the higher powers by which his world, however narrow its limits be, is governed and disposed, the superior power against which no human power can ever measure itself, against which he cannot do anything, but only with it; and hence he feels towards it that anxious *awe* which the powerless naturally feels in the presence of superior power. But with this there is connected from the first the feeling of *confidence* in the ruling power, from which, as his eyes show him, every good and beneficent gift comes to him; rain and sunshine, the growth and fruitfulness of his fields and of his herds. The more afraid he was during the night of invisible enemies, the more gladly does he greet, when the light of day dawns, the faithful friend and guardian who drives away from him the evil shapes of darkness. If in winter he suffered from frost and from want, and all the life of the world

seemed to have become the prey of death, he sees in the reawakening nature of spring the return of the life-preserving deity from his distant wanderings, his resurrection from the bonds of death, his victorious emergence from a hard battle, in which he has happily overcome his enemies and the enemies of man, and has secured once more the continuance of the world. Then come the storms and make him tremble at the raging forces of the elements, or at the demons, giants, and titans, who pile up their cloud-castles against the sky, as if they wanted to storm the heavens and destroy the earth; he sees the weapons of the heavenly warriors flashing, and hears in the thunder their cry of battle. Then he sees the dark army of the clouds dissolve, there streams from it the fruitful rain which the dark power had caught and held enchained, the bright heaven grows clear again, the bright and living powers have victoriously held the field against the destructive powers of darkness and death. How should he not trust these beneficent powers, which fight for him and for his world, as well as for their own, and whose victorious rule assures his life and well-being too; how should he not trust in them in all things? If his welfare is so inseparably connected with their rule as each new day shows it to be, how should he not seek protection with them, and ally himself with them in a mutual league of friendship and helpfulness, and so recognise the will of his guardian and master as the ruling power of his life and action? Thus with his awe of the higher powers and his trust in them there comes to be associated a feeling which is at least nearly allied to *love*, even though we cannot speak of love in its proper sense here; I mean the *longing for communion* with the beneficent powers, which is quite natural even to primitive man, the feeling of protection, and so of happiness in this communion, out of which there at once arises a shrinking from everything that might give offence to the divine powers, or hurt them, and thus disturb and bring to an end the communion he enjoys with them. Then comes a feeling of trouble and anxiety when any such interruption has taken place, and the peaceful and friendly league with the ruling powers is broken up; then the earnest endeavour to make the interruption good again, to

restore the normal friendly relation, or to propitiate the offended ones; in a word, there appears even here a *feeling of obligation* to the divine powers, which we can compare with no other human feeling so readily as with the *piety* of children to their parents, of a people to its leader and protector in war and peace, of the individual to his people or his country.

Must these relations of piety, because they are the source of the highest satisfaction to the child and to the citizen, be derived from egoistic eudæmonism? Or is not rather the feeling of piety the original root of all sacred moral obligation, the revelation placed in our nature of that divine impulse of reason, which leads us beyond the limits of selfishness, and makes us feel our subordination to a higher whole, our subjection to a reasonable divine order? And if this is so in the case of the feeling of piety towards man, the same will be true of the religious feeling of piety too, and that, as I have shown, from its very beginning. The very combination of fear, confidence, and love, of which the child's feeling of piety is composed, enters into the corresponding religious feeling too, and is the original motive of religious action. The latter then cannot be traced to egoistic eudæmonism any more than the exhibition of childlike or patriotic piety can justly be called egoism. In the one case as much as in the other it is reason which manifests itself in the form of an affection, and in this way becomes a power to get the better of the irrational selfish affections. In the social relations of piety, however, it is in each case one particular element only of the rational order which passes into the working affection of love of family, love of country, etc.; but in religion it is reason simply, the all-embracing, world-ordering reason of God as such that takes possession of the human heart, and in the affection of religious piety becomes the most powerful motive of the human breast, a living power which moves the world. This taking reason to the heart, this coming of the heart to reason, we may call it the incarnation of the divine reason in the human heart, this is really the secret of religion. And hence it is equally an error to think of religion as on the one hand a mere matter of reason without the heart, as if it consisted merely

in truths which the head thinks—if they were no more than this they could never come to be real acting forces in human life—and on the other hand to attend merely to the heart and its feelings, affections, and moods, as if these simply as such, irrespective of any reasonable ground and contents, were of any value, or could produce any wholesome effect on the world; for affections without reason can only be selfishly perverted and mischievous. The truth of the matter lies just in the *becoming one* of the two sides; on the one side reason, namely that objective divine reason which forms the ruling law of the world, becomes in man the pathos of the heart and a living power, and on the other side man's heart, defiant and timid as it is by nature, is united with the reason of the divine world-order, and thereby made truly reasonable in all its feeling and willing. This is the idea, the end of religion, which it is true only becomes revealed and perfectly actual at the highest point of religion, but is present from the first in its development (as an "entelechy"), and finds expression even under the veil of the most imperfect and naïve forms of consciousness, in the feeling of piety towards the world-governing power. Hence we are perfectly entitled to see in the beginning of religion a divine revelation, not an immediate one, but one mediated partly by the reasoned order of the natural world, partly by the reasonable constitution of the human soul, these two being so suited to each other that by the impressions awakened by the former the latter is moved to see "in the works of the creation the eternal power and Godhead of the Creator," as Paul says, Rom. i. 20.

In these practical motives of worship on the one side, and in the development of the intellect on the other side, we may seek the two principal levers of the progress of the God-consciousness beyond the primitive mythical stage of naturism. When man enters into a relation to the heavenly powers, which awakens in him similar feelings to those which he feels towards parents, patriarchs or kings, he involuntarily accustoms himself to represent the higher powers to himself chiefly under these forms which are borrowed from the moral

relations of human life, and in this way the anthropomorphic form of the divine beings comes to preponderate permanently over the zoomorphic form (which formerly alternated with it, and often, it may be, had the upper hand of it). The zoomorphic form then becomes a standing attribute of the god, with whom formerly it was identified (the eagle, the swan, the bull, of the heaven-god : the owl of the storm-god Athene, the serpent and the wolf of the light-god Apollo, etc.). And when once man has recognised in the beneficent heavenly beings the guardians in whom he may put his trust, he will then, impelled by the necessities of earth, turn to them seeking help even at times when they are not immediately visible or in other ways sensibly present : in case of need will call upon the sun, if once he has taken it for his patron, even by night, on the cloud-god when the sky is clear, on the storm-god when the air is still. And if he calls upon these powers, he must necessarily presuppose that they hear him, and that, though to visible appearance absent, they are yet invisibly present and ready to help. But this assumption once made, the distinction is already drawn between the supersensuous god of worship, and the sensuous phenomenon on which, in the mystic mode of regarding nature, the idea of God and of a relation to him was based. Thus it was *cultus* which, by force of the constant need of the continuous presence of the gods, raised the idea entertained of them above the change and fortuitousness of the sense-phenomenon, and exalted them to the permanent, free, individual existence of supersensuous subjects ; which in fact produced out of the deified elements the divine lords of the elements.

But preparations were made for this step from another side as well. Primitive man represents the external world to himself entirely after his own image. As long as he has not learned to distinguish between body and soul in himself, he cannot make the distinction in the "living beings" of nature. But as soon as he begins to gain some power of reflection he must necessarily be led to draw this distinction in man. Two observations of experience lead him to do this, as his reflection strives to explain them, and these two meet and assist each other, and so issue in a primitive *psychological theory*

which in its turn exercises a modifying influence on his mythology of nature. The first of these is his observation of the *death* of men and animals. The life escapes when the warm breath is breathed out: therefore, primitive man argues, the life which has deserted the dead was the breath, or the fire, or the fiery vapour that dwelt in the living, in his blood, because when it flows out the life flows away too. But where does this vapour-like essence, this soul, go to, when it deserts the dying? To this question outward appearance gave no answer; the question itself presupposes a certain degree of abstract reflection, and the answer could only come from a synthetic reflection which we cannot suppose to have belonged to the most primitive human consciousness. It is therefore a perversion to make the "belief in souls" the starting-point of religion, as the euhemerists propose: this belief marks a second stage of consciousness which only became possible with the advance of reflection; it marks the transition from primitive mythical naturism to the polytheism of developed mythology.

The question, what becomes of the soul when it escapes from the dying man? received a partial answer from another kind of observations, namely, from the phenomena of *dreams* and other allied states of unconscious mental life (ravings of fever, hallucinations, etc.) To us it appears plain enough that the experiences met with in dreams are the figments of fancy working unconsciously, and quite without objective reality, but this primitive man could not be expected to understand. What he experiences, sees, and hears in dreams he takes to be as real as the things perceived by the waking senses. If in his dream he was wafted through distant regions, he believes that he was really there; but when he reflects on the fact that his body did not leave the house during the night, or that he could not in the short space of a few hours have traversed such great distances with his own limbs, he comes to the conclusion, that it was only his soul which left his body during sleep, and made such a distant journey, not that it only did so in thought—it really and actually changed its place, and if the speed of its motion was uncommonly great, that was because the soul was not furnished with the coarse

material limbs of the body, but with more refined ones, more suited to its airy nature. But if it is possible for the soul of the living to leave for a time its sleeping body, and to travel about in the world alone by itself, then the inference is not remote that the same thing may take place with the souls of the departed, only that in this case existence and motion without the body, which in the case of the souls of sleeping persons is an episodical exception from the rule, has become the permanent state. And this conclusion appears to be confirmed in a visible manner by what is seen in dreams: if a man sees and hears departed persons in his dream, as if they were bodily before him, then these persons—we are thinking according to the psychology of primitive man—must really have been there; and as their bodies are destroyed or lying in their graves, it must have been the soul of the departed which at death left his body, and is now moving freely about, until it find perhaps a new body to inhabit.

Thus there arose from synthetic reflection on the experiences connected with death and dreams, the primitive theory of souls or *belief in spirits*, which certainly exerted a far-reaching influence on the formation of the religious consciousness, though it is not to be regarded as either the source or the primary form of it. When once the distinction between body and soul had been learned in the case of man, and the idea had thus been reached of independent spirit, separated from the coarse material body, but at the same time far from being conceived as purely spiritual, the next inevitable consequence was, that a similar distinction began to be drawn with regard to animated natural objects, so that here also the living acting subject was separated as an invisible spirit from its visible element,—an advance of consciousness which, as we saw above, was also demanded by the practical need of worship. We thus meet at the very threshold of religious development, an instructive example of the phenomenon which recurs again and again in this field of study, and which the student of religions cannot consider too much, that in the processes which go to form the religious consciousness, practical and theoretical, emotional and reflective elements co-operate and sup-

plement each other in such a way that it is often hard to say which is the more important of the two.

When the primitive mythical consciousness of man thus rose from the view of nature as living, to the idea of the spirit-world of the spirits of ancestors and of nature, above and behind the world of the senses, it entered upon that movement in the history of religion which, following the national peculiarities of various peoples, led in the case of some to a systematised and ethicised *Polytheism*, with others to a *Spiritism* destitute of system and of ideas, and with some to *Henotheism*. This threefold development, on paths that set out originally from a common centre, and at first frequently cross and recross each other, but then diverge more and more, to lead at last to such different results that it scarcely seems possible that they all had a common origin, contains the great problem of the history of religion —the key is to be found here.[1] What made it possible that the development should strike out different paths from this point, was that when the spirits were separated from the nature-element, they might either assume a new and higher, namely, a moral character, or might lose all definite character whatsoever, and fade away to shadows and nothings, the sport of subjective caprice. Which of these possibilities should be fulfilled, depended on the individual natural disposition of the different races, but more especially on the nature of the moral and social relations prevailing in each case. Where a people rose to civic order and humane manners, the conditions were present for the transformation of its spirits, when detached from nature, into higher supernatural, moral and spiritual, beings; for as man grows with his higher ends, his God grows with him. In the case of those tribes, on the contrary, which did not enter on the path of civilisation, the ideal ends of life were wanting to which the higher powers might attach themselves, and so become ethical and

[1] The third of the above-named forms of development is not discussed in this connection, as we have to discuss it more fully in the chapter after next, when dealing with the Semitic religion. I call it "Henotheism," using the word in a different sense from that of M. Müller and von Hartmann, to denote that national or relative monotheism which in the case of Israel was the porch to pure monotheism.

ideal beings; and it was therefore quite natural that they should lose by degrees all practical importance, and be extruded by the throng of lower nameless spirits which, wanting alike all definite character, all steadfast purpose, and all reasonable meaning, represent nothing but the arbitrary will and the arbitrary power to help or injure—symbols and ministers at once of the capricious egoistical will of these tribes, who, though they have emerged from the simplicity of the natural state, have not entered on the disciplinary process of civilisation; *i.e.* the degenerate tribes of savages. Thus the development of religion, the question whether its course is to lead upwards or downwards, depends from the first on the attitude taken up towards the moral potencies of life.

It would certainly be a very one-sided view to recognise in the mythological process which led to developed polytheism, nothing but pure progress; the development had two sides, neither of which must be neglected. We will set out, however, from that side which presents itself as the *progress* of polytheism beyond the primitive mythical religion of nature. The anthropomorphification of the divine nature-powers obviously presented the great advantage that *the personal gods were brought into relation to the moral life of man, and the relation to them thus changed into a moral one.* Their will and action is not now, as at first, identical with the operations of nature, but derives a higher character and aim from their connection with the interests of human society; instead of mere nature-powers the gods are now changed into representatives of the various branches of social custom and order. The all-overtopping heavenly spirit, whose nature was seen originally in the light or in the atmospheric phenomena of heaven, now becomes the prototype of paternal and princely dignity, the supreme judge and ruler of the world, and the patron of all human authority; the earth-goddess associated with him becomes the patroness of married women, of their rights and functions; the light and sun-god who conquers the demons of darkness, becomes the source of illumination, revelation, religious atonement, and poetic inspiration; the heaven-clearing goddess of the thunderstorm (Pallas) becomes the subduer of all rudeness and

the teacher of art and science. Thus in the more developed mythologies, especially of the Indo-Germanic peoples, there appears everywhere by the side of the natural meaning of the mythic gods, or even in part in place of that meaning, the cognate spiritual meaning of them, having reference to the social life of civilisation.

This ennobling of the God-consciousness was naturally followed by a corresponding growth of the moral side of the practical religious relation. The gods being once regarded as guardians of the laws and customs, every transgression of these is also a transgression of the divine will, of the sacred order instituted by the deity. Thus every moral wrong becomes at the same time a religious crime, which the gods cannot leave unavenged, a piece of guilt on which, if it is not made good or atoned for, divine punishments must be expected to descend. The service of God thus assumes a new and a profounder character. It consisted at first of a perfectly naïve forming and frequenting of association with the gods, and of the possibility or the permissibility of this, primitive man never thought of having any doubt. Now, however, a feeling appears, that the subsistence of the normal relation to the gods, and the keeping up of friendly relations with them, is dependent on the fulfilment of obligations towards them, that accordingly, where the divine displeasure is aroused by the fault of man, the fault must first of all be made good, atoned for, and a peaceful understanding thus restored. Hence the ideas and customs of *expiation* which from this point forward not only formed the central point of all worship, but were of the highest importance for the moral life of the peoples. The "*guilt*" to be avoided or atoned for may have been at first by no means a purely moral thing; the notion no doubt embraced mistakes or omissions in the ceremonies of worship, yet moral considerations of the most far-reaching scope must always have been included in it. Indeed the notion of obligation, liability, or indebtedness, with which that of guilt is connected, is the fundamental moral notion in which all legal and moral ideas have their root, and the very fact of the existence of the feeling of religious obligation to the gods, irrespective of the subject-matter of it, must have exercised an educating influence in forming the sense

of duty in social relations. And as these relations were placed under the protection of the deity, and regarded as proceeding from the will of the deity, it necessarily followed that violations of moral duty came to be regarded from the religious point of view as guilt to be atoned for, drawing after it the displeasure and punishment of the gods. Perjury, especially, and the shedding of the blood of relatives, and violation of the rights of hospitality, and generally of all relations of piety, were universally regarded in this way; and here we may see a confirmation of what was said above as to the close connection of the religions with the moral obligations of piety. Thus, as the gods put on the likeness of men, a fruitful interaction is set up between religion and morality: the religious consciousness concerns itself with moral duties, the moral consciousness finds itself founded on religion.

Here there was progress; but there is another side of this matter, for the gods when made men receive a share of human weaknesses and frailties. In proportion as the relation of man to the gods becomes more intimate and more dramatic, the superhuman exaltation of the latter disappears: instead of lifting himself up to them, man draws them down to himself; he considers that "God is such a one as himself," imputes to him human weaknesses and passions, regards him as capricious and despotic, revengeful and jealous, punctilious about honours to be paid to him in the way of ceremonial acts, and capable of being bribed by gifts and flattery, as is the way with the great ones of the earth. In these ways there came into worship, which originally was quite simple, a multitude of formalities and usages, which soon came to be regarded as indispensable conditions of pleasing the gods and winning their favour, and the violation of which was held to be as serious a transgression as, if not a more serious one than, the violation of social customs and rights. But the more complicated the usages of worship grew, the more need was there of special persons to attend to them, and thus a priesthood was formed which naturally found it in accordance with its professional interest to add to the number and the troublesomeness of religious obligations so as to establish their own position as the sole

administrators of the religious relation. Then it might easily come about, that these mediators and interpreters of the deity grew imperceptibly in the eyes of the people into types of the gods themselves, and that then the specific shortcomings of a priestly caste, greedy of goods, of honour, and of rule, were attributed to the gods themselves, the types of whom these ministers claimed to be. This may explain many a repulsive trait in the stories of the gods, and in the worship, of various religions.

The influences which thus introduce impurities into the polytheistic religions, lie in the very nature of anthropomorphism; but the poetic elaboration of mythology also operates in the same direction. Though in later times the plaything of poetic caprice, mythology was at first a perfectly natural product of development from the original mythic roots of polytheism. Even after the gods were made human, their original natural significance could never be quite forgotten, and yet the elemental nature and activity of the old nature-gods was quite out of keeping with the human ideal forms. But poetic fancy was equal to the occasion. First of all it transferred the natural doing and suffering, which was a constant element of the existence of the old gods, to a distant past, and made it into a history of what had once befallen gods and the sons of gods. It then divided the different attributes and modes of appearance of one and the same nature-god, among a number of different persons, who then appeared the more readily as independent gods and demigods, as their worship was different in one tribe and district from what it was in another. And finally this local reference of the different groups of legends and the different worships, served as a starting-point to connect the ideal history of the gods with reminiscences and legends of actual human persons and events of past times. In the legends of heroes especially, divine myths and historical legends are often inextricably blended. In this way there gradually arose out of the homely primitive myths, these childish poetic descriptions of the general and ever-recurring processes of nature, the whole rich cycle of epic legends of the long past deeds and sufferings, battles and amours of such and such gods and sons of gods. But when once the

old god-myth had become the subject of epic poetry, and then of popular legend, it is easy to understand that its growth proceeded not according to considerations derived from religion and morals, but under a purely æsthetic impulse. The epic singers did not ask what was worthy of the god or profitable for the manners of the people, they dealt with the many-coloured and plastic materials of the legends with the greatest freedom, their principle being that what will please is true. And all the time perhaps they were convinced that they were faithfully following the footsteps of tradition, and that all they were doing was to piece together the fragments of it, and explain it by their narratives. If, for example, the wife of the heaven-god had in one local legend the name of Hera, in another that of Dione, or Io, or Leda, or Danae, or Europa, the epic singer considered that nothing could be more natural than that the other names should stand for the rivals of the queen of heaven, and that the heaven-father had thus had a number of different amours, which the poet was at liberty to turn into amusing stories. Thus from the innocent myth, so full of meaning, of the bridal relation of the earth (which appears under every one of these names) to the life-awakening heaven, there arose in the hands of the poets those light stories of intrigue which suit so ill the "Father of gods and men," the guardian of law and of morality. What was in the primitive myth the natural force of heaven, a thing with which morality has nothing whatever to do, now became on the one side the immoral subject of burlesque legends, and on the other side, at the same time, the morally exalted ideal figure of the personal supporter of the moral world-order. From this example alone we may see very clearly the double aspect of the mythological development, how, compared with the naïve primitive myth, it was both a progress and a retrogression, both gain and loss. But when we consider that the mythological stories of the gods can scarcely have exercised any direct influence on practical religion, while the positive and valuable belief given in the ideal god-consciousness furnished rich nourishment to the heart as well as to thought, and became a powerful instrument of civilisation, we shall not hesitate to acknowledge that

ethicised polytheism with all its faults was a distinct advance upon the primitive religion of naturism.

The opposite of this is true of that religion which is usually spoken of as *Spiritism* or *Animism*, and is also still called fetichism, though this is a misapplication of the term, fetichism not being a particular form of religion, but simply a primitive kind of image-worship. We have already shown from psychological and historical considerations how untenable the widely-spread opinion is, that spiritism or the belief in spirits is the original religion. What remains is merely to add to this demonstration, a positive explanation of the origin of that belief. This has indeed been given in the preceding discussion, and we have merely to collect the conclusions already arrived at.

It was remarked above that in many savage tribes we encounter not vague traces merely, but distinct reminiscences of an older religious stage, in which the heaven-gods occupied the first place in the minds and in the worship of these tribes, a place from which they were afterwards driven out by the lower spirits. This is a fact which will not be denied, as many now seek to deny it, but requires to be explained. It is impossible to explain it if spiritism and fetichism are held to be original; and if pure monotheism be taken to be original, the explanation is at least extremely difficult. But on the view taken above of primitive religion, it admits of an easy explanation, and it serves fully to confirm that view. We saw that the original objects of the religious consciousness were those "shining, burning ones" of the phenomena of heaven, in which the sense-phenomenon and the supersensuous soul were not yet distinguished. Then we saw that this distinction was both demanded by the practical need of the constant presence of the objects of worship, and prepared in thought by reflection on the phenomena of death and dreams, which led to the idea of an independent soul without any body. When man transferred this distinction to animated natural objects, the representation arose of a countless number of the spirits of ancestors and of nature, which we see come to the

front in every land at a certain stage of culture. In the polytheistic religions the humanised spirits of the lofty nature-powers,—heaven, the sun, the thundercloud, etc.,—remained at the head of the army of spirits, and in full possession of the world-ruling power and authority at first attributed to them ; only in the manner in which they wielded this power did they now assume a more ideal character than in the primitive age. In the spiritist religions, on the contrary, those exalted spirits of the heavenly powers lose more and more entirely their practical importance, and are thrust into the background by the nameless lower spirits which flit about near man without his seeing them, and are destitute of any definite character, any consistent end of existence, any *raison d'être*, and retain one divine attribute only, that of power that works mysteriously. Whence this difference, that in the first case the exalted spirits keep the government in their hands, and are conceived always higher, more ideal, more rational and moral, while in the second case they have to leave the field to the lower irrational demons ? This is the question which the student of the spiritistic religion must seek to answer.

But when the question is put with precision, the answer is half given. To me at least it seems to be beyond doubt that the difference in the religious development was due to a *difference in the development of civilisation.* In cases where no orderly state was formed, in which law and justice could become to the savage tribe the general ruling power of social life, it is easy to understand how the world-ordering power of the high gods might also more and more disappear. Where no universal ideal goods were presented to the mind in the objective ends of the state and of civilisation, where in such a case could the heavenly spirits, separated as they were from their natural element, get the new morally exalted nature, which should replace the material exaltation they had before, and so secure the continuance of their predominance and rule ? Where the tribes, instead of entering on the humanising, restraining, and uniting discipline and work of civilisation, became decomposed into their selfish atoms, it could not happen otherwise than that those selfish individuals and families tore themselves away from the higher gods who were common to

all (to the whole community of the people), and chose their own separate gods out of the swarm of the surrounding spirit-world—spirits whose power, exercised without any rule or reason, corresponded entirely to the lawless and capricious will of selfish and degenerate men. A perfectly distinct reminiscence of this process is preserved among the Zulu negroes, who originally worshipped the heaven-spirit[1] as the "great father" (Unkulunkulu), but at a later time had degraded this common tribe-god below the separate lower spirits. This they explain by saying: "There was no going back to the beginning, for people increased and were scattered abroad, and each house had its own connections; there was no one who said: For my part I am of the house of Unkulunkulu."[2]

Thus the law which explains the spiritistic religion of uncivilised savages is one which frequently appears in the history of civilisation, viz., that *religious decay is a consequence of moral decay; as society is broken up into separate individual wills, the belief in God too is broken up into superstitious belief in individual spirits.*

And if we have thus laid our finger on the ultimate reason of this process of depravation—for such a process we undoubtedly have before us here—and seen it to be traceable to practical considerations, the theoretical steps of the process may also be discerned with no great trouble. The process naturally is not to be conceived in such a way as if the savages had passed a resolution some fine morning to depose the upper gods, and to worship the spirits in their stead. In religious transitions even more than in other spheres, change takes place step by step, through various intermediate changes. Only by degrees could the spirits out-top the original gods. At first they were merely *mediators* between the gods and men, mediators endowed with the powers of the gods to manage the affairs of the earth, and therefore standing nearer to the interests and thoughts of men, as the officials of a government stand nearer to the people, and are

[1] The euhemerist interpretation of Unkulunkulu as the spirit of an ancestor is as perverted here as in the case of the Polynesian Taaroa or the negro god Niongmo, or the "great spirit" of the Redskins, all of which signify beyond doubt the heaven-spirit.

[2] Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, ii. 313.

better understood by the people than the government itself. Thus the spirits in the first place answered the natural craving for more immediate and constant intercourse with the guardian powers. But in this relation of mediatorship held by the spirits lay the great temptation to which the religious consciousness, if devoid of the proper moral foundation, was too likely to succumb. The process was analogous to what takes place in civil life: liberties which would never be ventured upon with the highest authority, the mob in rough times is easily led to take with the minor officials: attempts are made to bend them to the will of their subjects by bribes and threats, and other arts. So it was with savages: the respect and piety which had been felt in primitive times for the higher gods, disappeared more and more as their place gradually came to be taken in an increasing degree by beings who answered more readily to the wants of ordinary life. The nameless spirits, at first their intermediates and subordinate messengers, ended by supplanting them, and one of these limited another, kept him in check, would even conquer and depose him. The power of these little lords was so split up, so limited, so fortuitous, so changeable, that men readily came to think they could get it into their own hands and force it into the service of their own fortuitous, individual, selfish, limited wills; the only question was, what were the proper means by which to get at the mediators of the deity, and to bind their power. He who believed that he knew these means, or at least pretended that he knew them, was master, to the eyes of the multitude, of the mysterious forces of the spirit-world. Thus *magic* arose which then drove out the worship of the gods in proportion as the spirits supplanted the gods in the belief of the multitude.

And finally it is easy to understand how *fetich worship* came everywhere to be connected with this belief in spirits, and this magic. The most effective means to contend with spiritual forces naturally appeared to be to shut up the spirits themselves in any sort of tangible and portable dwelling, so as to have them always at hand. For such a habitation any material object in man's immediate surroundings would serve, which possessed any striking quality to

show it to be related to the mysterious magic power of the spirit, or —as we from our standpoint must express it—which by some association of ideas it suggested in the mind of the beholder, became to him a symbol of the magical operation of the spirit. Fetiches are nothing but the rudest form of images connected with worship, things which appear to be representative symbols of supersensuous beings, and to stand in a mysterious connection with them, or to be their habitation, and so become media or vehicles of supersensuous powers, or *means of magic.* Fetichism is thus primitive image-worship, but to regard it as the primitive religion is entirely a mistake, for neither have images ever been identical with the gods, nor was the worship of the gods practised from the first in the form of image-worship. What need could there be of artificial images in the primitive mythical religion of nature, when the gods themselves were still seen bodily living and moving, working and ruling, in the phenomena of nature? Only at a later stage, when they came to be regarded as supersensuous beings separated from the phenomenon, and relegated to a position beyond it, could the need in any way arise to give them a form for the senses in an artificial image, and so fill up or bridge over the gap once more, which had not existed from the first, but had been created by reflection, as it separated between the world of bodies and the world of spirits, this world and the world beyond. Spiritism and fetichism are thus nothing but *degenerate forms of a primitive belief in mediators and means,* which in the case of peoples without culture, and fallen into moral savagery, had overgrown and stifled the belief in God.

CHAPTER II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE INDO-GERMANIC RACE.

THE earliest monument we possess of the Indo-Germanic religion is, as is well known, the Indian Vedas, that part of them especially which contains the songs and prayers of the heroic age of the Indians in the first century of their occupation of the Punjab. True, that primitive religion is not preserved here unchanged, which was the common possession of the Indo-Germans in their earliest home in central Asia; ideas which originally were prominent have retired into the background, and new ideas have acquired prominence; yet the Vedas still contain so much of what was common to the Aryans, that we may regard the *Vedic religion* (under this title we refer to the religion of the earliest age of the Indians, before the development of Brahmanism) as the nearest and most faithful picture of the common Indo-Germanic religion of primitive times.[1]

The heaven-god *Dyaus*, who is common to the Indo-Germans, is

[1] For the Literature connected with the Indian religion see Tiele's *Outlines of the History of Religions*, English translation, pp. 105, 110-112, 130. I add: Max Müller, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion, as illustrated by the Religions of India* (Hibbert Lectures, 1878). Wurm, *Geschichte der indischen Religion*. Barth, *The Religions of India*, authorised translation, by Rev. J. Wood, London, 1882; a particularly instructive book. On Brahmanism: P. Deussen, *das System des Vedanta*, Leipzig, 1883. And on Buddhism: H. Oldenberg, *Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde:* Berlin, 1881. [The bibliography of the last few years may be found (in selection) in *Chantepie de la Saussaye's Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 1887, p. 346, and heads of following sections. This work contains a condensed view of the Phenomenology of Religion, pp. 48-166. Vol. i. contains descriptions of the religions of China, Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria, and India. Vol. ii. has not yet appeared.—TR.]

often named as father, along with the earth (Prithivi) as mother, of the other gods, but in worship this pair, originally supreme, have retreated behind the more personal gods, because they did not so readily adapt themselves to anthropomorphical treatment. Their place was taken at first by two other forms of the heaven-god, the one certainly primitive, the second younger and specifically Indian. Far the most exalted form of the Indian Pantheon is *Varuna*, identical with the Greek Ouranos, and thereby shown to be of Indo-Germanic origin. He is the god of the wide bright heaven which embraces all, and is the primal source of all life, the prototype of all rule and order; the sun is his eye, heaven his garment, the storm his breath. He has founded the heavens and the earth on foundations which cannot be shaken, has assigned to the stars their places, to the sun its path, to the rivers their courses; he upholds everything in its proper state, he is the author and upholder of the world-order (rita), which in the Vedas is principally connected with his name. And as things in heaven and things on earth move in accordance with his inviolable laws, he also maintains the moral order of human life; with an all-seeing eye which never sleeps, he watches the conduct of men, decrees against the godless punishments which are like fetters they cannot escape from, but to penitent sinners he is gracious, and he forgives the contrite suppliant. Earnest penitential prayers, breathing a spirit of childlike piety, to Varuna, the omniscient defender of the world-order, are found among the oldest Vedic hymns.[1] The other light-gods too, as especially *Mitra*, the friend and constant companion of Varuna, the dawn *Usha*, *Aditi*, probably at first twilight, then generalised to infinity; also the sun-gods, *Surja*, *Savitri*, and *Pushan*, share with Varuna the character of exalted purity, of administrative power and all-seeing wisdom, in which accordingly we may see the characteristic traits of the earliest Indo-Germanic God-consciousness, while the peculiar mixture of beneficent and baneful attributes which characterises the Semitic sun-gods is quite foreign to the Aryan light-gods.

Of another and a ruder stamp is the representation of *Indra*, the

[1] *Rigveda*, vii. 86-89.

god of the stormy sky, who stands at the head of the gods worshipped in the Vedic religion in the same way, and doubtless for the same historical reasons, as Wodan or Odin with the Germans. With the latter the wind-god Vayu or Vata, who is met with in the Vedas as the companion-in-arms of Indra, becomes the god of the stormy sky and of battle. The Indians advancing victoriously in the valley of the Indus, like the Germans advancing through Europe, felt the need of something more than the god of the quiet unchangeable heaven, and sought to see in heaven the likeness of the impetuous hero; or rather they desired to worship the heavenly warrior whom they in fact already saw in the storm, as their supreme guardian and patron. "I will sing the victories of Indra, which the god won with his spear (lightning)"—such is the motto of the warlike singers in the valley of the Indus. Rough, like the god, was also the manner in which he was worshipped; he is compared with a raging bull, he is invited to strengthen himself at the sacrificial feast, and to make himself drunk with the Soma-draught, so that he may the more bravely conquer his enemies, and the more liberally enrich his friends. Complaints are also made quite frankly of his laziness and of the scantiness of the blessings he sends, but then the singer casts himself, once more, full of confidence, on the heart of Indra, his friend, brother, and father.[1] It is the religion, not to be called exactly deep and pure, but in its essence sound, of a warlike, pastoral people, which has taken form in the worship of Indra.

Next to Indra the most prominent god of the worship of the Vedas is *Agni*, the fire-god, who was born, the oldest of the gods in the heavenly dwelling, at the upper primal waters, and is born ever anew from the wood that is rubbed on the altar of sacrifice; who comes down in the lightning as the messenger of the gods, and is the first of the house who presents to the gods their gifts in the sacrificial fire, and by the ascending smoke invites them to partake of the sacrifice. As lord and mediator of the sacrifice, he attracts to his own person all those mystic speculations which, from the earliest times among the Indians, were connected with sacrifice: he is the

[1] Comp. *e.g. Rigveda*, iv. 16-32.

typical heavenly priest, who in the storm uses the incantation of the thunder, and performs the sacrifice which preserves the world, but who also called forth in a cosmogonic primitive sacrifice all the life of the world and of the gods. He is finally the all-vivifying soul of the world, which penetrates all beings, and everywhere engenders growth and fertility. With these mystic-pantheistic representations of Agni as the priestly mediator between gods and men, and the divine world-soul above both alike, is most intimately connected the theory of the *Soma*, which in the first instance was nothing but a fermenting plant juice. Afterwards it was used as a libation, but it was then transferred to heaven as a god-strengthening nectar, identified with the fructifying water of the clouds, and finally it widened out again into a universal life-energy, which, like the fire-energy of Agni and along with it, produced and sustains heaven and earth, gods and men. But this does not prevent both of them, Agni and Soma, from being subordinated, as auxiliary spirits, to the storm-god Indra, and his companions, the wind-god Vata, and the rain-god Parjanya.

The circumstance that now one and now another of these gods is represented as the highest, to whom all the rest are subject, is a salient peculiarity of the Vedic religion. It is not sufficiently explained either by the tendency of singers to flatter the object of the hymn in hand, by exalting his glory to the utmost, or by the difference between various epochs of civilisation. Indeed we must recognise here a monotheistic trait, the endeavour, still very primitive, and uncertainly feeling its way now with this god and now with another, to give polytheism a monarchical apex. The same tendency to pass from multiplicity to unity, is also the reason of the identification of one god with another or with several others, which is frequently met with; there is scarcely any god of the Vedas who escapes this fusion; but specially of Agni it is frequently said in so many words, that he is all the gods; and in a later portion of the Vedas (Atharva-Veda), this is explained to mean that the other gods represent the various forms in which Agni appears during the course of the day. Here we see distinctly the openings of the two ways, which in Greece

also led beyond polytheism; the monarchical exaltation of one god to be the ruling head over all the rest, and the pantheistic resolving of them all into forms of appearance, or names, of one impersonal world-principle. Each of these two ways is found to have been followed out in India.

Visvakarman, i.e. "Creator of all things," and *Pragapati, i.e.* "Lord of the Creatures," were originally surnames of older gods, especially of the sun-god Savitri, and also of Varuna and Indra. Now it often happens in mythology that attributes are taken from their original wearer and personified into separate subjects, and this was what happened with these two: the very circumstance that these new names denoted abstract notions in distinction from the old nature-deities, made them specially suitable to introduce the monotheistic idea. Yet these were no more than tentative efforts; in the few Vedic hymns dealing with this phase of thought the poets are seen to be attempting a bold flight, and struggling towards the thought of one sole world-ground beyond the many gods. One of these, however, ends with the resigned acknowledgment, which reminds us of the Preacher: "You will never know him who created these things: something else stands between you and him. Enveloped in mist and with faltering voice the poets pass along rejoicing in life."[1] Another finds in Pragapati the sole lord of the universe, who holds all being in his embrace, and establishes heaven as well as earth, the word which may solve his inquiry after the true God;"[2] but him also he apprehends as a god who has become, who has entered into existence from a golden germ; and thus we see clearly that reflection could not stand still here, but always pressed forward, seeking for something ultimate, and always lost itself in the abyss. Both the earnestness of the search and the despair of finding what is sought, are expressed in the most touching way in that hymn,[3] in which the philosophical poet describes how in the dark chaos of the beginning there was only the one, which breathless

[1] *Rigveda*, x. 82. Also in Max Müller's *Lectures*, p. 301.
[2] *Ibid.* x. 121. Max Müller, p. 302.
[3] *Ibid.* x. 129. Max Müller, p. 323.

breathed through itself, and how by its own heat it came to grow, to develop itself:—

> "Who knows the secret, who proclaimed it here,
> Whence, whence this manifold creation sprang?
> The gods themselves came later into being—
> Who knows from whence this great creation sprang?
> He from whom all this great creation came,—
> Whether his will created or was mute,—
> The most high seer, that is in highest heaven,
> He knows it, or perchance even he knows not."

With these questions we have arrived at the threshold of Indian philosophy, the further elaboration of which did not belong to the Vedic poets, but to the Brahmanic schools of philosophy of later centuries, and which is to be found in the Upanishads (properly sessions, colleges), which are added to the Vedas, whence the system which predominates in them is called *Vedanta* (end of the Vedas). True, the Upanishads do not contain a complete philosophical system, they seek the truth on various roads; yet one main feature is met with in them all, which is characteristic not only of the Indians, but of the Indo-Germans generally, viz., the striving after knowledge of a man's own self, and in and with it also of the great self of the whole world. The self (Atman) is at first represented in a somewhat material fashion as a small corporeal thing which has its seat in the heart, spreads through the blood-vessels, and becomes visible in the pupil of the eye; but the notion of it becomes more and more spiritual, till at length it is known as the self-conscious Ego, which knows itself as the one unsensuous and imperishable cause of its activities, and distinguishes from itself its bodily organs which are the means of these activities. But this spiritual self, which the wise man finds within himself as the kernel of his own being, is to Indian thought at the same time and immediately the highest divine self which forms the inmost kernel of all being. "The wise man who has learned to absorb himself in the self, and so has known the invisible, the withdrawn into darkness, the dweller in darkness, the lying in the abyss, the ancient, has known this as God,—he leaves

joy and sorrow far behind him. . . . The man who wakes in us while we sleep, who creates one wish after another, he alone is called the Shining, the Brahman, the Immortal. All worlds rest in him, and none can go beyond. This is 'That.' . . . It is an eternal thinker who thinks thoughts which are not eternal; though only one, he fulfils the wishes of many. The wise ones who recognise him in themselves possess eternal peace." But how does one arrive at this knowledge? The Indian sage regards it as a divine gift, which, however, is only extended to man under certain conditions. "This self cannot be comprehended by the Veda, not by the understanding, not by much knowledge. Only he who chooses it for himself attains it; such a one it chooses for its own. But he who has not yet turned away from evil, he who is not quiet and composed and of a firm spirit, he will never reach the self through knowledge."

Before following up these thoughts in their practical consequences, we must first consider the second source from which the main stream of Brahmanic thought receives its most important tributary. To philosophical speculation, which reflects on the self of man and of the world, theological speculation has to be added, the ultimate roots of which may be traced here as everywhere to motives connected with worship. This we gather from the notion of *Brahman*, which is identified in the passage cited above, and frequently, with the highest self (Paramatman). It is true that the fundamental meaning of the word is still doubtful, but whether it meant originally "power, fervour, exaltation," or "the word" of prayer, at any rate it is used throughout the Vedas as a designation for prayer. But how could prayer become the absolute being? The transitional thought lies in the conviction, which always belonged to the Indian consciousness, of the absolute power which resides in prayer and worship generally, a power which both influences the gods and is itself the result of divine influence in man. "Prayer is mighty, it rules the gods, it upholds heaven and earth."[1] It is this omnipotence of prayer which is personified even in the Vedic period, in the "Lord of prayer"—*Brihaspati* or *Brahmanaspati*—who is frequently invoked along with

[1] *Rigveda*, vi. 51, 8.

Indra as the Bestower of victory and of riches. It is said of him very suggestively that he was always mighty in the lower place of sacrifice, and that he extends far as a god to the gods, and embraces this universe; indeed he is directly called "the father of the gods,"[1] because the strength of the gods depends on sacrificial gifts, and their will is determined by prayers,—only he prospers happily in the favour of all the gods "whom the lord of prayer makes his companion." And this he does simply by giving him the proper strength of prayer. For effectual prayer is, on the other side, itself a divine work; whence the gods, especially Brihaspati, are besought to awaken devotion, and to further prayers. And here we have in fact all the premises for the formation of the notion of Brahma. If prayer is power over the individual gods, and at the same time a result of divine action in man, then it points to a divine above the gods, which is at the same time the divine in man. And this was precisely the speculative notion of the highest self, which is greater than heaven and earth and all the gods, and at the same time so small that it finds its dwelling in man's heart. Thus it is very comprehensible that this "self" of speculation, which is above all and in all, and has its special dwelling-place in man melted into one with the holy spirit or the "power" of prayer, of religious absorption, that so Brahma became the infinite world-ground.

As regards the relation of Brahma to the world, Brahmanic speculation presents us with various theories side by side. At one time we find in it a hylozoistic Pantheism, at another a theistic theory of creation, at another an abstract idealistic monism or acosmism. The last named belongs no doubt to a much later period than the other two; it did not, however, drive out those other theories, but became connected with them in the prevailing dogmatic of Brahmanic theology, the older realistic theory counting as the "lower (exoteric) knowledge," of practical life and of worship, while the idealistic theory was "the higher (esoteric) knowledge" of completed gnosis and mysticism. According to the former, Brahma is the undeveloped world-germ, the womb of beings, which gives forth the world out of

[1] *Rigveda*, ii. 24-26; vii. 97.

itself, as the spider lets out its thread and draws it in again, as the spark flies from the fire and into it again. The creation of the world, which the Veda had taught was the work of Pragapati, is now explained otherwise as the spreading out the world from Brahma and its return into him, proceeding through periodic changes, and infinitely repeated; the two processes, emanation and resorption, following the definite sequence of the elements, air, wind, fire, water, earth. The individual souls, which were also potentially contained in Brahma, enter into these elements at each new evolution, and receive, according to their works in an earlier period, the body of a god, of a man, or an animal, or of a plant. But both the individual souls and the elements which issue from Brahma and return to him, have according to this theory real existence; and thus Brahma, which contains them all in itself in germ, cannot be the pure indifferent one. But just this is seen from the point of the "higher knowledge" to be a false appearance occasioned by not-knowing. The truth of the matter is that the Brahma is without attributes, without form, without difference or determination; all that can be said of him is that he is the being, the spiritual, the blessed, and that he is moreover entirely different from all that we know and do not know, and is not knowable. From the indeterminate simple one, again, no determinate reality can come forth; the higher Brahma accordingly cannot be the cause of an actual world, and no truth can be attributed to the world of lower knowledge; it is nothing but the phantasmagoria (Maja) which Brahma as a magician sets forth out of himself without himself being in any way touched by it: it is only the not-knowing of the soul entangled in the senses, which takes this apparent world for a reality, and the manifold for an existence different from the one. How, it may be asked, explain this appearance, this not-knowing, this deception of the senses? To this question the Vedanta has no answer to give, any more than any other idealistic system.

Beside this acosmistic idealism and the naturalistic emanationism described above, we also find in the Brahmanic theology a theistic theory of creation, Brahma being represented as a personal god and

lord (Icvara), namely as the first manifestation of the absolute or of the impersonal Brahma, who gives the world-elements their shapes, and assigns to the souls the bodies they are to have in accordance with their deserts. But this personification of Brahma to a demiurge standing over-against the world, is expressly limited to the standpoint, based on not-knowing, of "worldliness" (the stage of the idea, according to modern theory, of opinion, δόξα, according to Plato), and is thus pronounced to be destitute of higher truth; and thus we are prepared to find that it never attained to great importance in the religious view of the world. The personal Brahma never played any part in worship; on the contrary, he was completely cast into the shade, as we shall see at a later point, by coarser deities.

Over-against these theories, which are so various in their character, and yet are all recognised as orthodox by Brahmanic theology, heretical systems also grew up among the Indians, which competed effectively with the Vedanta doctrine, and were important for the later development of Indian religion. The most important of these are the *Sankhya* and the *Yoga* systems. The former is attributed to Kapila, probably a mythical personage, and is in any case of earlier origin than Buddhism. Unlike the monism of the Vedanta, the doctrine of Sankhya is dualistic and pluralistic; it denies the one Brahma, and asserts as the sole eternal world-principles, individual souls and matter, the former knowing but not acting, the latter acting but not knowing. The soul entered into nature from eternity, and derives from nature the senses and powers which form its primarily incorporeal organisation or its primitive body, from which the present body of its visible mode of existence is to be distinguished, as having arisen in time. In this union of nature and spirit all activity and change belongs only to the former, the soul maintaining the position of a quiet spectator and remaining in itself. Here also what binds the spirit to nature is a mere deception or blindness; these are the source of the spirit's suffering under changing circumstances, which though in reality foreign to it, it regards as its own. As soon as it sees through this delusion, and

knows itself in its difference from nature and its unchangeable simplicity, the charm which bound it to the world of sense is broken; it has become inwardly free or "redeemed." This system has in common with the doctrine of the Vedanta the metaphysical notion of spirit as the abstract simple one, without determination and without change, which manifold and changing circumstances can only approach through not-knowing, through deception, the removal of which deception in true knowledge is therefore the way to practical redemption. The only difference is that the spirit is not conceived here as the one world-soul, but as the many individual souls, and that the cause of the delusion is sought in a matter (Prakriti) which stands over-against spirit. But in the Vedanta too Brahma is confronted by "Maja" as an independent principle, not to be logically understood from the other; and so it was natural enough to identify Prakriti with Maja; and in the same way the individual souls could easily be reconciled with the one world-soul as its emanations. Of a number of attempts to reconcile the orthodox Vedanta system with the heretical Sankhya system, we specify the Yoga system, which thinks of the individual souls as the manifold vessels or forms of appearance of the one spirit, and places nature at the side of spirit as the principle of multiplicity and of change—the abstract monism and idealism of the Vedanta being thus, without any surrender of the notion of Brahma, softened down in favour of the ordinary realistic way of thinking. But here also the practical tendency is the same as in the two other systems; spirit turns away from nature and becomes absorbed, to the pitch of ecstasy, in its own simple being (Yoga, *i.q.* devotion); the net of hallucination is thus cast off, and redemption attained, *i.e.* inner and ultimately absolute emancipation from the bonds of existence. Much more weight, however, is laid here than in the two other schools, on the practical side of the way of salvation, on self-conquest, mortification of the passions, and the exercise of beneficence, and the path is thus opened up, on which Buddhism proceeded to change the theories of the schools into the practice of a religious life.

The systems which arose out of Brahmanical speculation varied

widely from each other in the theories on which they built; but they all have the same practical tendency, the same *ethical ideal of life;* they might be called variations on one and the same theme, the redemption of man from the bonds of the world of sense. They were all fundamentally at one on the further point, that the end of this road was only to be attained by mystical gnosis; they only differed in the way in which they carried out this principle, in the spirit in which they drew the consequences of it, and adopted a stiffer or more accommodating attitude to common life. And here again the manner is highly characteristic of orthodox Brahmanism, in which it deals, in ethics as well as dogmatics, with the various standpoints which in reality are inwardly conflicting and exclusive of each other; it simply places them side by side, and recognises them as the lower and the higher, the exoteric and the esoteric truth of the subject, and indeed demands, at least from the Brahman, as a condition of the completeness of his ideal of life, that he should connect them together by passing from one to the other at a certain stage of life. This is certainly one of the most remarkable traits of the Indian mind, and is characteristic both of its strength and of its weakness, testifying both to the many-sidedness and tolerant comprehensiveness of its sweep of thought, and to the want of a positive moral end fitted to fill the whole of life, and form it from one impulse.

The ethics of Brahmanism is contained in the so-called law of *Manu* (a mythical name), the main features of which date from a period before Buddha. It contains, of course, as all positive religious legislations do, moral commands and civic and ceremonial statutes, mingled together without distinction of their relative value. In general, however, it breathes the spirit of a solid and practical morality, such as might serve the need of the multitude for a great length of time. Next to the ceremonies which have to be transacted before, at, and after the birth of every child, the chief solemnity is the initiation or admission of young men into the religious and social bond of caste by putting on the sacred girdle, a sacramental act accompanied with solemn prayers; a "regeneration," from which the members of the three highest castes bear the name of Dvija (twice-born). This

is to be followed as a rule (at least in the case of sons of Brahmans), by a longer or shorter noviciate or course of instruction at the hands of a Brahman, in which the knowledge of the Veda is imparted. When grown up, every Indian is expected to found a household, and in it to fulfil the threefold duties of a *pater familias*, to the gods, to the wise, and to parents. The first he fulfils by observing the daily and the special sacrifices and ceremonies, those to the wise by study of the Veda and piety towards the customs of the fathers, and those to parents partly by sacrifice for the manes of the house, and partly by begetting and bringing up sons of his own. But indispensable as these duties are, and they are enjoined on pain of excommunication from the caste on earth, and loss of blessedness beyond, this active life of civic and religious duty does not constitute the highest moral ideal of the Brahman.

Above "holiness of works" stands that of contemplation, above the piety of the law that of mystic theosophy. Hence, when the Indian has fulfilled his duties as father of a house, and seen the son of his son, he may, according to the law of Manu, turn away from the world to eternal salvation. He leaves house and family, and retires to the wood as a hermit, to live in quiet contemplation only: in place of all outward works, not excepting religious ceremonies and ritual sacrifices and festivals, there now comes his work on himself, ascesis and contemplation by which he becomes a "self-conqueror" (Sannyasin). By many this discipline was conducted by means of bodily chastisement and self-torture (Tapas), which was to effect emancipation from the bonds of the body. But the perfect wisdom goes beyond this: it knows that pious exercises one and all belong to "works," which, just because they aim at a reward in the other world, are not only useless for obtaining full emancipation and blessedness, but even stand in the way of these—perfect emancipation only being reached by knowledge of one's own self in its unity with the divine self. He on whom insight has dawned into the "Tat twam asi" (that art thou), into the unity of his own self with the eternal Brahma who is neither active nor passive, he is redeemed from the bonds of existence, he feels the pains of his body no more

as his, he is quit of all desiring and wishing, is indifferent to all works and duties, which have no claim save on those who are living in the world; in short, he has inwardly altogether died to existence, which only rolls on for a while outside him, as the potter's wheel spins for a while, even when he has ceased to drive it. But when this continued existence, which he who knows sees to be a mere appearance, a deception of Maja, ceases finally in death, then the redemption begins which is perfect and eternal, the life-spirits of the Sannyasin no longer go forth to new wanderings in new existences, but "Brahma is he, and he resolves himself into Brahma." This full redemption (Moksha) from the bonds of individual existence, is the *terminus ad quem* of the ethics of Brahmanism, and its esoteric ideal of life can thus be nothing else than the world-renunciation of the hermit, who has made himself free from the world and all its doings, from suffering and from doing, and loses himself in mystic self-contemplation, or in passive union with God. To the abstract idealism of the esoteric dogmatic, the abstract quietism of the esoteric ethics corresponds. The spirit being thought of here not as unfolding itself in the fulness of its living relations, and as a living power that acts and creates, but only as the empty unity, devoid of all distinctions and all motion, its moral destiny must in consistency be found not in an active ruling over the world, and changing it into a reflection of the Divine reason, not in a kingdom of God, but only in a flight from the world in which no deed is done, in an emptying of the spirit of all reasonable contents, in the spiritless and spirit-killing brooding and dreaming of the contemplative hermit.

It is clear that this esoteric life-ideal is quite opposed to the exoteric doctrine of duties of the Brahmanic law. All those ritual duties which the law describes, with the heavy exactness and rigorous pedantry that appear in every priestly code, and enjoins under threats of the heaviest penalties in this world and the next, appear from the point of view of him who knows, as perfectly valueless, vain, nay detrimental to salvation. "Only know the self, and away with all the rest; it alone is the bridge to immortality!" so sounds the motto of the "higher knowledge." (From this point it would have

been easy to proceed to regard the differences of caste, of race, of sex, all the barriers resting on the accident of birth, as destitute of religious significance; and at an earlier period this consequence must have been drawn to some extent in Brahmanism, as according to the oldest Upanishads women also shared in the sacred hermit-life. Later, however, when Buddhism had carried out the principle in earnest in this direction and on a large scale, Brahmanic theology refused to entertain an application of the esoteric principle, which was so dangerous to itself and its caste privileges.) In so far as the esoteric ideal of life led beyond ritual legality and external works to inwardness and freedom of the religious subject, it was an advance of great significance and far-reaching consequences, the further development of which we shall see in Buddhism. If only the disparagement of ceremony had not been accompanied by a depreciation of the fulfilment of the moral duties of social life as being also without value or significance! If only in the place of the low and narrow legal spirit there had come a really higher spiritual principle, which could have proved a new power of life, operating fruitfully by its own force! But what the esoteric morals put in the place of exoteric legality was nothing but empty and barren negation, the striving, really egoistic, for the liberation of a man's own soul from all and every bond, not excepting the most sacred social bonds of love and duty! Thus the esoteric morality of the Brahmanic doctrine of redemption was not a higher perfection above the exoteric morality of the law, but a negation of all positive and effective morality, in favour of an unfruitful and servile quietism. How far this assumed another form in Buddhism, in spite of the similarity in point of principle, we shall presently see.

The foil to the doctrine of redemption, in which at the same time lay the root of its attraction, is the doctrine of *transmigration*, which is so intimately connected with the metaphysics and psychology of the Brahmanic schools, that one might be tempted to regard it as a product of theological speculation. But this would scarcely be correct. *A priori* we should not expect to find a doctrine of mere scholastic speculation penetrating so deeply into the popular belief, and dominating it so entirely as the Indian doctrine of metempsychosis

actually did: and it makes its appearance at first in such a simple form, that it points less to a speculative than to a popular origin. There is therefore a good deal of ground for the surmise that this doctrine, which was quite unknown to the rest of the Indo-Germans, was familiar to the lower tribes of the indigenous population, and was adopted by the Indians only when they became a good deal mixed with the natives, and that the Brahmans then embodied it with the system they were in the course of forming. It does not, at least, occur in the oldest parts of the Vedas. Here the notion predominates, which belongs to the Indo-Germans from the first, that the souls of good men pass after death into the light-heaven of Jama and Varuna, where, in the assembly of their ancestors, and with the heavenly soma-draught, they lead a life of bliss, while the wicked are partly at once destroyed, partly thrown into deep places of darkness together with the demons and lying spirits. In place of this view there then appears first in the Upanishads the theory that the wicked, who are to be punished for special badness of life, return again into this world, and are made to atone for their misdeeds in a miserable existence. Being born again, accordingly, is here no more than a special form of punishment, instead of hell, for individual transgressors, not a general law of existence based on the nature of the soul itself. The theory was only generalised in this sense in connection with Brahmanic speculation. According to the developed doctrine, that which constitutes the finiteness of the individual soul, its separation from Brahma, its entanglement in the whirlpool of the world (Samsara)—namely, its *desire* (Kama), and its *doing* (Karman); this fetter of individual existence is what brings about the necessity for entering into ever new forms of existence through ever new birth to ever new pain and ever new death, and what at the same time determines the quality of the new state, high or low, happy or unhappy. "Man's nature is based upon desire. As his desire so is his striving; as his striving so is the deed he does; as is the deed he does so is the existence he attains to." But this very endlessness of becoming and passing away, this enchainment in an existence in which every definite form is alike inconstant and transitory, this

restlessness of desiring and doing, which never arrives at satisfaction or peace or quiet, this appears to the Indian temper as the cardinal evil, deliverance from which is to be sought at any price. Blessedness is only in the one unchangeable Atman, "what is different from him is full of suffering." Hence redemption from this circle-dance of existence cannot lie in doing, for doing is the manifestation of the desire present in individual existence, and so the assertion of that existence and the germ of ever new existence; redemption lies rather, as we saw above, in the recognition of the nothingness of all desire and all separate existence, and of the sole truth of Brahma, and the unity of ourself with him: only thus is the seed of new births in the future destroyed. Thus the belief in metempsychosis forms the theoretical foundation of the Brahmanic doctrine of redemption, and the practical motive for striving after redemption.

But the Brahmans also knew how to turn this belief to account as the most effective motive for maintaining and enforcing their exoteric doctrine of the law. Any disregard of their means of worship, any transgression of the minute precepts of the ritual, which became always more comprehensive, was threatened with punishment in so or so many new births: the sinner is incessantly exhorted to consider on what wanderings through lamentable existences the soul must enter to atone for its sins, and to remember "the future new births through 10,000 mothers' wombs!" With such terrible prospects did they emphasise their demands and claims, and force the life of the Indian people into the narrow framework of a social life based on the privileges of caste and of their pedantic and rigorous priestly code. Was it any matter for surprise that the temper of this people, once so energetic and so full of glad life, turned in time shy and sombre, wearied of life, anxious for death? Such comfort and salvation as a sound religion offers to a people even in the most depressed outward circumstances, the Brahmanic religion in the sixth century before our era was no longer capable of giving. In place of the happy prospect of a life together with the fathers and the gods in the heavenly kingdom of light, had now come the terrors of an infinite wandering of the soul. And the bright and exalted

figures of the old heaven of the gods, where were they? what had become of them? They still figured in the forms of prayer used in worship, but as shadowy beings without any life or energy, for the worship itself had sucked their vigour out of them by the claim made for it, that it possessed a magic power over the gods. The fact was that the Brahmans, as the guardians of worship and wielders of the magic powers attached to it, had themselves taken the places of the dethroned gods of former times. But neither the *opus operatum* of *cultus* nor the abstractions of scholastic speculation, Brahma and Atman, or Brahma and Icvara and Pragapati, could compensate the people for the belief, which had faded away, in living gods. And finally the way of redemption, while not closed *à priori* against any member of the upper castes, was yet beset with so many outward and inward difficulties, demanded so radical a breaking off of all ordinary relations, and at its highest stage such a difficult inquiry, an inquiry quite impossible without study, that to the multitude it was absolutely impossible to follow it. The aristocracy of those who knew, allied themselves accordingly with the priestly aristocracy (as in Judaism the scribes allied themselves with the priests, and in the middle ages the doctors with the clergy and the monks); not that the two always and of necessity agreed, but together they formed an aristocracy of an exclusive and arrogant character, indifferent to the mass of the people and to the spiritual needs which the existing religion had ceased to satisfy.

Matters were in this state in India, when towards the end of the sixth century B.C. one of these ascetic sages, *Gautama Buddha* (*i.e.* the illuminated knowing one), turned with his preaching of redemption to the whole body of the people, and thus became the founder of the Indian religion of redemption, the first religion which broke through the bonds of nationality and became a universal religion. A luxurious growth of legend has grown up around the founder of Buddhism, and it is by no means easy to arrive at the historical truth regarding him; but that such a one existed, that Gautama was a real man, and not a mythical solar hero, can scarcely be seriously doubted. Indologues like Senart and Kern, have shown that features

of the solar myth have made their way into the Buddha legend, but this is far from proving that the whole legend of Buddha is nothing but a solar myth. With equal reason might we strike out of the page of history and relegate to mythology, such figures as Dietrich von Bern (Theodoric of Verona) or Charlemagne or Frederick Barbarossa, not to speak of still later heroes, because the cycle of legends surrounding them undoubtedly contains some features which crept in from German mythology. To remove the person of Buddha out of the history of Indian religion, would be to make that history unintelligible. Buddhism was to an equal degree the personal work of Buddha as Christianity was of Jesus and Islam of Mahomet; which does not exclude either in those cases or in this one the essential connection of the new phenomenon with the existing elements of the consciousness of the time. The connection of Buddhism with Brahmanism is so intimate that it is often by no means easy to draw the line between them; yet Buddhism came forward from the first as a new and peculiar religion, which in respect of Brahmanism was very distinctly aware of its independence. And with equal distinctness did this consciousness connect itself from the first with the person of Gautama, his doctrine, his example, his circle of disciples; nay, a certain definite moment was fixed in his life, at which the new light rose upon his mind and he became the "Buddha," the Illuminated. The legend represents this bursting forth of the new truth in the form of a visionary experience, which took place in a moment after a period of severe inward struggle; but the whole analogy of firmly authenticated history in other similar cases tends to show that a true reminiscence is here preserved of the momentous inner experiences of Gautama in his striving for illumination and redemption.[1] It has

[1] Compare Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 112 *sq.* This instructive work throws many new lights on this part of the history of religion, and clears up many a traditional mistake. But in one point I find it impossible to agree with this meritorious inquirer, viz., that he makes Buddha a scholastic dialectician after the pattern of the later Buddhist theologians, or even of an Origen (p. 183). Were this the case Buddha's success would indeed be an inexplicable "accident" (p. 179); and it is contradicted by all that Oldenberg himself has to tell us of Buddha's teaching in popular parables and pithy sentences. These parabolic utterances he himself allows could not well have come from the same mouth with the scholastic dialectic. They are therefore a sure sign that the latter is not original.

ever been the case that the painful struggles of a soul dissatisfied with what was given, torn by doubt and inward discord, and striving after clearness and truth, formed the birthpangs out of which new spiritual life was born.

And wherein did the novelty of Buddha's appearance consist ? It did not consist in a new philosophical or theological system of doctrine, like that which issued from the Brahmanic schools. Against these systems and schools, and all their labours to unravel the riddle of the world, Buddha showed an unmistakable repugnance. As little did the novelty consist in efforts after social reform, proposals to abolish caste or to deal with the social rights of the Brahmans or nobles. Buddha never attempted any such reform, never indicated that he thought it desirable ; indeed his own disciples were mostly sons of Brahmans and of noble families. True, he called the Brahmans blind leaders of the blind, scoffed at their sacrifices as so much worthless ceremonial, at their Vedic scribe-learning as empty folly or impudent humbug ; but other ascetics had done all this before him, and Brahmanic mysticism itself had partly done the same, and this was never regarded as an attack on the social position of the Brahmans, who indeed were not an organised politically dominant clergy at all. The difference between Buddha and Brahmanism was in the first place a purely religious one, such as was always treated in India with great toleration ; not till later did matters come to open and declared hostility and persecution : not till the Buddhist church had grown in numbers and in riches, and threatened to overshadow the higher castes.

What was new in Buddha's appearance was simply *the preaching of redemption for the whole people and in the language of the whole people.* The thought of redemption was not in itself new ; we have seen above that that thought already formed the mainspring of Brahmanic speculation and mysticism in the various schools ; and that redemption was accomplished by means of renunciation of the world, self-conquest, and knowledge penetrating the veil of Maja, was the already prevailing theory and practice of the ascetics (Sramanas or Sannyasin). But in all sects and schools the way to

this end had always been made so difficult, that it could only be the affair of a few; some held severe corporal self-chastisement to be the main point, others profound philosophical meditation on Atman and his attributes or want of attributes, on the creation and the end of the world, or on its having no beginning and no end, on individual soul and all-soul, on the reality or the phenomenality of matter, etc. Of all this Buddha would know nothing. He declared painful self-mortification to be as useless for salvation, as unworthy and as vain, as luxury, since by both alike was the proper balance of the soul destroyed. He cared nothing, moreover, for metaphysical speculation about God and the world, the soul and matter, he neither denied it nor affirmed it, he left it undecided as a thing of no practical importance. "Because it is of no use for salvation, because it does not promote pious conversation, nor detachment from earthly things, nor the destruction of desire, nor ceasing, nor rest, nor knowledge, nor illumination, nor Nirvana, therefore the exalted one has not revealed it"—this is what is said with reference to all those questions. Nowhere is the elimination of metaphysics from religion (which is so much demanded in our days) in favour of a purely ethical and psychological way of looking at things, carried out to such a degree as in Buddhism; but just on this account it proved a religion without God and without soul, a religion in which religious mystery is contracted to a mere vanishing shadow of a possible other world, a religion therefore which completely lacks motive power both for progressive and deepening knowledge, and for world-conquering action. For only out of the depths of the divine mystery do the never-ceasing streams of living spiritual power issue forth; the streams which spring from the mere surface of experience do not flow to life eternal. Yet let us not overlook the other and more favourable side! Buddha cast overboard the metaphysics of scholastic speculation; but in doing so, he took the idea of redemption out of the narrow circle of the schools, and made it the common property of the whole people. It appears to me to be a highly significant point that the legend makes Buddha immediately upon his illumination come to the resolution to preach to others also the

way of redemption which he has discovered. In making this step, he had to overcome inner doubts, and anxious fears and reluctance; and this is done in two conversations, in the one of which the god Brahma encourages Buddha, in the other the tempter Mara seeks to dissuade him—evidently a symbolic account of the inner struggles out of which issued both his vocation as a Redeemer and the knowledge of the way of redemption. That those two things, the simpler view of the nature of redemption, and the conviction that it was meant for all, and thus the resolution to communicate it to all, were intimately connected with each other, belongs to the very nature of the case, and is corroborated by analogies in other fields, as, for example, the conversion of the apostle Paul and his call to the mission to the Gentiles. Thus Gautama, the illuminated ascetic, became a popular preacher, who not only collected disciples about himself, but also sent them forth "to preach for the salvation of much people, for the joy of much people, from pity for the world, for blessing, for salvation, for joy, for gods and men!"

The doctrine of Buddha was from the first comprised in the "*four sacred truths:*" of suffering, of the origin of suffering, of the removal of suffering, of the way to the removal of suffering. These form the standing creed of the Buddhists, the expression of the peculiar religious consciousness of the Buddhist church, which that church traces to Buddha himself, particularly to that sacred night on which, as he was sitting under the fig-tree and meditating, the light of truth dawned on him. Nor have we any reason to doubt the correctness of this tradition, though the more detailed exposition of the four truths in the dialectical and systematised form which was afterwards current in the theology of the school, was certainly not given in this way by Buddha. *Suffering and redemption*—such is the simple theme on which Buddha's doctrine was based from the first, however manifold the variations of the theme which were afterwards elaborated. A pessimistic view of the world, and a mood delicately sensitive, melancholy, not given to action, and shrinking from suffering, and thus it must be said essentially eudæmonistic, though certainly not in the least egoistic, and still less nihilist,

such are the main features of this doctrine. The error is still widely spread that Buddhism is "Nihilism," that it regards non-being as the true nature of all that is, and sees the root of all evil in the absence of the knowledge of the unreality of all apparent being. That such a theory of "absolute illusionism," the last sediment of one-sided reflection, should ever have become a popular religion, the most widely-diffused religion in the world, this surely would be the most incomprehensible of all miracles. But this view of Buddhism is taken from later systems of Buddhist gnostics, which by no means represent the religious nature and origin of Buddhism itself, any more than the systems of the Christian gnostics of the second century represent the teaching of Christ. The merit of having proved this by an exact historical study of the sources, belongs to the latest biographer of Buddha, *Oldenberg* (*op. cit.* p. 216): "He who inquires not for the metaphysical speculations of later centuries, but for what the oldest tradition teaches us to regard as the teaching of Buddha, the faith of that first community of wandering monks, will find in it not a single sentence of these contemplations of the nothing. Neither expressed nor unexpressed, neither in the foreground nor in the furthest background of the religious thought of that circle, had the idea of nothing any place. The sentences of the sacred truths show this plainly enough: if this world is weighed by the Buddhists and found wanting, the reason is not that it is a fallacious apparent something, but in reality empty nothing; the reason is simply that it is full of suffering, and nothing but suffering."

That all life is pain, because every living thing is subject to constant change, because everything only comes into being to pass away again, and passes away only to enter on a new cycle of restless becoming, such is the inexhaustible theme of Buddhist preaching and theology, now put in the form of poetical proverbs as a simple fact of experience (in this way no doubt by Buddha himself), and again dialectically discussed and proved in stricter notional forms. "Man gathers flowers, his mind is set for pleasure; as water-floods over a village by night, so death comes over him and snatches him away; him who desired insatiably, the destroyer subdues to his

power; out of joy pain is born, out of love fear is born; he who is released from loving, for him there is no pain, and whence should fear come to him?" In these two sentences (from the Dhammapada, the oldest Buddhist collection of proverbs) how near do the truth and the falsehood of this view of the world lie together! We, too, know that the world passeth away with the lust thereof, and that on this account it becomes us to rejoice as though we rejoiced not, and to use this world as not abusing it (1 Cor. vii. 30 *sq.*; 1 John ii. 17); but at the same time we know that he that doeth the will of God abideth for ever, that our faith is the victory which overcometh the world, and that perfect love casts out fear (1 John v. 4; iv. 18). This faith in a power of goodness, which in a world of transitoriness victoriously accomplishes its sacred ends, this perfect love which in the service of goodness creates goods of positive value, and is superior to all selfish fear—this faith the Buddhist knows not. His pessimism accordingly is justified as against the naïve optimism of the natural love of the world; but it is its error and its misfortune, that it does not elevate itself above the negation of the natural to the affirmation of the supernatural, that it fails to see in the holy will of divine and human love the power which conquers the world, the steadfast pole in the flux of phenomena.

Where, then, it has now to be asked, is the reason of pain? Buddha seeks it not in the metaphysical principles of the Brahmanic schools, in the charm of Maja, or the entanglement of the soul in matter; nor does he ask how the circle of becoming began, and whether it will ever cease. He places himself entirely at the point of view of the suffering man, and only asks how suffering originates and is to be removed *in his consciousness?* "The wandering of beings has its beginning in eternity. We can discern no beginning from which the beings, enveloped in their not-knowing, chained by the thirst for existence, flit and wander about." Here the objective metaphysical question is put aside, and there is a suggestion of the subjective psychological explanation of suffering: "it is thirst which leads from one new birth to another, thirst for pleasures, for becoming, for power." But this will, which thirsts for existence and hap-

piness, operates only so long as it is "enveloped in not-knowing." Thus *not-knowing* is the ultimate cause of thirst and pain. This had been said by Brahmanic speculation too, but there it meant the not-knowing of the unity of the individual soul and the world-soul, or of the not-unity of the soul and matter. With Buddha, on the contrary, it is simply not-knowing of the fact that all life is pain, because all existence stands under the law of causality, according to which becoming and dissolution succeed each other in endless circle. That everything is full of pain, and that everything, existence and the consciousness attached to existence, stands under the law of causal becoming, of the nexus of cause and effect, are to Buddha equivalent propositions, and are meant to express one and the same truth of experience. But this law of *causality* is invested with a transcendent meaning, as it is referred to the nexus of guilt and doom, act and reward, not only within the world of experience, but also as it exists between the present mode of existence and the earlier and the later modes of existence, of every being. The doctrine of the transmigrations of souls or of new births, and the doctrine that the fortune experienced at each time is conditioned by the merit or the guilt of a former life, forms for Buddhism too the fixed axiom that it is for all the Brahmanic schools. Thus the law of causality becomes a power having to do with the *government of the world*, a power embracing and connecting this life and the life beyond, the visible and the invisible world, present, past, and future, and distributing judicial compensations—a power manifestly of a more than empirical, of a metaphysical character. It is not the Nothing, as is often asserted, that takes the place of the Deity in Buddhism, but the power of law governing the world, or of the moral order according to which every act is seed and every pain fruit. This cannot be termed simple atheism; it may equally well be called Pantheism like Brahmanism, only of another kind. Brahmanism had seen in all the becoming of the world, the (real or apparent) manifestation of the one infinite being of Brahma; Buddhism knows no such eternal being, it recognises no actual being, but only becoming; yet it finds a persistent element in all becoming, namely, the law of becoming, the chain, never to be broken, of cause

and effect, the inviolable power of moral retribution. This might be called Pantheism of the process, or ethical causalism; it reminds us on one side of Heraclitus, and on another of Fichte's moral world-order (vol. i. p. 280). It is certainly remarkable that at the very time when in India the infinite being of Brahma was being confronted with the law of infinite becoming of Buddhism, Greek philosophy too had arrived at the antithesis of the Eleatic ἕν καὶ πᾶν and the πάντα ῥεῖ of Heraclitus; we are pointed unmistakably to the fact that there is a certain inner law by which thought is conducted to these antitheses,—and past them!

Pain continues as long as the Ego which wills remains attached to the world of becoming, which is subject to the law of causality, to the doom of the mutability of all being, the evanescence of all happiness. The fact cannot be changed that the world is what it is, but the position of the Ego towards it, the state of consciousness of man who suffers from its mutability, this admits of change. Should that not-knowing come to an end which fettered the will to existence, should man recognise the world-law of becoming, which condemns all exercise of will to endless pain, then his will ceases to be attached to perishing forms; as he comes to see the aimlessness and uselessness of all desire for happiness, desire itself goes out, and then pain is at an end, and a profound peace comes in its place. In this "extinction" of the will which cleaves to the world, brought about by the knowledge of the world-law, lies that *redemption* which forms the end, the turning-point, of Buddhist preaching. This is the simple original meaning of *Nirvana*, a term which has been so much discussed. The term is not understood aright if we connect it with a metaphysical notion, a beyond, whether the nothing or heavenly felicity; it is originally a *purely immanent ethical notion*, and denotes the state of consciousness of extinguished desire, of the will which no longer cleaves to the world, but has attained rest. "The disciple who has put off from himself lust and desire, he, rich in wisdom, has attained, even here below, redemption from death, rest, Nirvana, the eternal place. . . . He who has escaped from the difficult, obstructed, deceitful path of Samsara (the circle of becoming), who has penetrated to

the other side and reached the shore, retired into himself, without wavering and without doubting, he who has freed himself from the earthly and attained Nirvana, him I call a true Brahman." From these and numberless similar passages in all the Buddhistic writings, we gather beyond dispute that Nirvana is not a goal of any kind which is only to be reached at death, but the detachment of the Ego, taking place even in the present within the mind, from all desire, wish, hope and fear and pain, the state of passionlessness which is to the Buddhist the state at once of holiness and blessedness. This is the religious significance of the notion of Nirvana, the light in which alone it was entertained in the first preaching of redemption, and always afterwards stood in the forefront of the religious faith of the Buddhist community. The longing for redemption is with the Buddhist directed to this one point, this inner state of mind in which there is peaceful rest from the absence of passion; it does not by any means aim at the destruction of the Ego. The common opinion that the Buddhist hopes for redemption in the Nothing is quite erroneous, as well as the opinion that he believes in the Nothing as his deity: of both these positions it may be said that they are psychologically unthinkable and *historically* untenable.[1]

The question what becomes of the Ego of the saint who is in the state of redemption or Nirvana, at his death, was not left unconsidered by the Buddhists, but was never regarded by them as one of first-rate interest; indeed it was not regarded as a question of strictly religious importance, but as one of those questions of mere worldly knowledge, on which the Holy One made no revelation, "because it does not conduce to salvation, nor to a pious conversation, nor to detachment from earthly things, nor to the destruction of desire, to rest, to knowledge, to illumination, to Nirvana." As Buddha's attitude to metaphysical questions was in general that of simply declining them, he refused to enter on this question also, as to the future

[1] Compare the views of Max Müller, which are in substantial agreement with the above, in the essay "On Buddhist Nihilism" (*Essays*, second edition, i. p. 286 *sq.*), and those of Oldenberg, p. 270 *sq.*

of the saint, as we learn expressly from the tradition of a conversation on the subject, which is in all probability genuine. Nor indeed is it easy to say to which side the balance of the Buddhist view of the world would incline. The psychological premises seem to point mainly to an entire extinction of the individual; for the soul is taken to be a being set together without any bond of unity, out of different elements which dissolve at death, and its life to be the resultant of the meeting of various forces, so that the world like the soul is a mere becoming without persistent being. But on the other side we have the whole weight of the transmigration and retribution doctrine, which is by no means a mere exoteric way of putting Buddhist truth, but a fundamental doctrine of the religion from the very beginning. To this we have to add that in the Buddhist *cultus* Buddha and the principal saints were objects of worship not merely as historical types, but as the patrons and guardians of the community, from whom miraculous influences were always expected to proceed. To this we have to add such passages as the following:—"There is an unborn, unbecome, not created, not formed. But for this unborn, unbecome, not created, not formed, there would be no way out of the world of the born, the become, the created, the formed. . . . The wise ones who do no harm to any being, who keep their body ever bridled, they go to the eternal place; he who arrives there knows nothing of pain: but the monk penetrated by goodness who holds to Buddha's doctrine, let him turn to the land of peace where the transitory finds rest, to blessedness." The impression produced on the unprejudiced observer by these and other passages, could not be better summed up than in the following well-considered judgment of Oldenberg:—"One who clearly and decidedly rejected an eternal future would not speak in this way: desire has taken refuge behind the veil of mystery, to save from thought, which is slow to admit an eternal being to be a thing it can comprehend, the hope of a being that is higher than reason and comprehension."

If, then, there is a removal of pain, a redemption to be attained even in this life, the question arises, Which is the way to this goal?

To this question the fourth of the "holy truths" answers: "It is this holy, *eight times holy path,* which is named right belief, right decision, right work, right deed, right life, right striving, right consideration, right self-absorption." In shorter style, the way of salvation is described in the three stations, uprightness, self-absorption, wisdom. Uprightness may be summed up in "Ceasing from all evil, accomplishing all good, and subduing one's own thoughts." Conquest of the passions, resignation to destiny, patience towards wrongdoers, sympathy with the unhappy, gentleness and benevolence to all beings, the lower animals not excepted—such are the main features of Buddhist morality. Golden proverbs, not unlike the finest of those in our own Gospels, are found in great number in the writings of this religion. Yet its ideal virtue is more of the passive feminine than of the active masculine type; it is well adapted as a quietive to restrain rude natural impulses, but not so well fitted to be a motive, to call forth the moral power of action to subdue and reform the world. *Love,* too, highly as it is valued both in theory and in practice in Buddhist morality, is not quite the same as Christian love. We need not make too much of the fact that the injunction of beneficence, forgivingness and magnanimity, is often reinforced by a reference to reward, to advantages to be reaped both here and hereafter. The same is true of other religions also, and we must be impartial in our measurements. The appeal to rewards may be here also an exoteric form of putting things, which does not prevent that consciousness of salvation and of inward peace which belongs to the religion, from being itself a source of pure benevolence, of heartfelt and self-sacrificing love; in the example of virtue afforded by Buddha himself, self-sacrificing, unselfish love is very conspicuous. But we must not overlook the limitation imposed on love in Buddhism by the one-sidedness and weakness of its underlying view of the world. Where no positive valuable ends are known, no reasonable and universal contents of the will, no objective moral goods and tasks attaching to social life; where the moral ideal passes into an empty negation, such as the painlessness and passionlessness of the individual, there love can go no further than a dull-

hearted sympathy with the pains of individuals, it cannot lead to productive work for the commonwealth, nor to enthusiasm for the ideal goods of humanity.

It is therefore easy to understand how it came about that the kernel and the climax of Buddhist morality consisted from the beginning in the complete *world-renunciation of monasticism*, and that civil right conduct was a mere preliminary to this higher stage. Only in complete retirement from the world, in the discarding of property, family, and worldly calling, was complete detachment of the Ego from all cleaving to existence, all will and hope, possible: only here could desire be secured for that persistent and exclusive labouring at one's-self, that quiet devotional absorption which at its highest intensity led to ecstatic and visionary states: here only, in fine, was the highest stage of illumination and redemption to be reached, Nirvana, which constitutes the complete sage and saint. Buddha himself was a begging monk, and the circle of disciples as organised by him, consisted of monks and nuns, the lay community being attached to this circle as the faithful of the second rank, with a laxer observance, and with a less claim also to holiness and blessedness. Thus there was formed here also a contrast of exoteric and esoteric morality, just as in Brahmanism: the pious laity is charged with the fulfilment of worldly duties and the exercise of good works; but the monk who stands on a higher stage of holiness is beyond these duties: "he has transcended good and bad, which are both fetters." As long as the impulse was still strong to extend the religion, the monks had a positive calling in mission preaching: and this gave them a great advantage over the entirely unfruitful and egoistic asceticism of the Brahmanic hermits. And as missionary activity was furthered in a very great degree by the organisation of the monks in their cloisters, there can be no doubt that this very institution of monasticism, to which Brahmanism had nothing exactly analogous, was at first one of the chief means of the spread of Buddhism. But the institution which was at first the strength of the religion became, in proportion as the tendency to expansion of the Buddhist church grew fainter, a barrier in the way of every sound develop-

ment, and then the cause of inner stagnation and of the early appearance of mental drought.

The paralysing influence of monasticism would have made itself felt much earlier and much more fatally had not the Buddhist church possessed in the *personality of its founder* an element of popular religious edification, which even amidst the aridity of theological scholasticism and monastic casuistry, was never entirely to fail. However high a value we attach to the preparatory influence of Brahmanism on the spirit of the Indian people, and however favourable the influence of outward political conditions may have been in the first centuries of Buddhism, the principal inner reason of its immense success was undoubtedly this, that this religion, first of its kind, did not deal with nature-myths and ceremonies, nor with mere moral laws and scholastic dogmas, but appealed to the hearts of men with the living charm of a personal character of noble dignity and grace. The proverbs, the parables, the simple dialogues which the tradition of the church handed down in connection with its founder, were intelligible and impressive even to those simple ones who had little taste or liking for Brahmanic and Buddhistic scholastic theology. In this picture of an infinite goodwill, free from all aristocratic prejudices of caste and school, announcing the tidings of redemption "for joy to all the people," and making his law "a law for grace for all," the poor who were in need of help as well as the Brahman in search of truth found a common banner, before which they could bow themselves in reverence, which in love they could confess and in obedience follow.

It was natural that the thankful reverence of the community which beheld in the person of its founder not only the originator but the embodiment of its religious ideal, should exalt that person more and more beyond ordinary human dimensions, and at last make it an object of reverence—a *deification* which could the more easily take place on Indian soil, as the degradation of the old national gods on the one hand, and the exaltation of human saints into possessors of divine miraculous power on the other, had long made the boundary line between gods and men quite indistinct and wavering. All that

was done was to elevate Buddha to the highest among the "saints;" even in this character he stands to the faith of his followers high above the old gods of the people (who at the same time were not denied), and is invoked in liturgical prayer as "God of gods, father of the world, Redeemer and Ruler of all creatures," and thus he completely takes the place of the deity in worship. It was only a natural consequence of this, that the memory of his earthly life was woven about with a rich circle of miraculous legends, then that his relics and images, regarded as the media of his beneficent miraculous powers, became the objects of a cult which grew to be extremely sensuous, and that the localities connected with his earthly walk were covered with temples and cloisters which became objects of the pilgrimages of the faithful. And finally, it is quite in the style of Buddhist thought, that Buddha's historical appearance was thought to be not the only one, but one of a series of similar appearances of past and future Buddhas, as to the number, the dates, and the attributes of whom, different schools held different views.

It was just at this point that Brahmanism, alarmed at the victorious advance of Buddhism, entered into a not unsuccessful competition with it. Of the old Indian gods only two had remained living in the popular consciousness; *Vishnu* and *Siva*, formerly subordinate sun-gods, or more particularly wind-gods, had come, probably not without help from indigenous local cults, to occupy a dominant position. If the Brahmans were not to lose ground entirely with the people, there was nothing for it but to place these two popular deities by the side of their priest-god Brahma, and to adjust the relation of these gods to their theological system in the way in which Pantheism has always come to an understanding with Polytheism, namely, that the three separate gods were taken to be different manifestations of the one original being, Brahma. At first there was no regular adjustment of the functions of the members of this trinity, each of them was regarded as a creative power of life, and Siva as a destructive power of death as well. It was only at a very late period, when the attempt was made to introduce a

scholastic system of the trinity, that the creation of the world was attributed to Brahma, its preservation to Vishnu, and its destruction to Siva, as their special functions. This at least was the doctrine of the schools; in popular usage Vishnu and Siva (Mahadeva = great god) occupy down to the present day by far the most prominent position as the most living and the most powerful divine forms.

To later Brahmanism Vishnu became specially important on account of his incarnations or *Avatars* (descents). These are very numerous and of different kinds. An avatara in the highest sense is not a mere passing appearance of the deity (Theophany), nor is it the generation of a hero through the union of a god and a man: it is "the presence, at once mystical and real, of the supreme being in a human individual, who is at one and the same time true God and true man; and this intimate union of the two natures is represented as continuing after the death of the individual in whom it took place. It is, in fact, a mystery, in the contemplation of which minds disposed to speculation can engage as intently as they will, while the multitude is content to find in it such cheap contentment of its religious instincts as anthropomorphism or even zoomorphism, along with the grossest idolatry, can afford."[1] Several of the avatars of Vishnu, however, are nothing but myths or fragments of myths (Märchen) out of the domain of the solar deities. Whether this is the case with the most important of them, viz., Krishna, is still an open question. On the one side it seems established that the legend of Krishna contains several features from fire-, light-, and storm-myths; but this, as we observed above, is the case in the legend of Buddha too; and it is also the case in certain much later groups of legends, the kernel of which is yet undoubtedly human and historical. On the other side, it is certain that in the Indian heroic poem of the *Mahabharata*, Krishna plays the part of a human hero of palpable human individuality, just as one of the heroes of Homer or of the Nibelungenlied; but whether we should see in this figure a historical hero in the first stage of his apotheosis, before his identification with the mythic sun-god, or the last result of the epic process of anthropo-

[1] Barth, *Religions of India*, p. 170.

morphification, in which the mythic sun-god was solidified into the sun-hero of the heroic legend,—this is a question attended with as much difficulty here as in all similar figures of heroic legend, since it is the very nature of that legend to form an indefinite and fluctuating middle term between the divine myth and the historic figure. But in whatever way the question be answered, there can be no doubt as to the fact that the figure of the stout hero Krishna, who was regarded as an incarnation of Vishnu, supplied the Brahmanic religion with an important analogue and equivalent for the part played in Buddhism by the person of Buddha. As the latter in Buddha, so Brahmanism possessed in Krishna, the figure of a human saviour with definite and clear features. And as the former was believed to be only the last one to appear of the many Buddhas of the past, so Krishna also was but one of the many incarnations of Vishnu, which were always to be repeated, as often as the need of the world demanded the appearance of a divine saviour. With this outward similarity, however, we must not overlook the profound difference between the two. Krishna is a rough hero, and comes far short of Buddha in point of moral purity; but on the other hand he has the advantage of Buddha in point of popular natural freshness and vigour, and in being connected with the mythic and epic popular legend in which there is still life—an advantage which doubtless contributed much to the ultimate victory of Brahmanism over Buddhism on Indian soil.

Thus in its last stage of development, which for a whole millennium has scarcely changed, the Indian religion presents us with a mixture, extraordinary and unedifying, in which coarse mythology and sensuous image-worship, associated with such cruel usages as belong to the worship of Siva, occupy the largest space, while above all this there hovers the vague Pantheism of Brahmanic speculation, the scholastic methods of which are able to find a place in the system even for the foulest excesses of the popular religion, and we perceive only as a faint hidden current the influence from afar of the better traits of Buddhism, its fine thinking, and its mild and tender feeling.[1]

[1] Barth, *op. cit.* p. 139.

To the Indian religion of world-renunciation and passionless repose, the *Persian religion* of world-struggle and restless energy forms the greatest possible contrast.[1] The Iranians were near cousins to the Indians, had lived longest with them in the common home, and shared with them all the essential elements of the Aryan nature-religion; but after the separation the religious development of the Iranians pursued quite a different direction from that of the Indians—one of the most striking instances of the profound influence on the religious development of a people of outward natural and historical conditions. The dualism common to the Indo-Germans generally, of the gods of life and light on the one side, and the demons of darkness and death on the other, was accentuated in Eastern Iran by the situation of a country hemmed in between snowy mountains and sandy wastes; the only case in which such conditions are repeated is that of the Northern Germans, and in that case religious ideas were formed of a partly analogous character to those of the Iranians. With the latter, however, the dualism which was common to the Indo-Germans, and the tendency of which was thus reinforced, passed into an ethical dualism which dominated the whole religious view of the world and the whole moral tendency of life; a change which is beyond doubt the work of the reformer *Zarathustra,* to whose revelation, received by him from God, the most ancient religious authority of the Persians, the Zend-avesta, traces the Persian religion. As to the life of Zarathustra only scanty legends have reached us, but though we do not know even the century in which he lived (all that can be asserted with some degree of certainty is that it must be placed before the eighth century B.C), it is not open to us to doubt that his person is historical, simply because it alone enables us to explain in some degree the origin of that religion, which reached the Persians from North-East Iran, and was their state-religion at least from Darius Hystaspes downwards.

The peculiarity of the reform of Zarathustra appears to have consisted in this, that he placed the opposed spirits of the Iranian

[1] For the literature of the Persian religion, see Tiele's *Outlines*, p. 160-162.

nature-religion in two hostile kingdoms, each presided over by a spiritual power, and that by his exalted idea of the nature of the good God and Creator he approached closely to monotheism. He gave the highest of the good spirits (Spento mainju) the distinctive name of *Ahura-mazda, i.e.* most wise spirit or lord, and hence the adherents of this religion are called worshippers of Mazda. Ahura is in Zend the same word as the Indian Asura, which was used for the living gods generally, and particularly for the light heaven-gods Varuna and Mitra. Now as these two form a double deity in the Vedas, so do Ahura-Mithra in the Avesta, and it may be surmised with great probability that there was comprised in the Zarathustrian god Ahura-mazda an Iranian heavenly deity of essentially the same nature as Varuna. In the Vedas the luminous exalted heaven-god Varuna came to be the main representative of divine majesty and holiness, and in the same way the pure light-being of the Aryan heaven-god, exalted yet more by contrast with the threatening and destroying spirits of darkness, may have assumed for Zarathustra the transfigured character of a supra-mundane creator who was the source of all good. In lofty hymns which may be compared with the Hebrew psalms, Ahura-mazda is praised as the creator and preserver and sole lord of the world, as the type of man, whom he endowed with reason after his own mind; and then specially as the god of revelation, light and truth, of the sacred law and word which he gave Zarathustra as a victorious weapon to enable him to overcome the evil spirits.

But high as this monotheistic idea of God rose above the religion of nature, the bond with which it was still connected with that religion could not be entirely broken off. The old nature-gods continued by the side of Ahura, and were regarded as the immediate fighters against the evil spirits, while Ahura himself did not enter personally into the contest. To make them fit in with the monarchy of Ahura they were made his creatures and servants, and they thus occupied a similar position to that of the angels of the Bible. Yet it may still be seen that they have an independent place of their own; some of them (*e.g.* Homa) are called the self-created ones, and Asura says, for example, of Mithra and the star-spirit Tistrya (Sirius), that he

made them so great that they are to be worshipped and honoured like himself. With these degraded old gods, the priestly speculation which elaborated the system of Mazdaism and composed the greater part of the Avesta, further combined new ideal figures, personified abstractions, in a narrower and a wider circle of heavenly beings. The narrower circle forms the immediate court of Ahura, and consists of the six "sacred immortals" (*amesha spenta* or Amshaspans), which along with him govern the seven girdles of the earth. They are as follows:—Vohu-mano, good intention, guardian spirit of men and afterwards of animals as well; Asha-vahista, the best purity, genius of fire and opposer of sickness and death; Kshathra-vairya, the desired rule, Lord of metals and of riches; Armaiti, earth-spirit, and at the same time spirit of wisdom and of piety; and finally, Haurvatat and Ameretat, abundance and immortality, genii of health and good spirits, and also of plants and waters. In each of these spirits one may discern at once a sensuous and an abstract meaning; and it would be interesting to know which of the two was the original and which the derivative; but this question cannot yet be answered with certainty. Perhaps all the spirits are not alike in this respect: in the case of Armaiti one might suppose the natural significance to be the original one. This spirit is found among the Indians too, with the same double meaning, as an earth-spirit and a genius of wisdom, and is thus seen to have belonged to the old-Aryan system.

A further circle of superior spirits of the good kind is formed of the "Reverent ones" (*Yazatas*) who are likewise partly remainders of the old-Aryan mythology, and partly new formations of an ideal kind. At the head of the first class stands *Mithra* the light-god, who became the god of truth and justice, as Varuna-Mitra did in the Vedas; then the fire-god Nairyo-sanha (in the Vedas this is a surname of Agni), the messenger between gods and men; the water-god Apam-napat (Neptune); the star-spirit Tistrya; then specially Haoma, the god of the draught of immortality (Vedic Soma); and finally, the enigmatical Anahita Ardvicura, the "spotless high one," whose name is sound Indo-Germanic, but whose character appears to

be quite Semitic, or pre-Semitic-accadic, as she is quite a counterpart of Mylitta-Ashera, the luxurious goddess of love and of birth. In addition to these Yazatas who spring from natural mythology, there are ideal personifications, the most interesting of which are Ahunavairya, the word of prayer, with which Zarathustra smote the evil spirits, at a later time called *Honover*, and existing by himself as a personal Logos or creative word, as Brahma proceeded from the word of prayer in the Vedas. The highest among the Yazatas, however, is *Sraosha*, the personification of hearing and accepting prayer, thus of worship, of which he is the founder and the pattern, as by the word of prayer he smites the evil spirits; he is also further the genius of joyful obedience and of watchfulness, *i.e.* the service of God in an extended sense. Here too it is an open question, and does not yet admit of an answer, whether Sraosha was originally the mythical comrade in arms of Mithra, his nature-significance being then spiritualised till he became a spiritual knight and mediator, or whether the latter *rôle* was the original one, and his connection with Mithra, as the tutelary god of truth and justice, a later addition.

Next to the Yazatas, and the last we come to as we descend, are the *Fravashis*, the genii or spirits which form the inner self and the immortal part of every being, divine or human, and which in the case of men, not only continue after the death of the body, but also preexist before birth, and even during life are distinguished from the visible person as his invisible guardian spirit. In many prayers the Fravashis of the Amshaspans and Yazatas, are named and invoked along with those of the holy men of the law (*e.g.* Zarathustra) and of the worshipper's nearest relatives, and at last with that of his own soul; and we even hear of the holy Fravashi of Ahura, whose soul is said to be the sacred word of revelation. . . . This doctrine is peculiar to the Persians, and is only found in a similar development in the Italian branch of the Indo-Germans, where the last consequences of it will meet us in the form of the worship of the emperors, to which the Persians approximated somewhat nearly. It has been attempted to explain it by a reference to animistic influences belonging to the indigenous worships of the two countries, and there

may be something in this; but the phenomenon may perhaps be more easily explained from ethical grounds. Is it quite fortuitous that genii should have played so great a part in the two eminently warlike and political peoples, who founded the greatest and most durable empires of antiquity? May we not find in this personification of the "self" an expression of the energetic spirit, conscious of purpose and of strength, of the conquering Persians and Romans, as, on the other hand, India's quietistic passivity is expressed in the negation in Indian religion of the independent Ego? I advance this merely as a hypothesis; but it is surely one which deserves consideration.

This kingdom of the good spirits, marshalled in a threefold circle, Amshaspans, Yazatas, and human Fravashis, about the monarchic head Ahura-mazda, is confronted by the kingdom of the evil spirits, the *Daevas* (the Daevas of the Vedas are here changed into hostile demons), which also, like a monarchy, have their head in Auro-mainyus or (Neo-Persian) Ahriman, the "attacking spirit." Among the evil spirits too we find some of the figures of Aryan nature-mythology, such as the well-known cloud-dragon Azhi Dahak, by the side of personifications of abstract notions (lies, anger, unchastity, and other vices). As the good spirits dwell in heavenly light, so these evil spirits dwell in the darkness of the west and the north, and in the under-world. The earth, as the middle region between heaven and the under-world, is the scene of the conflict of the two spiritual kingdoms. All the evil of the world, natural as well as moral, is due to the Daevas. After Ahura had made the world of good beings by his good word in 365 days, Ahriman brought into the good world all the kinds of evil; he made darkness in addition to light; besides the fruitful earth he made the barren waste and the cold snow-clad mountains; besides the plants bearing fruit, the plants which bear poison; besides the useful animals the beasts of prey and vermin; besides health and life, sickness and death. Especially he led men astray to lying, indolence, uncleanness, and all manner of sin. His work and his character are thus thoroughly opposed and antagonistic to that of the good god Ahura-mazda. In the earlier Mazdaism, however, Ahriman is by no means co-ordinated with Ahura-mazda as

a god of equal rank; he is not, like the latter, an independent creator, but only a destroyer of the good creation; he is not an object of worship of any kind, for worship is due to Ahura only, but an object to be constantly contended against, a contest in which it is the duty of good men to take their part with the heavenly spirits. If a man has done his duty in this conflict, his soul passes happily after death over the perilous bridge of Tshinwat, and is led by Sraosha to heaven, while those who by their wickedness or indolence have furthered the cause of Ahriman, are cast down to the abysses of the world, where they are tortured by the demons till they issue purified out of the great world-fire of the final judgment.

For the great world-struggle, as it once had a beginning, so it will also have an end. After the elapse of 3000 years from Zarathustra's revelation, Persian eschatology looks for the advent of the "Saviour," *Saoshyas* (Sosios), who will be born of a virgin mother, conceived by the holy spirit of Zarathustra, so that it will be in a measure the second coming of the latter. With him will then begin the general destruction of the world by fire, in which all evil, together with the wicked spirits, will be destroyed. Thereupon Saoshyas will renew the earth, awaken the dead, who will arise with a new purified body; sinners also, after they have been purged by this process, will take part in the general resurrection to a new blessed life. Herewith the last world-period begins, in which, just as in the first, Ahura-mazda will reign alone, and, all evil and all sin having disappeared out of the world, all will be pure light without shadow, and eternal life without change.

In the middle, between this ideal final state, and the equally ideal first state, in both of which the kingdom of God and of the good spirits is the sole reality, falls the period of discord and struggle which makes up the history of the earth just now. A disruption of the original peaceful unity could not but arise at the beginning of history, because beside Ahura-mazda and his good spirits, Ahriman and his evil band were also in existence. Whence did these come? To this question Persian dogmatics has no answer to give; neither on the one hand was Ahriman (like the devil of Christian dogmatics) originally a good spirit whom Ahura had created, and who by his

own revolt had become the enemy of God, nor on the other hand are Ahura and Ahriman twin brothers who both had their beginning in a common higher principle (endless time). It was in the latter way that a speculation dating from the Sassanide period sought to mend the dualism of Mazdaism, but rather succeeded in making it worse. The Mazdaic faith itself regarded Ahura as the supreme principle, the originally solitary and thus absolute deity, which suffered a certain limitation by the existence of Ahriman (which is not further explained), but only a relative and accidental limitation, since the hostile opposition had a beginning, and will have an end, and is thus only a temporary stage of transition between the unlimited sway of Ahura before it and after it. Parsism thus makes no attempt to harmonise the personification of evil in Ahriman with the absoluteness of the good God, by showing the cause of it, but it gives a theological explanation of the difficulty, inasmuch as it regards the history of the world as the means by which the conflict of principles which exists as a fact, is to be atoned, and the unlimited world-rule which the character of Ahura-mazda both requires and guarantees, brought to actual accomplishment. Parsism aimed like Brahmanism at upholding the absoluteness of God; but the latter purchased that absoluteness with the price of the reality of the world, and so only arrived at a stiff and lifeless infinity of the one sole existence, while Parsism regards the unlimitedness of God as the ideal which is working itself out in the real world, as an ethical problem not of speculation, but of history, and to be solved not by abstraction but by deeds.

The practical religiosity of Parsism assumed in consequence quite a different character from that prevailing in India. Worship there retained its old-Vedic simplicity; it is transacted without images and temples, almost without sacrifices, if we except the primitive Soma-libation, chiefly by kindling pure fire, and by hymns, the words of which are here also considered to possess a magical force for overcoming hostile spirits. But much more important to the believer in Mazda than the ceremonial of worship, is the practical religion of a moral life; purity of intention, and personal cleanliness, truthfulness in word, and courage in deed—these are the principal

weapons for overcoming the evil realm of spirits, for promoting the cause of Ahura-mazda. Man's whole moral life, his care of his own body, his civilising work in tilling the soil, taming animals, increasing his substance—then his marriage, the begetting and the bringing up of children, his social propriety, his ability as a citizen, and his bravery as a soldier, everything is regarded as important to religion, inasmuch as it must be turned into a means to further the kingdom of Ahura, and to lessen and weaken the power and rule of the enemy which shows itself in natural and in moral evils alike. If no difference is drawn between grave duties essentially bound up with morality, and mere statutory forms (*e.g.* rites of purification), yet on the whole this morality is a sound one, to which the Zarathustrian religion brought up the peoples who were attached to it, and there can be no doubt that it contributed essentially to the foundation and preservation of the Medo-Persian empire.

The most nearly related to the Persian religion is the *German.* It also hinges on the struggle of the good world-preserving gods with hostile elemental powers, and this dualism, rooted at first in natural mythology, took here also, at least with the North Germans or Scandinavians, an ethical turn, in which the annually recurring natural process was generalised into a momentous world-drama, in which ethical adumbrations, and motives, and religious truths were suggestively interwoven with the images of nature.

Of the old Indo-Germanic mythology the German legend of the gods preserved but few traces. The Indian generic name for gods, Deva, may be recognised in the curious appellation Tivar; the ordinary names are *Asas* and *Vanas:* the former is no doubt connected with Asura, and signifies "living beings," spirits; the latter is connected with Venus and *φαίνειν,* and signifies the shining ones, the fair ones; amounts accordingly to the same thing as Devas. The old-Aryan Dyaus maintains himself in a tribe here and there, specially among the Swabians (Zinvari = Zios-people). Here he is the heaven-god Zio, in the same twilight fashion as Dyaus himself in the Vedas; but for the most part he is to be found in the sword-god Tyr, and

has sunk to a secondary position. As the storm-god Indra drove out the old heaven-god in the Indian heroic period, so with the Germans the storm-god *Wodan*, or (in the North) Odhin, to be derived neither from Wüthen (rage, Scots *wud*), nor from "wander," but from the Vedic Vata or Vaju, the "blower" or wind-god, who is a companion of Indra, and in fact his double. The leader and hero of the heavenly conflict, he became the guardian of warriors and princes, the arbiter of battles, who apportions the death-lot and the lot of victory, who gathers together in his Walhalla those who fell in the combat, who grants riches to his brave friends (hence the Romans identified him with Mercury), but who also watches over the sacredness of right, of oaths and covenants. Finally, moreover, being the all-wise he is the inventor of the sacred magically-potent runes, hymns, and oracles, by whom seers and poets are inspired, and thus he unites in one supreme person the Greek trinity of Zeus, Apollo, and Athene. The weaknesses of Zeus, too, are not unknown to him; by his intrigues with the daughters of giants and by his love of gold, he brings mischief upon gods and upon the world, becomes a belated wanderer and a wild huntsman, and there is in his nature a certain weird element which gives ground for apprehension as to the duration of his rule. A simpler figure is his son Thor or Donar, who scarcely gets beyond the nature-meaning of the storm-god, save that he is the patron of agriculture and of marriage: as the god of peasants and of servants he was subordinated to the noble Wodan, although the older of the two.

A most peculiar position is that of *Loki* the fire-god (Lohe = flame, Scot. *lowe*), who, according to one version, is the brother of Wodan, according to another, his son by an earth-giantess. It is clear that at first he appears as the friend, the ally, the adviser of the gods in their fight with the giants, but afterwards becomes a faithless traitor who reveals their weaknesses, foretells their fall, and himself prepares it by bringing about the death of Balder. For this he is cast out of the world of the gods and put in chains, but at the last decisive battle he is to break loose again, and then to be destroyed along with the gods. This legend is in several points similar to the myth of

Prometheus, and suggests that both had a common origin in Indo-Germanic fire- and storm- myths. With the Greeks, however, the fire-god becomes a hero of human civilisation, who finally makes his peace with the gods, while with the Germans he becomes a hellish anti-god, who not only seriously threatens, like Ahriman, the continuance of the gods' rule, but at last actually brings ruin both on them and on himself. Loki is thus the personification of imperfection, of innate contradiction with the idea of the divine, in fact, of the untruth of this world of nature-gods, in which, objectively at least, a prophecy is contained of a true belief in God afterwards to appear. This idea is represented from another side in *Balder*, who was originally a sun or light-god, and then, like the Indian-Iranian Mithra, became the personification of moral innocence and purity, goodness and wisdom. He is said to be the wisest and the most beautiful of the Asas, who alone never had part in any wickedness, and is therefore loved by gods and men, but who yet falls a sacrifice to the wickedness of Loki, and thus, suffering the penalty of all, represents typically in advance the future fate of all the gods. This incident of the dying sun-god is otherwise unknown to Indo-German mythology proper; where it is found with the Greeks (Herakles, Dionysos), Semitic influences may be traced. I think it likely that the Balder-myth came to the North Germans from some other country (perhaps from a pre-Germanic indigenous religion); the more so as it was not known to the south Germans, as we may infer from German popular story. Instead of it we there find legends which correspond to the Indo-Germanic sun-myths, as that of *Freyr*, who in autumn goes to a far country and comes back again in spring, again to be united in the mountain cave with his wife *Freya* who has waited for him, or to release his bewitched bride out of the fire-tower, or to win again the bride whom the giants had carried off (hence the stories of returning home, the legends of Tannhäuser, Dornröschen, Brunhilde, etc.).

Accordingly, the well-known legend of the *Twilight of the gods* (*Gotterdämmerung*) must be reckoned not to belong to German mythology, but to the Scandinavian north, the home of the Eddas. Even there, I should conjecture, it only received its last form at a time

when Christianity was pressing in, and the fall of the old gods was already beginning to appear as a doom which history would shortly fulfil. That this should have filled a bard who believed in the gods with a certain tragic resignation is quite natural, as it would be unnatural to regard the melancholy tone of a tragic romance as the religious key-note of the Germans generally, a people which had joy in living, and was conscious of energy. A people which believes in itself and its own future, as the German tribes certainly did during the migration period, cannot possibly believe in the ruin of its gods, unless when it has already made acquaintance with a higher faith, which it instinctively feels to be superior and destined to prevail. I am therefore convinced that a closer study of the Eddas will show the legend of the twilight of the gods to be a late product of heathenism when slowly retreating before Christianity, and inwardly broken and divided. Positive Christian influences were also at work in the production. In the mythology of the south Germans, on the other hand, those German forefathers of ours among whom the fall of the old gods took place much more rapidly, there is no trace to be found of the shadow coming before the fall of the gods, nor of the prelude of it in the death of Balder. For all this it is not to be doubted that German religion could not have produced before it withered a flower of such peculiar beauty as the idea of the universal world-tragedy, had it not possessed from the first, like the religion of the Persians and no other in that period, an eminently moral and earnest character, which enabled it to see in the conflict of the good, world-preserving powers, against the rude, world-destroying elemental powers, the essential nature of the great world-process, and in faithful co-operation in this conflict, in the brave devotion of all one's power to the good cause of the gods, the great task of human existence.

At its earliest Pelasgian stage of development the religion of the *Greeks*[1] was not essentially different from the Indo-Germanic

[1] For the literature see Tiele's *Outlines*, p. 201. There may also be added Maury, *Histoire des religions de la Grèce antique*, 2 vols. 1857.

nature-religion which prevailed among other peoples. The Pelasgian Zeus, as he was worshipped at Dodona, is the heaven-spirit of nature, just like Dyaus, Indra, Zio, and others. His oracle was the rustling of the oak, and thunder, as with the Germans. Human sacrifices occurred in Arcadia and Messenia. By the side of Zeus, Dione (the female form of Diu) was worshipped at Dodona, Herê at Olympia, and in Arcadia Hermes and Pan as the god of shepherds and the god of flocks. The sanctuaries were sacred groves and heights, such as the Thessalian and Elian Olympus, and Mount Lycaeon in Arcadia. There were no actual images of the gods any more than in the Vedic, Persian, and German religions; there were, however, symbols and articles of worship of the nature of fetiches, such as sacred trees, and rough-hewn stakes and stones.

The advance of the Greeks from this rude nature-religion to a moralised religion of civilisation, the gods of which were the ideals of beautiful humanity, the worship of which was the root and centre of splendid artistic achievement, was the consequence partly of the rich natural endowment of this race, partly and very specially of the manifold intercourse the tribes of Greece maintained with each other and with the Semitic civilisation of Western Asia. "In the religion of Greece we see the first fair fruit of the union of the Indo-Germanic or Aryan with the Semitic or Chamitic—the dawn of a new age" (Tiele). Throughout Greek mythology we trace the various elements of this mixture, some of them fused very early into new and distinct myth-formations, some of them, however, resisting such fusion, and by their intractable nature betraying their foreign origin. To the latter class belong most markedly the legends of Kronos, who mutilates his father, devours his children, and is overcome and deposed by his son Zeus. Whatever may be the etymology of this Kronos, a point which is still doubtful, he is certainly not of Greek or even Indo-Germanic origin, but one of those savage deities of begetting and destroying Nature, which are peculiar to the Semitic nature-religions; it is certain that there never was a time when this thoroughly un-Greek form lived as a god, and was the object of worship, in the minds of the Greeks. On this point we must not allow

the "Theogony" of Hesiod to lead us astray, a work which in many instances disarranged popular legends with foreign Asiatic speculation.

What gave the Greek legend of the gods its rich articulation and development and its fixed, and to some extent canonical, authority for the whole nation, was the *Homeric poetry.* Here the gods are no longer beings without freedom, bound to their element, but free, as it were human, persons, who act upon human life, watch as guardians over the moral ordinances of society, and, as earthly princes gather around their king for council and action, recognise in Zeus their common head. Their anthropomorphification being completed, and their detachment from the ground of nature accomplished, the Homeric gods have also outgrown those conflicts with the hostile powers of nature which are so largely present in the Vedic and Germanic, particularly the Persian religions; the Titans and giants who sought to dispute with them the sovereignty of the world, have been conquered in a far past age, and the rule of the Olympians over the world of nature and of man is established beyond dispute. It is not, however, quite unlimited. Not only are the various gods in many ways at discord with each other, so that they frequently cross each other's paths and interfere with each other's plans: the whole power of the gods, even when concentrated in the one hand of Zeus, is limited by the mysterious and inevitable power of fate. "Moira," fate, in presence of which even Zeus in Homer confesses himself impotent, is not to be taken as an indication of monotheism (whether as a survival or a germ); it is not a divine power at all, it is not a reasonable purpose or a guiding will; it is the necessity which as a fact lies in things themselves, the nexus of cause and effect in the course of the world, the cosmic law of causality, objective, inexorable, the hard opposite to all subjective wishing and willing, and thus to every particular will, whether of gods or men. That the anthropomorphic gods find in fate a limit to their will, is only so much as to say that their will is like the finite and capricious will of man, which follows his own particular ends, and is not yet identified with that which is in its own nature necessary, the reasonable order of the world. The arbitrary will of the gods, not being in itself reason-

able, but swayed by selfish passions, is confronted by the necessity of the world, it also unreasonable, a fate which rules blindly, not with a view to ends. The one is the exact counterpart of the other; and hence at a later period the limit of fate disappears more and more completely in proportion as the will of Zeus ceases to be a capricious and selfishly limited will, and is seen to be one with the reasonable law of goodness, the moral order of the world. But in Homer, and generally in the popular polytheistic Greek way of thinking of God, we are still very far from this point; here the gods were so completely in the likeness of men as to be types not only of human virtues, but of the opposite qualities as well, of human weaknesses and passions (compare above, p. 39). The degradation of the old nature-myths by the epic poets into burlesque legends of the love-intrigues, adulteries, frauds, and quarrels of the gods and heroes, could never tend to increase piety towards the gods, and this is true even though we should admit that the mythological legends had no immediate connection with the religious God-consciousness. In these moral weaknesses certainly, as well as in their dependence on fate, we see the inherent limitation which the Greek gods, in spite of all their ethicised humanity, could never transcend, because their roots were indissolubly connected with the soil of the nature-life out of which they sprang. A survey of the principal figures of the Greek legends of the gods will make this plain.

The highest place in the circle of the Olympians is occupied by the trinity of Zeus, Apollo, and Athene, who form a moral unity in respect of the fact that no conflict of will or thought ever divides them, Athene simply representing the wisdom, and Apollo the word, of the Father of the gods. In Zeus the old Indo-Germanic heaven-God has become the king of heaven and earth, the type of princely dignity, the patron of civil order and justice, the disposer of the fortunes both of peoples and individuals. Attempts of the other gods occur here and there in Homer to resist his will, but they effect nothing, and recoil on the heads of the rebels themselves. It may be said on the whole that even in Homer "all the gods are in reality nothing more than representatives of Zeus, each in his own sphere,

which Zeus has assigned him: monarchism here approaches nearly to monotheism" (Tiele). We shall afterwards see how in the hands of the poets and thinkers of the sixth century it more and more attained to this goal. In Apollo and Athene the ideal nature of Zeus divides itself into two separate figures, which even in point of their natural significance are closely connected with the heaven-god. It is still uncertain what Athene originally stood for: according to Max Müller the name is derived from the Vedic Ahana and Ahania, which signify the "Dawning-one" and the "Brightness of day;" according to Maury, Athene as Tritogeneia is originally the same as Amphitrite, and both are to be derived from the Vedic Trita Aptya, and to be explained as "she who is born in the midst of the waters:" and her attributes finally,—the ægis with the gorgon-head indicates the thunder-cloud, the spear the lightning, while her birth from the head of Zeus also points to a thunderstorm-goddess. Perhaps the two first interpretations may be combined with the last; the thunderstorm causes the upper waters to stream down from the clouds, whereupon the clear ether, born as it were out of the cloud-sea or out of the split head of the cloud-sky, appears in the height of heaven, the victorious brightness dawning again out of the vanquished darkness of the thunder-cloud. At all events, this original nature-meaning is excellently suited by the later ethical one, according to which Athene is the goddess of wisdom, prudence, art and science, eloquence and politics; as once at the side of Zeus she laid the rude Titans low with the lightning-spear, so now with the ray of reason and culture she overcomes all the rudeness and boorishness of human society, and as the guiding thought of divine providence leads mankind forward on the path of noble refinement.[1]

Apollo, who of all the sons of Zeus stands nearest him, and is his ideal image and the mediator of his revelation, was originally a sun- and light-god, whom the Greeks received from the allied race of the Lycians, and whose worship was diffused and elevated to a high

[1] A closely-allied form is that of the Vedic Sarasvati, who also was originally the goddess of the (heavenly and earthly) waters, and the helper of Indra in the dragon-battle of the thunderstorm, and also came afterwards to be the goddess of eloquence.

importance chiefly by the Dorians. With the Greeks he lost his nature-significance from the very first, an easy change, as that significance was already connected with Helios; and thus the light-god became more completely the exalted type and author of intellectual illumination, poetic inspiration, prophetic revelation, and priestly atonement. As "leader of the Muses," he was the teacher of truth and beauty, and at the same time as god of divination and purification he was the true mediator of revelation, and founder of the most important cults; thus he embodies in his own person the triad which to the Greek mind was inseparable, of the true, the beautiful, and the good, or of religion, morals, and civilisation. He became the founder of purifying propitiatory rites, from the fact that during his eight years' service of Admetus as his shepherd, he submitted to a purificatory atonement by which he became a "truly pure Phœbus," who could now act as a compassionate maker of atonement for sinful men, whose lot he knew from his own experience.[1] Still more important was his position as the god of revelation. In the centuries between the Doric migration and the Persian wars, his sanctuary at Delphi was the religious and political centre for the Greek tribes, and a most important instrument in furthering their national unity and their moral education. The utterances of the somnambulous priestess of Apollo, the Pythia, were a matter of small importance; the main point was the editorial setting and interpretation of them by the priesthood of Delphi. The latter dealt less in revealings of the future than in directions for wise conduct in the present; the intimate knowledge the priests possessed of the circumstances of the Greek states and towns, as well as their freedom from local interests and prejudices, enabled them to issue useful counsels as the commands of their god. The earnest view they took of his nature made them feel themselves called to be the prophets of his will, and thus their counsels were willingly accepted by those who received them as revelations of superior wisdom. Their influ-

[1] Aeschylus, *Suppliants*, 214-15—

> "The pure Apollo we invoke heaven's fugitive
> Who knows this human lot, and can forgive."

ence extended to political affairs, to the institutions of worship and to general movements of civilisation; they sanctioned codes of laws and constitutions, and advised the founding of colonies, the making of war and the conclusion of peace: the introduction of festivals, and even the arrangement of the public games, which were of such vast importance for the whole social life of the Greeks, was subject to their direction. Their influence was also felt in literature and art; they set the tone of poetry, religious and profane (Hesiod, Pindar) and were connected with the philosophical efforts of their day (Pythagoras, the seven wise men, and Socrates too at a later time). But it was in the moral consciousness of the Greeks that the worship of Apollo showed most of its educative power; it required self-examination and self-command as the highest duties; the pure deity was to be approached not with outward ceremonies of purification, but with a pure heart; for the good man, a drop from the Castalian spring might be sufficient; the ocean itself would never wash away the sins of the wicked. The false and double-tongued finds no illumination at the hand of the Delphian God, the evil-doer no help; but to the weak he extends protection, and to the penitent forgiving grace. Not the mortification of nature, but wise control of it by the clear self-conscious, free spirit, truthfulness and moderation, a fine harmony of sense and reason, such were the main features of the Delphic service of Apollo, in which the popular religion of the Greeks attained its highest development, not to speak here of the æsthetic illumination which the Dionysus-cult underwent in Attic tragedy.

The process of spiritualising the nature-meaning of the gods began at least with the other gods too, though it did not go so far with them as with Zeus, Apollo, and Athene. *Hermes* or Hermeias is derived from the Vedic Sarameyas, the heavenly watch-dog of Jama, a zoomorphic wind-deity who drives in the celestial cows, the rain-clouds. In his oldest Pelasgian significance, therefore, Hermes appears as a shepherd-god, who is connected with the fertility of meadows and flocks. Very old is also the function he wears as the leader of souls to the under-world, and generally as the conductor of

the intercourse between the earth and the upper and under worlds. At a later time he came to be the patron of business intercourse on earth, of travellers, merchants, and also of thieves. Whether his relation to music is derived from the shepherd's pipe, or from the whispering, rustling, roaring, whistling, and shrieking of the winds, we need not seek to determine. And that the god of music should afterwards come to preside over the higher arts of the Muses, eloquence, and even philosophy, is a thing we cannot call inconceivable, and is at least more likely than the connection of this function with the wind-nature of the god. *Dionysus* is one of the most interesting figures of the Greek Pantheon. His name is derived, according to Max Müller, from the Vedic Dyu-nise or Dyu-nisya ("Day and Night"), and designates him as the son of heaven and earth, in whom the heavenly fire is combined with earth's moisture to compose the fire-juice of the grape, as in India the Soma-draught of the gods.[1] The Soma-myth is found feature for feature in the myth of Dionysus; in his fire-birth of Semele, his growing to maturity in his father's thigh, his education by the nymphs of the springs on the mountains, and in his names Bacchus also (Dakcha = the strong), and Dithyrambos or Dimetor (Dwidjamnan = the twice-born), and finally, in his old Pelasgic signification as god of the rustic harvest and of harvest joy. So far this god is primitively Greek; but at the same time of subordinate importance. On this old stem from Crete, however, there was budded a new sapling of Semitic origin: as Dionysus Zagreus he reproduced the dying, dismembered, and then reviving sun-deities (Adonis, etc.), and thus there came to be in the Dionysus-myth the double character of joyful life and dying pain, which led to the most important developments in the cultus of the mysteries and in tragic art.

By the side of the heaven-god there always stood with the Greeks, as with all the Indo-Germans, the earth-goddess as his spouse. In different tribes she had, however, different names and forms: Dione, Herê, and Demeter were the oldest and the most

[1] M. Müller, *Origin of Religion*, p. 284, note; Maury, *Histoire des Religions de la Grèce*, i. 118 *sq.*

widely diffused. In local cults there also appeared those women whom the epic myth afterwards lowered to the rank of heroines, and placed in irregular connections with Zeus; while they also were originally forms of the earth- or moon- goddess (often both combined): Leto, Io, Semele, Europa, Danaë, Alcmene, etc. In the Homeric Pantheon *Herê* was the acknowledged queen of heaven, and though her married life with the heaven-father did not afford exactly a pattern of unity, yet art and worship invested her with the whole dignity of the matron and the protectress of marriage. *Demeter* was more constant to her original significance as "Mother Earth," and as such was the goddess of agriculture, of marriage, and of settled life, in which the beginnings of civilisation had their roots, of which civilisation she was therefore regarded as the founder. In this respect she is nearest akin to Hestia, the patroness of the domestic hearth, and to Thetis, the goddess of law and order. Thus the legend of Demeter was originally altogether Greek in its character, but it received, like that of Dionysus, a foreign addition in the myth of the rape of her daughter Core by the death-god Hades, who bore her off from the meadow (she is the blossom of spring) to the under world, where she became the death-goddess Persephone, but on her mother's complaining to Zeus, received permission to return to the earth for a few months every year. This legend reminds us so exactly of the legends of descents into hell among the Assyrians (more particularly Accadians) and Fins (Turanians), and is so foreign to the Indo-Germanic circle of thought that one is led to suppose a Semitic origin for it. We shall afterwards see what significance she attained for the cultus of the mysteries. The case of *Artemis* is similar, genuine Greek and Semitic traits being found together in it; but here they are not fused into a unity; the contrast between the virgin moon-goddess and sister of Apollo, and the luxurious and cruel Artemis of Asia Minor, Crete, and Taurus, who was worshipped either with the sacrifice of chastity or with bloody human sacrifices (Iphigenia), was never unnoticed by the Greeks. If Dionysus, Demeter, and Artemis are deities who were originally Greek, but were modified by Semitic influences, *Aphrodite*, on the

other hand, appears to be an originally Semitic goddess, who was afterwards refined by Greek taste. That she is related with the Phœnician goddess of the water and of love, we see from her Cyprian or Cytherean origin, her birth from the sea, her connection with Cinyras, Adonis, Pygmalion; and finally, her worship at Corinth, where Asiatic naturalism maintained itself. From this naturalistic side of her character, represented in "Aphrodite Pandemos," the ideal side, that of "Aphrodite Urania" detached itself, in which artists worshipped the inspiring goddess of beautiful form, and philosophers the goddess of harmony, who holds the universe together, the goddess of social harmony and cosmic order.

To the story of the gods strictly so called there is joined the *legend of heroes*, in which divine and human, nature-myth and historic legend, are so intimately connected, that it is often difficult to say whether what we have before us in a particular case is a god become man, or a man deified, made a demigod, a son of a god or otherwise kindred to the gods; in other words, whether the origin of the myth is to be sought in the deified natural phenomena of primitive mythology, or in great figures of history turned divine in memory. Both are often united, and all that can be said is that one of the two sides, the divine (nature-mythological) or the human (historical) element has obtained the preponderance; and it is evident that the latter is distinctly the case when the heroic legend is of late origin, while the oldest of these legends are as much nature-myths as the divine legend itself, from which it is not marked off by any clear line. This is specially the case of the two most important of the Greek heroic legends, Prometheus and Heracles. In *Prometheus* recent investigation has recognised an Indo-Germanic fire-god. Originally he played a part like that of Agni, the part of a mediator in civilisation between gods and men; then he came to stand against the gods as the representative and agent of men, and thus he was brought into connection with the enemies of the gods, the Titans. In Hesiod he appears as the son of the Titan Japetos (a connection of Ptah, the Egyptian fire-god?), and as at first the ally of the gods, who afterwards, out of compassion for the privations of men, brought

them the gift of fire which had been arbitrarily withheld from them, and so taught them the beginnings of all the arts. Thus the "most benevolent demon" became a typical representative of the daring human mind: in his efforts after progress he deems that he can defy the gods, but is cast into the deepest misery, in which he becomes aware of his impotence, desists from his pride, and is freed from his bondage by the saving act of Heracles, a son of the gods, and makes his peace with the gods again. This myth, one of the profoundest to be found among any people, was expounded by Æschylus in a great trilogy of guilt, judgment, and redemption, a prefiguration of the Christian mystery of redemption. The *Heracles* legend is indebted to many quarters: Indo-Germanic and Semitic nature-mythology have a hand in it as well as many historical tribal legends. Originally Heracles may, in all probability, have been an Indo-Germanic god like Indra or Thor or Vishnu-Krishna, whom he most strikingly resembles. In the Greek Epos he is the son of Zeus and Alcmene, and is a type of knightly courage, proving itself in endless battles and labours, and everywhere using its power for the good of those who are oppressed—a "Saviour and Liberator" of mankind. A further and a very peculiar trait is that Heracles has to suffer the undeserved hatred of Herê, and to be the servant of Eurystheus, a worse man than himself, so that his beneficent heroism is at the same time a self-denying sacrifice which he takes upon himself for the love of men, and by which he earns his exaltation among the gods, which takes place when he burns himself on Mount Œta. This last trait is plainly formed upon the Semitic sun-myths of Melcarth, Sandon, and Samson; and the trait, which occurs nowhere else in Indo-Germanic heroes, of the hero suffering and submitting to humiliation, is no doubt drawn from Semitic sources. It was an easy step for didactic moral story, to make of this divine hero an ideal man, who, in the faithful service of virtue, proves his exalted origin, and deserves his final elevation to the Olympians; the opposite picture to Prometheus, whose titanic pride in his own strength leads him to quarrel with the gods, and plunges him into ruin, a ruin from which none but Heracles, the hero who is faithful to the gods,

can set him free. There thus lies in these two legends of heroes the mythic prototype of the "first and second Adam," the introducer and the conqueror of death.

Such were the divine and heroic legends which formed the common material the popular religion of Greece had to work upon. We may now cast a glance on the treatment of this material in the Attic cults of *Dionysus* and *Demeter*. The worship of these deities of the field and vineyard was much more popular in character than other modes of religion in Greece, greatly more popular in especial than the worship of Apollo, which was aristocratic and priestly. The Dionysiac festivals in spring and harvest were true people's holidays, in which there was no lack at any time of song and noise, dancing and games. In these festival songs (Dithyrambs), which were given with mimic movements, the antiphonal parts were gradually expanded into dialogues with two speakers, later with several, and thus the Greek *drama* arose. The tragedies and comedies of an Æschylus and Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes, were written for the festival performances at the Attic Dionysia. The lofty ideality of these poetic works is mainly due to the religious purpose for which they were written, but also in part to the peculiar combination of cheerfulness and earnestness, life-joy and death-pain which was peculiar to those Attic cults—a consequence of the admixture of Semitic with Greek humanity. That change of moods which answers to the changing fortunes of the dying and returning deity is in itself a dramatic sketch, and that it should have been artistically worked up in tragedy and comedy by a people so æsthetically constituted as the Greeks, especially the Greeks of Attica, is no more than natural.

But splendid as these dramatic representations were, the public festival did not entirely satisfy the deeper longings of the heart for consolation, and for salvation from the ills of life and from death. The deeper satisfaction after which the worships of Dionysus and Demeter themselves awakened a craving, was therefore sought in the secret rites attached to these worships. The *mysteries* were really nothing but dramatic representations of the fortunes of those

deities, extended over several acts, accompanied with sacrifices, processions, purifications, and festival songs of various kinds, and creating the sense of being brought into a mysterious union for life and for death. The minor mysteries, at the beginning of spring, represented the death of Dionysus and his coming to life again. There followed in autumn the "great Eleusinians," which began with a set dramatic representation of the rape of Persephone, and the search of Demeter, her complaints and wanderings; after this came an esoteric celebration for the initiated; after the exhibition of the sacred symbols of death and ever new life, they descended with Demeter into the under-world, namely, into the subterranean spaces of the temple, and were led through places of terror till they gained the Holy of holies, where strange light and melodious music transported them into the fields of the blessed. The final act took place by night, and consisted of a torch-light celebration of the reunion of Demeter with her daughter Persephone. The idea underlying these representations may be easily recognised; it is that man has to share with the deities the deepest pains and the terrors of death, but that he may see in their life, which rises again out of death, the type and earnest of his own better life after death, especially of the great law of the conquest of evil by goodness. Hence Sophocles calls the initiated of Eleusis thrice happy, whom a blessed life awaits in the under-world, where for others there is nothing but tribulation and need. The mysteries accordingly led through the symbolism of worship to the very ideas which Greek philosophy was striving in another way to lay hold of; to a moral view of the world greatly exceeding in profundity the naïve sensuousness of the nature-religion, and better satisfying the needs of the heart.

How far such a view of the world was attainable on the soil of Greek religion, we may see most readily in the three poets whose religious thought was formed mainly under the influence of the Eleusinian mysteries: Pindar, Æschylus, and Sophocles. The basis of *Pindar's* view of the world is a deep sense of the dependence of man on the divine power, and of reverence for its wise government, to which nothing foolish, but only what is good is to be attributed;

this confidence is not yet quite free from fear of the gods' mysterious caprice and disfavour. In Zeus Pindar sees the sum of divine perfection, he has a presentiment of his infinity and his unity with the law of the world, and often calls him simply "the God," he alone being God in the full sense of the word: the many gods are thus lowered to subordinate instruments of his will. Man he admonishes to be mindful of his impotence and transitoriness, which separates him from the deity; but at the same time he sees in man's reason that side of his nature which is allied to God, and requires that we should exercise this side of our nature by always having an eye to the moderation of our acts.

In the tragedies of *Æschylus* we may see the turning-point of the Greek mind, at which it rose from the natural to the moral gods —the change finds powerful expression under the mythic form of conflicts of gods and heroes.

> "Know thou thyself and change to manners new,
> For a new tyrant rules among the gods!"—*Prom.* 309. 10.

These words, with which Prometheus is exhorted to desist from his foolish defiance, and to bend meekly under the just government of Zeus, the poet too addresses to his age. That the fortunes of peoples and of individuals are not subject to a blind fate, but governed by a recompensing righteousness which allows no sins to be unpunished, which follows inexorably the sinner who deems himself secure, but which also, being a moral will of goodness, leaves room for forgiving grace, this is the fundamental idea which goes through all his dramas. The idea reaches its highest expression in the *Eumenides.* After the decision of Athene, the wise goddess of government and of public welfare, the Erinnyes, formerly the inexorable goddesses of the rude old custom of blood revenge, are changed into the beneficent Eumenides, kind guardians of civic order and law. Thoroughly Greek is the frequently recurring thought that moderation, self-restraint in freedom, is the health of the soul, which brings outward prosperity also in its train. Yet even the unhappy one who suffers innocently may assure himself of the divine help.

"Near to the sorrowful is the divinity,—
Pain is ordained him, yet shall he have
Glory, pain's dearest child, for his comfort;
It is good to be taught, though with tears."

In the dramas of *Sophocles* the humane religiosity and morality of the Greeks attained its highest point. The whole conflict of the gods for rule is past, the government of Zeus is universally acknowledged, and is no longer an object of shrinking fear, but rather of joyful confidence and child-like devotion. It sounds like a word of the Bible when the chorus calls to Electra fearful and complaining:

"Fear not, my child; still mighty in the sky
Is Zeus who ruleth all things and surveys.
Commit to him thy wrath that surgeth high,
And walk in safer ways." [1]

To the mind of Sophocles the character of the deity is more human and more mild than it had been to Pindar and Æschylus; before his punitive retribution comes the wisdom and goodness of his providence. And as God has grown more human, men also have grown with him more divine; their inner life is much deeper and richer, their characters much more varied and more complex; the individual conscience is already struggling to free itself from the bondage of universal custom, and rising to the thought of the "unwritten eternal law of the gods," which is more to be regarded than every ordinance of man. In that conflict between the law of the moral person and the law of social order, between the divine in conscience and the divine in the world, in which a breath of the modern spirit meets us from the lines of the *Antigone* the moral idea of the tragic is taken back to its deepest source. But to find the atonement of this conflict in the thought of an all-embracing highest end of the human race, a divine kingdom in which the human person finds its godlike dignity and worth in giving itself up in that love which accepts service and suffering for the good of society, this was denied to Sophocles, was denied to the Greek spirit altogether. The tragic conflict is only externally atoned here by the common ruin of the conflicting parties, it is not inwardly atoned in the thoughts and

[1] Tr. by Professor Lewis Campbell.

feelings of the persons themselves.[1] Hence even the cheerful humanity of Sophocles is mixed throughout with a touch of melancholy resignation, the dark riddle of human fate is after all unsolved, and nothing remains but the practical counsel to submit meekly to the ruling will of the god whose counsel irresistibly fulfils itself in good fortune and in bad.

While Æschylus and Sophocles idealised the gods of Greek mythology without at the same time breaking with the popular beliefs, or even suggesting that there was any difference between the ideal contents they supplied and the form with which tradition had provided them, reflection of this kind makes its appearance in the dramas of *Euripides*, where doubt is cast on the traditional ways of thinking of the old religion, in such a way as clearly to show that Greek religion had already entered on its decay. With Euripides this doubt is far from being a mere frivolous pleasure in destroying what is sacred; it is rather the struggling of a spirit ideal in its aims, a struggle which is itself tragical, to save for himself and his people something permanent out of the inevitable impending shipwreck of the popular faith, to save the belief in a holy world-order, a wise divine government which, all the riddles of experience notwithstanding, yet guides human destiny to a salutary end.[2] The effort to give spirituality to the external mythical way of thinking of religion, to transfer the oracle to man's own breast, to find a psychological explanation of the necessity of fate in the dialectic of the passions, to engage the feelings of the spectators in sympathy and then raise them by suggestive sentences on the features of the particular case, to the height of universal truths; all this sounds to us like the language of the modern spirit (Schiller, Browning), and testifies to the approach of a new age, a profounder and more human

[1] Compare the powerful complaint of Antigone when being led away to death; the sombre painfulness of it is not relieved by the faintest ray of comfort or hope or joy in the sacrifice she is making.

[2] Zeus, whosoe'er thou be, O hard to know,
Necessity of Nature, or the mind of man,
Thee I invoke: Thou on a noiseless path
To a right end dost guide all human things.—*Troades*, 886.

inner life. But in spite of this, the old faith of the people is not to be directly assailed, ingenious reason is not to exalt itself in a light spirit above the beliefs of the older generation, the new spirit is to settle its affairs with tradition as gently as possible. The pious poet is fully in earnest when he exhorts—

> "What pious fathers taught,
> What time has sanctified,
> Pert logic shall not change,
> The highest human thought
> Shall not destroy!"

These examples may suffice to show how the poets sought to develop the religion of Greece by extracting the ideal kernel of it out of the husks of mythology, without entirely discarding the latter. Zeus was exalted far above the other gods as in fact the only god, and the others were lowered to his ministers and instruments, almost to the position the angels of the Bible occupy towards God. And Zeus was more and more released even from the limitation of fate (p. 91), the latter being recognised as one with his will and decree, as his own reasonable, wise, and good ordering and government of the world, towards which man feels no longer shrinking fear, but a reverence which is full of confidence, and which proceeds to manifest itself in moral shrinking from evil, well-considered self-government, and wise moderation. We need not hesitate to say that the monarchical primacy the Father of the gods enjoyed from the beginning has here advanced to a *practical monotheism* of no small moral and religious value. How wide the interval may have been between this view of God, held by the best in Hellas, and that of the multitude, it is hard to say. Dramatic and plastic art no doubt did something to fill up the gap, when the people gathered at the Dionysiac festivals to listen to the powerful choruses of the tragedians, or beheld in the Olympian Zeus, as Phidias had made him, the union of majestic greatness, quiet power, clear wisdom, and mild benevolence; it may have felt itself raised, if only for the moment, to the idea of god of an Æschylus, a Sophocles, a Phidias. But how much of this exercised any practical influence on their lives? Who

can judge of this? And was it with the Greeks only that a wide distance lay between the highest ideals of the best spirits and the common every-day thinking of the multitude?

While Greek art thus sought to improve the popular religion by purifying and idealising it in practice, the philosophy which was cultivated at the same time was on the one hand preparing for its dissolution by direct polemical attacks on the traditional mythology, and on the other hand attempting to provide a substitute for it by setting up a new philosophical view of the world. So early as the 6th century B.C. the Eleatic *Xenophanes* had made the gods' likeness to men and the moral infirmities the Epic poets had attributed to them, the subject of ridicule and of the severest condemnation: the divine, he taught, must only be conceived as the perfect, and therefore only as one. "One god is the highest both for gods and men, and he is not to be compared to mortals in form nor yet in thoughts." This one is all eye, all ear, all thought, "who governs everything without trouble by the insight of his understanding." The philosophical opponent of the Eleatics, *Heraclitus* of Ephesus, was yet at one with them in condemning the myths, the worship of images and animal sacrifices. During the course of the 5th century the decay of the Delphic cult of Apollo, combined with the enlightening influence of natural science which was then beginning to be studied, as well as increasing contact with peoples of other faiths, tended to produce a sceptical rationalism, of which the *Sophists* were the most famous representatives. They held a position of unbounded subjectivism, which made man in all his fortuitous opinions and movements of will the measure of all things, and in religion as well as in state and in society they saw a mere work of arbitrary human invention, devised in the interests of rulers and priests. As it always happens in similar circumstances, this shallow radicalism found great applause and wide acceptance among the half-cultured illuminated multitude. The state thought it necessary to meet the threatened decay of religion and morality by measures of repression aimed at the innovators; but as it frequently happens in such circumstances, it only made the evil worse, since its attacks were directed at the

very men who could have done most to cope with it effectually and permanently—Anaxagoras, Pericles, Phidias, and most of all that equally pious and profound and original thinker, Socrates.

Socrates, like the Sophists, set out from man to understand the world, but instead of making superficial thought the measure of things, he required that man should first of all know himself aright, and learn to understand his own true and reasonable ends, so that through self-knowledge he might attain to moral cultivation, virtue, piety, and happiness. That knowledge which, in the hands of the Sophists, was an instrument for the decomposition of faith and manners, was, according to Socrates, to turn its gaze upon itself, and so to prove the means of building up a firm practical conviction of truth and goodness. As he was aware of a divine voice within himself, which served him as an infallible warner and counsellor, an inner oracle, so he found everywhere in the world the traces of an all-wise and all-knowing, almighty and all-good reason, which transcends ours as much as the magnitude of the world transcends that of our body. Holding these views he was far from making any attack on the popular religion, and always manifested in the clearest way his piety towards the faith and the usages of his fathers. He certainly conceived of the many gods, just as Pindar or Sophocles did, as the subordinate assistants of the one former and preserver of the universe; in this way they no longer presented any difficulty to practical piety, or to the recognition of one sole order and government of the world according to the best plan. Could any style of thought have brought about a treaty between the ancestral faith and the needs of a more advanced age, that of Socrates certainly might have done so. In rejecting him the Greek people pronounced the coming doom of their religion and their state, just as the Jewish people did when they condemned Jesus.

But if Socrates was not to prove the reformer of the religion of his people, there yet sprang up from his sowing a fruit which was to have a great future, the idealistic view of the world of *Plato*. The greatest of the disciples of Socrates extended his master's principle of self-knowledge to the knowledge of the supersensuous world of

pure forms, of the prototypal ideas and laws of being, and by this step the bond was loosed which, in the classic Greek world, connected nature and spirit in an indivisible unity. The spirit turned into itself and found in the world of thoughts that truth of things which the appearances of the senses did not contain, that highest good which the pleasure of the senses could not yield, that permanent home for which the world of fleeting phenomena gave no place. The fair world of the senses in which the Greek formerly drank deep of the pleasure of living, now sinks to an unessential appearance, a deceitful shadow-picture, the bonds of which are to the human soul which comes from above, a painful fetter, a dark cell, from which it cannot escape too quickly, to put on the likeness of its divine prototype. The watchword is no longer merely moderation in natural enjoyment, not merely balance and harmony of nature with spirit, but detachment from nature, flight from the bonds of the senses to the supersensuous world of thought. With this metamorphosis of theoretical and moral thought, the consciousness of God also assumes a new form; the Platonic deity which is one with the highest idea of pure being and knowledge, or of the perfect, of the highest good, is at last completely removed from the ground of nature, and has become a purely supernatural spiritual principle, the character of which Plato describes as pure wisdom and goodness; but with this it is also removed to the other side, to a region from which there seems to be no bridge over to the world; it has disappeared in a remoteness where man's longing eye can scarcely any longer find it. Hence it looks about for means and mediators which may help it to bridge over the chasm between this side and that side. Plato shows it these means in the world-soul, in which the deity becomes a living and active power; he also points them out in the person of the wise man who, having perfect virtue, would typically represent the idea of goodness: two germs in which a world of thoughts slumbered, the development of which was worked up to by the last philosophical schools of Greece.

The *Stoics* took possession of the world-soul, and regarding it as the creative world-reason made it the principle of their Pantheism, in which the old popular gods experienced an artificial restoration as

forms of the manifestations of the one divine being, a restoration which naturally could do nothing to retard the inner decay of the old religion. Transplanted to Egyptian ground, however, and grafted on a Jewish stem, this Platonic Stoic world-soul, the divine Logos, was to have a rich development for the future of religion. As for the ideal of virtue of the "wise man," the Stoics, Platonists, and Neo-Pythagoreans vied with each other in seeking not only to set forth the notion of him, but to realise the notion in practice; but this they could never do, as it is well known that ideals cannot be manufactured. But this seed too was to blossom and bear rich fruit on Egyptian soil, when the philosophical ideal was transferred to the real forms of the history of Israel, and so set forth bodily in living persons.

This survey of the Indo-Germanic development of religion may conclude with a glance at the *Romans*, who, however, may be treated shortly, as their religion of worldly and social utility and of external ritual had but a scanty development both in point of breadth, in the number and interest of its mythological representations, and in point of depth, in its religious formation of character. While Greek fancy formed the nature-deities into human ideals which grow always more distinctly individualised, the Roman intellect, which was wanting in fancy, drew from the old powers of nature, and from social relations and activities, a set of notional personifications which became more and more lifeless. If the remains of the old Roman mythology are scanty, the abstractions which the Romans elevated to the rank of deities are past numbering. Not only has every person, divine and human, his own genius, in which the ego projects itself outside, as in the Persian Fravashis; every virtue also, every condition of social life, every regular occurrence in agriculture, industry, and family life, even to the opening of the barns, or the supply of corn in the market, or the testing of copper and silver, or children's learning to walk or to speak, and so on, is represented in a separate deity. In this the Roman religion is most nearly allied to the Persian, in which personified moral notions also predominate largely over the mythological element, which also places religion in the most

intimate connection with civic welfare, and also attaches a high importance to the formalities of the ceremonial of worship. Only the dualism of Persia, which it shares with the German religion, is wanting to the Roman.

The highest gods of the old Latins were Jupiter, Mars, and Janus. In *Jupiter* (Djovis) we meet once more the familiar Indo-Germanic heaven-father Dyauspitar, who accordingly occupied the supreme position with the Italians as well as the Greeks; his popular importance, however, appears to have been less with the Latins than that of Mars here as well as on the Indus and among the Germans; he might have been in danger of being thrust back and obscured by the warlike storm-god, had he not come to be in Rome the representative of the Roman idea of the state and of the Roman claims to ascendency. The original character of *Mars*, and perhaps also the etymology of the name, connect him closely with the Maruts, the Vedic storm- and war- gods, who, along with Rudra and Vata, belonged to the standing escort of Indra; quite like the Vedic Indra, the Hindu Rudra-Siva, and the German Vata-Wodan, Mars combines with the nature-significance of the wind-, rain-, and spring- god, who awakens life and scatters blessings abroad, that of the irresistibly storming and destroying war-god; as the protector of herds and of warlike young men he receives from both at the spring festival his *ver sacrum*, the human sacrifice being early replaced by the sending forth of the young men to conquer new seats. *Janus* (Dianus) is the bright one, *i.e.* the sun-god who opens and shuts the day and the year (hence figured with two faces), and is then more generally the beginner of all undertakings, especially of war. By the side of the sun-god Janus, appears like a sister the light moon-goddess Diana. Beside them there appeared, from ancient times, the fire-gods Vulcan and Vesta; the latter, like Hestia, the goddess of the domestic hearth, and consequently of public welfare; Venus, mistress of blooming gardens, is the goddess of grace and love; Tellus is the goddess of the fruitful earth; Ceres and Ops dispense the blessings of corn and harvest; Neptune is an old Vedic and Iranian water- and sea- god; Liber and Libera are perhaps gods of the

blessings of harvest and of children. Last come after these ancient nature-gods the manifold spirits of ancestors and of nature—the Penates, Manes, Lares, Larvae, and Lemures, Fawns, and Silvani; the three first were held in high honour as good lightsome spirits of ancestors (the Penates were even the objects of public adoration by the side of Vesta); but the others are ghosts, who were feared, and therefore taken to be evil spirits or mischievous gnomes. Though this belief in spirits had great vogue among the Latins, no less than among the old Iranians, Slavs, Germans, and Pelasgians, yet there never was a time in any of these peoples, when the spirits took the place of the gods, and were the highest or even the sole objects of worship. The cultus of this old Latin religion was still quite simple, and without temples or images, as was the case also in the Vedic, the Persian, and the German religion, and in fact everywhere when either the anthropomorphification of the gods was not yet quite accomplished, or, on the other hand, was transcended as an unsuitable form for representing the spiritual nature of God; with the old Latins, of course, the former was the case.

The elevation of this nature-religion to a state-religion suited to the moral needs of civil society and useful to the commonwealth, was the work of the Tarquinii and of Servius Tullius. The old heaven-God being the best and the greatest of the gods (Jupiter optimus maximus) received a splendid temple on the Capitol, and was here worshipped as the national god of Rome and the patron of Rome's welfare and rule, as the personification of the idea of the Roman state, of its absolute rights, its unlimited power. By his side stood Juno, the patroness of the family, and Minerva ("the thinking one") as the goddess of wisdom, especially of political ability. These two with Jupiter formed just such another moral unity as Zeus, Apollo, and Athene, but it is characteristic that the place of the goddess of the muses is given with the Romans to the goddess of marriage. In Rome they cared but little for art, but they knew far better than in Greece the profound importance of a worthy family life for the welfare and security of the state.

Even the Tarquins enriched the cultus by the introduction of

Greek gods who were then in part combined and mixed up with old Italian deities, and in part merely provided with Latin names. This importation of foreign gods and worships was carried to greater and greater lengths in the centuries of the republic; after those of Greece came those of Egypt and of Asia (Cybele, Isis, Mithra), till at last Rome became the Pantheon of the gods of all the peoples of the empire. But they were all vassals and underlings of the one god of the Roman world-empire, Jupiter Capitolinus. Thus Rome by her world-conquering and -ruling commanders and statesmen, no less than Greece by her poets and philosophers, prepared for the fall of the national polytheistic systems of gods to give way to a universal monotheism.

But more important than the doctrine of the gods to the practical Romans was their *worship*. It was carried on as a business in which everything depended on the proper observance of the prescribed forms which rested on divine sanction, and which were believed to act in a magical manner on the gods. Sacrifice was the most important, nor were human sacrifices wanting in the earliest times; then came divination, which was practised according to fixed rules by the augurs appointed for the purpose. The complicated rules for divination in the proper form of art, as well as a mass of other forms, the Romans received from the Etruscans, whose sombre religion, replete with all kinds of superstition and magic, cannot be of Indo-Germanic origin. But the Romans could not have appropriated the ceremonies and forms of the Etruscans so easily or so thoroughly, had they not suited their own way of thinking, had not their taste been at once superstitious, prosaic, and utilitarian. What they desired to have in their worship was an instrument for the attainment of their worldly ends, a means which should both be mysterious and at the same time capable of being applied externally and with mechanical efficiency. The state of mind of those engaging in worship was a matter of no moment, if only the act were gone about with scrupulous accuracy in all its details. The most such a religion could do was to foster a dull feeling of dependence on higher powers; it could contribute nothing to the enlightenment of the mind and

the purification of the spirit by exalted ideas. How much higher was the Greek cultus of Apollo, which required self-knowledge on the part of the faithful, and produced a purifying effect by causing the mind to dwell on the contemplation of the pure character of the deity! Even in the outward bearing of the worshipper we see the different views and moods which belong to the two worships: the Greek prays with uncovered head, looking up to the deity: the Roman with his head covered.

For all this we quite allow that the Roman religion was very suitable for the disciplining of a people disposed to military and political matters. And as long as the supremacy of Rome over the world (the countries about the Mediterranean, the civilised world of that age) was an ideal still admitting of fulfilment, it is very conceivable that the belief in the victory of Jupiter Capitolinus over the national gods of other peoples, and the sense of obligation to co-operate towards this end, may really have evoked a religious sentiment in which the Roman felt himself lifted up above his own petty personal ends and devoted to the ends of the state, which he saw to be the will of God; and that he may thus have enjoyed a certain measure of really religious satisfaction. But how, when that end was reached and the supremacy of Rome established on a sure foundation, and when at the same time the guidance of the affairs of state passed from the popular assembly of the republic into the hands of Cæsar, when there was no longer any care or hope to be entertained, no suffering or exertion to be undertaken, for the state? Was it wonderful that when the ideal end disappeared, this religion of utility was entirely disabled, that while some regarded the emptied religion as a mere superstition which was good enough for the multitude, others were driven by the religious need which their own faith failed to satisfy, to seek for help in all sorts of foreign cults? Radical unbelief on one side, and on the other a syncretistic mixture of every possible faith and superstition—such was the end of the Roman religion.

Yet at the very end it put forth a new sapling which is equally characteristic considered as a symptom of its entire decay and as a

confession of the political motive on which it had always been based: the *deification of the Cæsars.* This was by no means intended as a mere metaphorical exaggeration of flattering devotion, it was thoroughly and literally in earnest. It was based on one side on the belief in the guardian spirits or genii of individual persons, on the other on the deification of the idea of the state. When the state had come to be incorporated in the person of an unlimited ruler, so that there were no longer any objects of state different from the personal will of the emperor, it was an easy step to regard the genius of the emperor as that of the state, and to pay it accordingly the honours of worship along with the former patron-deities and -spirits of Rome. This deification of men who were weak, and many of whom were wicked, appears to us very shocking and revolting; but it must not be overlooked that it met, in a way, the want of the time for revealers and mediators in human personalities of a deity who had come to be far-off. The nature-gods of mythology had spent themselves; the notional god of philosophy had never acquired entrance in a living way into the mind of the people, and therefore a desire was felt, once for all, to see the deity in human flesh and blood;[1] this was what was sought in the Cæsars; others sought it in Stoic sages, others again in Neo-pythagorean saints, others in the ideal picture of Moses; and the Christian found it in Jesus, the Saviour of the world.

The new attitude of mind brought about by the general position of the world in that age, may be observed very distinctly in the turn philosophy took, especially the Stoic philosophy, in the period of the Empire. In the writings of *Seneca*, *Epictetus*, and *Marcus Aurelius*, we meet with a moral and religious view of the world, which is as remote from that of the old Porch as it often comes strikingly near to Christianity. It is very significant that philosophy is here

[1] What Stein says (*Geschichte des Platonismus*, ii. 286) with reference to Apollonius of Tyana, may be regarded as applying to the character of that age generally: "The feeling seems to me more than anything else characteristic of that time, which asked that that theoretical, practical, and religious truth which had been attained by means of reflection, should be connected with some personality, and its effects made visible even to fancy, viz., in the life and death, the acts and sufferings, of that person."

valued almost solely for its practical side; it is praised as a school of the wisdom needed for life, as a medicine for ailing humanity, a consolation in the distresses of the age. The needs of men are met and helped by Stoic idealism offering them withdrawal from the inner to the outer world, and discipline in self-knowledge and self-control; hence the better spirits turn to it, but not without introducing into it various remarkable changes. In the notion of God the old Stoic monism is not quite given up; God and the world, natural law and God's will or providence, are spoken of by Seneca as equivalents, yet the spiritual and moral side of God's nature is distinctly placed before the physical side; God is the perfect spirit, the supreme, all-knowing, wise and kind reason, which orders and rules all things according to a purpose, cherishes a fatherly care for men, and therefore is not to be feared by us but loved as a father. Here a *monotheism* was actually reached which was capable of satisfying the religious needs, and this was indeed the principal motive which led to such a reconstruction of the former naturalistic monism of the Stoa. A similar change took place in the anthropology of the system. That declared ethical idealism, the painful consciousness of an inner division and struggle, in which the sages and the saints of that period were agreed, led in psychology to a softening down of the old Stoic monism, and to its replacement by a platonising *dualism*. Reason, the part of man which is akin to God, and on which the human dignity is based which must be recognised in every man, is confronted by sense, the flesh, a stranger and an enemy: Seneca calls the body, just as Plato does, a fetter, a burden, a cell, a temporary lodging in which the reasonable soul cannot feel itself at home; the day of death is the birth-day of the eternal, the life beyond is the true, the perfect life, to which the present is but a faint prelude. Now it is just from this sensuous side of our nature that the passions arise; and so that conquest of the passions which the Stoa demands here, becomes a warfare against sensuality, and takes a spiritualist ascetic turn which formerly was far from it. "Renounce and bear!"—the motto of Epictetus—is the key-note of this later Roman Stoicism. And with this, moreover, is connected a much more pessimistic view of man's

moral nature. We find in Seneca a number of the strongest expressions as to the moral weakness of man's nature, the universality of evil, the impossibility of altogether freeing ourselves from it, the increasing depravation of the race—expressions which find their closest parallels in well-known assertions of the apostle Paul, and which form a great contrast with the old Stoic confidence in man's moral strength. In such an attitude of mind it was natural that more weight should be attributed to the softer virtues of the disposition, to mildness and indulgence, pity and benevolence, than could be the case in the rough and proud morality of the old Stoa ; and it was also a natural consequence of the more serious and softer tone of thought and feeling, that the mind should turn more decidedly to religion. If evil is so deeply rooted, the conflict so universal, so difficult, so endless, then there is need not of instruction merely, but of a transformation (*transfigurari*) of the whole disposition, and thus is engendered an irrepressible desire to sustain weak human strength by the higher divine power. Mere subjective freedom and negative passionlessness now turn into a willing and joyful surrender to the divine order and government of the world, and the natural strength of reason becomes the strength and help of the indwelling or assisting God. But this divine assistance consists not merely in general in the seeds of goodness which are implanted in us, but more specially in the elevating and strengthening influence of a moral pattern of the highest perfection, which, filled with God's spirit, shines as a light in darkness and draws all eyes to itself.[1] Thus the Stoical abstraction of the wise man becomes with Seneca a call and a hope for a bodily religious example for all, for a Saviour of the world.

[1] Seneca, *Ep.* 73. 15 ; 41. 2 ; 52. 1 ; 120. 14.

CHAPTER III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE SEMITIC RACE.[1]

THE development of religion among the Semites was on very different lines from those we have just traced in the case of the Indo-Germanic family. With the former we find neither the rich development of mythology, nor the religious speculation of the Indians and the Greeks, but on the other hand we find a profounder feeling of dependence, and a simple and exalted view of God, which may be regarded as the natural predisposition of this race to monotheism. The assertion of Renan that the Semites were monotheists by nature, by a sort of instinct, obviously goes too far; but it may be said with perfect correctness that the plurality of nature-gods never grew with them, as with the Indo-Germans, into the definiteness of an elaborate mythology. With the latter, particular aspects of nature are reflected in the various individual gods; but the Semitic names of the deities give rather a general impression of superior power, authority, and rule, and the special manifestations of the one ruling power disappear to some extent behind those general names. It is connected with this, that the Semites originally found the Divine, except in so far as they were influenced by the religion of the pre-Semitic inhabitants of their lands, only in the supra-mundane, in heavenly powers, whether the sun and stars, or the heavenly fire of the storm. The original Semitic belief in God was in its essence star-worship, not monotheistic, but yet with a tendency to *practical henotheism*, or the recognition of one god before others as the specific tribal god and lord of the particular people. Thus with the Semites

[1] For the literature see Tiele's *Outlines*, pp. 60, 69, 79, 91.

the Deity was from the beginning separated from mundane nature, from the transitory life of the earth; the fundamental trait of Semitic belief in God is that of separateness from the world, oppositeness to man, who feels himself to be a powerless slave over-against the overmastering deity. The most obvious analogy for such a relationship was that of subjects to a political ruler, a relation which the more exactly answered to that religious one, since whenever the Semites were organised in a state their government assumed the form of an unlimited despotism, which does not preserve the freedom of all by means of the reasonable order of the whole, but sacrifices freedom to the unconditioned will and unlimited power of an individual. The Greek Zeus was the head of the Olympian aristocracy of gods, just as the kings of Greek tribes and cities were the leaders of the aristocracy of the nobles, and as such subject to the limitations of custom and law; hence those peoples were capable of producing political constitutions, but not religious monotheism. The Semites, on the contrary, who knew none but unlimited rulers, conceived the deity in accordance with this as the unlimited *one* ruling power, the heavenly king of the nation, who cannot, any more than the earthly king, tolerate other lords beside himself, and is therefore within the sphere of his rule (the people which worships him) an unlimited ruler, who, however, does not prevent other gods from being lords over other peoples. A deep and living religious sentiment of dependence here co-operates with an energetic and exclusive national sentiment; in these points the Semites are strong, and their feebler endowment in point of æsthetic fancy and philosophical reflection also helps to produce that peculiar practical henotheism which is common to the Semitic race.

With the Indo-Germans plastic fancy and theoretical intellect—objective, political, or philosophical thought—predominate: with the Semites, on the contrary, the subjective practical interest of the heart is always first, which is always occupied with the one object of getting into the best relations with that power with which all ultimate decisions lie; of being connected with it as intimately and exclusively as possible, and engaging it for the interests of one's own life

(*i.e.* the life of the people). Hence the phenomenon which is found universally among the Semites, that every tribe has its own tribal god; the Babylonians their Bel, the Assyrians their Assur, the Canaanites their Baal, the Moabites their Chemosh, the Ammonites their Milcom, the Philistines their Dagon, the Arabs their Allah, the Hebrews their Jahveh. The difference between these various deities is not to be sought in various views taken of nature, but solely in the practical interest of each tribe to conceive the divine being in special connection with itself, and consequently to the exclusion of other such beings. It is only in this special sense, as referring to the exclusive separate deity of each tribe, that we can properly speak of the "monotheistic instinct of the Semites;" the phrase is incorrect if meant to refer to a theoretical knowledge of the one God of all the world. From the theoretical idea of the divine unity, which indeed is inseparable from that of the divine universality, the Semites were originally even further removed than the Indo-Germans, for we find nowhere any trace among the former of the speculative monistic idea of God of the latter. A further observation presses itself upon us, namely, that the religious difference which springs from the difference of natural endowment between the two families of peoples, is in exact correspondence with what history tells us in other respects of their characters. The strength of the Semites never lay in æsthetic or scientific contemplation of the world, but in that emotional strength which enabled them to fix their practical ideals and postulates in hard and definite forms, and pursue them with indomitable perseverance.

Where this peculiar religious faculty of the Semites reached ripe and full development, as it did with the Hebrews and the Arabs, it attained immense importance for the world's history, an importance, indeed, which no other phenomenon of the history, either of religion or civilisation, at all approaches. But most of the Semitic peoples (the "Northern Semites") came too early into contact with a superior civilisation, and offered too faint an opposition to the entangling influences of the nature-worship which accompanied it, to be able to maintain their distinctive religious character, and to

pursue an independent course of their own. They also, it is true, had a rich religious development of a kind, but it is historically important, not as being of value in itself, but from the manifold influences, positive and negative, of attraction and repulsion, it brought to bear at various times on the history of Israel.

Among the eastern Semites of Mesopotamia, the Babylonians or Chaldæans and Assyrians,[1] the old Semitic star-worship was mixed with the more naturalistic belief of the original inhabitants of the land, now generally distinguished by the name of Accadians or Sumerians. Little as we yet know of this enigmatical people, we may yet say with some certainty that it was neither Semitic nor Aryan, and that at the time of its subjugation by the Semites it already possessed a well-developed civilisation, which it imparted to its conquerors. From this intermixture proceeded alike the mythology, the *cultus*, and the art of the Babylonians. The Babylonian system of gods combined the five gods of the planets with two triads of deities, corresponding to the three worlds (the world above, the middle world, the under world), and placed before all the rest the Bel Beli or "Lord of Lords" as the supreme god and unlimited ruler, also called more simply the god (Ilu). In the local *cultus* of the town of Babel the star-gods played a foremost part; Nabu (Mercury) as the god of revelation and of priestly wisdom; Nergal (Mars), the god of war, represented as a lion with a man's head and with wings; Merodach (Jupiter), the lucky star; and Istar or Bilit, Mylitta (Venus), the goddess of fertility and of death, who united in herself the two sides of the life of nature, represented among the west Semites by Ashera and Astarte. Of great interest is the newly discovered epos of "Istar's descent into hell," [2] the Accadic-Semitic prototype of the Greek Demeter-Persephone legend. Of greater importance, however, are the Babylonian legends of creation of Paradise and of the flood, now brought to light by Assyriological

[1] Recent literature in *Ch. de la Saussaye*, p. 318. And the last series of *Hibbert Lectures*, "The origin and growth of religion as illustrated by the religion of the ancient Babylonians and Assyrians," by A. H. Sayce, 1887.—TR.

[2] Translated into German and explained by E. Schrader: Giessen, 1872.

investigation, in which we have no doubt to see not only the parallels but the sources of the corresponding legends of the Bible. An Accadian origin must be ascribed to the astrological divination which was so largely cultivated in Babel, and what was connected with this, the organisation and power of the priesthood. Accadic, finally, is the custom peculiar to the Babylonians, of the sacrifice of chastity, which belonged to the cult of Mylitta. The bloody human sacrifice of the warlike Assyrians has many parallels among the other Semites, and may confidently be reckoned to be of Semitic origin.

The West Semites in Syria, Canaan, and Phœnicia show their Mesopotamian origin by the close affinity of their religious traditions and customs to those of Mesopotamia. They worshipped nature as the life-producer and the life-destroyer in the pairs of deities, Asher and Ashera, and Moloch and Ashtoreth, which, however, were contracted into a unity and designated with the common generic names Baal and Baalit ("Master and Mistress"). These two sides of the deity are harmonised in the Phœnician myth in which the sun-god Melcarth pursues Ashtoreth (the Babylonian Istar) who is shyly fleeing from him to the western end of the world, where at last he overtakes and overcomes her, and celebrates their marriage; whereupon the austere and warlike "Virgin of heaven" is changed into the gracious goddess of love and marriage, Ashtoreth into Ashera, Dido into Anna, Artemis into Herê. Akin to this are the Greek legends of Zeus and Europa or Io, and of the wanderings of Helen or Odysseus, and afterwards of Æneas, etc. As the beneficent and the hostile aspects of the deity are here combined, so in some cases were the male and the female sides,—which the Syrians frequently included in one figure which was both male and female, where we may see a reaction, if certainly a coarse one, of the monotheistic impulse from the dualism of nature-religion. Such a combination of the male and the female deity is present, for example, in the myths of Melkart-Heracles and Omphale, or of Semiramis and Sardanapalus. The same idea was expressed in worship in a change of clothes between priest and priestess.

Of great importance in the West Semite worships is the idea,

which appears under various forms, of the dying and reviving sun-god; an idea which is doubtless of Accadic-Babylonian origin. The southern Semites are without it, as well as the pure Indo-Germans. Adonis was the young spring god of Byblos, the beloved of Baltis (Istar); killed in summer by the tusk of the boar Moloch, he becomes Thammuz, *i.e.* the Vanished One, for whom solemn dirges were raised, as in Egypt for Osiris, in Eleusis for Core. But in spring the god revives again, and now his coming to life was celebrated with as much sumptuousness and merry-making as his death had been with lamentation. Joy of life and pangs of death, revels and pain; these were always the antithesis round which the cultus and the mythology of the Northern Semites turned, whether the two sides bore reference to distinct figures of gods or to different phases of the life of one and the same deity. How capable of development these ideas were when detached from the nature-ground of rude sensuality, and spiritualised and made moral, we have already seen when speaking of the Greek worship of Dionysus and the Greek mysteries, and of the myth of Heracles. The Hebrew legend of Samson too, with all its details, is nothing but the Hebrew form of the Syrian myth of the waning and dying sun-god.

But the Hebrews[1] or the children of Israel borrowed from the Canaanites after their immigration into the country west of the Jordan, not this legend only, but many legends and usages besides. Till this time nomads, they were as far inferior to the Canaanites in civilisation as they were superior to them in religious purity and moral energy. We do not know whether the Hebrews belonged ethnologically to the North or to the South Semites; it is certain, however, that up to the period of their immigration their religion had remained unaffected by the sensuous nature-worship of the

[1] The works determining the present position of the study of the history of Hebrew religion are the following: Kuenen, *The Religion of Israel.* Dutch, 1869. Translated in the present series. Wellhausen, *Prolegomena to the History of Israel.* German, 2d Ed. 1883. Translated by J. S. Black and the present translator, 1885. Stade, *Geschichte des Volks Israel.* [Not yet completed.—Tr.] Reuss, *Gesch. d. heil. Schriften des alten Testaments,* 1881. Schultz, *Alttestamentl. Theologie,* 2d Ed. 1878.

North Semites, and had most affinity with the South Semitic worship of the pure and austere deity of the heavenly light and fire. Nor can anything be said with certainty as to the original home and the significance of the Hebrew name for God, Jahveh, whether it is of purely Hebrew origin, or of Kenite, or Assyrian—each of these hypotheses has recently found supporters;[1] but this is of less importance, as in any case the world-historical importance to be afterwards attained by the belief in Jahveh is not in any way connected with its origin, but simply and solely with the splendid religious ideas which the prophets imported into it in the course of subsequent centuries. That Jahveh was represented from the first as the morally exalted world-governor, as the prophets afterwards conceived him, there is no reason whatever to suppose. On the contrary, every trace, some traces even from later times, point to the supposition that the national god of the old nomad Hebrews was the mighty and austere storm-god of the desert, who was supposed to have his seat at Mount Sinai (Judges v. 4 *sq.*) who makes the darkness of the thunder-cloud his chamber, utters his angry voice in the thunder, and in the roaring of the wind the snorting of his nostrils, who shoots forth his arrows in the lightning, who comes down upon the wings of the storm, and makes the foundations of the sea and of the land to shake (Psalm xviii.). Even in later times the metaphorical language of the prophets and the symbolism of worship delighted to associate Jahveh with light and fire, and this was never in any case an arbitrarily chosen symbol, it was an unconscious survival of the original nature-meaning of Jahveh. That the worship of this deity was at first completely in keeping with the sternness of his nature, may be inferred from the facts that human sacrifices occur even in the time of the judges (Jephthah's daughter), that the prophet Micah presupposes an acquaintance with them on the part of his contemporaries, and that the substitution for them of animal sacrifices only takes shape in the (late) prophetic form of the legend of Abraham. When the warlike nomad tribes of the Hebrews were penetrating

[1] Stade, *Gesch. d. Volks Israel*, p. 130 *sq.* Schrader, *Cuneiform Inscriptions* (translated in this series, p. 24 *seqq.*), and *Jahrb. für prot. Theol.* 1875, 317 *seqq.*

northward, they received this stern and warlike god, whose character had nothing whatever to do with the sensuous nature-deities of the North Semites, to be their national god, their leader, whose name was henceforth to be the motto of their union and of their national consciousness, the infallible token of their national hopes. This was the work of Moses: this and this alone seems to have been the work by which that great leader laid a foundation for his people and prescribed the first step of a long history; for there is no doubt that not only the miraculous legends recorded of him, but the whole legislation of Sinai, are mere inventions of later story and of priestly tradition, the historical value of which is to be regarded in the same way as the attribution of the Brahmanic laws to Manu, or of the Persian to Zarathustra.

The promulgation by Moses of the belief in Jahveh did not, the prophet Amos expressly assures us (v. 26), prevent the Hebrews in their wanderings in the desert from keeping up at the same time their primitive star-worship, and so we understand the more readily how, after their settlement in Canaan, when they mingled with the more cultivated Canaanites, and themselves made the transition from nomadic life to agriculture, they could appropriate the Canaanite *cultus* of the agricultural deities Baal and Ashera, and innocently carry it on by the side of the service of Jahveh. Up to the time of Hezekiah no one found fault with this, or saw in it a transgression against Jahveh. Even the most zealous servants of Jahveh, men like Samuel, Saul, and David, only insisted on the supremacy of the worship of Jahveh, not on its exclusive right, nor on its being carried on without images. Saul and David named some of their children after Baal; Solomon built an expensive temple for Jahveh, but set up beside it the chapels of various other gods of the land and of foreign countries, and though this was charged against him as a sin by later historians, none of his contemporaries objected to it. Even Elijah and Elisha only protested directly against the introduction of the Phœnician cult of Baal and Ashtoreth, not against the high places with the Ashera-altars.

These "high places" (Bamoth) were primitive sites of worship

of the Canaanites, hallowed by ancestral tradition, and by sacred legend; it was quite natural that the Hebrews who had settled among the people of the land, should share in their local cults, and assemble at the same sacred places along with their neighbours, to pay respect to their own Jahveh along with their neighbours' gods. The places being in this way common, the usages and legends of these local cults naturally passed over to the Hebrews too; they found in them a welcome enrichment of the too simple religion of the desert they had hitherto practised. In place of the old worship without images, which had been content with the most primitive furniture of worship, such as sacred stones and posts, and such-like fetiches, they now became accustomed to worship Jahveh under the images of the golden bull, the brazen serpent, or the winged lion (cherub), all of them imitations of North Semite image-worship. It was also unavoidable that the Hebrews when turned farmers should adopt the spring and harvest festivals of the Canaanites which were connected with agriculture and with vintage, which then became the foundations of their own later festival calendar; thus for example the principal harvest feast (the "feast of tabernacles") is first mentioned as a feast of Baal of the Canaanites of Shechem, and it could not in any case have originated in the nomadic period of the Hebrews, when they did not cultivate vineyards. The other festivals also are all connected with the yearly cycle of settled agricultural life, and the same will be true of them; only the festivals of the new moon may have been of earlier date, but these lost in time their importance, while the yearly festivals gained. As for the Sabbath, the seven days of the week would naturally lead us to surmise for it a Chaldean origin, but the very word Sabbatuv has recently been found in Assyrian texts,[1] with the explanation: "a day of rest of the heart;" and the extra-Israelite origin of this institution has thus been placed beyond doubt.

With sacred places and seasons sacred legends are everywhere most closely connected, being in fact nothing but the attachment to particular localities of the myths of gods or heroes on which

[1] Comp. Schrader, *Cuneiform Inscriptions*, p. 20.

the various cults are based. Nor was it otherwise in Canaan. When the people came together to the celebration of a festival at the sacred places, the stories were told under the terebinths at Hebron, at the seven wells of Beersheba, at the Stone of Jacob at Bethel, at the altars of Dan and of Shiloh, about those ancestors of early times with whom the deity had still conversed under various forms face to face, to whom here and there they had revealed themselves visibly, thus founding this or that sanctuary. It was probably very little of the patriarchal legends that the Hebrews brought with them to Canaan; most of them have their roots in the local cults of this land, and are thus probably of Canaanite origin. It is quite consistent with this that certain elements of them may date further back to primitive Semitic divine myths and heroic legends which were then localised by individual tribes, and adjusted to their own special needs. How much of these legends is historical reminiscence from Israel's prehistoric age, the origin and fortunes of the tribes crystallising into family stories of the tribal heroes (*heroes eponymi*), or how much of the story of the gods or of nature-mythology there is in them, that, as in all cases of the kind (p. 98), is difficult to determine in detail. In general, however, the question must not be put in the form of an exclusive dilemma; even to this day this is too much the practice. All analogy points to the conclusion that both these elements enter into these patriarchal legends, and that it is merely a question of the proportion between them. To reduce all those legends simply to mythology, as some writers have recently done, is certainly mistaken; but on the other hand, it cannot be declared off-hand to be impossible that the forms of Abraham and Sara, the "exalted father" and the "princess," may have a mythological background. That Jacob-Israel, and Esau-Edom are connected with the Phœnician Dioscuri, that in the legends of Enoch and Elijah certain survivals of sun-myths may be at work, after the fashion of Melcarth and Heracles, and that the legend of Samson originated entirely from such a myth; these and many similar questions still admit of discussion—only let the discussion be in cool blood and free from prejudice! As for the legends of the creation, of Paradise, of the flood, no doubt now remains

that they belong originally to Chaldea, and the only question is whether they became known to the Hebrews in pre-exilic times through the channel of the Canaanite tradition—in which case the absence of all reference to them in the prophets would certainly excite surprise, or whether it was only from the exile onwards that the collectors and editors of the legendary and historical materials of the people got hold of these stories and fused them together with Israel's history. But this question belongs rather to the history of literature than to the history of religion.

The connection between the Hebrews and the Canaanites was so close, and the former were influenced in so many ways by the latter, in matters of belief and worship as well as others, that the danger was by no means remote that the belief in Jahveh would be swallowed up in Canaanite nature-worship. With the great mass of the people this almost proved to be the case. That things did not go quite so far, but that at least in the better kernel of the people the belief in Jahveh not only asserted its distinctive character, but developed itself with ever greater purity and richness, this was due to the misfortunes, hard yet salutary for its great historical mission, through which the people of Israel was led by providence. The constant battles by which, after their settlement in Canaan, the Hebrew tribes had to defend themselves against powerful neighbours in the East and West; the fearful straits into which they often were cast, awakened again and again among the best of the people the national sentiment, and along with it a courageous faith in the national guardian deity, Jahveh. In every appearance of a god-inspired hero and seer, in every united rising of Israel against his oppressors, in every victorious casting-off of their yoke, there was recognised a new manifestation of Jahveh, a fresh pledge of his inalienable grace. But this enthusiasm which awoke in times of war did not last long in peace; the need once past, every one "did that which was right in his own eyes;" there was no settled civic right, any more than any fixed religious custom. To consolidate the state and the religion of Israel, it was necessary first of all that the temporary leadership

of the people in those brave generals so inappropriately called "judges," should be consolidated into a permanent kingship; and of equal utility was the permanent organisation of the seers who hitherto had only come forward episodically, in a standing school of inspired men of God and popular teachers. The merit of both these changes is due to *Samuel*, whose perception of the necessities of the time, and introduction of what was needed, entitle him to the rank of a second founder of the nationality of Israel. The Biblical accounts of Samuel's action at the introduction of the monarchy contain, as is well known, a number of unhistorical traits in which we recognise the hand of a later (exilic) editor, who carried the pessimistic view of his age as to the relation of the monarchy and prophecy back to the very different age of Samuel. Removing all those unhistorical features, the undoubted kernel of the matter is seen to be no more than this, that he played a decisive part at the institution of the monarchy, that foundation-stone of the religious arrangements and hopes of Israel. Equally decisive and far-reaching was his influence on the institution of *prophecy*.

The roots of Israelite prophecy go back to the divination of early Hebrew times, to the development of which these orgiastic phenomena of Canaanite nature-worship, so similar to the fury of the worship of Bacchus, no doubt contributed a share. The Bacchic orgiasm of the worship of Dionysus was invested with a nobler form by the æsthetic spirit of the Greeks, and led to the thoughtful figures of the Dionysiac festival games; and the "possessed" of the Canaanites underwent an analogous transformation through the sanctifying power of the religious spirit of Israel. Samuel was the first to enlist this phenomenon, the earlier home of which was outside of Jahvehism, in the service of Jahveh; in his hands it became the vessel of the noblest energies of the spirit of Jahveh; the fury of orgiastic ecstasy was taught to occupy itself with ideal themes, and was thus changed into a sacred enthusiasm for the honour of the nation and its god Jahveh. That this higher prophetic spirit might not be extinguished again, he formed the unions of the prophets, in which there should be a regular organisation, and a nursery for the common fostering and mutual stimulation of the higher powers of the mind and of

prophetic states. These unions shared with the priesthood the advantages of a fixed order, the educative and awakening force of common action, the *esprit de corps* of a corporation, and the hereditary transmission of technique and of tradition; but it was more fortunate than the priesthood in being independent of king and people, and in its power of free and independent development as the times required. Hence it might happen that in times of universal degeneration and corruption, the prophetic unions remained the sole citadels of Jahvism, around which all those rallied who cared for the good cause, from which a stout resistance was offered to the powers inimical to God and to the people, and against which in turn the whole of the wrath of opponents was discharged.

Such a time of trial came for the prophets of the northern kingdom of Ephraim, under King Ahab, who sought forcibly to introduce the Phœnician worship of Baal, and to extirpate the worship of Jahveh. The prophets Elijah and Elisha took up the contest for the cause of Jahveh. It was the first time the prophets had been called on to contend not against external but internal foes; but the mode of conflict was still the same—the weapons used were those of worldly power, only turned within instead of without, but all the more serious in their effects on that account. What Elijah could not accomplish individually, his disciple Elisha succeeded in doing by allying himself with the military and political opposition: the house of Ahab fell, and with Jehu the outward rule of Jahvism was victoriously established. But only the outward rule. It soon appeared how little religion is served by such means. In spite of the most zealous fostering of the outward forms of worship, the general corruption of manners made fearful strides, the luxury of the rich, the oppression of the poor, disregard of justice, the degradation of religion to a cloak of unrighteousness.

Thus a new task emerged for prophecy, and it was in addressing itself to this task that it rose to its full importance for the world. The prophets of and after the eighth century, whose written works we possess, were not fighting merely for the national honour of Jahveh against foreign peoples, nor merely for the sole rule of Jahveh against foreign cults; they were fighting principally for the

true moral religion and worship of Jahveh against the sensuous and impure views of Jahveh's character and of the value of the ceremonial service of him, cherished by the people. What nerved men like *Amos*, *Hosea*, and, chief of all, *Isaiah* to contend against king and people, against priests and false prophets, was the detestation felt by a conscience both heartily religious and morally sound, of the distorted religiosity of a morally corrupt generation. In the course of this struggle their own ideal God-consciousness was more and more seen to be different from that of the majority of their contemporaries, and thus from reformers of the national faith of Israel, they became the creators of the ethical monotheism of mankind. Not that the canonical prophets brought in a new belief in God till then unknown. They only continued to build on the foundation which was ready to their hand in Israel, and which goes back to Moses. That Jahveh was the God and helper of Israel, that he had chosen this people before all others for his own peculiar property, and was surety for Israel's welfare; then that he stood higher than the gods of the heathens, not only from his superior power, but also in virtue of his holiness—*i.e.* his austere, unapproachable exaltation above the weak and low life of the earth—all these convictions the canonical prophets undoubtedly shared with their people as a whole, and with the seers and prophets of their day. Yet they held an essentially different position from the latter, and set up their own convictions against those of the multitude, as truth against falsehood. What entitled them to do so? What was the difference between their view of God and that of the people? Both alike believed in Jahveh as the "Holy One of Israel;" but the people attached most weight to the *national* aspect of this notion, to the fact of Jahveh's belonging to Israel, and therefore expected his holiness to show itself chiefly or solely in a destroying judgment on Israel's enemies; hence their arrogant insistence on the "day of Jahveh," which they took it for granted could only be a day of vengeance on Israel's enemies, of triumph for Israel. The canonical prophets thought differently. They laid the chief emphasis on the *Holy* One of Israel, and understood by this designation Jahveh's exaltation not only above the physical but

above the moral imperfection of earthly life, that moral elevation and unconquerable energy, which manifests itself in judgment and justice upon all evil, whether outside Israel or within: they knew in fact that the Holy One of Israel, since he was a just judge, must set to work *first* on Israel, that judgment must begin at the house of God, and therefore that his "day" would be darkness and not light to the sinful *people*.[1]

In this transition from national to ethical considerations, a totally new standpoint was attained, namely, that of a teleological historical view of the world, which made it possible, amid all the disasters of the time, not only to hold fast the belief in God, but even to purify and deepen it, so as at last, in the shipwreck of the nation, to save the religion of Israel for mankind. The blows of fortune which Israel encountered in conflict with the world-empires could not shake the faith of those men in the power and faithfulness of their God, who had predicted beforehand that such calamity would befall the nation as a proof of the righteousness of Jahveh, and with a view to the chastising and refining of his chosen people. On the contrary, the very misfortune, which to the carnal national view of God held by the people generally, was an incomprehensible riddle and stumbling-block, was to them the greatest proof of all of the universal government of Jahveh and of his rule over the nations, since the proud world-empires which oppressed Israel were but chastening rods in his hands, mere instruments of his almighty will in the execution of his purpose with Israel, the restoration of a winnowed and purified people of God.[2] This was at once to make Jahveh, instead of a mere national God and King of Israel, the King and Lord of the whole world of the nations, the universal ruler of the world, and so the only true God. Thus there sprang from national henotheism, in the way of a moral and teleological view of history, ethical monotheism, of which the prophets of Israel may thus be properly regarded as the founders.

But the limitations of nationality had not, as one might suppose

[1] Amos v. 18 *sqq.*; Isaiah v. 16; Jeremiah xxv. 29.
[2] Amos vi. 14, ix. 7; Isaiah x. 5-15; Micah iv. 11 *sq.*

from the above, fallen away at once and altogether from the prophetic view of God—only a beginning had been made; the principle had been set up which, as it developed further, was to lessen the national exclusiveness, and at last to do away with it altogether in Christian universalism. The idea of the national theocracy, however, continued to be for the prophets also the fixed basis of religious consciousness; they knew no other than that Jahveh was the God of Israel in a special sense, that he had chosen this people before all others for his own kingdom, and stood towards it in a peculiar and exclusive covenant relation of mutual alliance and obligation. To them, too, Canaan was the dwelling-place of Jahveh, and in so far the Holy Land, every land outside which is unclean; Zion especially, with the temple, the centre of the national cultus, is the throne of God, from which Jahveh causes his voice to be heard, and his instruction to go forth to the peoples; and to which his name, his presence, and revelation are attached, although the heaven of heavens cannot contain him.[1] As for the other peoples, we find it said in the Book of Deuteronomy in the time of the kings, that God assigned them to the host of heaven as their special national deities, while he kept Israel only for his own possession. Thus even the prophets do not understand the sole godhead of Jahveh in the strictest sense as excluding altogether the real existence of the gods of the heathens; they are only subordinated as under-gods and vassals to Jahveh, the "God of gods" and "Lord of lords;" and they thus lose all practical importance for Israel, and cannot be the objects either of his worship or of his fear; and even their importance for the heathen nations, though not yet directly denied, appears from this point of view as a mere temporary relation for the period of nonage, which must one day yield to the universal recognition by all peoples alike of Jahveh as the one true God. This prospect of a future approach of the heathen nations, too, to acknowledge and to worship Jahveh along with Israel, is found in the canonical prophets from the first,[2] and is no more than the natural and obvious corollary of their

[1] Hosea ix. 10; Amos vii. 15 *sqq.*; Isaiah ii. 3, viii. 18; 1 Kings viii. 27.

[2] Isa. ii. 2 *sqq.*, xi. 10, xix. 23 *sq.*; Mic. iv. 1 *sq.*; Zech. viii. 20 *sqq.*, xiv. 9.

monotheistic idea of God and their teleological view of history. If Jahveh is not merely one God beside others, but the supreme God and Lord of the world, to whose will the fortunes of all nations are subservient, then it follows unavoidably that the purpose of his government of the world must be a universal one, and must be directed to the recognition of his honour, his supremacy, his sole majesty, on the part of all peoples. We may thus speak with perfect justice of the pure monotheism of the prophets, because the sole godhead of Jahveh stands firmly in their consciousness, if not as a full reality of the present, yet as an undoubted ideal of the future.[1] At the same time, it would clearly be a mistake to suppose that the idea of the particularist theocracy was with the prophets a mere form for the pure thought of the universal moral world-order. To say so is to overlook the fact that even in the prophetic pictures of the future, Israel is the dominant and privileged central people of Jahveh, to which the other peoples come for instruction and law, and which, of their freewill or under compulsion, they are to serve as tributary vassals.[2] The faith of Israel never put away, even in its best sons, this hope of earthly rule; this, indeed, was the limitation which could not but adhere to Jewish monotheism, just because it arose out of national henotheism, and which it required the new motives of the Christian religion of redemption to overcome. Only here could the pure thought of the "moral world-order," which sprang out of the germ of the Jewish theocracy, but was not essentially of Semitic origin, come to the front, to develop itself in time on Indo-Germanic soil.

In addition to particularism, anthropomorphism and anthropopathism also were to some extent limitations of the prophetic consciousness, though of less importance than the former for the religious relation. Of the absolute spirituality of God, the prophets have no idea. "At every step we meet with the eye of God, his ear, his mouth, his nose, his hand; he sits, drives, dwells, whether in the upper room of the world-building, or with the cherubs in the

[1] Micah iv. 5; comp. with 2.

[2] Amos ix. 11 *sq.*; Zechariah ix. 9-16; Micah v. 1-8, vii. 16 *sq.*; iv. 8, 13; Isaiah ii. 3, xi. 14, lx. 4-16.

sanctuary; his actions proceed from anger, jealousy, revenge, pity, repentance, etc." (REUSS.) It is impossible to say that all this was only meant figuratively; on the contrary, it must be allowed that the prophets and the prophetic historians of the Old Testament actually represented God to themselves according to the picture of a human ruler. There are two things, however, which we must not forget here. First, that this anthropomorphic mode of representation was the only effective means to drive out of the field the zoomorphic idea and representation not only of the gods of the heathens, but of Jahveh himself, who had been made like them; that the anthropomorphic representation was, compared with naturalistic zoomorphism, an immense step in the direction of a more spiritual view, and the indispensable condition for making the idea of God moral, is very plain. In the second place, we must observe that for the practical religious consciousness, the narrow anthropomorphic representation of God at once and without explanation corrected itself and approximated to the truth. If God was known to be dwelling in heaven above, he was also known to be present in the sanctuary at Jerusalem, present in Jacob's dream at Bethel, present everywhere in his Spirit, which is active and living as the breath of life in every creature, as the energy of courage, wisdom, and virtue in all the human instruments of God. How that side was to be harmonised with this, they simply did not consider, it was enough that for the practical needs of the mind his exalted distance combined as was required with his omnipresent nearness, and the anthropomorphic localisation of him was thus rendered harmless. As for the anthropopathism, or the human passions attributed to God, this is inevitably the form in which any living and practically active idea of God comes before the human consciousness. It is a form, it is true, which may easily lead to errors of a material and hurtful kind; but this danger is avoided the more easily, the more decidedly the moral ideal is the determining element in the apprehension of the divine being. And this was the case in the prophetical notion of the *holiness* of Jahveh.

This notion was not originally of moral significance;[1] all that it

[1] Compare Baudissin, *Studien zur Semitischen Religionsgeschichte*, part ii.

denoted at first was that characteristic of the notion of God peculiar to the Semitic mind, that the divine as the heavenly, the strong, the pure, is separated from the creaturely as the earthly, the weak, the impure. Though thus denoting a negative relation, holiness is not a pure negation, but embraces as it were a negative magnitude, namely, the notions of exclusion and subjection, of overwhelming and destroying energy, of fearful majesty. The holiness of Jahveh is thus intimately connected with his majesty, strength, greatness, incomparableness; it is also without doubt connected with the old title "Jahveh of hosts," which originally meant, it is likely, no more than the heavenly general or war-god. In the mouth of the prophets, however, a majesty which at first was purely physical, received an ethical turn; it became the antithesis to the moral weaknesses also of the creaturely human being—an antithesis which embraces not only exaltation over evil in a state of rest, but also the positive energy of reaction against it. It was because Jahveh was from the first the terrible and exalted one, that the moral view of his holy nature in the prophets took on that trait of incomparable moral exaltation and austere earnestness, which distinguishes the Biblical notion of God from every other. But this exclusive austerity, which is essentially present in the notion of holiness, was only one side, which was supplemented and softened by the other. The Holy One is at the same time the God of Israel, who, out of free *grace*, chose this people for his own possession, and has entered into a covenant of mutual attachment with it. And as Jahveh's holiness must certainly manifest itself against human sin in retributive *justice;* so, on the other hand, it must also certainly manifest itself in the unchangeable *faithfulness* of his electing grace, which, in spite of all human sin, cannot abandon the covenant once made. "The Lord of hosts is exalted in judgment, and God the Holy One is sanctified (shows himself holy) in righteousness," Isaiah says (v. 16); while Hosea makes God say: "I will not execute the fierceness of mine anger, I will not return to destroy Ephraim; for I am God and not man, the Holy One in the midst of thee, I will not come in wrath." Precisely the holiness of God, his exaltation above human passion and change-

ableness, is the ground of his unceasing grace and long-suffering towards his chosen people (comp. Psalm ciii.), as on the other side it is also the ground of his punitive justice against sin, both in Israel and outside it. The one as well as the other is a standing idea of all the prophets; these are the two poles, around which their religious view of the world moves, and the individuals among them differ mainly in point of the proportions in which they mingle together these two elements, as we shall soon see from the example of the three great prophets of the exile. Here, however, we must further add, that the manifestation of God's holiness in justice and that in grace are not quite alike, inasmuch as his punitive justice extends to all peoples; but his grace, compassion, and faithfulness are limited to the chosen people. This infuses into the divine procedure a certain arbitrariness, connected with the particularist limitation of the Jewish god-consciousness spoken of above. But while this cannot be denied, it must at the same time be allowed that with the prophets the defect is little felt, chiefly for the simple reason that they generally leave extra-Israelite humanity out of consideration. How far the second Isaiah forms an exception in this particular, we shall afterwards see.

Israel being Jehovah's own possession is called to be a *holy* people, a *kingdom* of priests,[1] *i.e.* entirely devoted to the service of Jahveh, and as intimately identified with him as priests with their God. In this application, as well as others, the notion of holiness does not originally imply the moral quality of a pure and good disposition, but the ritual one of separateness from what is common and everyday, and of dedication to God for his peculiar property: the holy is first of all just what is dedicated to God, what belongs to God. It is used in this sense of persons and things belonging to the ritual; in this sense men and things are sanctified by ceremonial solemnities, *i.e.* dedicated for a divine possession, for instruments of God—*e.g.* for Jahveh's army, or merely for a temporary ceremonial, belonging to God during the celebration of a festival. Now it is a common idea in all religions —an idea which prevailed from the beginning, and no doubt in Israel too—that as matters belonging to worship must not be desecrated by

[1] Exod. xix. 6; Deut. vii. 6.

common use, so the persons also who serve God must attest their belonging to the Deity by abstaining from certain things by which they might make themselves common. Thus, for example, a priest of Israel was not to marry a wife who had formerly belonged to another, because if he did so he would make himself common, would desecrate his peculiar position towards Jahveh. If this priestly condition is extended to the whole people of Israel as a "kingdom of priests," then we reach the idea which we find to be the fixed motive of the whole legislation in the "Book of the Covenant" (Exodus xxi.-xxiii.) as well as in the law-book of king Josiah, "Deuteronomy;" Israel is holy, belongs to God as his peculiar possession before all other peoples, and must continue so to belong to him; and so Israel must first of all guard against everything that might desecrate this consecrated position and make the people common. This idea no doubt belonged to those ancient elements of the religion of Jahveh which the prophets found already existing, and to which they only gave a moral development after their own fashion. The difference between the popular priestly, and the prophetic, idea of Israel's holiness, turned merely on the question to what matters those demands were addressed, which were implied in the formal notion of Israel's holiness.

By what does Israel make himself common, violate his dedication to God, his position of belonging peculiarly to Jahveh? According to the traditional view, he did so by acts which brought about a *ceremonial uncleanness;* but according to the conviction of the prophets he did so chiefly by acts of *moral impurity.* The idea of what is ceremonially "unclean" and what ceremonially defiles, is itself a composite one, made up of a number of elements; it comprises first the idea of what is physically unclean, what creates instinctive aversion and disgust, and hence is thought to be displeasing to the Deity as well; then perhaps the idea of the changeful life of nature which moves through birth and death, and is therefore opposed to the eternal heavenly existence; and last of all, a point hitherto generally overlooked by theologians—the idea of the sacrosanct, *i.e.* of that which the Deity claims as reserved specially for its

own possession, what the Deity has laid his hands on and appropriated, and what therefore no mortal must dare to touch. It is the "taboo" of the Australians, the accursed or devoted thing of the Hebrew, the *sanctum* or *sacrosanctum* of the Romans, that underlies most of the ordinances regarding things which are clean and things which defile, both in Israel and elsewhere. Thus the notions of "unclean beasts," which are not to be eaten, are not due, as has generally been supposed, to any supposed defects or unwholesome qualities in those creatures, but simply to the circumstance that from the earliest times they counted as the "taboo" of the Deity, which men therefore were forbidden to take. The prohibition of animals which have died of themselves, or of "things strangled," which still contain the blood, rests on exactly the same ideas; animals which die of themselves, which man did not kill, belong to higher powers, and man has no right to them; in the same way the Deity claims what is strangled because the blood which everywhere belongs to the Deity is still in it, and declares it also to be "taboo." This could no doubt be established by a detailed examination of the laws of purity in the Old Testament, for which, however, this is not the place. It is at all events clear, that all such ideas and usages have their origin in old times, and in the savage, naturalistic stage of the religious consciousness. That they maintained themselves in the age of the prophets by the side of much higher views, and that they even attained prominence and importance again in Ezekiel and in the priestly law, only shows what persistent life and force old ideas which are deeply rooted in the usages of worship may still possess, even when religion has developed very far in other respects.

But the advance made by the prophets did not consist merely in their attacking the popular priestly traditions about ceremonial defilement, and confronting them with pure and more enlightened views. They merely placed by the side of the traditional demand that Israel, as the sacred people of Jahveh, should abstain from ceremonial impurity (Exodus xxii. 31; Deut. xiv. 21), the demand of abstinence from what was morally to be rejected; on the one side they imparted to the idea of the holiness of Jahveh a new scope and

a far deeper meaning by dwelling on the moral side of it; and they treated the ideal of the people holy to God in the same way. The one followed from the other; if it belongs to the sacred nature of Jahveh that evil is hateful to him, then the people which is consecrated to him must avoid the evil which is hateful to its God; its worship should not consist only of ceremonial offerings, abstinences, and purifications, but also of righteousness and straightforwardness of moral conduct. Jahveh takes no delight, Amos said to the luxurious and sanctimonious people of Ephraim (v. 14-26), in festivals and solemn assemblies, nor in burnt-offerings and meat-offerings, nor in the voice of songs and the melody of viols; rather "let judgment roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream. Seek good and not evil, that ye may live, and then Jahveh shall be with you as ye (now untruly) say." To the penitent sinner who inquires with what penances he shall atone an angry God, Micah answers (vi. 8): "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth Jahveh require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God." Most powerful of all, however, is Isaiah's denunciation in the name of Jahveh of the pretentious piety of Judah (i. 10 *sq.*): "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? I delight not in the blood of bullocks. Bring no more lying oblations. My soul hateth your feasts. When ye make many prayers I will not hear: your hands are full of blood. Wash you, make you clean, put away your evil doings from before mine eyes: cease to do evil, learn to do well, seek judgment, set right the oppressor, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow! Then come and let us reason together!"

Such expressions could scarcely, every one can see, have been used of the public worship of Israel, if the prophets had regarded it as not merely a popular custom, but a divine institution based on a positive revelation of Jahveh, as it is made to appear in the later book of the priestly law. Jeremiah declares expressly, and even with superfluous clearness (vii. 21 *sq.*), that God gave the ancestors of the people no laws about sacrifice, but only required of them the obedience of moral conduct. And it is a further proof that the prophets were not

acquainted with the priestly law, that when they put forward similar demands to those of the law, as in their animated attacks on idolatry and image-worship, they never take occasion to appeal to the legislation of Moses, though the support of a recognised and venerated authority would have been a welcome ally. We must indeed acknowledge that the whole activity of the prophets, as it is before us in their writings—the manner in which they come forward, the tone they adopt in controversy, their reception by the people, and, last of all, the slightness of the success which attends their efforts, that all this taken together remains the most unintelligible riddle so long as we regard them as merely the expositors and defenders of a Mosaic law which had long been in existence and was well known. But so soon as we abandon a fiction which is a complete inversion of history, and which may be easily explained, and see in the prophets not the successors, but the preparers, for what is called "Mosaism," the whole matter at once grows clear and simple. Now we understand why they appeal solely to the unwritten word of God, the call of which they have inwardly received in great struggles and efforts (Isa. vi., Jer. i.), to the living Spirit of God, the glow of which they feel like burning fire in their hearts (Jer. xx. 9). Now we understand why they ignore so entirely all positive authorities. And now, for the first time, we admire in them the inspired heroes of a religious advance of surpassing moment, who, just because they transcended their own age by centuries, stood lonely and not understood amidst a deaf generation, misjudged by the people, suspected by the priests, persecuted by the kings, and yet unshaken like an iron pillar and a brazen wall against the whole land, firm and at peace in the belief that Jahveh was with them, and the future therefore theirs.

Nor were the prophets mistaken in this faith; it was fulfilled in the great arena of history, even beyond what they conceived. But the time and place of this fulfilment turned out here, as with all the great hopes of history, quite differently from what they had expected. Their immediate successes were extremely trifling. The northern kingdom of Ephraim succumbed to its fate, which the prophets were powerless to arrest. Under the impression of this

catastrophe, and of the preaching of Isaiah, King Hezekiah roused himself to a reform of worship on the lines of the prophetic ideal, abolishing image-worship, and (perhaps), by his prohibition of sacrifice on the "high places," making the first attempt at the centralisation of worship. But even under his son Manasseh the old evil returned in an increased degree. To mend the disorganisation occasioned by the misgovernment of this monarch, Josiah, the grandson of Hezekiah, and about a century after him, set on foot a new scheme of reform, in which he had the assistance of priests and prophets, and which, though surpassing the first in energy and thoroughness, yet as little survived its originator. One fruit only of great and permanent importance remained from the reform of Josiah, namely, that first comprehensive law-book of Israel, which has descended to us under the name of "Deuteronomy," and forms the fifth book of Moses (chap. v.-xxviii.), but of which it is quite certain that it is the first law-book which was published under Josiah, 622 B.C., and was only written a short time before.

The character of this book, which possesses such momentous importance for the subsequent history of Israel, may be indicated without difficulty; it is both in form and in matter the result of a compromise between the prophetic and the priestly spirit, in which, however, the former very greatly predominates. The fundamental law of the two tables stands first, in a revised form of the older version of Exodus xx.; and the sum of the prophetic preaching is then given in the two sentences: "Hear, O Israel, Jahveh is our God, Jahveh alone. And thou shalt love Jahveh thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy strength"! (vi. 4 *sq.*). With a clearness and decision such as is to be found elsewhere only in Jeremiah, the religious relation is here taken to consist in *love to God*, founded on the free love and faithfulness of God to his chosen people (vii. 6 *sqq.*) The motive of the fulfilment of religious and

[1] This is commonly assumed to be the case. I cannot, however, conceal that a comparison of the reasons supporting the Sabbath law in the two versions (in Deuteronomy the history of the liberation, in Exodus the history of creation) awakens some doubts in my mind as to the correctness of the view hitherto received.

moral duties consists, according to the Deuteronomist, firstly, in this mutual love, and also, it is true, in fear at the terrible threatenings of the punishment of an angry God.

The first of those duties is the exclusive worship of Jahveh without any image. Further directions for the ordering of *worship* are only given so far as they seemed to be necessary in order to its being conducted in harmony with this cardinal requirement of the prophets. The most important of these is the centralisation of worship in the sanctuary at Jerusalem, and the entire prohibition of all worship on the high places, an innovation now first introduced (if we do not count the problematical attempt of Hezekiah), and of far-reaching consequences, which we may take to have been a heroic measure intended to lay the axe to the root of the tree of that heathenism which crept in again and again in connection with the high places, and could never be altogether suppressed. It is possible that the change was also recommended by selfish motives on the part of the priesthood at Jerusalem, who thus became possessed of a lucrative monopoly ; and it is quite likely that it was not introduced without a certain degree of harshness and force, which revenged itself afterwards in a reaction. Yet, whatever may have been the various human motives which dictated such a measure, the effects which followed it certainly far transcended the views of its authors, for the abolition of sacrifice except at Jerusalem cleared the way for a worship without sacrifice, the spiritual worship of the synagogue and of the church. "Of the *civil laws* it has first of all to be said, that they are distinguished by the truly humane spirit which breathes in them. Care for the weaker sex, for widows and orphans, for slaves and strangers, even for domestic and family peace, appears in many a provision, in such a way that the word *law* is scarcely applicable—these precepts speak of things which cannot be enjoined, but only recommended. Beneficence, mildness, justice, honour, and other virtues and principles on which the welfare of human society rests are brought before the understanding and the conscience as divine commands, in a graphic way, as if by examples ; nor are they, as is elsewhere usual, sanctioned by punishments assigned for the breach of

each precept. Such ascetic rules as are also found here merely confirm practices of older date. We see quite plainly that this work, so remarkable in every way, is less correctly defined by the name under which it has became known to us than if it were called a manual for the people, a catechism of religion and morality from the school of the prophets."—(Reuss.)

The immediate success of Josiah's work of reform soon disappeared after the death of that monarch; but it was a matter of the highest importance that the will of God, as the prophets conceived it, was now fixed in a written law, and had, by being practically carried out, though but for a short time, attained the position of being publicly recognised. An authority of acknowledged validity in religious affairs had thus been provided, which the prophetic religion, if ever it was to take popular form, could not do without. True, there was a dark side to a reform which had been carried through and been fixed in legislation by sheer force; it was thought that all was done when the outward ordinances of religion were restored, the festivals, sacrifices, and fasts regularly observed, and the book of the law widely known, and that this was a compensation for any prevailing immorality; as long as the temple and its legal worship stood fast, it was thought that the people could not possibly want the help of its God. Even priests and prophets shared this general delusion, and by their thoughtless optimism betrayed both themselves and the people to a fatal security. Then *Jeremiah*, the most elevated and most tragical of all the great prophetic figures, opposed himself as a brazen wall to the whole land—kings, priests, prophets and people, and declared to a blinded nation the inevitable judgments of God. He was thoroughly in harmony with Deuteronomy in his vigorous opposition to all idolatry, but a religion which was limited to outward legal forms did not content him.[1] He cannot make his warnings forcible enough against carnal confidence in the temple, which immorality has made a den of thieves, and which therefore will fare no better than the house of God at Shiloh: sacrifice and offering are not what God delights in; not about sacrifice did God speak to the

[1] *Cf.*, for example, vii. 4-15, 21 *sqq.*; xiv. 11 *sqq.*; viii. 8-1 1.

fathers of the people, but that they should walk in his ways; and what profit is there in all wisdom and knowledge of the law, when it is made a lie (by superficial interpretation and superficial observance)? Lying and lying prophecies he calls the soothing voices which called "Peace, peace," where there was no peace, but incurable sickness from which he is convinced that state and town must perish. With incorruptible love of truth he gave expression to this conviction, though the multitude raged madly against him, and his own heart was bleeding with bitter anguish for his people. But though he would know nothing of premature and superficial comfort, at the end of the way of suffering he also saw the ray of hope of a new period of salvation, the more splendid that it was bought so dearly by such heavy trials. Above the old covenant of the law, so universally relied on, so universally broken, there rose to his eye the new covenant of the future, in which God's law would be written in men's hearts, and all, both small and great, would know Jahveh, him who loves Ephraim, as a father his first-born son, with an eternal love (xxxi. 3, 9, 31 *sq.*). True, Jeremiah expects this to be followed by the restoration of the nation and of the holy city, of the Davidic monarchy and the Levitical priesthood (xxxiii. 14 *sqq.*); but all this is to him merely the form and the outcome of the inner renewal in which religion will cease to be a national legal matter and will become an individual concern—a concern of the heart, a new covenant of the knowledge and the love of God. Thus, at the close of Israel's national existence, prophecy rises to its highest point, from whence it already sees in the distance the dawn of that new day for which all the dark fortunes of the people were intended to prepare.

But such flashes of light, in which the mind flies over centuries, are only granted to chosen spirits in the excitement of the most momentous times; when the storm of the time sinks to rest, this rising of the spirit is followed by an ebb. Scarcely any one after Jeremiah maintained himself at the same height; the second Isaiah stands not far under him, far beneath him stood Ezekiel, and as for all his other successors, till that One whose herald and prototype he was,

they are not to be compared with him at all. *Ezekiel*, too, was a powerful preacher of repentance, but in quite a different way from Jeremiah. What comes with the latter immediately, and with aggressive energy, straight from a soul on fire, presents itself in the former quite cooled down, in the form of artificial visions and allegories; while of the tone of melancholy and pathos, and of the compassionate sympathy of a soul which, however much in earnest, was yet deeply sensitive and tender, there is nothing to be found in the harsh rebukes of the exilic preacher of repentance. And as the two men differed, so did the pictures differ which they made to themselves of God. Through all the judgments of the present, Jeremiah looks into the heart of his God, and sees it filled with eternal fatherly love and faithful goodwill to his firstborn son Ephraim; Ezekiel, on the other hand, prefers to speak of the holiness of God, which he apprehends not in the moral sense as Isaiah does, but rather in the earlier sense of exalted majesty, incomparable greatness, fearful power. The chief fact in his eyes is the *antithesis* of the almighty Creator and the weak creature, while Jeremiah prefers to regard the religious relation as the *communion* of a gracious God with grateful and devoted man. The difference between the two prophets, however, appears most markedly in the ideals they form of the future. If the eagle eye of Jeremiah saw on the distant horizon the dawn of a new covenant of religion made inward, the priest-prophet on the banks of the Chebar inclines to more limited ideals, which, however, are more practicable for the immediate future; he draws up a new order of worship and of society for the community, about to be restored, of the returning exiles. The beginnings were sketched of a hierarchical organisation of the priesthood, of which Deuteronomy, to go no further back, had known nothing. Worship received an extension in atoning ceremonies and festivals of atonement, such as the profound sense of sin of the exile called for. A new division of the soil among the twelve tribes is arranged in such a way that they shall be regularly grouped about the temple at Jerusalem. The architecture and arrangement of the temple itself are minutely described; in short, an exact picture is drawn of a

theocratic community of which worship is the centre and pivot. With all this, Deuteronomy is supposed to be known, but no acquaintance is shown with the priestly code; the legislative projects of Ezekiel form an intermediate stage between the two. The spirit of Ezra and of legal Judaism manifests itself first in Ezekiel, and is the new power which in the future is to take the place of prophecy.

But before it ceased, prophecy threw out one wonderful blossom, in the work of that unknown prophet about the middle of the sixth century, whose book is appended in the canon to that of the prophet Isaiah (chap. xl.-lxvi.), and who is therefore generally distinguished as the *Second* or *Babylonian Isaiah*. His is a kindred spirit to those of Isaiah and Jeremiah, and he forms, along with them, the triumvirate of great prophets, in whom the spirit of Hebrew religion found classical expression. The preaching of repentance retreats with him before an exulting certainty and inspired announcement of an approaching redemption, in which the chastened and purified people of God is to return and to advance to a new splendour, far surpassing all the glories of the past. Salvation is here promised in the immediate future, and the main feature of it is to be the triumphant return of the exiles and the brilliant restoration of the nation (which it is well known never took place in history), and in these respects the view is a limited one compared with Jeremiah's forecast of the new covenant of a religion turned inward and spiritual; but it may be said with truth, that that view is with the second Isaiah merely "the body in which the spirit of prophecy for the moment incorporates itself," which, however, does not exhaust itself in this expression, and not merely equals the spirit of his great predecessors, but even transcends them (Reuss). The idea of God especially receives at the hands of the second Isaiah its highest and richest development, the two sides of it represented by Jeremiah and Ezekiel respectively being here combined in a unity, and justice done to both alike. Deutero-Isaiah agrees with Ezekiel in the emphasis laid on the sole and incomparable greatness, power, and glory of Jahveh, the Creator of heaven and earth, who is seated on the circle of the earth, before

whom the nations are as the drop of the bucket, the dust of the balance, as a nothing; whose wisdom is to us incomprehensible; who makes known his sole deity to the world by wonders of power as well as of knowledge (foreseeing the future). But the same God, "the Holy One," who sits on high in heaven, dwells also with the contrite and broken in spirit, to revive the hearts of the contrite ones (lvii. 15). His principal names are the Redeemer and Saviour of Israel, his Father from the beginning; he has compassion on Israel with a love deeper than a mother's; though for a small moment he has forsaken Israel, yet now his grace shall no more depart from him, nor the covenant of his peace be removed (xlix. 15, liv. 10, lxiv. 8). Thus Ezekiel's view of the exaltedness of God, who is above the world, combines with Jeremiah's sense of the intimate nearness and communion of a God who lovingly makes himself known; in the view of the second Isaiah law and gospel are combined in unity. His view of the future, too, transcends that of his two predecessors, as it embraces the Gentile nations, whom they had left out of view. He takes up again the thought to which Isaiah had given utterance two centuries before, but gives it a new and profounder turn, the conversion of the Gentiles being brought about not by an immediate act of power of Jahveh, but by means of the teaching of Israel. Israel is the "servant of Jahveh," whose world-historical mission it is to be a light to the peoples which sit in darkness, a mediator between Jahveh and mankind (xlii. 1-7, xlix. 1-8). Prophetic teleology is here on the point of overstepping entirely the limit of national particularism; the logical outcome of its premises would be the universalism of the Epistle to the Romans, but the prophet himself did not draw this conclusion, and the Judaism of the following centuries did so even less. On another side, however, that teleology led to a signal extension of the religious view. The prophet sees in the sufferings of his people the means of fulfilling the great purposes of God for the salvation of man, and in the conspicuous afflictions which fall on the best part of Israel, the consequence of the solidarity of the guilt of the whole people, and the means to bring about the salvation of the people as a whole;

and thus he arrives at the idea of an atoning and saving suffering of the righteous for the sinful multitude. The "servant of Jahveh"—*i.e.* ideal Israel as embodied personally in such figures as Jeremiah and other sufferers of the time—now appeared not only as the patient, humble, and gentle teacher of the nations (xlii. 1 *sq.*), but also as the willing victim who bears and atones for the guilt of the community, and so purchases and brings about salvation and peace (liii.) This was not intended as a Messianic prophecy of Christ—the prophet is not speaking of things future, but of things present,—yet it was in fact such a prophecy, since it contained an eternal truth which fulfils itself again and again in history, but never did so more grandly, or with more far-reaching consequences, than in the sufferer on Golgotha. Deutero-Isaiah has thus a good right to be called the evangelist of the Old Testament.

The question how the sufferings of the innocent were to be explained and reconciled with the just judgment of God, was earnestly taken up by other pious thinkers of that time. This scarcely applies to Ezekiel, who set up the harshest doctrine of individual retribution without the least attempt to explain the contradiction offered by daily experience to such a theory (chap. xviii.). It applies, however, to the unknown writer of the Book of *Job*, the date of which cannot be placed earlier than the period of the exile, certainly not before Jeremiah; for the problem dealt with in this great didactic poem presupposes a time when the religious consciousness had begun to individualise itself, and the fortunes of individuals, not as heretofore of peoples only, were made the object of religious reflection; and this could scarcely be the case at a time when all interest was absorbed in the fate of the nation, *i.e.* before the exile. I believe, therefore, that the origin of the Book of Job is to be placed at least in the time of the exile, if not after it. The mention of Job in Ezek. xiv. 14 does not prove that Ezekiel knew the Book of Job, any more than the mention of Daniel in the same passage that he knew the Book of Daniel; these names were no doubt well known in popular legend. It might with more likelihood be said that the Book of Job presupposes Ezekiel, because the doctrine first set up

in Ezekiel xviii., of the strict adjustment of the fate of every individual to his personal merit, is obviously to the author of Job the fixed, universally acknowledged axiomatic view, from which all the speakers in the discussion set out. It is just the contradiction presented to this view by daily experience, which shows that the innocent suffer, and even suffer more than the ungodly, which forms the riddle for which a solution is sought, a solution which is nowhere found, since the poetical close of the book points to the conclusion that the only course remaining to man is resignation in presence of the unsearchable ways of God. It is not a long step from this to the somewhat sceptical mood which we afterwards find in the "Preacher." At a later time eschatology was more worked out, and offered a solution of the problem in the hope of future compensation. Both of these attempted solutions are far inferior in point of religious ideality to the doctrine of Deutero-Isaiah of the teleological meaning of the sufferings of the innocent and their instrumentality to salvation, and to the genuinely Christian assurance held by the Psalmist, of a present blessedness in God, which lifts him far above all the sufferings of the world (Psalm lxxiii. 25 *sq.*).

The circumstances of the Jewish colony which returned under Joshua and Zerubbabel were far from answering to the high-wrought hopes of the people, or to the prophetic promises. In the struggle with daily necessities and with hostile neighbours, the first enthusiasm soon died away. The restoration of the temple was accomplished, though only with difficulty and after various interruptions; but the beginnings of church order were imperfectly settled, abuses flourished, the organisation of the priesthood threatened to fall to pieces from the want of any regular income, and the mixed marriages of the new community boded ill for its religious purity. Nor did the word of a few prophets, itself a weak echo of former power, produce any deep or permanent results. The time called for men of practical energy and organising talent, who would bring order and fixity into the unsettled circumstances of the colony by means of laws and institutions. This task was discharged by *Nehemiah*, the

governor, and *Ezra*, the priest and scribe, in such a way as to entitle them to be called the founders of the Jewish community.

The object aimed at by these men was to embrace in a fixed legal form, and to invest with the sanction of sacred authority, that ideal of the ecclesiastical community which had been present to the minds of pious priests from Ezekiel downwards. The Deuteronomic law-book enjoyed, it was true, a high degree of reverence: its cardinal requirement in point of worship—viz., the abolition of the high places and of images, and the centralisation of worship in the temple of Jerusalem,—was easily carried out in the small colony which dwelt in and around Jerusalem, and which no longer felt any attachment to the ancient sanctuaries of the land. So far the law was unconditionally and naturally obeyed. But in many particulars both of worship and of civil life, the directions of Deuteronomy no longer sufficed for the new needs and circumstances. Even Ezekiel had worked out many points and added many new provisions; others had followed in the same path, and out of the contributions of many men, all animated by the same spirit, a collection of religious and civil laws had arisen, which were then edited by Ezra, the priestly scribe, in the *Priestly Code*, and publicly read in the year 444 B.C. to the assembled community, which then solemnly accepted them (Nehemiah, chapters viii. x.). This work of Ezra was still further extended by later scribes, and worked up along with writings and fragments of more ancient and more recent date into one great work (the "Pentateuch"). Thus we no longer possess the work of Ezra in its original form as a complete and independent book of laws with its historical introductions and arabesques; yet it is possible to sift out the contents of it with a considerable degree of certainty from the materials of the first four books of Moses, in which it is imbedded. Most of what we find from the 25th chapter of Exodus to nearly the end of Numbers, belongs to Ezra's work; and in the earlier portion of the Pentateuch the so-called Elohistic portions also, which are artistically interwoven with the more detailed materials of the Jehovistic or prophetic narratives, and often show some degree of inconsistency with them.

The law-book of Ezra had thus a *historic setting.* It went back to the creation and the flood (in these narratives Chaldean legendary materials were also worked in), then proceeded with rapid steps through the history of the patriarchs, dwelt at greater length on the early history of Moses, to find in the solemn legislation of Sinai and of the wilderness its proper aim,—and that of the creation and the history of the world. To understand the history of the priestly law-book we require to start from this point; this is the absolute end to which everything pointed from the beginning, and what we have before us is not a working up of the national legends and reminiscences from religious points of view—the earlier treatment of history by the prophets was entirely of this nature—but a quite ideal construction of history which serves the one purpose of exalting worship. The ideals of ecclesiastical and civil order which appeared to the law-men of the fifth century to be the necessary expression of the religion of Jahveh, and therefore the subject of divine requirement, are to be placed under the nimbus and to receive the sanction, of hoary antiquity and of the venerable name of Moses as their inspired promulgator. We might say, indeed, that what the priestly law-book contains is prophecy turned upside down—retrospective prophecy; instead of projecting their religious ideals into the future as the prophets did, priestly literary effort painted them upon the unoccupied surface of misty antiquity, and so placed them in the magic light of primeval and directly divine revelation. And indeed it is the same ideal pictures which appear in the prophets as hopes of the future, and in the law-men as historical narratives. The miraculous return of the redeemed people through the wilderness, which Deutero-Isaiah depicts in ideal sketches; then the glory of the temple of Ezekiel; his description of the organisation of the priesthood, of the division of the land, of the arrangement of worship—these are the types which inspired, though the details are freely drawn, the narratives of the priestly law-book, the stories of Israel's wanderings in the desert under Moses and of the tabernacle, the descriptions of the arrangement of the camp, of the functions of the priests, etc. In opening up to us this relation, recent criticism not only provides us

with the key to an understanding of the earlier history of the religion of Israel, but gives one of the most striking and interesting examples of the process by which religious ideas are solidified into ideal historical narratives, or edifying legends. The whole history of religion, and not least the Christian history, provides us with abundant analogies, and we may say with confidence that insight into this process, which is based on the religious consciousness itself, is the *conditio sine qua non* of a real comprehension of historical religions and of religious sources; and yet the theologians are still a small number in whom this insight is to be found! The failure to understand this may partly be excused by the difference in the historical spirit in ancient and in modern times. The ease with which antiquity in general, and particularly Semitic antiquity, overstepped objective historical fact, transformed history and put the transformation in the place of the history, this sovereign self-exaltation of fancy guided by practical interests, is no doubt very strange, very astonishing to us Europeans, whose minds are cool, and who have passed through the discipline of objective science. But he who seeks to understand the history of religion must possess the faculty of putting off the modern habit of thought, and placing himself inside the spirit of those times and peoples, to whom that was still becoming which reaches us as a thing finished, with whom accordingly creative fancy, working in the service of the heart, still ranked before the intellect with its objective thinking.

As for the general character of the priestly law, it may be described as a consistent carrying out of the tendency which had its beginning in Ezekiel, to make religion mechanical by enclosing it in a ritualistic worship and in a high-church priestly system. Civil and moral precepts, such as formed the burden of the prophetic exhortations, are only found here in the section Lev. xvii.-xxvi., which, cogent reasons lead us to suppose, does not belong to the post-exilic school of law, but is of older origin. Many think of Ezekiel as the author of this piece; at all events the spirit it breathes is still prophetic, and especially in chapter xix. it resembles the mild spirit of Jeremiah or the Deuteronomist. We even find love to one's

neighbour enjoined, both to the member of the chosen people, and to the stranger settled among them (vers. 18 and 34), and a condemnation of rancour and revenge—a supplement to the Deuteronomic injunction of love to God (Deut. vi. 5). Apart from this older section, however, which probably originated in prophetic circles, the priestly code of Ezra contains little more than directions connected with worship, about priests and festivals, and sacrificial and purificatory ceremonies. Of more moment to him than that purity of heart which the prophets required, is the purity of the skin and of dishes; of more importance than the amends of penitence and change of life, are purifications by means of lustration and sacrifice. For a forgiveness of sins extended by free grace to the penitent, a subject on which so many a splendid word was spoken by the prophets, the priestly code has in fact no room: according to its view a sin "with a high hand," *i.e.* with conscious unlawful intention, cannot be forgiven, but requires to be punished by the death of the sinner; while other sins, such as proceeded from ignorance or haste, are to be made good by definite means of atonement (ceremonies of lustration, and the "sin-offering" and "offering of atonement"). It introduces as a new and crowning festival of the Jewish year, the annual day of atonement, on which, by ceremonies some of which are primitive in their character, a general absolution is to be effected for all the sins of the people not yet atoned for, committed during the preceding year. The moral act of the removal of guilt, which takes place within the heart, is thus replaced by an external mechanical act, the mysterious sacramental efficacy of which depends partly on the correct performance of the prescribed formalities, but also to a great degree on the higher consecration of the officiating priests. In earlier times the priests had neither possessed a monopoly of sacred offices, nor had they been invested in performing them with any peculiar sacramental consecration. Now, however, they received the exclusive privilege of entering the sanctuary and offering the sacrifices to God; they became the official mediators between God and the community, the expositors and executors of his will, by whose sacramental action alone the community

is made pure and pleasing to God, and the divine grace is assured to it.

This, it is clear, was to replace the prophetic religion by something that was new and different. We can understand and allow for the historical necessity which led to this; pedagogic considerations called for such a discipline as this in order to impress the main thoughts of monotheism firmly and durably on the mind and the life of the Jewish people; but this does not prevent us from pronouncing that in point of substance this legal religion of *Judaism* founded by Ezra falls far below the prophetic religious ideal. What took place here was just what takes place everywhere in the world, and most of all in every great religious reform and reconstruction: to introduce the ideal into the actual life of the people (a thing which had never been done permanently or generally accomplished in pre-exilic times) the ideal had to submit to every sort of narrowing, impoverishment, and mixture. To embody itself in a popular church institution, the idealism of the prophetic genius had to submit to a compromise with priestly and theological ritualism and dogmatism. The foundation was thus laid for the external work-service of Pharisaism, for carnal reliance on ritual means of salvation; and at the same time for the forced, unloving, and arrogant Jewish national spirit, in which the healthy patriotism of the prophets suffered a sickly degeneration. All this cannot be denied, and the opening act of Ezra's work was characteristic of its genius, when he compelled the Jews who were living in mixed marriages to put away their non-Jewish wives. This measure may have been serviceable to the interests of the theocracy; but sound human feeling will never consent to see anything amiable or lovely in such a pedantic application of the theocratic principle, either in an Ezra or in a Hildebrand or Calvin!

For all this, it would be a great mistake to suppose that the period of Judaism founded by Ezra was a time in which nothing was done but to harden and narrow the religion of the prophets. On the contrary, it shows in many respects important progress and new lines of development. Specially important was a growth which sprang on

one side from the centralisation of sacrificial worship in Jerusalem, and on the other from the need which was felt for regular public reading of the law, namely the *worship of the synagogue*, in which the Jews who lived outside Jerusalem found a regular substitute in the way of worship, for the distant sacrifices of the temple. In Jerusalem the sensuous form of worship which the prophets had liked so little was conducted with constantly increasing pomp, but in the synagogues there grew up by the side of that one, a new form of worship which approached much more nearly to the prophetic ideal, and was destined in the course of time entirely to supersede the sacrificial temple-worship. At the Sabbath meetings every Jew was regularly instructed in the law and the prophets, and there was added to the reading of the word, free exposition and edifying exhortation by those learned in the scripture, and in this way religion became the personal affair of the individual. Individual religion, thought, and feeling, formerly to be found only in a man of God here and there—by no means in the mass of the people—became by means of the synagogue universally diffused. Thus under the shelter of legal institutions, and even indirectly occasioned by them, though by no means consciously aimed at, the ground was silently prepared for a subsequent higher stage of religion, the worship of God in spirit and in truth.

The fairest fruit of this personal deepening of religion, this personal appropriation of the prophetic belief in God, was the rise of religious poetry, both lyrical and didactic. With the exception of a few older songs (the so-called King's Psalms, perhaps) all the Hebrew *Psalms* certainly belong to the centuries after the exile, many of them indeed to the Maccabean period of religious trial and of the spirited wars of liberation. (The traditional reference of most of the Psalms to David is based on the quite unhistorical legend, which makes a pious singer of the warlike king, the celebrated hero of patriotic story, who certainly was far from a fine-strung nature; just as it makes of his splendour-loving son Solomon a philosopher infected with world-pain.) For the most part the Psalms are the immediate expression of those religious moods which re-echoed in the hearts of the hearers the word of God proclaimed in the synagogue, an echo varying ac-

cording to time and place, but always harmonious; and the collection of them, which grew very gradually, was mainly intended to serve the purpose of edifying the community in the synagogue service. The Psalter was originally the congregational hymn-book of the synagogue, and it afterwards came to fill the same place in the church, which felt strongly and immediately the attraction of these hymns, in which more than anywhere else the religion of the Old Testament found a genuinely human, profound, and natural expression.

In the Books of *Wisdom* we see quite the other side of the Jewish religion. These works contain something like a moral philosophy; we also find in them the faint beginnings of a speculation on the divine "Wisdom," the personified mediatrix of creation (Prov. viii., Sirach xxiv.), in which may be found the elements of the religious philosophy of Alexandria. The *Proverbs*, the *Preacher* (these two, of course, are just as little the work of Solomon as the Psalms are the work of David) and the collection of *Proverbs of Jesus ben Sirach* belong to this class. All that can be said with certainty on the question of their origin is that it belongs to the period of the Greek rule over Palestine between Alexander and the Maccabees. These writings are distinguished from the Psalms and the Prophets by the absence in them of religious warmth and inspiration, the cool, sober, rational view of the religious relation. That exalted God, whom the prophets yet felt to be inwardly present with them as an energetic holy Spirit, retreats with these moral teachers to a distance, in which he is connected with the community of the faithful only by the loose bond of the miracles and revelations of antiquity and by his general providence. At the same time nothing is further from them than godlessness; it is one of the fundamental ideas of their working view of the world, that the fear of God is the source of the wisdom of the right ordering of life; they are penetrated by the feeling of dependence on God, and of the obligation of obedience to his commandments. Their morality is built up on the basis of an honest though cool, legal, and deistic piety, and thus is not specially ideal, but mixed up with many elements of utilitarian prudence. Yet it always bespeaks a sound moral sense, and is very far above the

lightness of the contemporary Greek world. Specially noticeable are the ideal description of family life (Prov. xxxi. 10-31), the sacred estimation of which was at all times the noblest side of Judaism. Nor are there wanting exhortations to love our enemies, though the moral force of these is greatly weakened by the mixed motives on which they are based (Prov. xxiv. 17 *sq.*, xxv. 21 *sq.;* better is x. 12.) A very curious contrast to the cheerful spirit of the two collections of Proverbs is presented by the lugubrious pessimism of the *Preacher*, a work entirely unique in Old Testament literature. The problem of Job is here taken up once more, but is extended to a pessimist view of life generally, which leads to the melancholy result, that all is vanity, wisdom not excepted, which with all its labour produces nothing but disappointment, and cannot even arrive at a comprehension of anything. The questioning glance of the Preacher is directed also to the beyond, but he does not venture to hope from it anything that might serve to comfort man for the emptiness of his present existence (iii. 19-21, ix. 2-10). Thus nothing remains but the counsel to be content with the joys of life which God has given, to do one s daily duty with unwearied energy, but not to trouble ourselves much about what lies beyond—a rational resignation which yet cannot disarm the sting of inner dissatisfaction. The last word therefore remains with pessimism : " All is vanity " (xii. 8). The following verses (9-14) are a later addition by a strange hand, added to obviate what might appear to be objectionable in the book. To us this book is an interesting indication of the crisis reached at that time in the development of Judaism, when the old powerful motives of earthly national hopes had all but disappeared, and no compensation had yet come in sight either in the hope of happiness beyond this world or in a living religious mysticism.

Under such circumstances the increasing importation of Greek culture among the Jewish people, and particularly among the aristocratic circles of Jerusalem, contained a great danger, in which the legacy of the prophets might have been lost entirely to the world. That things did not come to such a pitch is due to the arrogance of the Syrian ruler, Antiochus Epiphanes, who, by his attempt forcibly to

suppress the Jewish religion, awakened as from slumber the national feeling of an insulted people. In the heroic risings of the wars of the Maccabees the nation saved its religious independence, and even recovered its political independence too, for a period of several decennia. From this renascence of the national consciousness there sprang that later flower of the prophetic spirit which is usually termed Jewish "Apocalypse." The first and the most important work of this kind was the book of *Daniel*, which contains a philosophy of history from the Jewish theocratic point of view, in the form of a vision placed in the mouth of a legendary saint of the period of Nebuchadnezzar. Starting from the prophecy of the prophet Jeremiah of the seventy years' duration of the affliction, the apocalyptic writer makes out a period of seventy weeks of years, the turning-point of which, the era of salvation, is immediately impending in his own time, the time of the wars of the Maccabees: he sees in the Macedonian monarchy the last of the four heathen world-powers now approaching its end, whereupon the eternal rule (over the world) of the "saints," *i.e.* the Jews, will begin, and the history of the world arrive at its consummation (vii. 14). The prophetic hope of a future period of national splendour (so-called Messianic prophecy), a hope which had been long deferred, was thus again brought to the front, but at the same time a new turn was given to it, which afterwards proved of the greatest importance for the development of religion in the direction of the supernatural, the miraculous, the other world. This was the effect, first of all, of a doctrine which here makes its appearance for the first time—the doctrine of the *resurrection of the dead*, some to eternal life, others to eternal contempt (xii. 2 *sq.*, 13). While it is probable enough that the appearance of this doctrine on Jewish soil was partly due to the knowledge the Jews had formed of the Persian religion, of which it had long been a part, it is yet also certain that it lay in the straight line of the development of Jewish thought. From the time of the prophets Jewish thought had taken a more individual form: it was no longer only the people as a whole, but individual believers too, who felt themselves to stand in a personal relation to God, and so to be entitled to hope for a personal share in the blessings of the promised era of salvation. But this

salvation was conceived now as it had always been, as an earthly national splendour, and thus the postulate presented itself of a resurrection of the just who died before its arrival, in order that they might take part in the earthly Messianic glory. The idea, too, of a *judgment of the world* enacted before the judgment-seat of God, and forming the opening scene of the rule of the saints (vii. 10 *sqq.*) is manifestly a transformation of the old prophetic "day of Jahveh." And finally, the Messiah, or the ruler of the kingdom of the saints, is mysteriously indicated in a figure which oscillates between symbolism and real opinion, of a person like a Son of man coming down from heaven (vii. 13 *sq.*). This figure may be compared most readily with the *guardian angels* or genii of the different peoples, who are also spoken of in various other ways in this book (ix. 21 ; x. 13 *sqq.*). In connection with this figure we can scarcely help thinking of the Persian Fravashis (p. 84), though it must be admitted that it was also led up to in the old Hebrew idea of the various gods of the peoples, who are reduced, even in Deuteronomy iv. 19, to vassals and satraps of Jahveh. If to all these new dogmatic ideas we add the appearance in Daniel of a new style of insistence on legal observances in respect of fasts, purity of food, hours of prayer, and other such points, we have essentially the *programme of the Judaism of later times,* which on the one hand cultivated a strict formalistic legalism, and on the other hand held fast the warm prophetic hopes of the future ; maintaining the national theocratic framework of these hopes with even an added narrowness, and yet, by means of the other world of angels and of the resurrection, passing beyond the natural historical ground of old prophecy, and setting up a bridge to transcendental speculation.

In the Palestinian schools of the Scribes much attention was devoted to the working out of the ordinances of law and of worship. The letter of the law being held to be the sole source of all civic and religious rules, it was a matter of importance not only to expound the law, but to extend it in accordance with the growing needs of the time, to find in it, or deduce from its propositions, new answers to new questions, and sometimes to support its requirements by new and stringent provisions ; as it were to "make a fence round the law."

As the decisions and explanations of Scribes of reputation were orally handed down, and possessed the force of law for those who came after, the *tradition of the school* was formed, which was placed by the side of the written (canonical) law, now as an equal, and now even as a superior authority. The theological contents of the tradition consisted mainly of a scholastic casuistry which aimed at regulating every act and every step of daily life, and realising the Pharisaic ideal of the holy people by an unspeakably petty and formal system of ascetic and ritual regulations (purifications, Sabbath, etc.). The doctrine of retribution was specially worked out in the form of an extremely external service of works with a view to rewards, based on the principle that every sin must be atoned for by penal suffering in this world or the next, though these punishments can be bought off by meritorious works, such as study of the law, fasting, and alms: and finally that one man can suffer and purchase merit for another, the just for the unjust, so that the pains of a pious sufferer may be put down to the credit of his whole brotherhood and go to alleviate their punishment, and the merits of an eminently righteous man may even benefit his whole people, as a sacrifice by which guilt is blotted out and salvation procured.[1] Here we recognise the profound idea of Deutero-Isaiah, of the substitutionary character of the sufferings of the righteous, but disfigured by being coarsely externalised to suit the formalistic nature of the legal religion, and the bargaining and reward-seeking service of God which pertained to Pharisaism. This theory is interesting to us principally because it was the immediate presupposition of the Pauline doctrine of atonement, though with Paul its original ethical kernel victoriously asserts itself against its Judaistic form.

That the Messianic hope which became prominent in Jewish thought from the times of the Maccabees onwards was a subject of the greatest interest during the two centuries preceding the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, we learn from two works which date from the beginning and from the middle of the last century before Christ: the Apocalypse of Enoch and the Psalms of Solomon.

[1] Compare Weber, *die Theologie der Synagoge*, parag. 69-72.

The *Book of Enoch*,[1] the original part of which belongs to the beginning of the rule of Jannæus Alexander the Maccabee (105-79 B.C.), gives a philosophy of the history of the world similar to that of Daniel, only with a more extensive plan, and taking more pains to point out the separate moments of the history and to show their connection with each other. Earthly history is most intimately connected with the heavenly spirit-world. The six highest angels, who surround the throne of God like the six Persian Amshaspans (p. 83) are the *chefs de département* of the divine government, which is conducted in detail by innumerable hosts of angels and star-spirits. The cause of all the mischief upon earth is to be found in the revolt of those angels who mingled with human females (Gen. vi. 4); it was they who seduced men to eat flesh, to make war, to the love of finery, to art and industry, to star-gazing and magic: these fallen angels, with the star-spirits, are the gods of the heathens, who led them astray from God to worship idols. (This theory, the rise of which is very naturally explained from the presuppositions present in Daniel x. 13 *sqq.* and Deut. iv. 19, continued to be the standing view of heathenism entertained from this time forward by both Jews and Christians.) The whole history of the world now turns upon the struggle of dæmonic heathenism with the chosen people of God, and the apocalyptist naturally places the crisis of this struggle in his own times. How greatly the powerful and fortunate reign of Johannes Hyrcanus had stimulated Jewish national feeling, we may gather from the fact, that in the following week of years the author makes the weapons of the Jews destroy the heathen world-empires and found their own universal empire; a time of world-wide peace and earthly happiness then following under the Messiah-King, who is born of Israel. At the end of this earthly Messianic rule, however, in which the righteous who have risen again also take part, the

[1] Compare Hilgenfeld, *Jüdische Apokalyptik* (1857). The proof here given that the revision of the Book of Enoch in chapters xxxvii.-lxxi. is of Christian origin, and that this circumstance is the explanation of the essential differences between the doctrine of the Messiah and the eschatology of this part and those of the original work, appears to be convincing. In the text above, only the original work is made use of.

world's history is brought to a close by a general judgment of men and of angels, and the reign of eternity begins with the creation of new heavens and a new earth. Here, accordingly, just as in the Christian Apocalypse of a later time, the two sides of the Messianic idea which with Daniel are scarcely separate at all—the earthly and the heavenly ideal of the theocracy—became two separate and successive epochs of the kingdom of God, that of earthly splendour enacted in time, and that of the heavenly and eternal consummation.

Writing about the year 100 B.C., the apocalyptist could still hope that the Messianic world-empire of the Jews would issue immediately and without any break of continuity out of the rule of the Hasmonæans; but a few decennia later this hope had proved illusive. The frightful misgovernment and the bloody discord of the rule of the last of the Hasmonæans, which occasioned the first interference of the Roman power, showed the Jewish patriots that they had nothing to hope from this quarter. The more passionately did their hopes, which nothing could destroy, now fasten on the earliest promises of the prophets. A Messiah of David's race, who would in the power of God cast down all unjust rulers, raise up again the people of Israel and rule over it in righteousness, and who would hold under his yoke the nations of the Gentiles, this was the hope of the pious patriots in the middle of the last century B.C., whose views and temper find expression in the so-called "*Psalms of Solomon*" (Psalms xvii., xviii.). This was a belief of astonishing boldness: even in sight of the Roman legions it went on insisting on the charter which seemed to guarantee to the Jews the empire of the world. The chief supporters of it were the *Pharisees*. They were not a sect, but the theocratic popular party, which even under the rule of the Syrians had been the soul of the resistance to the process of Hellenisation, —which had followed the Maccabean heroes to battle and to victory, but which had then suspiciously and proudly turned away from the princes of this race, as soon as their politics did not square with the stiff demands and unbending principles of a national and religious Chauvinism and Puritanism. Modern historians, in the praiseworthy effort to do justice to every one, have sought to remove from the

character of the Pharisees the stains left on it by the judgment of the Gospels. And it is no doubt true that every fanaticism for an idea has a praiseworthy side when contrasted with flat indifference and egoism; but none the less it is a morbid and sinful passion which cannot build but only destroy. Such, too, was the fanaticism of the Pharisees for the ideal of the theocracy as they read it out of their sacred writings, a fatal delusion which led astray the moral judgment, making small things great and great things small, narrowing and hardening the heart of the Jews, filling them with an opinionative self-righteousness and an unlovely arrogance towards the rest of mankind, which ended by making them blind to the circumstances actually surrounding them, because they mistook their political wishes for realities. There may, therefore, be some substantial reason for the judgment of the Gospel, according to which the Pharisees were "blind leaders of the blind," who, in religion led their people astray, in morals tyrannised over them and reduced them to servility, and in politics hastened their ruin.

Their opponents, the *Sadducees, i.e.* the priestly aristocracy, were not, it is true, a whit better. We cannot, indeed, think the worse of them that they did not burden themselves with the ballast of puritanical scholastic traditions, but adhered to the canonical law; or that they knew apocalyptical fancies, which went far beyond old prophecy, to be what they were. We should also be prepared to find that their position as the ruling party prevented them from ignoring as naïvely as did the idealistic democrats, the real political relations of the day. But what was wanting to those cool aristocrats and dealers with the realities of politics, was a heart for the people, and for what stirred the people's soul, its beliefs and hopes. Their accommodation to strangers was something more than a mere measure of prudence; it was due to sympathy with the Gentile way of thinking, and this appeared to the Jews as a defection from the faith of the fathers. Their emancipation from the pettiness of tradition degenerated in many respects into libertinism, and led them to treat morals and good manners with a levity which gave double offence when seen in the wearers of the sacred office (comp. Psa. Sol. i., iv., and v.). It was not, there-

fore, to be wondered at if they enjoyed neither the respect of the people nor its love, and could exercise but little influence on it.

While the Pharisees and the Sadducees formed politico-religious parties inside the Jewish people, the *Essenes* stood outside the national life, a separate sect, fleeing from the world. Their origin is undoubtedly to be sought in that effort after legal purity which distinguished the Pharisees also; but in their practical application of such principles, they went a step further than the Pharisees: to avoid every polluting contact with society, they secluded themselves from the world, and lived together in a union resembling that of an order, under strict rules. Many of them may have been driven into the wilderness by the pressure of poverty, or by the distress arising from the unsettled state of the country and fear of the never-ceasing dangers of war; and the companions in misfortune then joined themselves together and sought comfort from the evils of the world in pious contemplation. It is very natural that when a number of like-minded world-weary souls came together in remote districts, something like the organisation of the cloister should by degrees have arisen among them, that their meals should have been made common, and the expense of them defrayed by common labour, that a sort of community of goods should have prevailed. Celibacy, too, arose in most cases quite naturally out of the circumstances; it was not an unconditional law. The frugal vegetable diet, the rejection of all luxury, and of the crafts which minister to it, and the repudiation of slavery, may be explained from the fundamental character of the sect. Beside these traits of the Essenes, however, we find others of a striking nature, which it is less easy to account for. Firstly, their rejection of the bloody temple sacrifices, though these were prescribed by the law which in other respects was regarded as so sacred; then the rejection of oaths; then the custom of directing a morning prayer to the rising sun; the zealous practice of the art of healing, of divination, and of magic, as well as the cultivation of secret knowledge with regard to angels, exorcism of spirits, and charms; and finally the Platonising doctrine of an immortality without the body, and of the blessedness of souls in heavenly regions: a doctrine

otherwise unknown to Judaism, and which seems to have replaced with the Essenes the earthly Messianic ideal of the future held by the Pharisees. It is not very easy to explain these peculiarities from Jewish custom and doctrine, and, on the other hand, they show so great an affinity with some traits of the common life of the Neo-Pythagoreans that we can scarcely help interpreting the statement of Josephus,[1] that "the Essenes observe that mode of life which the Greeks learned from Pythagoras," as pointing to an adoption of Neo-Pythagorean usages and ideas, and considering it as in this sense justified. We need not go so far as to look for the origin of Essenism in Neo-Pythagoreanism; we may concede that the main idea of it was essentially a Jewish one, and that its origin is most simply explained in the manner indicated above. But this does not, so far as I see, preclude the supposition that a Jewish community of the kind in question may have been influenced in some ways by the kindred Greek union, and may have appropriated from the latter any ideas and usages found suitable.[2] As regards practical religious matters, it is impossible to deny that such influences may have operated, since, as we shall immediately see, they are indisputably active in the theological literature of Judaism at that time, and formed a most important factor of the religious history of the period. We must therefore recognise in Essenism the first meeting of Judaism and Hellenism in faith and manners, and the meeting had important consequences for the whole consequent development; it is to be seen in the retreating of the particular, national, and worldly element in Jewish piety, and in the growing tendency towards the ideal human conceived in the form of the spiritual and transcendent. This constitutes the distinguishing character of the Alexandrian Jewish theology and religious philosophy.

While the religious thought of Palestinian Judaism turned upon

[1] *Antiq.* xv. 10. 4.

[2] This view, which was strongly stated by Zeller, was accepted by Keim in the modified form in which it is stated above; most scholars continue to attribute to Essenism a purely Jewish character, but fail to account satisfactorily for its specific peculiarities.

the interpretation of the law and the Messianic hope, at Alexandria the theology of Judaism formed a league with the worldly wisdom of Greece, out of which sprang that Jewish philosophy of religion of which Christian theology has made such varied use. The first product of this new movement of thought was the *Book of Wisdom*, which, like former books of wisdom, bears the traditional name of Solomon, but the author of which was an Alexandrian Jew, familiar with Greek philosophy, of the last pre-Christian century. The idea of divine wisdom is here made objective even more distinctly than in the eighth chapter of Proverbs. Indeed we may say it is here made a person, and represented as an intermediate being between God and the world, as the organ of the creative and the governing activity of God, and particularly as the principle of all religious revelation in history, and in the hearts of the pious. It is described (vii. 22 *sq.*) as a fine and pure spirit, all-penetrating, extremely mobile, all-powerful, all-seeing, as the breath of the power and the effluence of the splendour of the Ruler of all, as the reflection of the eternal light, the mirror of the activity, and the picture of the goodness, of God, unchangeable and yet renewing all things, which, passing from generation to generation into holy souls, makes friends of God, and prophets. There is an unmistakable affinity between this "wisdom" and the Stoic world-spirit, or the all-working reason (Logos); and this affinity can scarcely be fortuitous, it must indicate a direct influence of Stoic philosophy on the Jewish teacher of wisdom. Still more distinctly does the influence of Platonic philosophy appear in the theory of formless matter out of which the world was made (xi. 17), and in the dualistic psychology, of the Book of Wisdom. Quite contrary to ordinary Jewish teaching, and quite in harmony with Plato, is the doctrine we here meet with (viii. 19 *sq.*), that the soul comes into the body from a previous existence, and feels itself oppressed in the body as in a prison (ix. 15), but that because it is made after God's image it is created for immortality, so that its departure is no destruction, but an entrance into peace, into a rest without annoy in God's hand—nay, into participation in His kingly rule over the world. There is no reference here to the resurrection

of the body, on which later Judaism conceived its eschatological hopes to depend, any more than to that dull shadow-existence of Sheol or Hades, which was the sole eschatological idea of ancient Hebraism. A new element accordingly enters here into the circle of the religious ideas of Judaism, an element of which the roots are to be found in Greek speculation, while the belief in the resurrection indicates Persian influence. New also is the thought (ii. 24), that death came into the world through the envy of the devil. The devil is thus for the first time invested with the dualistic *rôle* of an enemy of God and of his creatures (in earlier thought he was an instrument of divine punishment), which proved so portentous for the theology of later times. As for the ethics of the Book of Wisdom, we find mention of the four cardinal virtues of stoic Platonism (viii. 7), and an ascetic trait is visible in several passages, which reminds us both of the theory and of the practice of Essenism.

The Hellenistic Jewish philosopher *Philo*, a contemporary of Jesus, followed up the lines of the Book of Wisdom, but went a good deal further. He systematised those speculative elements which had appeared here and there in the development of Jewish philosophy, and combined them more or less happily with the philosophical ideas which were then dominant in Greek civilisation. He was thus the founder of the *Alexandrian philosophy of religion*, which proved of great importance for the world's history, because it prepared the theories which served as clothing and equipment for the new religious forces just then issuing into the world from Palestine, and thus enabled the new faith to establish a position in the world of thought, and to gain and subdue the proud spirits of Greek civilisation. From the position of the science of to-day, Philo's view of the world may be thought far from valuable, yet it ought to be perceived that it was anything but the mere arbitrary web of fancy of an idle head, which had turned to the Scriptures of Israel as a field in which to exercise its learned imaginations. Indeed it was the result, both necessary and most fruitful for the future, of the union, founded even by Alexander, of the Greek and the Oriental spirit, of Indo-Germanic thought and Semitic faith. Practically this process was consummated in the Roman

Empire, theoretically in Alexandrian Hellenism; and these two were equally essential to the preparation for Christianity. These two great developments started from very different quarters, and the inner spirit of Greece was still very widely different from that of Judaism, yet so many kindred ideas had come to the front on both sides that they could not fail mutually to attract each other, and to combine for a new crystallisation where, as at Alexandria, the races were mixed. On each side a point had been reached where the feeling of need and of difficulty in the old system irresistibly created a feeling of the need of transcending former limits, of widening the sphere of vision, and supplementing one's own deficiencies by the adoption of new elements of culture.

This was the case with the Jews of that age to a greater extent than is generally supposed. Even on the soil of Palestine, the world-renouncing Essenes had not been able altogether to withdraw themselves from the influences of a similar Greek tendency, and how much less was this possible to the cultivated Jews of the Diaspora! If such men, while firmly convinced of the divine truth of the holy Scriptures of their people, yet found so many things in them that could not be made to agree with purer views of the divine being and activity, or even with their own ideal views of primitive times, and of the forefathers of their race, what course was open to them but to get rid of what was thus offensive by means of allegorising interpretation? They did not consider that in doing this they were guilty of any innovation—they were only going a little further on the road long trodden in the synagogue, when the book of the law was expounded with a view to edification. It is but a small step from that idealising and generalising treatment of the letter, which must take place whenever historical works are expounded for edification, to an allegorical interpretation like that of Philo, which sets to work after fixed principles, and with definite rules for the interpretation of the symbolism present in names and numbers, and makes Biblical personages the representatives of ideas, and the external events of history symbols of inner mental processes and states of the soul. And we have to add that this method was common in the

Greek world too, being universally applied in interpreting the old myths and epic legends; even with the Stoics, allegory was necessarily resorted to in order to uphold their piety and their conservative belief in the traditional popular religion, at the same time with the purified metaphysical and moral views they had come to hold. Homer and Hesiod were dealt with in their lecture-rooms in precisely the same manner as the books of Moses and the prophets in the school of the Alexandrian Jews. Thus, whatever horror the exegete who is accustomed to the scientific method of to-day may feel at the "arbitrariness" of a Philo, an objective historical view will not regard the method practised in these times as the arbitrary invention of individuals, but will understand it and do justice to it as the natural result of the whole tendencies of that time.

But it was not only in point of allegorical form that the Greek philosophy and the Jewish theology of that day were alien to each other; there were similarities in matter also, which could not fail to suggest attempts to combine the two. To the naïve deification of nature which prevailed in the popular mythology, and in the early natural philosophy of the Greeks, the philosophy of Plato had opposed the sharp antithesis of the world of ideas and the world of phenomena, and the deity as the highest idea was removed from all contact with material and finite existence to a supramundane height. Thus, while the purity and dignity of the idea of God were adequately guarded, a great chasm was introduced between the infinite and the finite, in presence of which the philosophical need for an explanation of the world failed to reach satisfaction, as well as the religious need for intercourse with the Deity, while the popular mythological belief remained quite unaccounted for. The Stoic philosophy met this want with its pantheistic doctrine of the immanent divine Reason, which, on the one hand, is an active power, and on the other has its special forms of manifestation in the powers of natural and of human life, to which latter the gods of popular religion are to be traced. It was an obvious step, to combine this immanence and living omnipresence of the divine Logos, belonging to Stoicism, with the Platonic doctrine of the transcendence and the exalted purity of the Supreme

Being, so as to make the former subordinate to the latter as a mediator and an executive instrument; in fact, approaches to such a combination are to be found in certain Greek philosophers before Philo.

But a similar need for some bridge over the ever-widening chasm between God and the world had long been felt and observed on the part of Judaism too. The naïve anthropomorphism of the old prophetic idea of God, which saw no harm in making God act immediately as a person in the world, and even appear in it visibly, had long been an offence to a more refined style of thought; where the older Scriptures introduced God as himself speaking, acting, and appearing, the later parallel narratives, and still more the Alexandrian translation of the Old Testament and the Jewish commentaries, had always sought to remove the anthropomorphism, by speaking not of the divine personality itself, but of a form of its appearance, the angel, or the glory, or the presence (Shechinah), or the voice, of God. There were in particular three notions in which the living activity of God and his revelation in the world had always been expressed: *Spirit*, *Word*, and *Wisdom* appeared to later Judaism to be specially suited for the part of mediator between the supramundane God and the world. The Spirit of God, according to the history of the creation, hovered brooding and life-engendering over the waters of Chaos; the same Spirit, sent by God, stirred up the prophets and other men of God to the fulfilment of their calling. But the *Word*, too, was the means God used in creating, it was the expression of the divine will: "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth," the Psalmist says (xxxiii. 6). And inasmuch as the divine Word showed itself, in the mouths of the prophets who were its organs, to be an efficient power now of penal judgment, and now of healing comfort, the second Isaiah could make God say (lv. 11), "The word that goeth forth out of my mouth shall not return unto me void; but shall accomplish that which I please, and shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it." The Word appears here as an independent messenger going out from God and executing his will, yet in this passage we have no more than a poetical personification. It was otherwise with the notion of *wisdom*. Com-

paring the passages Job xxviii. 25 *sqq.*, Prov. viii., Sirach xxiv., Wisdom vii. 22 *sq.*, we can trace step by step how the personification of wisdom, at first no more than poetical, by degrees passed into actual hypostasis, so that wisdom becomes an organ of the divine creative and revealing activity, and a mediator between God and the world. The same need to reconcile the transcendence of an idea of God conceived abstractly, with the religious requirement of a living nearness of the divine, led, in Jewish theology as in Greek philosophy, to the representation of middle beings, which, however, could possess no more than a fluctuating and vague subsistence, since they were mere products of abstraction, without any hold on historical reality.

Where two streams of thought, which rose independently of each other, are yet so plainly converging in the same direction, their meeting in one single stream can only be a question of time. What *Philo* did was no more than to guide the converging streams finally into the same channel: he found the suitable notional form for the two allied views. First of all the transcendence of Jewish theism united in his mind with the transcendence of the Platonic idea, to form that abstract dualistic conception of the divine being which first empties it of all determination, but only to fill it up again with all perfections. God, according to him, is not only not like man—he is without any attributes at all, he cannot properly be designated by any name, he is exalted above all thought. One cannot know of him what he is, but only that he is, and what he is not. He is not in space, not in time, not changeable, not in need of anything, he is absolutely single, indeed more simple than unity, better than the good, more beautiful than the beautiful, more blessed than the blessed. He is what he is: and this alone, being absolutely, can be ascribed to him as a true predicate: hence Philo calls him "That which is," or "He who is." As the alone true being he is in one passage identified with the whole of what is; generally, however, he is spoken of as the all-efficient cause of all things; he is the simply active being, over-against which is matter, the simply passive. To this Stoic definition of God there is to be added the Platonic predicate that God is the highest good and only the good, which communicates itself

without envy and manifests itself only in beneficent acts, while evil proceeds from him in part not at all, in part but mediately. But this very perfection of God excludes, according to Philo, his immediate operation on the world, because he would then be polluted by contact with matter, the hideous, confused, changeable, vain being, which is the cause of all badness in the world and in man. If an activity of God is possible—and that it actually takes place is attested alike by the order of the world, by the religious consciousness, and by religious tradition—it can only be thought to take place through intermediate beings, or "ministering powers," by which the highest power realises itself in the world. Philo calls these powers partly, after Plato, the ideas, in so far as they are conceptual types of the actual world, partly, with the Stoics, the powers or specialisations of the general world-reason (Λόγοι), partly, in the language of the Old Testament, the angels and servants of God. But the personification suggested by this latter way of speaking is but vague and fluid: since the multiplicity of angels is comprised in a unity again in the one *Logos*.

In this notion, which is the centre of his system, Philo combines the Jewish ideas of "Wisdom" and the "Word of God" with the Stoic notion of the immanent world-reason. Like the Logos of Heraclitus and the Stoics, that of Philo is the principle which forms and preserves the world by continuous separation and combination of opposites, and it is therefore called at one time the divider, at another the bond, chain, law, necessity of the whole, or he who fills, penetrates, holds together, orders, and guides the whole. This principle, however, varies from the Logos of the Stoics in being identical neither with God nor with matter, but that which mediates between them. In point of his relation to God, the Logos is the "oldest or the first-born son of God," while the world is the younger son; he is therefore also the "image of God," and the "second God." As to his procession from God, Philo's expressions do not explain whether it is to be conceived as taking place in time nor in what way it takes place: all that is distinctly asserted is that he is distinguished from God and entirely dependent on God, who is the cause of his existence too. As the image of God he is also the prototype of the world, and

specially the prototype of man, and thus he is also called the typical man, or the one man, whose sons we all are. But he is not merely the resting prototype, he is also the active power, creative reason, arranging power and guide of the world, not however as an independent and original being, but only as the servant and instrument of *that* God who alone can be called in the true and underived sense "the God." Thus he stands midway between the created and the uncreated, holding them apart and at the same time uniting them. In virtue of this metaphysical mediating position he is admirably suited to become the *religious mediator* between God and mankind. On the one hand he is the instrument of divine revelation, and is called the servant, the ambassador, the representative, the interpreter, the archangel of God; on the other hand he is the representative of men before God, and in this capacity is called their High Priest, their For-speaker, their Advocate (Paraclete), their Mediator; standing in the midst between God and the creature, he guarantees to both parties the continuance of the world-order. In particular, he is the mediator of the historical revelation of God to Israel, and the representative of this people with their covenant God: he was the subject of the theophanies in sacred history; he it was, particularly, who revealed himself to Moses and gave him the law, the sum of all divine truth, in the written word of which the Logos finds as it were his abiding incarnation. But outside of the sphere of positive revelation also, the Logos is the universal principle of revelation, which works in the soul of man, illuminating, rebuking, educating, liberating, healing, reviving. From him as the absolute world-law flows all moral legislation and knowledge of goodness; from him alone as our creative prototype comes the strength of the soul for goodness and for overcoming sense; only where he dwells in the soul and communicates himself to it as the true bread, the heavenly manna and drink, is it possible to become free and whole from the universal sinfulness which attaches to everything material, and to find the way of return from the exile of this earthly world to the home above of the supersensuous city of God. In this respect the Logos is also called by Philo the Teacher, Steersman, Guide,

Physician, Exhorter, the bread and manna, the cup-bearer of the human soul.

Philo's doctrine of man also combines Platonic speculation and Stoic morality with Biblical tradition. Like Plato, Philo represents the souls (of men) as descending from a higher world into an earthly body, in the bonds of which they feel themselves imprisoned and estranged from their true being; matter, and consequently the material body, is the cause and the seat of all evil, all error, and all mischief, and deliverance from it, elevation above the sensuous to the communion and vision of God, is man's true destiny. Philo sought to reconcile this theory with the Biblical account of creation by seeing in the two narratives of the creation (Genesis i. and ii.) a suggestion of the creation of a double man; an ideal heavenly man, bodiless and sexless, who is the immediate image of the Logos or the Logos himself, and is related to the earthly man as the perfect and complete type to the imperfect and limited copy. The earthly man then is made after the image of the heavenly, and participates to a certain degree in the reasonable nature of the latter, on which is based his capacity for the knowledge of God and for freedom; but by the union of that heavenly being with earthly matter he has come to be a being in whom good and evil are mingled, which stands in the middle between the angel and the brute. Philo distinguishes two kinds of men: those whose soul proceeds from below, from the common life of nature, and who therefore live in the flesh and fall a prey to destruction, and those into whose soul a divine spirit has been breathed from above, and who therefore live in the spirit or according to reason. Here the Biblical antithesis of the godless and the righteous is combined with the Stoical antithesis of fools and wise men, a step which was certain to be taken, since even in the Jewish books of Wisdom the pious man was always represented as the true sage. And the picture Philo draws of the wise man corresponds even in its details—in the wise man's sinlessness and freedom from error, his self-sufficiency and freedom, his priestly purity, his royal dignity, his divine blessedness—it corresponds in all these particulars with the Stoic ideal of the "sage." The Jewish

philosopher, however, deviates in some characteristic ways from his Stoic pattern. The ethics of Stoicism, especially in its earlier form, had referred the wise man entirely to himself, and made him raise himself to his moral height by the sole strength of his own rational will; but Philo is far too deeply convinced of the weakness and the universal inborn sinfulness of man, to think it possible for him to elevate and redeem himself by his own power. His redemption can only be the work of divine grace, to which man must surrender himself in pious confidence. Thus the Platonic and Stoical ethics became with Philo (as also with the Neo-Pythagoreans, the later Stoics, and particularly the Neo-Platonists) a religious doctrine of salvation, which points out the way in which, under the enlightening and life-giving influence of the divine Logos, man may arrive by knowledge and ascetic activity at faith and vision, and at last at a mystic and ecstatic union with God, in which from a son of the Logos he becomes a son of God, and will partake, as immediately as the Logos himself, of the divine nature.

Now the Logos, who is the leader of every soul in the way of salvation, manifested himself typically in the sacred history of Israel; and thus the ethics of Philo attains at last a positive foundation in the religious tradition of Israel. The question as to the reality of the wise man, which in the Stoic school always remained a problem, receives a solution from the faith of the Jewish community; the ideal picture of the perfect man, which was so indefinite and so abstract as to be destitute of any practical influence, is embodied for religious contemplation in the well-known and much-loved forms of sacred history and tradition, most of all in the person of *Moses*. All the predicates, and even the name of the Logos, are transferred to Moses, in a way which comes near to suggesting an incarnation. Moses is the sinless "Mediator and Reconciler, Redeemer, and Interpreter" of his people, in one person their prophet, priest, and king, the pattern for all souls, the guide and saviour of humanity, the friend of God and participant in the divine nature. Philo's work, *The Life of Moses*, is "the Alexandrian Gospel, in which the lawgiver of Israel is transfigured into the saviour of the

world of Jewish philosophy" (Thoma); it is a pendant to Plato's ideal picture of Socrates, and to the Johannine transfiguration of the synoptic Jesus. At the same time the historical ideal picture of Moses is not in Philo's view the exhaustive and final revelation of the Logos; he still expects a higher revelation of it in a superhuman appearance which shall one day take place in a visible form which all may perceive, to fulfil the hope of Israel, and, along with the victory of the chosen people over all nations, to bring to world-wide ascendency the true religion of the One God.

Thus Philo is the last Messianic prophet of Israel, the Alexandrian John the Baptist, who stretches out a hand to John the Evangelist. The revelation of the divine Logos in a personality which is the ideal of mankind, this revelation which as a philosopher he saw in spirit, and as a Jew hoped from the future, had in the meantime already attained to actual existence in a corner of Galilee, in a personality the actual influence of which was destined far to transcend the ideals both of the philosophers and of the prophets.

But before passing to this new formation, we must cast a look on that world-historical episode, in which Semitism made one last energetic attempt to defend itself from being conquered by Christianity—namely, *Islam*. Its founder, Mohammed (or Mahomet, 571-632 A.D.), was a genuine Semitic nature of active religiosity, energetic will, and acute intellect. His circle of ideas, however, was very limited, and his moral feeling far from sensitive, which, however, fitted him the better to pursue the objects he had once taken up, with concentrated force, and with complete freedom from scruple. In his intercourse with Jews and Christians he had arrived at a conviction of the truth of monotheism and of the evil of that heathen polytheism which still prevailed, at least officially, among his Arab fellow-countrymen, though greatly undermined in many individuals by scepticism. Through various inner struggles, which sometimes took the form of ecstatic and visionary states of consciousness, he became convinced of his vocation as the prophet of the one god Allah, in the first instance for the Arabian people, to

whom alone his attention was at first devoted; but as his cause advanced he extended the sphere of his mission to other peoples also, and declared expressly that he was sent to all men. With the outward history of his success, in which military enterprise was almost from the first a prominent element, the plan of this work does not call us to deal.

The proverbs of Mohammed had at first only been handed down orally, and it was not till near the extinction of the first generation of his community that his followers began to give them the fixity of writing. The collections of proverbs at first differed from each other very widely, and it was to obviate this that the third Caliph, Othman, caused an official revision to be made by Mohammed's secretary, Zaid, which was the origin of the sacred book of Islam, the *Koran*. This book is written throughout in rhymed prose. In the proverbs from earlier times the style is pregnant like that of ancient oracles, but it soon grows more and more diffuse, full of artificial rhetoric and of innumerable repetitions, which betray an absence both of productive originality and of taste. This did not prevent the book from being received by the faithful of Islam for what it claimed to be, a "Word of God," proceeding immediately from God, which preexisted from eternity in a heavenly original text, and was revealed to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel. By the side of the Koran stands the second rule of faith of Islam, tradition, *Sonna*. It contains elaborate directions about all possible externalities of ceremonial of civic and domestic life, all of which are said to be from Mohammed's own mouth; but in many cases this is not the fact. The tradition also contains a great number of miraculous legends, none of which had a place in the Koran, as Mohammed expressly rejected them, and only pointed to the great miracles of God in Nature. The principal miracle of the tradition, of which it constructed a most wonderful story,—the flight of Mohammed on the miraculous horse Borak to Jerusalem and to heaven, is only told in the Koran as a visionary experience in a dream, not as an outward occurrence.

Islam counts five foundation pillars which are based on the doctrine of Mohammed himself—1. Faith in the two great dogmas of

God and his prophet; 2. Prayer; 3. Fasting; 4. Almsgiving; and 5. Pilgrimage to Mecca. All these are laid down very minutely in the ceremonial, which is petty and elaborate in proportion to the scantiness of the dogma in which the religion is set forth. The principal dogma of it is the *unity of God.* As to the nature of God Mohammed did not think profoundly nor clearly: he never got beyond a naïve anthropomorphism and anthropopathism; God is an absolute almighty ruler, fearful in his anger, arbitrary in his rewards and punishments, his will incomprehensible and irresistible; he requires from men slavish subjection, and even this does not certainly secure his favour. This all-determining freedom of the ruling will of God Mohammed expressed partly, but without any strict consistency, in the form of unconditioned predestination. Even traits which are not moral, such as revenge and stratagem, Mohammed did not scruple to impute to God—they are traits which seem unavoidably connected with the Oriental type of ruler. To this dark view of the Deity there corresponds a somewhat pessimistic estimate of the world; it is compared to a dung-heap full of rotting bones; the misery of it is so great that it can only be surpassed by the tortures of hell. Thus a foundation was laid for that dark asceticism, in which the saints of Islam soon rivalled those of Buddhism and of Christianity. But in proportion to the terrors of hell are the pleasures of heaven. In the sensuous representation of the joys of Paradise we see the work of that rank sensuality which is so often and so characteristically combined in Semitism with a sombre rejection of the world.

God has at all times made known His will through His *prophets,* though differently in different circumstances, and the total number of the prophets is estimated to amount to 124,000. But the most important of these are, according to the Koran, the following six:—Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, the last being also the greatest of them all. The method of revelation is variously represented; sometimes a divine intimation is brought by the angel Gabriel, sometimes the prophet is removed to heaven bodily, and receives instruction from God himself. The process is

always quite coarse, external, supernaturalistic, such as we nowhere find in the Bible; but in the dogmatic of the Talmud it is the same. The acknowledgment of Jesus as a prophet by no means prevented Mohammed from rejecting Christianity, which he called an adulteration of the pure doctrine of Jesus. He especially objected to the doctrine of Jesus' sonship of God, which he said was a manifest lie, for the plain reason that God has no wife! Striking, too, is Mohammed's view that Jesus was not actually crucified, but that another who was like him was crucified in his place, while God was led by his power and wisdom, which could not allow the shameful death of his messenger, to take Jesus to himself. This speculation is extremely characteristic of this stage of religion, though it was no doubt suggested by some similar Gnostic legends. The miracles of Jesus are also mentioned in the Koran, as well as his supernatural birth and ascension, and many of the apocryphal legends of early Christianity. Yet it is taken for granted in the Koran that Jesus was nothing but the last of the predecessors of Mohammed, and support is sought for this view in New Testament predictions of the Parousia and the mission of the Spirit; Mussulman theologians even find a direct prophecy about Mohammed in the Paraclete, changing the word παράκλητος into περίκλυτος, *i.e.* the famous one.

There is nothing original in the Koran beyond the statement of the mission of Mohammed. Yet it may be the case that this very absence of originality, and this lack of deeper religious ideas, has favoured the spread of Islam. That thorough student of Islam, Dozy, has expressed the judgment regarding this religion, that it is the least original and the most prosaic and monotonous religion in existence, and at the same time the least susceptible of change and development; this he explains from the fact that it is based upon a book, which consists mostly of the sayings and commands of the founder himself, "so that here belief, custom, and law were firmly fixed from the first according to the ideas of an individual, and a very narrow and limited individual." This may be true, yet on the other side we must admit that not only would the rise of Islam be inconceivable without the peculiar "limited," energetic, and commanding personality of

Mohammed, but that for the spread and the continuance of this religion too, the worship of the person of the prophet and of the "saints" connected with him, was of the very greatest importance. When we consider that the worship of sacred human personalities is the one point common to the three world-religions of Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism, which in other respects differ from each other so widely, we can scarcely help supposing that this pious reverence for human ideals, as the visible types and supports of the religious life and effort of the community, is the spring of the specific power of expansion these religions possess. At all events this point appears to me to deserve more consideration than it has yet found.

We must, however, observe that Islam cannot be called a universal religion in quite the same sense as Christianity and Buddhism. Its founder certainly contemplated the universal spread of his religion; but he certainly lacked the true universal human spirit. Though the founder of a religion he never ceased to be an Arab, and he impressed on his religious community forms of thought and life, which however well they answered the genius of the Arabs, were to the members of all other peoples nothing but a heavy yoke, and a fetter which prevented all sound and living development.[1] Even the customary spread of Islam by force of arms shows that the religion now before us is not a religion of humanity, which overcomes the limits of race by the inner influence of spiritual universality, but is in fact only the outward embodiment of the genuinely Semitic idea of a political theocracy, in which the people of God rules and makes the other peoples its vassals by violent means. Islam might in fact, in this respect, be called the Messianic kingdom of the Jews translated into Arabic. And if the difference is great between the Christian kingdom of God and the Moslem theocracy, this should lead us to think the more highly of those spiritual forces which brought about the transformation of the Jewish idea of the Messianic kingdom into the Christian kingdom of God.

This judgment of Islam is not refuted, it is rather confirmed by

[1] Comp. Kuenen, "National Religions and Universal Religion," *Hibbert Lecture*, 1882, p. 30 *seqq.*

the observation of the forward movements shown by the history of Islam in Persia. The influences it met with on this soil, and out of which peculiar religious tendencies were developed, were foreign, Indo-Germanic; and these tendencies besides have always been regarded by Moslem orthodoxy as aberrations and heresies, and were therefore soon, with a greater or less degree of decision, expelled from Islam. The most important of them was the heresy of the Motazilites or Free-thinkers, who made use of the weapons of Greek philosophy to introduce a purer notion of God, and establish the doctrines of the freedom of the human will and of the creaturely nature of the Koran, under which they meant its liability to error. Orthodoxy found it the most convenient course to reduce these rationalists to impotence by the secular arm of the caliphs, yet the controversy against their arguments gave rise to an apologetic theology, the principal representative of which was the able dogmatist, Al-Ashari (ob. 941), who, though he had learned his dialectic in the school of the heretics, employed it in the defence of orthodoxy, though an orthodoxy somewhat emasculated by its tendency to the *via media*. Thus, for example, in the predestination controversy his position was purely semi-pelagian: to will, he said, belonged to man, but to execute to God. With regard to the sinlessness of the prophet this writer asserted that he had a possibility of sinning, but that divine protection as well as the prophet's own merit kept that possibility from ever becoming realised. Yet it was not to the acuteness of this apologetic dialectic that the rationalists succumbed: the rock on which they split was the character of Islam, which was then fixed or had been fixed from the beginning. "Not in the god of the Motazilites, whose essence was righteousness, but in that of orthodoxy, the Almighty God bound to no other law but his own arbitrary will, did the great multitude recognise their Allah and the Allah of Mohammed. Unfortunately they were not mistaken." (Kuenen.)

Another no less interesting peculiarity of Persian Islam was *Sufism*, a mystical speculative tendency composed partly of deep religiosity and partly of lofty idealism, which also, however, degenerated in part into sickly and sensuous trifling. It certainly was no

genuine product of Islam, though it cannot be decided whether it was due to Brahmanic influences or to Buddhist, or perhaps to those of Neo-Platonism. (Plotinus was diligently commented on by Moslem scholars.) According to the theory of Sufism the world is a constant emanation from God and a flowing back into God. The soul of man, in particular, is a part of the divine being, and its destiny is union with God. This destiny it accomplishes in three stages. At the first stage, that of the law, God is still regarded as being on the other side, a being who requires external service by traditional ceremonies. At the second stage the knowledge is attained that outward worship is only necessary for the multitude but valueless for those who know, and that material works of this kind ought to be exchanged for those which are spiritual, *i.e.* ascetic mortification of the senses and desires. By means of continued concentration of thought, the state of enthusiasm or rapture is at last attained, the more frequent recurrence of which till it becomes chronic is the introduction to the third stage, the stage of certainty, at which the man no longer seeks God outside himself, by acts either of worship or of asceticism, but has and knows God in himself, so that here the differences of the positive religions disappear or lose all their importance as compared with the higher knowledge, which is the same for all, of the one truth. Theories like this, such as were set forth in a very profound and charming style by the best known of the Sufis, Dshelaleddin Rumi (ob. 1252), are evidently as far as possible from representing the unbending deism and positivism of genuine Islam. If they could yet find access to it, this only proves that Islam felt itself poor in mystic warmth and speculative depth, and was constrained to borrow from foreign treasures what was lacking in itself.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS IN CHRISTIANITY.

THE origin of Christianity is the act of *Jesus of Nazareth;* out of his religious self-consciousness, the work of his life, and his tragic death, the world-religion of redemption, on the basis of monotheism, arose. This is not to deny, but rather to pre-suppose, that Christianity was in many ways prepared for before its advent, for the mind of the individual only in that case becomes the common possession of the world, when the world meets it with ripe receptivity and sympathetic understanding, when it recognises in the genius of the individual the word which solves the riddle of the time, and which many had long been seeking and yearning to discover.

The universal need of the times, pain for a world which was robbed of its gods, for the fall of the glory of national states, for the desecrated honour of art and poetry, for the breakdown of the confidence of the antique spirit which desired to know its strength its own; this deep and general pain was what caused the question of redemption and healing to be on the lips of all men. And this negative preparation was accompanied by an anticipation of a positive nature. The eyes of Rome and of Greece were turned to the east, the home of a vigorous god-consciousness. The more the bright heaven of the gods of Homer paled before the terrible god of the earth, the Roman Caesar, who was taking the place of Jupiter Capitolinus, with the greater longing did the world-weary eye turn to the one God of heaven, of whom the Jewish people possessed ancient knowledge, and to whom the synagogues in all the cities in the world bore witness. And how nearly did this witness agree with the best of the teaching of the schools of the philosophers! Since Socrates had

made knowledge of one's-self the beginning of wisdom, a process had been going on in the thinking and feeling of the best men, which made them turn away more and more decidedly from the outer world, to turn to the inner, the ideal world of the mind. A Plato saw in the outer world no more than an unessential appearance, in which man's true home and highest good could not lie; he held that men were called to flee as quickly as possible from here to the world above, to become free, as they became like that God who is pure goodness, and were united with him, from the prison of the senses. The Stoics, too, sought salvation in the detachment of the disposition from the outer world and its changing fortunes, in the unshakable rest of a mind at one with itself, and they felt with growing clearness that it is not in proud self-sufficiency that man can find and maintain this inner unity and freedom, but only in humble and pious surrender to the all-governing world-spirit, whose offspring and image he himself is. But this ideal of the wise man strong in God—where is it realised, and can it be realised by men who are so blind and poor? What roads lead out of this world of error and weakness to the ideal world of truth and freedom? In this question Platonists, Stoics, and Neo-Pythagoreans all met, but the variety of their attempts to solve it only shows how sadly at a loss all the questioners were. The wisdom of the ancients thus advanced to the very threshold of the new religion, but that threshold was not crossed by the wise man of the schools, but by the religious prophet of Israel.

In Israel too, the ground was prepared for Christianity. On this soil two ideas had always been the pillars of the religious consciousness, the idea of the kingdom of God and its perfect realisation in the splendid age of salvation, and the idea of righteousness, as the condition God required of that object of men's hopes; and these two ideas had, under the pressure of the times, been revived in the hearts of the faithful, and ruled there with greater power than they had ever had before. The Psalms of Solomon, which date from the middle of the last century before Christ, show how at that time the deep humiliation of the people of God had awakened the old prophetic

hope of the speedy rise of the theocracy to a new and crowning glory under a God-sent king, and how this hope quickened the zeal of the faithful for the preparation of a righteous people. But the first effect of this zeal was to make it felt more and more painfully that the ideal of righteousness and of the kingdom was not to be attained in this way of outward Pharisaic legalism. Those who were weary of such an effort withdrew to the wilderness to find peace of soul in Essene contemplation, but with their membership of the people they parted with the popular ideas, which were replaced by the quiet of the life of an order, and the (un-Jewish) hope of another world in heaven; and thus while they excelled the Pharisees in point of earnestness of disposition, and of freedom from national limitations, they wanted the elasticity of the Pharisaic hope and effort.

John the Baptist represented the union of the best elements of the piety of the day, still quite on Jewish ground. He shared with the Essenes the deep earnestness of their moral disposition, and their conviction that the tradition and the outward holiness of Pharisaism effected nothing, no more than the appeal to Jewish birth and to the privileges of the seed of Abraham. There was need, he held, for a complete uprooting of the corruptions of the whole people and a complete change of mind, of which baptism with water, a popular representation of the lustrations of Essenism, served as a symbol. But with this Essene ideal of righteousness, with his earnest demand of a purification of disposition and of life, John combined the Pharisaic ideal of the kingdom, a lively hope of the near approach of the promised kingdom of God, the consummation of which he conceived, after the manner of the prophets, as a kingdom of goodness it is true, but not less of national elevation and splendour; to prepare his people for this approaching kingdom was the object of his preaching of repentance. But important as his work was in preparing the way for the greater who should come after him, John could not himself bring in the new: he is still an Old Testament preacher of the law and of righteousness after the manner of an Elijah or Ezekiel; he could shake the heart, but could not win it nor inspire it; he conceived the approaching kingdom of heaven as

a threatening judgment, not as a dispensation of happiness and consolation, and he was still half entangled in such external matters as fasting, self-mortification, and retirement from the world.

The watchword of the Baptist, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," was adopted by Jesus, who to this extent trod in John's footsteps. The nature and the results of his activity, however, soon showed it to differ profoundly from that of John, and we may ask to what this difference is to be attributed. Jesus, as a Galilean, stood further from the centre of the Jewish legalistic doings; he did not grow up, like John, in the desert, but amid the impressions of the pious home of his parents, of a cheerful neighbourhood and a beautiful outward nature; his young soul, moreover, drew its spiritual nourishment directly from the words of the prophets, with which he had become acquainted in the Synagogue. These were undoubtedly favourable circumstances for the development of his religious genius, but the most important matter is the genius itself, which was native in him, a thing which has its roots in divine soil, and for human eyes must always have something of the nature of a mystery which cannot be revealed. Others too had read in Hosea, Jeremiah, and Deutero-Isaiah, these evangelists of the Old Testament, of the compassion and love of God, that he was a gracious and forgiving father to Israel his son, and sought to be a Saviour and Redeemer, that he sent out his messengers as preachers of peace for the consolation and not for the dismay of a punished and afflicted people, and that he loved most to dwell with contrite hearts and humble spirits. Yet to others God was still the strict master and punishing judge before whom they trembled in slavish fear; and in the heart of Jesus only did the word of the Father-God find so powerful an echo that it became the ruling note of his whole religious life. Why was this? Because his pure heart was formed to respond to this note more than to any other; because in the childlike piety and the loving disposition of his own heart he found the copy and the confirming seal of what he saw to be revealed in the utterances of those prophets as the highest essence of God's character. It is undoubtedly true to this extent that Jesus taught no new notion of God and no other God

than the God of the prophets; but while others had only touched occasionally on the idea of the Father-God, and had only used the term figuratively, as describing the relation of Jahveh to the *people* of Israel, Jesus felt it to be the central truth in his own personal feeling, and allowed it to cast its own light on man and human destiny and on his own life-task, thus reaching new views on these subjects. This was the new *fact* which hid in its unassuming likeness, as of mustard seed, the germ of a wholly new religious world. The first and most immediate outcome of this new *feeling of God* (a more accurate expression here than "notion of God") was a new ideal of righteousness: from this there proceeded in the dialectic of the kingdom a new *ideal of the kingdom*, in combination with which the Messianic consciousness was formed. In this way we can understand psychologically the development of Jesus (the mystery of inborn genius always pre-supposed); while the view hitherto current that Jesus came forward at first with a new idea of the Messianic kingdom and a fully formed consciousness that he himself was the Messiah, labours under psychological and historical difficulties of various kinds.

The starting-point of Jesus' preaching, that a better righteousness was requisite for the kingdom of heaven than that of the Pharisees, was a general truth which was common to him with John the Baptist; but with him the idea at once took another turn, since he deduced it not from the motive of fear of the approaching day of judgment of a Lord God who came for vengeance, but from the consciousness of childlike relationship to the heavenly Father, and of the call which this implied to put on his likeness, who makes his sun rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust. If God's nature consists of this perfect and unlimited goodness, which shows itself abundant in mercy above, or without their deserving, and from its own free impulse alone; and if we are called to become like him as our Father, to be perfect as he is, then it follows that the ideal of righteousness can consist of nothing but the full and unreserved surrender of an undivided heart to God, to the dispensations and to the tasks which his goodwill assigns to us

to bear and to discharge. The Father-God of perfect love can ask no less of his child man than the perfect love of the whole heart, which no longer bargains between self and God, human performances and divine rewards, but which seeks to have God alone above all else, strives to promote his cause, fulfils his will, and is thus sure to find all it wants, namely, its own contentment and blessedness, in God. Here the law, the requirement of righteousness from man, is brought to its highest, its ideal expression; but in being thus fulfilled it is at the same time abolished as law, its fulfilment is also its end; in being brought to its highest expression it is inwardly overcome, for in the full surrender of the love of the child to the loving will of the Father-God the shall of the commandment ceases to be heard, and freedom comes to rule, which wills and does the good, not from compulsion but from its own impulse, with pleasure and lovingly. Thus the ideal righteousness set up by Jesus is on the one side the loftiest enforcement of the law, all its demands being placed in connection with the deepest motives and feelings of the heart; but on the other side it is the replacement of the slavish law of the letter by the free law of the childlike spirit of love, which he himself calls with great simplicity and clearness the "easy yoke" and the "light burden" of his disciples. It is an indisputable fact that a new moral and religious principle was thus attained, of such a scope as to transform the world, and the fact is in no way changed, though Jesus did not himself draw the practical consequences of the principle in detail, perhaps was not even fully aware how much it involved. How far he saw this is a very difficult question, which will never perhaps be answered with certainty; all that is certain is that Jesus allowed the positive Jewish law to remain in the enjoyment of its outward authority, where it did not conflict with his better insight into the divine will. It might be hard to fix what his reason was for doing so, whether he had never thought of the abolition of the law, or whether he only expected that abolition to take place at the inauguration of the kingdom, and regarding that event as near, shrank from any encroachment on the existing order of things as a presumptuous anticipation of God's purposes. Such expressions as

those of the new wine and old bottles—there are others of the kind,—almost suggest the latter possibility. Quite in harmony with such a view would also be the free, open-hearted, great manner in which the piety of Jesus regarded the things of the world; far from all ascetic anxiety, he knew how to enjoy with others, and he knew how to be in want without complaining and without care, because he regarded earthly goods as adiaphora, which may happen to turn to our good or to our harm, to which therefore we should not allow our heart to attach itself, but which we may thankfully accept as the gifts of God.

Along with love to God with the whole heart, Jesus required that a man should love his neighbour as himself; this he called the second commandment, equally great with the first, thus indicating that the two are inwardly one, love to one's neighbour being the practical manifestation of love to God, and hence too a copy of the unlimited free love of God. Our love to our brethren should be like his, unselfish, pure, unwearied, energetic, not bargaining about rights and duties, not judging the erring brother, not condemning the sinner, who has lost himself in the pleasure of the world, and is bound and possessed by evil spirits, but who yet is called to be a child of God, and feels a longing for his father's house, and therefore possesses a right to repent and to return to the heavenly Father. To look for this divine element in man everywhere, in every one without exception, and to recognise in the smallest child and in the abandoned woman the infinite value and the eternal destiny of the human soul, to believe it capable of being saved, and attempt and labour at its salvation by awakening and tending the divine spark in it, such are the main features of the loving activity of the Saviour himself, and such are the main requirements of his morality for all. His principle that help should be brought first to the sick who stand in need of the physician, involved as an obvious necessary consequence that the ministry of the Gospel should extend not only to the poor sinful part of the Jewish people whom Pharisaism despised and rejected, but also to the Gentiles. This consequence Jesus himself recognised in his acts on certain occasions which happened to fall in

his way. In general, however, he confined his ministry to Israel; and here a similar question presents itself to that about the law: whether Jesus himself did not consciously realise the universalistic consequences involved in his principle, or whether he purposely refrained from overstepping the framework of the theocracy, because he wished to leave the removal of this barrier, as of that of the law, to the act of God at the opening of the kingdom? It is difficult to answer this question, especially when the preliminary question remains so unsettled, how far the various declarations of the Gospel on this point are to be referred to Jesus himself, or how far they are transferred to him from the circumstances and views of later times. So much may, however, be asserted with confidence, that the later universalism of the apostle to the Gentiles was as certainly the true consequence of the unlimited and unconditioned love of Jesus in his work as Saviour, as on the other side the national and theocratic limitations of Jewish-Christian theory and practice were undoubtedly kept within the lines of the positive acts of Jesus in such matters, so that the Jewish-Christians could appeal to the outward example of their Master Jesus; while Paul had on his side the higher authority of Christ, which, however, could not be so tangibly demonstrated and insisted on.

In the new ideal of righteousness, of perfect love to God and man, Jesus set up the principle of a new, and that the highest, religion and morality, which reaches down to the deepest ground of the human soul, has its roots in the purest God-consciousness, rises to the most exalted freedom and rule over the world and all the things and fortunes of the world, and manifests itself in the richest and most fruitful social activity. The religion is that of *Sonship of God*, the morality that of the purest and most comprehensive *humanity*. And he not only set up this new principle as a theoretical ideal; he also realised it in practice and in fact. It was first of all a living typical activity in his own person: he himself lived in a God-possessed feeling of the intimate love of the heavenly Father to him, and of his own childlike and thankful answering love to the Father; and he lived with the impulse and the power upon him of

God-like saving love to his brethren, all of whom he knew to be intended to be children of God, and whom he regarded it as his mission to lead towards this their divine calling. From this the consciousness of his Messianic vocation arose of itself. If Jesus knew and felt himself to be in possession of a saving knowledge and love of the heavenly Father, and if he saw his brethren all wandering, lost in the world's pleasure, entangled in its care, weary and heavy-laden under earthly needs and still more under the heavy yoke of a slavish law, it was quite natural and necessary that he should offer to others too that higher life of the peace and joy of the child of God which he bore within himself, as a cure for the sick, as comfort for the sorrowful, as rest and refreshment for the weary and heavy-laden. And if from the very beginning of his public ministry he was convinced by his daily experience that in that which he imparted of his own there really lay the most sovereign cure for ailing hearts, if in the streets and lanes he came to know the burning power of his word, the life-giving, demon-quelling power of his glance, the whole mysterious magic of the divine elevation and the human kindness of his personality, how natural was it that what was at first a faint anticipation became as his success increased a growing certainty, that he and no other was called to bring on for his people the promised era of salvation, *i.e.* that he was destined to be their Messiah, or their "Saviour." [1]

If Jesus arrived in this way at the consciousness of his Messianic vocation, it is clear that he did not think of his Messiahship in the light of the idea which was ordinarily associated with the title, that of a worldly king and a victorious popular leader who was to help the Jewish state to triumph over its political enemies. The whole manner of his appearing, the way in which he spoke of himself as a teacher and physician, as "meek and lowly in heart," as the good

[1] I may take occasion here to ask why modern theology has substituted for this venerable, beautiful, and most appropriate name the much narrower notion of "Redeemer," which is far more open to misunderstanding, and is not strictly biblical at all? I cannot consider this as any gain, and should wish that the word "Saviour," which is the most literal and the oldest translation of σωτήρ, might be retained.

shepherd and compassionate friend of the people, is the strongest possible contrast to the political Messiah, whose *rôle* he repudiated by his unambiguous rejection of the title "Son of David." And further, Jesus conceived the full reality of the kingdom of God with the fulness of its blessings as a constitution of things which was only to come about in the future by means of miraculous divine acts. He did not transform the traditional ideal of the kingdom to such an extent as to see it entire in the present piety and righteousness of his band of disciples, and still less must we impute to him the modern philosophical notion of a kingdom of God realising itself in the world in history and consisting simply of the natural moral organisation of society with its state and family, church and school, art and science, trade and commerce—all these things obviously did not enter into his mind. Taking a purely historical view, we must say that the traditional supernatural theocratic side of the idea of the kingdom of God never wholly left him, though it retreated to the background of his view, more prominence being left to the inner preparation for it, begun even in the present, in the pious hearts of his disciples. Jesus too, like John, looked to the future and to the wonder-working arm of God for the actual coming of the kingdom with its blessings and its judgments; what distinguished him from John was, as Keim very pertinently remarks, "that with him present and future were much more vitally and intimately connected than with John, and in many respects even melted into one. For the love of God which he knew and proclaimed, and which he regarded as the most precious treasure of the coming kingdom, was present in the world from that hour in which it was believed in and became the joy and consolation of sorrowing human hearts. Thus his preparation for the kingdom was at the same time the presence of the kingdom." This is objectively very true, from our mode of view, and it may also be conceded that in the consciousness of Jesus the boundary between the present and the future of the kingdom, its spiritual preparation and its visible appearance in splendour, may in many respects have been uncertain; but that Jesus himself took the bold step of entirely casting off Jewish expectations and miracles,

can scarcely be said without contradicting reliable historical traditions (which Keim himself accepts).

But whatever was the nature of Jesus' expectations as to the future realisation of his ideal of the kingdom, so much at least is certain, that he conceived his present office as a Saviour not in accordance with the popular picture of a Davidic Messiah, but in accordance with the type set forth by Deutero-Isaiah in the God-anointed servant of God, the humble and gentle teacher of the nations; indeed, he applied the description of the procedure of that personage (Isa. lxi. 1 *seq.*) directly to himself. And as in Deutero-Isaiah the picture of the patient teacher (chap. xlii.) passes into that of the suffering servant of God, who by his patient sufferings atones for the guilt of sinners, and carries God's cause to a triumphant conclusion, so Jesus also might be visited by the anticipation of a like tragic fate, when after the first astounding successes the reaction of public opinion set in which unavoidably takes place in such circumstances. It is certain that Jesus did not at the beginning of his ministry contemplate such a tragic issue; yet it is easy to conceive how towards the end of his work in Galilee, when experiences multiplied of the unimpressionableness and fickleness of the multitude and of the passionate opposition of the ruling parties and authorities, the prospect of his sufferings entered into his view. And if when he set out on the fateful journey to Jerusalem the hope of victory and the fear of death were alternating in his mind, a few days' experience after his arrival at the headquarters of the hierarchy were enough to convince him of the inevitableness of a tragical end. At the last Passover meal he expressed this conviction without reserve, and he indicated at the same time the view by means of which he was able to reconcile so paradoxical an issue with a steadfast faith in his Messianic calling. He regarded his death as the God-ordained propitiatory sacrifice at the inauguration of the new covenant, an idea which might easily suggest itself to him from the type of the passover sacrifice of the Old Testament, which was just then being celebrated, as well as from the prophetic word of the atoning sufferings of the servant of Jehovah. And, in fact, the

strictest historical consideration of the case shows that it was only the *death* of the Saviour, the moral sacrificial act of self-surrender to the necessities of his Messianic office, that formed the decisive turning-point at which the breach with the old religious world and the foundation of a new one, proved to be accomplished.

But while Jesus saw in his approaching death the means for the victorious accomplishment of his mission as a Saviour and of the realisation of the kingdom of God, he at the same time cherished the assured hope that God would bring back to life the obedient instrument of his will for the salvation of man, and would exalt him to the visible splendour of the Messiah. Not only was this intimated and guaranteed by the predictions and hopes of the prophets and the psalmist, as Isa. liii. 10 *seqq.*, Hos. vi. 1 *sq.*, Ps. cxviii., etc.; this postulate naturally and necessarily accompanied his belief in his Messianic vocation, for he had always conceived the realisation of the Messianic kingdom as the miraculous inauguration of a new state of affairs, for which the spiritual effects of his preaching had been nothing but a preliminary. A mere Messiahship in heaven or (to express the thing in more modern terms) in the ideal sphere of religion and morality was entirely foreign to Jewish thought, by the conditions of which Jesus, free as he was, could not but be bound. If he was not to give up his Messiahship completely, it was necessary that he should hope to attain to it on earth, either immediately, by winning over the people to his side, or if the path to it should lie through death, by means of a speedy return, which the view of the resurrection then current in Judaism would lead him to conceive as a miraculous revivification and resurrection.[1] It is therefore very conceivable that along with anticipations of his death Jesus may also have cherished the *hope of his second coming*, and may have given expression to it, though certainly not in such distinct terms as

[1] Compare Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*, T.T.F.L. iii. 281; Zeller, *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, i. 534; Weizsäcker, *die Evangelische Geschichte*, p. 552; Hausrath, *New Testament Times*, T.T.F.L., ii. 235. I cannot, however, conceal that this question does not appear to me to be cleared up and placed beyond doubt, if only from its close connection with the problem of the "Son of Man," a designation undoubtedly of apocalyptic origin. (See below, pp. 206, 7.)

those of his sayings reported in the Gospels. Then this hope was the form, borrowed from popular thought, which the exalted idealism of his faith, his firm belief in his coming victory over the world, assumed as its garb.

And here what we had repeated occasion to remark with regard to the hopes in which the faith of the prophets was expressed, proved true once more, that hope did not deceive, although it was fulfilled in a very different sense from that in which it was first put forth. The crucified one did rise again into life and dominion, if not bodily, yet in the belief and for the faith of his disciples. His own faithful trust in God became the staff of his people, which in spite of his death upon the cross upheld their faith in him as the Saviour, became the rock on which the infant church was founded. That this assurance on the part of the disciples of the continued life of the crucified one should have clothed itself in the form of visions, in which the image of the Saviour which lived in their hearts was presented to their eyes with what seemed to be corporeal reality, is a phenomenon which psychology can sufficiently explain, and for which history provides numberless analogies; the miraculous character of it consists in nothing but the creative power of a faith and a love which are stronger than death. Those Easter experiences were to the consciousness of the disciples the decisive turning-point at which their conviction of the Messiahship of Jesus received its seal; but looking at it from without we see that the real root and active energy of this faith of theirs lay nowhere but in the religious and moral impression produced on them by the whole personality of Jesus, which went on living and working in their hearts with irresistible force. This formed the spiritual kernel of their belief in Jesus as the Christ; the shell of it was the hope, borrowed from popular thought and related to the history of the time, of his speedy and glorious second coming. And so far as they felt or knew, the latter was the main point; not the higher moral and religious spirit which had lived in Jesus, and the breath of which had touched them too, was in their estimation the substance of the salvation they possessed, the essence of Christianity; this they sought exclusively

in the miraculous apocalyptical world of the Messianic kingdom to be expected from the skies. So exclusively did their longing eye turn to this supernatural hope, that they scarcely noticed the earthly development of the kingdom of Christ in the historical life of the church. What was to be done about the Jewish law, what about the admission of the Gentiles, these great questions, so momentous for the independent existence of the religion of Christ, entered not at all into the horizon of the primitive church. And so it was that men like Peter could in isolated cases disregard the law, and hold intercourse with Gentiles with open-hearted generosity, while yet in principle the whole law still stood in undisputed authority for the mind of the church, in all its parts and in all the exclusiveness it enjoined or implied. The primitive church regarded the expected Messianic kingdom only as the fulfilment, not as the abolition of the national Jewish theocracy; and the removal of the legal foundations of the theocracy or of its natural limits could not come up for discussion even as a possibility.

It might thus be said not without some reason that this primitive Christianity of the early church was rather Judaism than Christianity, for it shared with Judaism not only its whole dogmatic view of the world, but also the hope of the speedy appearance of the Messiah: the sole difference was that the Jews who adopted Christianity considered the coming Messiah to be Jesus returning, while the other Jews regarded Jesus as an executed malefactor. Could one who had been crucified be the Messiah whom God had chosen? that was the point at issue between the early Christian church and Judaism, and the early Christian apologetic was mainly directed to explaining the offence contained for the Jewish mind in the crucifixion of Jesus, justifying God's permission of it, and discovering the reason why it was permitted. The early Christians, it is true, had scarcely a glimmer of the width of the chasm which this one point of difference, the belief in a crucified Messiah, had, in fact, created from the first, though it was not yet seen, between them and the Jews. As soon as the consequences involved in the fact of the crucifixion of the Messiah had been worked out, and the momentous import of them clearly

brought to view, Christianity must separate from Judaism, with which in the primitive church it was so closely connected and interwoven.

This was the work of the apostle *Paul.* With the profound insight of religious genius he saw from the first the revolutionary meaning of the cross of Christ. As a Pharisee this led him into a passionate persecution of the believers in Christ, and after his conversion he saw in this stone of stumbling for the Jewish mind a God-appointed foundation and corner-stone of a new religious world. Working out the consequences of this foundation-fact with all the resources of an acute intellect trained in rabbinical dialectic and Alexandrian philosophy, he became the founder of Christian theology and of an independent Christian church, detached from Judaism. Paul set out from the position that the death of the Messiah on the cross would have been objectless, if after it righteousness came from the law just as before. The purpose of it cannot have been merely, as the primitive church supposed, to fill up the gaps of human righteousness, but must have been to open up a new way to righteousness and to life. How could it be conceived to have done so?

Here the pupil of Gamaliel found himself assisted by the view which prevailed in Jewish theology (p. 160), that the sufferings of the just man are a means of propitiation by which guilt is purged, and benefit those connected with him, his family, his circle of friends, his fellow-countrymen, he counting before God as their substitute and representative; a view the roots of which are to be found not only in Isa. liii., but also in the belief generally cherished in ancient times of the representative character, the solidarity of the acts and the sufferings of a prominent member of society in reference to the whole community he belonged to. Regarding the death of Christ in this light he saw in it the propitiation appointed by God himself for the atonement not of Israel only, but of the world, the whole of humanity represented in Christ as the second Adam. When one died for all, all died (2 Cor. v. 15); his death means the death of all, and has therefore atoning power for all, which, however, only comes to the good of those who enter into such a relation of faith and love with

Christ that his death and new life is inwardly repeated in them, so that in him they feel themselves to be "new men," dead to sin, alive to the spirit. In this fundamental view of the solidarity and unity of Christ as representative head with all (potentially with all, actually with all believers), lies the key to a proper understanding of the apostle Paul's doctrine of salvation, which develops itself quite simply from this point. If Christ, himself sinless, suffered as the representative of all, that death which the law demanded as the wages of sin, then he therewith once for all settled with the law and sin, satisfied and disposed of their demand for penalty and all their claims, and that not only for his own person, but for all who are his, who are identified with the crucified Christ, and are therefore partakers of all the consequences of his death.[1] This involves several things. Firstly, Christians are free from the condemning sentence of the law, which continues to rest upon the sinner as long as the debt of sin is not atoned perfectly, *i.e.* by death; it is now atoned by death for those who have died with Christ, and thus the faithful have no debt of sin resting upon them, no curse of the law against them. The barrier is thus cleared away which separated them from God; they are now justified before him, free from guilt in his eyes; they know themselves to be his beloved children, and, as such, they have peace with him and access to his grace. Thus even death, which reigned over mankind from Adam, on account of their sins, has lost its power for them; it can only dissolve their outer man, it cannot separate their inner man, who lives in and with Christ, from the love of God. And thus finally there comes for them, instead of fear of the powers and dominions of the world, peace and joy and blessedness in hope. But those who are Christ's are quit and free not only of the curse of the law, but also of the claims and obligations of the letter of its commandments. For the law rules over a man only so long as he lives—upon the dead it has no claim; and as little as it has anything to do with Christ himself, the dead and risen one, so little has it any obliging power for Christians as the partakers of the death and life of Christ. As brothers and

[1] Rom. vi. 1-11, vii. 1-5, viii. 1-4; Gal. iv. 1-4, iii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 15-21.

members of the first-born Son of God they also have become free and emancipated sons of God, who no longer stand under the discipline of the law. Thus the liberation of the Christian community from the bonds of the Jewish law is with Paul not a concession of practical generosity without any principle in it; and as little is it the result of allegorising interpretation of the law: it is the logical result on one side of his speculative doctrine of Christ, which sees in Christ the ideal man, and so extends the act of one to the act of all, and on the other side of the mysticism of his faith, which feels itself united in thankful love in one spirit with the Saviour, whose transfigured image is printed on the heart. Without doing justice to these mystical and speculative roots of his theory, no one can understand the apostle Paul, and he can only be caricatured and misrepresented.

And this befell him during his lifetime at the hands of his Judaistic opponents, who represented his freedom from the law as a falling back into the sinful life of heathenism, as libertinism and godlessness. Against such charges Paul had to show that faith in Christ, while it emancipates from the letter of the law, at the same time involves a new moral principle. As Christ, having once died for sin, henceforward lives to God, so the Christian also has become dead to sin, so that it no longer has any right to rule over him, and has become alive to God, so that in point of legal position he can only devote his life to God. Or thus: as Christ died according to the flesh, and rose as spirit, so the Christian's old man, who was under the dominion of the flesh, is crucified with Christ, given up to death, and the new man is risen from the dead for him, who lives in the element of the spirit, of the divine power of life, and therefore stands no longer under the bondage of sin. From this new condition of life, which Paul conceives as a completed fact from the time of his baptism, he deduces the duty of the Christian to walk in accordance with his new condition of dedication to God and emancipation from sin: "If we live in the spirit, let us also walk in the spirit!" With the possibility and the power of overcoming sin and doing good goes the duty to do so; the love of God and of Christ which is experienced in faith must approve itself in the Christian as an impulse and a

power of the sanctification of the man's life in the service of God; the new religious feeling must be translated into a new moral direction of the will. It is therefore true of the Christian in every respect that he has become a "new creature," in whom old things are passed away, and all things are made new. There lives in him no longer the old ego of the carnal man governed by sensuous and selfish natural impulses which have their seat in the body; Christ lives in him, the spirit of the Son of God has become the ruling central power of his personality, and the fruits of this spirit are the manifold virtues which adorn the Christian life. Thus out of the depths of religious mysticism, which opened to him in his belief in his sonship to God, there flows for the apostle the vigorous spring of a new moral life. In place of Jewish legalism and Gentile lawlessness there comes for him the new law of the spirit of life in Christ, in which the conflict between what he would and what he should, between the human will and the divine, is reconciled, the law taken up into the man's own will, and made the living impulse of a holy spirit, an inner law of love. If the apostle did not himself work out his principle as it applies to the various spheres of human life, he yet opened up an infinite prospect of autonomous improvement in humanity when he uttered the magnificent words: "All things are yours, and ye are Christ's."

In the same depths of his religious mysticism in which he found the sources of a new ethic, Paul also found the source of a new dogmatic speculation, which formed the foundation of the theology of the church. The primitive community had seen in the "Holy Spirit" that Messianic miraculous gift which manifests itself in extraordinary inspirations and miraculous powers, but Paul saw in that spirit the divine power of a new religious and moral life, which man takes to himself in faith as the permanent principle of his personal life, which works from within, purifying, vivifying, sanctifying, and illuminating the whole personality, and changing it into a genuine god-man and copy of Christ. The primitive Church had no view of salvation but as future participation in the glory of the returning Messiah Jesus, and in his earthly kingdom, but Paul sees

the higher life of Christ to be already here, namely, as the life (at present the inner life) of the faithful in the spirit of Christ in which the essential goods of the future kingdom, righteousness, peace, and joy, are already realities (Rom. xiv. 17), so that what is still to come, what is still the object of hope, may from this point be regarded as the natural working out, the completion of the development of what is already there. The primitive Christian ideas continue to subsist by the side of these more spiritual ones: the expectation of Christ's visible return, of the resurrection of the dead, and the transformation of the living, even of the change of nature, when she is delivered from her bondage and vanity (1 Cor. xv., Rom. viii. 18 *seqq.*) To the apostle this hope of an outward completion of salvation, to take place at a certain point of time, was a thing of great importance; yet the fact is not to be disputed that his peculiar doctrine of the life of believers "in the Spirit" or "in Christ," and of the indwelling of the spirit of Christ or of God, or of the Sonship of Christians (Rom. viii. 9-16), dictated the tendency which caused the Christian view of salvation to loosen its grasp of a future apocalyptic miraculous world, and to concentrate itself mainly on the present of Christian experience, to change in fact from matters supersensuous yet sensuous (miraculous), external, to matters spiritual, moral, internal—a change of attitude which found its completion (in type, at least, and for the time) in the Johannine theology. The way was opened to supplement the exclusive other-worldliness of the Jewish way of thinking about God by means of religious experience of the inner presence in us of a divine spirit and life. A richer and higher view of God was thus to be attained, in which the Jewish sense of God's exaltation above the world is wedded to the Greek sense of our living and moving in God.

With this central point of Pauline speculation, the doctrine of the spirit of Christ, is connected his new and peculiar view of the *person of Christ.* Paul had no personal knowledge of the historical Jesus: he only saw in the spirit the Lord of heaven in the bright splendour of his heavenly glory. Hence Christ is to him not only the earthly man equipped with prophetic power, that he was to

the primitive church; he is essentially and originally the heavenly spirit-man: the pure spirit which is the essence of God, assumed in God's Son Christ a form which is the image of God and the type of man: Christ is therefore the Son of God, inasmuch as in virtue of his holy spirit-nature he is the ideal man in the image of God, whom all Christians are called to resemble.[1] In the production of this theory there is no doubt that Jewish and Alexandrian ideals of the prototypal man from heaven (p. 174) had their share; but at the same time it lay quite in the track of the apostle's own religious speculation, and it was admirably fitted to raise the ideal kernel of Christianity, which appealed to all men, out of the Judaistic wrappings in which the circumstances of its appearance had invested it, and to give it a fixed form in the image of a Saviour which both impressed itself strongly on the pious imagination and presented itself to the grateful heart as a worthy object of adoration in worship. Now as the pre-existent heavenly Son of God had been from the creation the organ of divine revelation, in the fulness of time he was sent by God in the likeness of sinful flesh, a "second Adam," who should remove the curse which rested on humanity since Adam, and found a new humanity which receives from its head the gift of righteousness and of life, as the first had inherited from Adam sin and death. The guilt incurred for all by the first Adam's act of disobedience is made good by the obedience of the second Adam, who did not, like the first, desire to snatch to himself equality with God, but divested himself of his divine form and his rich glory in order for our sake to become poor, to take upon himself the human form of a servant, and to humble himself to death on the cross.[2] Thus Paul sees the motive of the Saviour's work, His self-denying love in the service of God and of men, manifested even in the fact of His appearance in the flesh: he sees nothing in Christ but an embodiment of the saving love of God. As in the children of God the impulse of the Holy Spirit manifests itself in love which is the fulfilling of the law, so the nature of Christ, the first-born Son of God, is all spirit and all love; this is what makes him

[1] Rom. i. 4, viii. 29; 1 Cor. xv. 45 *seqq.*; 2 Cor. iii. 17, iv. 6.
[2] Phil. ii. 6; 2 Cor. viii. 9; Rom. v. 12-19.

the Lord and the type of the church, the object of her faith and of her love. In this doctrine of Christ we see very plainly the elements of the dogma of future times, only not yet scholastic nor turned to wood: the outer integument is still sufficiently tender and transparent to allow us to discern through it the throbbing life of warm religious pulsation.

The profound speculation of Paul culminates finally in a *philosophy of the history of religion and of the world,* in which the general development of humanity in its various stages and antitheses is regarded as being in macrocosm what the development of the individual is in microcosm. Paul was the first to understand the history of religion as a divine education of the human race. To the infant-stage of innocence in which there is no consciousness as yet of the law which forbids, or in consequence, of sin, corresponds the age of the patriarchs, the period of naïve childlike piety, in the faith of which the Christian faith of redemption is already prefigured. Between these two, however, comes the law, which holds in ward in the prison of its commands and prohibitions, as the pedagogue the boy still in his nonage, natural humanity which is dominated by fleshly impulses; the object of this is not to conquer sin inwardly, a thing which the law is incapable of doing, but by the painful sense of unfreedom, division, and guilt, to prepare for a future liberation and atonement in sonship. But as the power of the pedagogue ceases at the time appointed beforehand by the father, and the boy now attaining his majority enters into the free rights of a son, so for humanity the period of majority and sonship begins with faith in the Son of God; the slavery of the law comes to an end, and in place of fear comes the free and happy spirit of the son, in which all division is atoned, and the covenant of grace of the patriarchal period restored as a new covenant, universal and eternal. But the development of this new covenant of the spirit, which has taken the place of the old covenant of the letter, also proceeds according to God-ordained laws and measures. If formerly, in the preparation time of the law, the Gentiles were postponed to the people of the promises and covenants, Israel has now to take his place after the Gentiles, and to allow them to enter first into the Christian community,

bursting the while with jealousy like the elder brother of the prodigal in the parable. Yet this delay is not to prove a permanent loss or fall to him; when once the fulness of the Gentiles has come in, Israel too, provoked to jealousy by their preceding him, will come as a people to the kingdom of perfected communion with God, which was promised to him. Then the end of God's ways will be attained, the eternal counsels of his wisdom and love will be fulfilled. For all those manifold fortunes of humanity, those epochs of history, the necessity lying on one as much as the other of passing through the bondage of sin and the law, to reach only through division the peace of atonement, this is not all the play of chance and of caprice; the will of God's eternal wisdom and love manifests itself in all these events; by these steps in time does he carry out his eternal purposes for the salvation of man. Unsearchable as the ways of God may be in their detail, one thing stands always sure, that all things are through him and to him.

Such are the outlines of the apostle Paul's theological speculation. It is a sea of profound and suggestive ideas, from which the Christian theology of every age has drawn, and the traces of which may also be found without difficulty in the philosophical systems of the Christian era. But as they first appeared in Paul these ideas were so mixed up with old Jewish and heathen notions, and the combination of the heterogeneous elements was so individual and characteristic, that his doctrine could not make its way immediately and without change into the mind of the church. The Gentile Christians could not understand the presuppositions and forms of his Jewish thought, and to the Jewish Christians his freedom from the law, both in thought and action, was incomprehensible and offensive. In the first conflict with the Judaistic incendiaries, which took place at the meeting of the apostles at Jerusalem, Paul succeeded in arranging an amicable agreement with the moderate party of the primitive church, in which the principal apostles also took part. In this agreement the position of Gentile Christianity in freedom from the law was recognised, but the law was maintained for Jewish Christianity

without any relaxation, and a sharp dividing line was thus drawn between the two mission-fields. But no allowance was made in this agreement for the working of actual facts where both parties lived side by side in one community, and hence a new conflict soon emerged on the occasion of a visit of the apostle Peter to Antioch, and the controversy as to the importance of the Jewish law for the Christian communities, a controversy which the treaty of Jerusalem had shelved rather than settled, now led to a breach between Paul and the Jewish Christians. Traces of this conflict may be observed in all the Pauline Epistles, and also in part in the three older Gospels, and it also appears plainly enough in Judaeo-Christian writings, in the Epistle of James, and in the Johannine Apocalypse.

Yet it may be seen from the latter remarkable work that however far asunder the two positions were, in many particulars a powerful bond of union was not wanting between them; namely, a common faith in Jesus, the exalted heavenly Lord of the church. The Apocalypse competes with Paul, and in part even surpasses him in the glorification of Jesus. It transfers to Christ even more decidedly than Paul does predicates of majesty, which otherwise belonged to God alone, calls him the King of kings, the Lord of lords, the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning of the creation of God; indeed it does not hesitate to make him the object of the adoration of the blessed. In following this line the writer avails himself of a number of Pauline terms and expressions. Paul calls Christ the Passover that is slain for us, and the seer of the Apocalypse is fond of the expression, the "Lamb which was slain," and delights in emotional contemplation of the suffering Saviour: "Him that loved us and redeemed us from our sins with His blood." Paul speaks of the "second man from heaven," and the "Lord of glory," and to the seer of the Apocalypse also Christ appears under a figure (borrowed from Daniel), "like to a Son of Man," on a white cloud, a golden crown on his head, his countenance shining like the sun.[1] Jewish Christianity and Paulinism had differed on the question of the law: on the question as to Jesus the Christ, we see the

[1] Rev. i. 5, 11-18; xiv. 14 *seqq.*; xix. 16; iii. 14; xxii. 13; v. 8-14.

two sides, the prophecy of the primitive Church and the theology of the apostle of the Gentiles, meeting harmoniously, and reaching out to each other across the separating gulf the hand of reconciliation. A common ground was thus given for the meeting of the parties in the church. The first important consequence of this, and a thing which itself became a mighty agent in bringing about this mutual understanding, was the working out, which only now took place, of the evangelical tradition.

In the process of forming the material of the evangelical tradition, which only at a late period received its ultimate shape in our *canonical Gospels*, many other influences were at work besides historical reminiscence. Among the forces which helped to form, but also to modify, the evangelical history, we must certainly name in the first place Pauline theology and apocalyptical prophecy. The picture of Christ, which these two agree in putting forward, naturally became the formula of agreement of the union of the Church, and at the same time the ruling canon for the shaping of the whole map of the gospel tradition, which was still fluid and plastic. The rays of the apocalyptic Pauline splendour of the heavenly Son of God and Son of Man cast their reflection upon the earthly days of the God-sent prophet of Nazareth, and the pale picture of the earliest tradition was suffused with the glowing colours and mysterious shadows of the supernatural, of miracle. According to Paul, Christ was the Son of God through the spirit of holiness which was on him, and through his heavenly origin,[1] and the plastic legend as it grew made this spirit not only descend upon him visibly from heaven at his baptism, but even engender his earthly life in the virgin womb of his mother.[2] This supernatural origin might appear to be called for by the ascetic ideal of holiness set up in the Apocalypse. Then again the work of the heavenly Christ appears, according to the Apocalypse, to consist in a victorious struggle with the kingdom of Satan, and so, in the history of the temptation, the legend placed a prelude of this battle at the beginning of the public life of Jesus as a frontispiece, and a prelude of his victory and glorification before its close in the story of

[1] Rom. i. 4 ; 1 Cor. xv. 47. [2] Matt. i. 18 *seqq.* ; Luke i. 26 *seqq.*

the transfiguration, in which the heavenly scene of the prophetic vision of Apocalypse i. 13-17 is dramatised, and even some of the words of it made use of. In the Apocalypse (xxi. 5 *seqq.*) Christ is the world-ruler who sits upon the throne of omnipotence, and who at the end is to make all things new, and to put an end to death and to all pain; and the legend gave visible form to this elevating hope in typical ideal narratives of the wonder-working, nature-transfiguring, dead-awakening omnipotence of Jesus. Finally, the waiting and longing of the church and of the whole creation with her points to the return of "the Son of Man in the clouds of heaven," as both the seer of the Old Testament and he of the New beheld it,[1] and we can easily understand how the productive legend of the expectant church not only can tell of precise and definite promises in this direction even of the earthly Son of Man, but in addition to this can give a prelude, a counterpart of his hoped-for visible descent from heaven in his visible ascension to heaven. When this is done, the ascension is distinguished from the resurrection as the second act of the exaltation of Christ,[2] and the appearances after the resurrection tend accordingly to grow coarser, more massive, more realistic. These few examples—and the subject could be pursued much further in detail—show sufficiently that the key to the explanation of our Gospels, from beginning to end, is to be sought in the Pauline and Apocalyptic picture of the Christ.

This uniting centre of the tendencies of primitive Christianity, on which the crystallisation of the different elements of the evangelical history then fastened, provided also a common point of departure for the progress of dogmatic speculation from the beginning of the second century onwards. Here, however, a new element entered into the Christian process of development—the idealism of Alexandrian speculation, which touched Pauline apocalyptical theology at so many points that a combination of the two was quite to be

[1] Dan. vii. 13; Rev. xxii. 17-20, xiv. 14; Rom. viii. 17-25; 1 Thess. iv. 16; Matt. xxiv. 30; xxvi. 64.

[2] Luke xxiv. 51; Acts i. 1-11.

expected. It meets us first in the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, which transfers to Christ the metaphysical predicates of wisdom from the Alexandrian "Wisdom of Solomon," and makes him open the entrance to the heavenly sanctuary by his sacrificial death, and dispense the heavenly goods in the "world above" as an eternal high priest and steward. In the world above, the heaven of the apocalyptic visions is fused with the ideal world of Alexandrian speculation. The allegorising of the Jewish ritual law, which Philo had brought into vogue, was applied by the Epistle to the Hebrews on a much more extensive scale than by Paul, and used to prove that Judaism is related to Christianity as prophecy to fulfilment, as the preparatory and imperfect, to the fulfilling and perfect, dispensation. On the same lines is the thought of the Deutero-Pauline Epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians, which represent the ecclesiastical form of Pauline gnosis, in opposition to the heretical gnosis then beginning to show itself. Against an Essene worship of angels which encroached on the sole dignity of Christ, stress is laid on Christ's central position in the world; as head of the Church he embraces in one, in an all-atoning unity, the divided parts of the world of men and the world of spirits, of the earthly and the heavenly spheres. The Epistle to the Ephesians differs from that to the Colossians in seeking to give the transcendental speculations of the latter a practical turn, and to apply them to the moral and religious needs of the church's life. And here the Deutero-Pauline theology of the second century met and harmonised, as had been the case before, with the Deutero-Johannine theology of the fourth Gospel, which belongs to the same period. Even by its name this work declares itself to be an apocalypse of a higher order, *i.e.* a free product of the same creative intuitive spirit, in which not only had a Philo translated the figures of the Old Testament into ideal types, but the apocalyptist John and the apostle Paul had also seen Christ as the Lord, who is spirit.

If even in the three older Gospels the historical tradition was materially affected by the ideal motives of the Pauline apocalyptic theology, it is still more the case with regard to the fourth, the "pneumatic" gospel, that history is used solely as a plastic material

for setting forth religious ideas, to which Philo contributed scarcely less than the Apocalypse and Paul. The Johannine theology hinges on the antithesis of God and the world and its reconcilement by the Logos-Christ. God is a spirit, a purely moral being exalted above all the limits of natural existence and of popular worships; but we must not predicate of him inaccessible distance from the world, or empty indeterminateness (as was done by the Gnostics); he is the inexhaustibly active spring of life, he is the loving Father, who has loved the Son and the world from eternity. The Son is the "Logos." Under this notion Philo had combined into one the personified Old Testament forms of revelation, wisdom and the word, with the world-forming reason of Greek speculation; and the notion is here placed in the front of the Gospel, underlies it throughout, and determines its view of the history. The metaphysical and cosmic side of the Logos of Philo, however, is much less prominent in the Gospel than the character pertaining to it as an organ of revelation in the history of salvation, such as the personified word of Jewish dogmatic, the "Memra" of the Jews, also was.[1] In the Johannine Gospel, metaphysical relations are never more than the faintly-suggested pre-suppositions of religious relations. The relation of the Son to the Father, in particular, is not yet described in the later dogmatic formulas; three points only are asserted with regard to him, he is equal in nature to the Father, generically a God, but he is also entirely subordinated to him, and dependent on him in his whole existence and activity; and finally, he is intimately united with him, in a mystic union of life and love. These three points compose the essence of the religious relation, and one might see in the Johannine Logos-Christ the personification of the true religion of sonship to God. But he himself represents the absolute ideal, and so he is distinguished from the other sons of God not only as the first-born, which he is in Paul, but as the "only-begotten," who does not form one of the series of creatures, beings who must always be imperfect, but is the one Mediator of all creation and revelation. Even in pre-Christian history he was the instrument of a partial and preparatory

[1] Weber, *altsynagogale Theologie*, p. 175 *seqq.*

revelation, both in and outside of Israel, and he has finally appeared in person by means of the incarnation in Jesus. In the person and work of Jesus, therefore, all the divine glory, grace, and truth that was formerly present in humanity is embodied and concentrated; he is the consummation, the highest point and the fulfilment of all earlier revelation of God, both among Jews and Gentiles. But the ideal subject which, as an embodiment of the perfect revelation of God, is himself a divine being, ceases therewith to be a real and full human being; in his consciousness of heavenly pre-existence, in the omniscience which at once sees through all men and all things, in his creative miracles, testifying to omnipotence, in his ghost-like inaccessibility, in his superiority to human pains and passions, nay, to the human need of prayer to God (xi. 42), he walks in mystery over the earth, no longer the meek and compassionate friend of the people of the earlier Gospels, but the concealed God, whose exalted majesty presents to the world a face of haughty exclusiveness, and only in the esoteric circle of the disciples manifests some symptoms of warm and true human feeling.

The work of his life consists in revealing and communicating to mankind by his words and acts, and in his death, the divine life and light which he bears in himself. Hence his teaching no longer deals with the ideal of righteousness and of the kingdom of the primitive Christian announcement: its subject is himself and his personal relation to the Father and to the world and the church, naturally because the ideal of religion is here represented in its most concentrated form. His works prove his divine power even more than his love, they are testimonies of the Father which accompany him and attest the truth of his word, illustrations of eternal truths in examples striking to the senses; hence His miracles are here raised to the highest pitch of unnaturalness, so as to answer to the absolute miracle of his divine person; and yet on the other side the miraculous occurrence for the senses is deprived of all value, because every occurrence is to be regarded as merely a parable of supersensuous ideas. The death of the Johannine Christ has no reference to the law's demand of expiation, which for this theology belongs to the long

antiquated standpoint of Judaism; it is simply the moral sacrifice of love which humbles itself in order to be exalted. In his voluntary surrender to death there lies also the conquest of death, and therewith the judgment of the prince of this world, the devil: in this highest proof of love there also lies the purifying and uniting consecration sacrifice for the church, which is richly compensated for the brief mourning of separation by the mission of the Spirit which proceeds directly from the risen one as his second I, who takes his place with the church and continues the work of his mediatorship, as the other Paraclete, as Philo also called the Logos the Paraclete, or advocate of the church before God. In this Spirit the church is more than repaid for the personal presence of Christ; for the Spirit leads the church into all truth, even beyond what the historical saviour had taught, he reveals many things which Jesus could not say to them because receptivity was wanting on the part of the disciples. Thus it is only through the Spirit that the church arrives at the full independent and clear knowledge which requires no further instruction conveyed by another mouth and wrapped in symbol. He also teaches them to pray in the name of Jesus, and makes their prayer so immediately effectual that they no longer require any other intercessor; in fact, he introduces them into such an immediate communion with God the Father and the Son as is not conditioned and limited by any outward mediator and means, and in which therefore the peace and joy of the sons of God reaches full and immediate inner certainty, being thereby made complete. Thus the atonement of the antithesis of God and man, this world and the other world, which takes place in the pre-existent Logos in an eternal mediatorship and in the incarnate Logos-Christ in a historical work of salvation, finally becomes an actual fact of experience in the consciousness of the Christian church. The faith of the church, this work and activity of the Holy Spirit, is in itself and essentially eternal life though in the midst of time, victory over the world, hell, and death, the blessed communion with God which is the fulfilment of all wishes, the solution of all problems (xvi. 22 *sq.*; xvii. 3-22 *sqq.*). There is no need then to wait for a visible second coming in the future, no need

of longing inquiries as to the time of the erection of the kingdom. This, the primitive Christian hope, here passes out of sight in the faith of the church, which already possesses all the satisfaction it requires in the sense of present unity with the Father and the Son. In the place of the earthly chiliastic messianic kingdom which filled the imagination of the Apocalyptist, we here find the kingdom which is not of this world, whose king is the witness to the truth, whose citizens are those who are of the truth (xviii. 36). Nor is the day of judgment impending over the church; in her faith the church is exalted above death and judgment, while the judgment of the unbelieving world takes place continuously in the process of separation between the children of light and the children of darkness, of God and of the devil. Thus the antithesis between God and the anti-divine world-ruler the devil is never completely adjusted, but comes more and more completely into view; the revelation of God's love in Christ, though in its nature intended for all, is not, as experience shows, taken advantage of by all, but only by those who from their essential affinity to God possess an inner receptivity for it, for only those can come to the Son and believe, who not only hear the word externally, but are inwardly drawn and instructed by the Father; for others, again, who are not of God but of the devil, it is impossible to hear the voice of the Son of God in such a way that they shall believe; they remain in the condemnation of darkness; in their unbelief which cuts them off from the life which is in God, they are already condemned. While these immanent spiritual processes take place in man's historical life, the eschatological conclusion of earthly history does not entirely disappear, but it now belongs not to the earthly drama of the messianic kingdom of the Jews, but to the super-sensuous world which is the home of the Spirit; and hence it does not now stand, as it did formerly, in the forefront of the Christian consciousness, since it is not what brings eternal life, but that life is already present in the knowledge of God and Christ contained in faith. The eternal kingdom of God will be nothing new: it will be the completion and fulfilment of that *worship of God in spirit and in truth*, which is already really present in the church.

This theology is a system of ecclesiastical gnosis in which idea and history, speculation and church belief, accurately balance each other, and act and react on each other. The former served to liberate Christianity from its early Jewish narrowness, and to elevate it to a world-religion, which could take its place in an impressive and convincing way before the cultivated Gentile world; the latter practical and historical element restrained speculation from taking any ruinous Icarus-flight into the mists of empty abstractions and mythical dreams. True, the Gospel of John makes of the religious ideal which was embodied in Jesus, a definite pre-mundane being which he places before his history; and in doing so, he prepares even more distinctly than Paul did for the development of the Christological speculation of the church. But from this speculation the evangelist is still far removed; his eye does not linger on the heavenly existence of the Logos, but hastens at once to the historical embodiment of the Logos in Jesus; he forms the abstraction, but refuses to fix it as an abstraction, and makes it at once embody itself in religious life in history. This is the essential difference which separates this ecclesiastical gnosis from the *heretical gnosis* of the second century. The latter severed idea and history from each other, made the former a remote shadowy being, and the object of fantastic myths with no historical foundation and of no religious value; at the same time, the historical element of Christianity was emptied of its contents and of its specific meaning, and reduced to a mere ordinary human thing with which the heavenly beings (æons) were then placed in a purely external relation; in fact, in a fantastic and untrue relation. Thus in their false gnosis there came of the Christ, as he lived in the belief of the church, on one side an unhistorical appearance-being, and on the other side a historical being destitute of idea, the one one-sidedness ("Docetism") as well as the other ("Ebionitism"), unfruitful and without value for religious edification. Hence the various tendencies in the church combined in a common struggle against the danger which threatened Christianity from the fantastic luxuriance of Gnosticism. The Alexandrianism of the church defended itself in the "Johannine Epistles" against the caricature of

the genuine religious gnosis; in the so-called "Pastoral Epistles" the Paulinism of the church retreated to the shelter of church tradition and constitution; and finally, the Judaism of the church combined in the Epistle of Jude and in 2d Peter a renunciation of Gnosticism with a word of brotherly recognition for its old opponent Paul. Thus by the middle of the second century the three tendencies of original Christianity found themselves side by side, allies against the common foe: the oppositions of the century succeeding the appearance of Paul were now harmonised and lost in a *Catholic Church.*

But this union of the old Christian parties was not the result of outward purpose merely: it was the natural consequence of the fact that these parties had from the first been inwardly united in the religious and moral tendency of life which they pursued. A threefold bond kept the members of the community of Christ indissolubly joined together. Firstly, the belief in Jesus as the Christ, the Lord of the world to come, whose speedy appearance all alike expected; their aversion to the present world as the realm of evil in opposition to God; and finally, the warm and deep connection of love of the brethren, between all the sharers in the faith. The most striking feature of the outward appearance presented by the primitive church was its rejection of the world as it was; the breach was inwardly complete, and showed itself, at least in part, in outward respects too, with all the existing relations of the world, and in this the members of all the Christian parties were from the first at one. Paul exhorted the Christians so to use the world as if they used it not, because the fashion of the world was passing away. The Apocalyptist glowed with hatred against the Roman empire, which was hostile to Christianity, and saw the judgment of that empire at hand. James says the friendship of the world is enmity with God. The Johannine Christ tells his disciples that the world will hate them because they are not of the world, and the first Johannine Epistle warns against loving the world which passes away with its lust. It is true that this Christian view was very closely allied with a tendency which

was widely diffused at that period among holy men and sages, both in the Gentile and in the Jewish world; yet there is a specific difference of far-reaching significance which we must not overlook, between the Christian view and theirs. The heathen tendency to turn away from the world was connected with Platonic spiritualism, which conceived spirit and matter as antagonistic and mutually exclusive, and hence regarded the corporeal world as such as impure and worthless as contrasted with the alone substantial and good world of spirits beyond. This tendency was reinforced by the nearly related Stoic idealism, which purchased the inner freedom of the Ego by indifference to everything outside, by the mortification of all affections, and the rupture consequently even of all social ties. The outcome of both these tendencies was a depreciation of real life and its positive ends, a withdrawal of the "wise man" from active morality to idle contemplation and fruitless resignation. With the Christians it was otherwise. Their denial of the world did not apply to the material world generally; for the body, too, is a creature of God, destined to be the instrument and temple of his spirit, as Paul taught in unison with the Old Testament. The Church Fathers, therefore (*e.g.* Athenagoras, Irenæus, Tertullian), opposed to the contempt of the material an emphatic defence of the dignity of the body, which found its dogmatic expression in the doctrine of the resurrection. What the Christians rejected was only the "present world," social life as then existing among Gentiles and Jews, which they regarded as governed by the demons and condemned to destruction at the approaching judgment; with that world the Christian, who was a citizen of the kingdom of Christ, which was soon to be inaugurated, was forbidden to have any communion. This denial of the world, therefore, had for its reverse a very emphatic affirmation of the world, in the hope of the approaching better world under the rule of Christ.

This hope might certainly assume many a fantastic, story-like, sensuous form (*e.g.* the "chiliasm" of a Papias); yet it also contained a practical moral motive of priceless value, such as neither Jews nor Gentiles knew. It differed from the Jewish messianic hope in that

it abjured the limitations of national politics and of a national law; it was superior to the spiritualism of Gentile thought in the practical motives it derived from positive hopes and ends. The heavenly world to which the Christian looked as his home was not always, like the Platonic world of ideas, to remain another world; it was the "world to come," it was to attain reality here, and every effort must be made to level the way for its coming; the world must be prepared, the power of darkness must be opposed and defeated, mankind won and converted for Christ. And further, the head of the heavenly or future world was neither a Jewish Messiah-King nor a fantastic being born of philosophical and mythological speculation; it was that Jesus who, in his life and death, had given a visible pattern and a historical earnest of that saving love which conquers in suffering, who called the poor and wretched his brothers, and said that whatever one might do to the least of these his brethren he would regard as done to himself. *The elevation of this crucified saviour to be the heavenly Son of God and Lord of the world was the elevation of the divine power of suffering and ministering love to the throne of a world which had hitherto recognised only the right of the stronger, of physical or intellectual superiority.* The cruel self-seeking of the nations, the proud aristocracy of rank, the frivolous treatment of woman, and the brutal mistreatment of the slave, were met in Christianity by a view of the world which thought nothing of all the outward advantages of birth and fortune, and appraised a man's value according to no other standard than that of the purity of his heart, his capacity for love, the willingness for sacrifice of his feeling ego, and which for that very reason recognised even in the lowest and the most miserable, in the poor and the sick, in the slave and in the condemned prisoner, the dignity of man, of the child of God and the brother of Christ, and made him the object of pitying and helping love. This was the new feature in Christianity, by which it rose equally above heathen wisdom and Jewish righteousness; others asked what a man had done, what he deserved, what he was fit for, what he knew; but Christianity saw the essence of man in his heart, and in opening the sanctuary of the purely human it at the same time revealed the divine element in man.

This was the secret of its power, by which it conquered the world, saved the world.

It ought not to be a matter of so great surprise that this principle did not maintain itself in all its purity, but that in its victorious career through the world many a Gentile and Jewish element became attached to it again, and destroyed the fairness of its form. As the world goes this could not be otherwise, nor was it in every respect to be regretted that it was so. The coarser substance of church doctrines, usages of worship, forms of constitution, was not a concealing veil merely; it was also a protecting mask, by which the noble kernel was preserved till the expiry of the times of pupilage, till that time arrived when the Christian Germanic peoples had become ripe for the gospel of the sonship of God and of the freedom of the Christian man.

The labours of the Eastern Church to elaborate and fix the Christological Trinitarian dogma are not to be imputed, as a superficial view of history is apt to do, merely to the Greek love of disputation and to hierarchical love of rule. On the contrary, the interests which determined the line of the most important of the Fathers, especially Origen and Athanasius, were undoubtedly first of all religious in their nature, and such as penetrated to the very depths of the Christian consciousness. The problem in hand was simply to bring to a precise expression in the typical person of the Redeemer the true reconciliation of God and man in a full and living communion. That it was God's own nature and not a mythical demigod that was revealed to us by Christ in human form, and that the whole of human nature, actual human nature, and not merely a part of it, was taken up into unity with the divine nature, that thus from both sides the living union and communion of God and man was a full, true, and indissoluble one, this was the ultimate issue at stake in all those controversies which sought to fix and to guard against aberrations on this side and on that, the notion of the "God-man," and his relation to God and to humanity. That the problem was a legitimate one, and that the devoted labour of the church in solving it deserves the highest recognition, ought not to be denied because the attempt at a solution proved so little satisfactory. When we observe that

dogmatic reflection had to work with the presuppositions set up by the Pauline and Johannine theology, and with the notions provided in the philosophy of the age, we can scarcely imagine any other result to have been possible than that embodied in the decrees of the Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, and Chalcedon. The God-man, as thus adjusted, was, in spite of all the trouble that was taken to preserve the human in him unimpaired, yet in substance a heavenly being, miraculous and incomprehensible, who is quite removed above all that is human, and in whom the religious consciousness of the church can only with difficulty see itself reflected.

With this removal of the Mediator to the distance of the trinitarian deity, there naturally arose a need for new forms of intercourse between the deity and man. The saints stepped in as new mediators to fill the gap, and the same process almost was repeated once more: the human ideals of piety, from considering whom the church had drawn comfort and strength, became for that very reason heavenly fellow-soldiers and intercessors, and these increased with time till they became superhuman, godlike dispensers of blessings, and representatives of God. In them compensation was found for the many gods of heathenism, who could not but be sorely missed by the people, who could make little of the mystery of the trinitarian God. This, however, must not be regarded as a simple relapse into heathenism; there was a vast difference in point of the practical effect on the mind between the earlier celebration of the festivals of nature-gods and heroes, in whom there was nothing but pure nature, and whose worship therefore had little idealising and elevating effect on the minds of the worshippers, and the later *cultus* of the saints in whom were adored the ideals of patience, humility, faithfulness, and love. It cannot be denied without great injustice, that in this *cultus* there lay religious and moral impulses of the greatest value, which more than outweighed its superstitious extravagances. How much, in particular, the worship of Mary and of other holy women did to raise the estimation of women both in their own eyes and in those of the other sex, and so to purify and ennoble social and individual life, it is quite impossible to say.

But even the mediation of the saints, the invisible church of the other world, could not quite satisfy the need for making the Divine present to the human consciousness. To perfect the chain of communications between the other world and this, there had to be added to the "hierarchy of heaven" the earthly hierarchy of the church, as its outer ring. Here it was the Church of Rome which, following in the footsteps of the heathen world-empress, and entering at the same time into the inheritance of Jerusalem, assumed the lead, and gave to Christendom the organisation which was necessary for its contiuuance in the world. The spirit of the two churches, Renan aptly remarks,[1] was the same, but what was a danger at Jerusalem, at Rome became an advantage. The taste for tradition and hierarchy and respect for authority were in a manner transplanted from the courts of the temple to the West; as James, the Lord's brother, had been a quasi-pope at Jerusalem, so Rome now addressed herself to play the part of James. The epistle of Clemens Romanus to the Corinthians was the first announcement of the principle of authority in the church. And it is a characteristic circumstance that the two types to which the epistle appeals on this point are drawn from the military organisation of Rome, and from the Jewish priestly hierarchy. Cyprian, the principal champion of the idea of the episcopate, appealed with emphasis to the example of the Jewish hierarchy, and based on it his theory of the superiority of the bishop over the church. And it was the same tendency to theocratic monarchy which found expression in the dogma of the trinity and of the Homoousia of Christ with the Father, and which led in the practice of the church to the primacy of the bishop in the congregation, and of the Roman bishop in the Catholic church. As the heavenly God-man withdrew to the mysterious darkness of the trinity and faded from the consciousness of the church, the need grew more pressing to see in the bishop as the visible head of the congregation, and in the Roman universal bishop as the head of the whole church, the bodily representative of Christ. According to the primitive apostolic doctrine it was the Spirit, the Paraclete, who was to take the place of

[1] *Hibbert Lectures* on "The Influence of Rome on Christianity," p. 122.

Christ in the church, and unite it to the unity of his body. But when not only the heretical Gnostics declared themselves to be the spiritual Christians pointed at, but the Montanists too defended their prophecy, their eschatological extravagances, their moral rigorism, and in fact the whole of the separatist subjectivism by which they destroyed the unity of the church, by alleging a special possession of the Spirit on their own part, then everything suggested, and the very desire of self-preservation seemed to require, that a principle which in the hands of individuals was so easily abused, should be fixed by the church in the regular forms of an ecclesiastical office, and that the bishops, as successors of the apostles, should be regarded as the sole depositaries and organs of the spirit of Christ. A dogmatic foundation was thus provided for the claim of the hierarchy to the possession of unconditional authority to teach, and exclusive power to forgive sins; there was once more in the church a "spiritual order" of men, analogous to the Levitical priesthood, which was equipped with special divine authorities and powers, which stood above the congregation, and while meant to connect the congregation with God, undoubtedly at the same time separated it from him.

From our Protestant point of view we cannot but regard this as a relapse into unevangelical Jewish ways; and yet we cannot but acknowledge that for that age the hierarchical organisation of the church in the episcopate was very wholesome and quite necessary. Without it the church could not have maintained its position in those times of outward persecution and inner disturbances and conflicts. The bishops being the ordinary representatives of the historical continuity of Christianity with its past, became at once and naturally the pillars of its regular continuance in the future; by the bishops as a body, and especially by the bishops of Rome, Christianity became a historical world-power, which now struck firm root in the soil of earthly society, and renounced the unwholesome and feverish fancies of the nearness of the Parousia, the reign of the saints and the end of the world, which had rocked its cradle. The spirit of the Roman church, sober, realistic, awake to the conditions of external social life, here met and harmonised with the speculative idealism of the

theologians of Alexandria; for the belief of Chiliasm, at once supersensuous and sensuous, which had kept Christendom upon the stretch during the first two centuries of its existence, and had called forth one last paroxysm in the exaggerations of the Montanists, was too sensuous for the Alexandrians, too unpractical for the men of Rome: and so the fancy of the East was, after it had done good service, thrust aside by the sound reason of the Greek and Roman world.

The church, to answer to the idea of a Catholic world-church, was bound not to exaggerate the rigour of its moral claims on men after the unnatural fashion of Montanism. This was first seen and recognised by the Roman church, which thereby proved, at an early period, her world-historical mission as the educator of the peoples of the world. If the church was to fulfil her mission to penetrate the world, like leaven, with the moral idea of Christianity, it was inevitable that that idea should be to some extent secularised, and to say that the Church of Rome did this is not in itself a reproach to her. The mischief which was to prove so fatal for the future lay in this, that while the church, looking to her rule over the world, accommodated her moral claims all too easily to human weakness, on the other side she held fast the idea of supernatural, not to say unnatural, ascetic world-avoiding holiness, only that she did not make it a binding law for all, but a counsel for those who were aiming at perfection. Thus there arose the doctrine which proved so portentous for Catholic morals, of a *double morality*, a lower for the multitude, and a higher for the *élite* of the church. This doctrine, it is true, is in a certain way related to the peculiar aristocratic way of thinking which prevailed in heathen society and philosophy. The Stoics notoriously distinguished between perfect and middle duties or those of the morally "perfect," and those of the "advancers," who were making the transition between folly and wisdom; and a certain analogy may be seen in this to the double morality of Catholicism. But the root of the Catholic doctrine does not lie in this direction; Clement of Alexandria, the Gnostic and the Father who stands nearest to the Stoics, stands furthest from the ecclesiastical exaggeration of ascetic morality, and ex-

presses opinions of truly Protestant reasonableness on the subject of marriage, property, and the worldly calling. The church doctrine is more essentially connected with the *legal* character, which, as the hierachical constitution of the church was developed, its Christianity more and more tended to assume, from the middle of the second century downwards. The more Christianity became embodied in the church, and was moulded into an organised system of ecclesiastical offices and institutions, the more was the free evangelical morality which has its inner life in the Holy Spirit replaced by the "new commandment" of ecclesiastical precept which aimed at regulating the moral conduct of the individual in all the details of life. Now it belongs to the nature of such a positive legal morality which seeks to arrange the life of society by special commandments, that its standard of moral valuation tends to become an extremely mechanical one, and that more attention is given to the "how much" of performance than to the "how" of the disposition. But where duty has once been conceived in so external a manner as a positively fixed quantum of performance, it is a natural and logical inference from this position to regard it as possible to exceed the required quantity, and so to create merit in excess of our duty. As this is not and cannot be demanded of all, it establishes a superior degree of moral perfection on the part of the man who voluntarily does it. This is the simple and unavoidable consequence of a heteronomous morality according to ecclesiastical law; of this there can be no doubt, as the same process has constantly repeated itself in history under similar conditions; indeed the Catholic doctrine of merit is closely paralleled by the righteousness of works of Jewish Pharisaism.[1] But besides the more general reason which lay in the general character of ecclesiastical legality, there operated as an additional motive in the same direction the exaggerated value attached to the ascetic ideal of virtue, especially fasting and celibacy. And yet this

[1] The book of the *Shepherd of Hermas*, though early, is yet full of the Judaistic legal spirit of Roman Christianity, and it is a noticeable circumstance that the Roman Hermas is the first to set up the doctrine of the supererogatory merit or the higher perfection of the ascetic life.

also was so generally present in the spirit of the age that it cannot be regarded as a specifically new phenomenon in Christianity, and cannot be explained entirely from heathenism or Judaism either. The same things are found among the Jewish Essenes and the Greek Neo-Pythagoreans, and the New Testament plainly shows the germs of such growths, though there the motives may have been, partly at least, of a different nature. We may ask whether the cloister organisation of world-avoiding Christian asceticism in Egypt is to be traced to local types of asceticism there among Gentiles or Jews (Priests of Serapis or Therapeutæ), or even to Buddhist influences, which cannot be thought to be out of the question especially on that soil, or whether it produced itself from the nature of the case without any such external suggestion ; but it matters little for the essential character of the phenomenon, which theory we adopt. The main point is that in *monasticism* a special order arose in which the Catholic church saw realised her ideal of higher Christian morality or of perfection. This new "spiritual order" which owed its superiority to the personal services of its members, might easily have proved a dangerous rival to the order of the clergy, which rested its claims on doctrinal tradition, and on its official character, had not the church adopted it as one of her own regular institutions, governed it by her own laws, and thereby converted it into the most powerful instrument of her own hierarchical endeavours. It was specially the Western Church, most specially the Church of Rome, which thus turned monasticism to account, and thereby gained a further prop for the world-empire she was aiming at. Supported by this chosen band, she could take up the conflict with the world the more confidently, but she could also yield with the less anxiety to the tendency towards laxness and worldliness, because the superfluity of the merit of the saints and monks appeared to cover up and to compensate for the moral minus of the majority.

The work of fitting together in an artistic whole all those building-stones, which had been prepared in the dogma, the worship, the hierarchy, and the moral life of the early church, and thereby laying the solid foundation of the church which ruled the world in the

Middle Ages, was done by that great church-father, Augustine. He was one of those world-historical persons who unhesitatingly offer up wide and varied talents to one single great aim; deep piety and brilliant intellect, manifold learning and thorough knowledge of life,—all was given to the promotion of the sole rule of the church. His nature was closely allied to that of the apostle Paul, and his theology came straight from that apostle, only that he always gave Paul's evangelical thoughts a catholic and ecclesiastical turn. With the apostle Augustine considered salvation to be based on the grace of God alone, which not only commands, but itself gives what it commands, and therefore is only to be received by man in faith. But he does not, like Paul, consider the divine grace to be given simply through Christ and Christ's spirit; he considers it to be attached exclusively to the Catholic church, the visible organism of salvation which is represented in the clergy. The doctrinal tradition of the church is to his eyes the sole source and pillar of saving truth, and this to such a degree that he would not believe the Gospel itself without the authority of the church; the church's ritual act in the sacrament of baptism is the unconditional and exclusive channel of grace, and all who are unbaptized are lost: to be separated from the communion of the church in heresy and schism is, according to Augustine, as much as to lose the love of God and the Holy Spirit. "A man can have everything outside the church, only not salvation: and though he thinks he is living a good life, yet for the one crime of schism from the church he will not have part in life, but the wrath of God abides on the schismatic." But what is the foundation of this *extra ecclesiam nulla salus?* Augustine gives the dogmatic substructure of this assertion in his doctrine of original sin, in which again he comes very close to Paul's teaching, but evidently goes somewhat further. By Adam's fall, he teaches, human nature, originally quite perfect, was entirely spoiled; man lost all power for good, and is only free for evil; even what appear to be the virtues of the heathens, are in reality nothing but splendid sins. If things are so, it is vain to speak of a capacity in reason to know the truth, equally vain to speak of an inner impulse of goodness (which Paul did not refuse to

the natural man—Rom. ii. 14 *sq.*, vii. 22). Thus man is subjected unconditionally to the positive authority of the church and to her dispensation of grace, which is the only one: the church, and particularly the spiritual order, the clergy, is ruler over the faith and life of all Christians. The authority of the church rests, in the absence of all inner authentication, on purely outward credentials: on the venerable age of the Catholic church, which reaches back to the apostles; on the multitude of its believers, and on its miracles. And if any one should not be satisfied with these proofs of the truth of the church as the sole channel of salvation—and the many heretics and separatists, especially the Donatists, did not as a fact bow to the force of such evidence—he, Augustine, holds, must be convinced of the "utility of faith" by forcible measures which the State is to put in practice: for for what other end is the State there but to protect the peace of the church, and to punish the enemies of the church, who are also the enemies of God, and of righteousness, and of civic welfare?

Here we have the complete programme of Mediæval Catholicism. The church is the kingdom of God embodied on earth, the exclusive and privileged possessor of all truth and all power for virtue, which therefore are of a positive nature, and have no point of attachment in human nature as such. On the contrary, human nature is, even in its higher moral endeavours, evil only, a God-forsaken and God-opposing realm of the flesh, the world, and the devil (*civitas mundi = diaboli*). Individuals can only be saved from this "mass of destruction" by the infusion of grace into them in baptism, and the moral unions of marriage and the State only receive a certain consecration and moral value by their subordination to the church: of themselves they have none. The church is therefore called to be ruler, not only of the faith and conscience, but also of the secular life of her members: she regulates it in all respects by her statutes, interpenetrates it with her arrangements and usages, gives it consecration by her ritual acts. But on the other hand this same church depreciates and disparages secular life as compared with the higher ideal of the "holy life," which, severed from all earthly ties, from family, country, property, profession, lives to heaven alone, and—since heaven is

represented on earth by the church—dedicates itself entirely to the immediate service of the church's interests. This holy life is the higher, supernatural virtue, which transcends ordinary human morality as much as the perfection of the angels transcends human weakness; the merit of it is so superfluously great as to be able to cover the shortcomings of others. The meritorious character of this higher morality is not obliterated, as we should have expected, by Augustine's doctrine of grace; for Augustine himself had taught that, while man cannot acquire merit without grace, he can do so by means of grace, and this enabled scholasticism to work out under his authority the grossest doctrine of works and rewards. The external character of the church's work in procuring grace was accurately matched by the external character of the services by which individuals worked out their salvation; the whole process of salvation was thus a business transaction between the church as the dispenser of grace and the individual who acquired grace, a view which found its most striking expression in the trade of indulgences.

But while this individual development is undoubtedly traceable to Augustine's doctrine of the church, there was in the theology of that remarkable father another side which pointed to a development of a different kind. Though he attached man's salvation exclusively to the mediatorship of the church, the reason of this did not lie in the church, but in the unconditioned gracious will of God, who in an election made antecedently to time destined some to salvation rather than others, and who leads the elect infallibly towards their destiny, himself working in them what is necessary for that end, faith and love, the power for good and perseverance in it. Now it was, no doubt, Augustine's intention that this unconditioned dependence on God's grace should not only not put an end to his dependence on the church, but should even confirm it, since the uncertainty of each individual as to his being or not being elected would strike down all pride and security, and compel recourse to be taken to the church's means of grace. But how if the believer in his feeling of the divine love, a feeling which according to Augustine can only proceed from divine grace, should become conscious of his own election, would not

this consciousness of itself, and at once, lift him up above dependence on the church? Must not the instrumentality of the church in procuring salvation lose in value and importance in proportion as the centre of gravity of the religious life was transferred to the inner immediate experience of the work of divine grace, which no one since Paul had described with such feeling and vividness, as Augustine? The Augustinian doctrine of grace had in fact two sides; for the Catholic church it proved the means of riveting the yoke of the church on the neck of the faithful, but for individuals, and particularly for profoundly religious natures, it was capable of being turned into a weapon for freeing the conscience from servitude to the church, and turning man's religious life back to itself, to the immediate inner certainty which it possessed. This side of the Augustinian theology was laid hold of by the mysticism of the Middle Ages and by all those efforts for reform inside Catholicism which aimed at deepening and purifying the religion of the church; this feature of the theology of Augustine was the lever which the reformers of the sixteenth century used to overturn the proud building of the hierarchical church.

The Reformation arose out of the feeling of the Germanic peoples that the Catholic Church neither satisfied the religious need, nor did justice to the moral sense; the former because by the multitude of ecclesiastical mediators and means which it interposed between God and man it actually closed against man his way of access to God's grace, and rendered impossible for him that assurance of salvation, of communion with God and of his love, which the pious heart longs for; the latter because the hierarchical domination of the conscience encroached on the right of the Christian to free self-determination, and the arbitrary preference given to the false ideals of ecclesiastical sanctity depreciated the true ideals of human morality, and made a healthy arrangement of social life impossible. Against the former radical defect of the Catholic system deeper religious natures had long sought help in mysticism, which, disregarding all the externalities of ritual and ascetic works, retired to the deep places of the heart, and sought in the renunciation of all self-love and self-right-

eousness, and in a faithful, humble, and devoted self-surrender to the love of God, that satisfaction which the service of the church in the works which she prescribed, did not afford. But the defect of this mysticism was that it remained stationary in its retirement and inwardness, and could not find the way from the sanctuary of the love of God to the workshop of the kingdom of God. It still shared with the church the fundamental Catholic view of the oppositeness and mutual exclusiveness of the divine and the worldly, the holy and the natural; and hence it was more or less indifferent to the moral condition and needs of society, and without influence for its improvement. The reaction against these moral evils of the Catholic world proceeded from the secular Illumination, from humanistic science and civic efforts for reform; but these, too, remained without much permanent effect, because the religious lukewarmness which accompanied them almost prevented them from seeing, not to speak of healing, the deepest cause of the evils against which they contended. Thus the pious reformers were deficient in moral energy, and the worldly reformers in religious depth and concentration. Before any decisive result could follow, it was necessary that these two currents, both of which were at their strongest in the Germanic people at the beginning of the 16th century, but which, being isolated from each other, were equally ineffective, should come together in one person and produce a new moral and religious life.

This took place in the person of *Luther*. His work is the German reformation: he laid the foundation of *Protestantism*, which is not merely a purification of Catholicism from certain false doctrines and usages, but an entirely new development of the Christian religion, in which there was realised for the first time that which lay in the essence of Christianity from the first, but in fact was never properly brought out in it before—namely, the complete reconciliation of God and the world, the incarnation of the divine spirit not only in men's hearts, but also in the life of individuals and of peoples; the taking up of all that is human into fellowship with the divine, into the kingdom of God. Luther is usually compared with Augustine and Paul, and these two were not only his chief teachers, but also his

nearest spiritual kinsmen. Only it must not be overlooked that Luther is the Germanised, as Augustine had been the Romanised, Paul. Luther also like these two passed through severe inner conflicts before he reached peace in believing in the grace of God, which he saw embodied in the historical form of the Saviour, and the roots of which he also traced to the eternal fore-ordination of God's decree of election. But this faith did not prove for Luther, as for Augustine, a chain binding him to the ecclesiastical tradition and hierarchy; with him it turned out to be a hammer to shatter all such fetters and to conquer for the conscience, which was bound to God alone, "the freedom of a Christian man." Nor was faith's self-surrender to God for Luther as it had been for the mystics, a withdrawal from the world to an idle contemplative enjoyment of God; his faith is "life in God," which manifests its living power just in life and work in the world and for the world. Nor could Luther say with Paul that in Christ the world was crucified to him, and that he found all his happiness in the hope and the prospect of the approaching Parousia of Christ from heaven and of his miraculous kingdom; with the forgiveness of sins he knew "life and blessedness" to be actually, presently given to him, and starting from this experience of the divine life which dwelt in him, he saw the outer world too to be full of divine gifts and divine truths, so that it might well be said that for Luther the world was no longer crucified in Christ, but rather risen in him to a new, fuller, and richer existence, transfigured into the stage and the material of a human and moral divine kingdom on this side of death. Now marriage was recognised as the true spiritual order, much more sacred and more pleasing to God than the life of the cloister: the magistracy was restored to its dignity as a holy, divine institution, as an independent member of the body of Christ, as old as, and not subordinate to the clergy; now labour in an earthly calling was lifted out of the contempt which rested on it in the Middle Ages, and elevated to the dignity of a service of God, a work of love in which the Christian honours God and serves his brethren, according to Christ's example, for their best profit. Now nature was liberated from its bewitchment under the rule of demons,

and transfigured into a wonderful work of God, the form in which his presence was made visible, the mirror and the instrument of his spirit; the doom was reversed which had oppressed with slavish fear and dark asceticism all natural and social joy, all beauty and all grace, for Luther saw in every noble joy the best of all weapons against the dark spirits of doubt and of bad humour. Thus in the Christianity of Luther the deep division and the hard battle between spirit and nature which had filled the Middle Ages, was at last brought to rest and atonement; the spirit, in its complete surrender to God in faith, became assured of its own divine power and of its supremacy over nature, and now holds out the hand of atonement to the conquered for a covenant of free, moral, beautiful humanity.

This was in fact a new stage of the religious and moral consciousness of humanity; the like had never been before, not in the old pre-Christian world, because it did not know the full depth of the division, but had the conflict still before it: nor yet in the Christianity of the early and Middle Ages, which rather looked to the beyond of the future world for atonement, than actually possessed it in the present in its moral and religious spirit. And yet this new element which came to the front in Luther was simply the matured development of that which had been contained from the very first in germ in the essence of Christianity, which always was a religion of atonement. In its earliest works, in fact, *i.e.*, in the words of the Bible, Christianity produced the purest and clearest expressions of the fact of atonement, which kindred spirits most readily understood and adopted. It was therefore quite natural that when the higher knowledge of the truth dawned on the mind of Luther, he considered it to be the true contents of holy Scripture, the "pure word of God" of Scripture: had not Scripture been his guide out of the confusion of his doubts and struggles, and had it not served him as his commission in his work as a Reformer, as his two-edged sword to the right and to the left, against the authority of Rome and against the subjectivity of the enthusiasts? Yet Luther never understood the authority of the Bible in such a way as to surrender his Christian freedom to it and become slavishly subject to it. He recognised its

word as God's word so far as it was in harmony with the divine voice in his heart, so far as he found in it that image of Christ which had taken shape and life in his own soul as the human manifestation of the saving love of God; but in other respects he allowed himself to judge of many parts of Scripture in the freest way, and sometimes perhaps with even too great severity. The later deification of Scripture in his church certainly cannot appeal to his authority. Even when he accepted entirely, or almost entirely, the dogmas of the early church (as in his Christology and his doctrine of the Lord's Supper), he did not do so out of deference to the doctrinal tradition of the church, but mainly because his own religious ideas still moved in these forms, which thus met a need of his own feeling. In such a case intellectual difficulties either were not considered at all, or if they thrust themselves upon him, were simply rejected as assaults of "Lady Reason" who was inspired by the devil. He followed in this a necessity of his own nature, as much as in his boldest emancipating acts: his nature was not that of the philosophical thinker and critic, but that of the religious genius and prophet. It was only on the side of the religious and moral life, in the things of the heart and the conscience, that he worked as a liberator and creator; and while his activity in this direction afforded a most effective impulse to theoretical thought, as is apparent from the whole history of Protestantism from his time onwards, neither his vocation nor his interest inclined directly to this side. It is therefore equally foolish to defer so much to the religious greatness of Luther as to bind modern Protestantism to his dogmatic propositions and his theoretical view of the world, and to make so much of his sharing as he did in old-fashioned ways of thinking which criticism has since condemned, as to question his religious genius and the world-historical importance of his person. And yet how often do we see both the first and the second of these mistakes actually committed!

Of Luther's fellow-workers in the Reformation the only one who can be compared with him is *Zwingli*, who, though far from equal to Luther in point of religious genius, is superior to him as a theological systematiser. With Luther the person is much greater than the

theological doctrine, with Zwingli the importance of the system transcends considerably that of the man. Luther's theology is the product of the heart, and therefore inextricably bound up with the whole man who originated it, but on that very account also, affected by the peculiarities and limitations of his individuality, so that in many places the mediæval underground of his personal feeling still darkens it. Zwingli's theology is the product of a thought cultivated all round, which had early been trained in the school of the ancients to systematic consistency and subordination of everything particular under the universal idea of the whole, and which was able therefore to set forth the truth of the Gospel too in a consistent and clearly thought-out system which was all of a piece. This was the first systematic statement of Protestant theology quite free from the bonds of scholasticism; and in fact only the nineteenth century has been able to appreciate its importance. Zwingli sets out not from man's need of salvation but from the thought of God as the infinite Being and the Supreme Good, the all-working power, wisdom, and goodness which, communicating itself without any envy to that which is outside it, creates a world of the richest life, in which everything is good in its kind, is useful, and serves the chief end of the whole, which is the glory of God. Man, destined to communion with God, carries in his spirit which is derived from God, the tendency to the eternal, the all-uniting law, which binds him to the order of the whole. But at the same time he carries in his flesh, his finite side, the centrifugal force of self-love, which detaches itself from the whole, and only seeks to revolve round its own centre. This is the "strutting of original sin," which is the destruction of mankind; it first came into view at Adam's fall, but it was not caused by that fall, for it is based on the Divine necessity that the way to blessed communion with God can only lie through an unblessed opposition to him. If, then, the state of sin is ordained from the beginning with a view to redemption, the bond which connects man with God can never be quite broken even when the opposition is at its highest; the Divine Spirit manifests itself in humanity through the whole course of history as the redeeming power, which in the sages of the

Gentiles as in the prophets of Israel scatters the seeds of truth and awakens the activity of self-denying virtue. Such men were everywhere Christians before Christ, and salvation is not to be denied to them. But the revelation of God reached its highest stage in Christ, in whom human nature became a perfect and sinless organ of the Divine Spirit. His redeeming power is based on the communication to us of his higher life; the Holy Spirit works faith in us by holding before us the type of Jesus, and faith is nothing but the renunciation of self-love and the acceptance into the heart of the Divine will. It is not opposed to works, for it is itself the impulse to all good action, nor is it opposed to knowledge, for to the enlightened mind of the faithful truth is no longer a sealed mystery. Yet even in the believer the original antithesis of flesh and spirit never entirely disappears; indeed, according to Zwingli, faith shows itself to be true faith chiefly in the accentuation of this antithesis, in the energy with which the spirit wars against the flesh, limits it, keeps it in order, and extirpates all that is ungodly.

Here we see a characteristic difference in Zwingli from the piety of Luther and of his church. To Luther faith is primarily the peaceful consciousness of atonement, of peace with God: with this life and blessedness are already his, a present salvation; and what he has now to do is merely to guard this possession, to keep at a distance all that might disturb or shake his consciousness of salvation. Hence the anxious care of the Lutherans for "purity of doctrine;" the attitude in which their faith places them is simply the defensive one of holding fast the state of feeling in which they have found satisfaction. This is quite compatible with innocent enjoyment of the world: the heart which is reconciled and knows the guilt of sin to be forgiven, retains but little fear of the power of sin; indeed the inner harmony of such a position is unconsciously reflected in the outer world, and makes it also appear for the most part as a state positively ordained by God, in which nature and spirit are seen and felt to be a harmonious unity. Hence the positive, free, and quiet character of Lutheran morals: the divine life once felt as a life within, develops itself with the necessity of the fruitful

tree, to an organic whole of morally beautiful life, in which the inward and the outward, spirit and nature, duty and inclination, are harmoniously united with a scarcely perceptible remainder. The danger certainly lurks in this position, and must not be overlooked, that the "beautiful soul" may in its self-enclosed unity withdraw in sensitive shyness from the world's rough touch, and may be so satisfied with itself, so sufficient for itself, as to take no part in the world's labour and care.

The strength and the weakness of the Zwinglian type lie in another direction. Here faith is first of all the being driven, with force and energy, by the power of the Holy Spirit, indefatigable activity in the service of God; but this active force shows its strength in conquering opposition, in the accomplishment of difficult tasks. Here accordingly faith does not take up the attitude of guarding a salvation already present, so much as that of realising a purpose of salvation which is still future; its aim is less the peaceful self-manifestation and self-unfolding of the inner life in the congenial material of natural relationships, than that of subjecting a recalcitrant nature, the flesh and the world, under the victorious power of the Holy Spirit. Hence the practical energy of the Reformed[1] piety, its zeal and its address in entering into the world's life, acting, guiding, organising; hence its zeal for purity of life rather than of doctrine, its strict moral discipline, its rigorous avoidance of everything, even in worship, that might flatter the senses and interfere by specious beauty with the sobriety and purity of the spirit. And here the danger certainly is near, that practical zeal may pass into a new service of works, organising activity into hierarchical love of rule, Puritan strictness into unevangelical legality and dark asceticism, which would make the world a hell instead of a kingdom of heaven.

It thus appears that Luther was not entirely in the wrong, when he said to Zwingli at Marburg, "You have a different spirit from ours." The controversy about the Lord's Supper was only a symptom of a difference which lay deeper. Luther sought to have the

[1] The Protestants of Germany are divided into the Lutheran church and the Reformed, which follows Zwingli.—Tr.

spirit and the body of Christ present in the sacrament, because his thought generally, and specially in matters of worship, was directed to the interpenetration of the spiritual and the corporeal: Zwingli protested against such a bodily presence, because the immediate mixing up of the spiritual and the sensible appeared to him to be, wherever it occurred, a pollution of the former, a heathenish idol-worship. There thus appears on this subject precisely the same antithesis of the two tendencies, as we noticed before in the morals of the respective sides. But the two tendencies are both alike founded on human nature, and make their appearance everywhere in the most various forms: from Mary and Martha in the gospel to Kant, and Schiller and Goethe. It appears that each tendency is equally justified, and that they must seek virtually to supplement each other. What is to be regretted is not that Protestantism developed itself in two sister churches, but only that they refused so long to recognise each other, that each, instead of supplementing and furthering, denounced the other as heretical and repudiated her. In this respect certainly the day of Marburg was a fateful day. Yet it was not to sunder in perpetuity two who were inwardly akin. When Pietism on the side of practical religion, Rationalism on the side of theoretic criticism, had softened and broken up the stiff dogmatism of the churches, and when modern philosophy had added to criticism a positive explanation of the growth of dogmas from the conditions and needs of the religious spirit, the ground was prepared on which the *union* of the two Protestant churches could be accomplished in the present century—an act of the greatest importance, if for no other reason, yet because it embodied an official recognition of the fact that the Reformation of the sixteenth century had stopped half-way, and that its work required to be carried further forward by a continued process of disregarding externals which were matters of controversy, and looking instead to the essence of Christianity which is common to both.

In this work we are still engaged. Certain as it is that in the Reformation the development of Christianity took a mighty forward stride, it is equally certain that it has not found its highest and ulti-

mate form in ecclesiastical Protestantism. This appears at once from the circumstance that the Protestantism of the church fails to get over the antithesis of Catholicism. And the reason why it cannot do this is that by taking faith to be a matter of dogma, and attaching it to a positive tradition which is to be accepted on authority, it shows itself too much of the character of Catholicism, too much external traditionalism and legal positivism. The case presents an exact parallel to the antithesis of Paulinism and Judaism in the early church; the former could not get the better of the latter because it shared too many of the pre-suppositions of legal rabbinical Judaism, and argued mostly in Jewish modes of thought: and hence the antithesis could only be overcome from the higher standpoint of Johannine theology, which combined faith and works in love which knows. If we may see in Catholicism the ecclesiastical repetition of legal Jewish Christianity, and in ecclesiastical Protestantism a repetition of Paulinism, the conclusion at once suggests itself that we must look for the overcoming of the antithesis to a *Johannine Christianity of the future*, in which positive faith and positive works will find their higher synthesis and fulfilment in the liberating knowledge of the truth which makes the conscience its own support, and in that binding power of love, which assigns to individuals their place as ministering members of the whole. If some day the great union of all the Christian confessions takes place under this standard, then this truly "Catholic" Christianity will be great enough and wide enough to make it possible even for those who are still standing without to enter in; and then the Johannine word of promise will be fulfilled:

"THERE SHALL BE ONE FOLD AND ONE SHEPHERD"!

SECTION II.

THE CONTENTS OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.

CHAPTER I.

THE BELIEF IN GOD.

We have found above [1] in our investigation of the beginnings of religion, that the belief in God has its roots in the impression produced by the phenomena of nature on the minds of the first men, and in the impulse this impression could not fail to produce upon them, to place themselves in practical connection with these higher powers for the mutual furtherance of the interests of life, on both sides. The original object of religious faith was therefore visible nature itself, appearing to the fancy of the first men as an animated power which acted according to motives. Primitive man was unable to make the distinction between matter and spirit in himself; and as little could he make such a distinction in nature. It appeared to his senses as a manifold of visible, audible, sensible beings and occurrences, all connected with each other; and so it was to him the living power on which he felt his weal and woe to depend, and which therefore he could conceive after the analogy of his own will and activity. He did not at first think of one or of many personal beings above or behind nature, he thought of nature itself as the being — not exactly personal, yet living, and acting according to motives,—which possessed power and ruled. Nor did he as yet

[1] For the details in this recapitulating survey of the development of the belief in God, I refer, once for all, to the various statements in the *first section*.

distinguish clearly between unity and multiplicity. Nature certainly presented itself to him in a plurality of manifold appearances, but he did not at first mark these off definitely as separate from each other; he saw in the many-coloured succession of its appearing and disappearing, its becoming and its transformation, the manifold forms of the one Divine Being and Life. It was neither polytheism nor monotheism: it was a perfectly undefined nature-worship, in which these and other alternatives were wrapped up, still in germ.

We then saw, further, how various motives both of a theoretical and a practical kind worked together to develop this germ. The distinction of his own soul from his body, or the idea of spirits without bodies, led early man to distinguish the non-sensible divine being from the sensible nature-phenomenon, and this opened up the possibility of making the former independent, and then of making the nature-deities human. This tendency was strengthened by the need experienced in worship, of imparting to the stated objects of worship a more definite outline, a more visible form, a more real presence. Once detached from the sensible nature-phenomena and made independent, the objects of worship became more nearly related to the social interests of human life, and thus received a new and a higher character in addition to or instead of, their old nature-significance. Thus the developed polytheism of the mythological popular religion was the result of a process of consciousness, which, though a great advance on primitive religion, yet had its dark side. There was a progress; the old nature-deities had been ethicised, had been elevated to ideals and guardian powers of the moral life of civilisation, and the religious sentiment thus became a fruitful source of ideal impulses and views. But the humanising of the gods had also the result of dragging them down into human limitation and weakness. Where civilisation was little advanced, and this side was left without anything to balance it and became predominant, there we see the purer primitive religion degenerate to a meaningless and empty belief in spirits, and a rude image-worship (Spiritism, Fetichism).

But even where this was not the case, and the world of the gods reflected all the rich civilisation of such a people as the Greeks or the

Indians, the humanised gods yet suffered from various imperfections. For one thing, the many gods limited each other, and even the supremacy which pertained to Zeus, the father of heaven, did not prevent his will from being occasionally thwarted by stratagem or violence on the part of the others. Again, all the gods were subject to the power of fate, against which even the will of Zeus could do nothing; in Homer he is obliged to ask as to the decree of fate, and look on resignedly though sorrowfully when it crosses his own wishes. In this "fate," it would be quite illegitimate to see a remainder of monotheism: it is not a personal, scarcely even a rational will, it is mere blind power; yet the feeling may be seen in it, that there is an objective all-embracing necessity, an ordering world-law, which stands above every particular will, even that of the gods, if the latter is no more than a particular isolated arbitrary will: and thus monistic philosophy could to a certain degree appeal to this notion, to dispose of the many gods in the all-one. A third limitation finally, was the moral imperfection of the popular gods. The idea of the envy of the gods may not be primitive, but may be chargeable to later sophistical scepticism; yet epic mythology ascribes to the gods so many traits of human weakness and passion, so many disgraceful acts, that no serious spirit can possibly have recognised in these gods of the popular faith the pure ideals of his own moral feeling.

The discrepancy between these polytheistic gods and the notion of the divine perfection, everywhere led those who thought more deeply to go back from the many gods to *one supreme unity*, which was sought partly in the monarchical ascendency of one highest god over the others, partly in a pantheistic all-one. Both of these ways of transcending polytheism were followed both in India and in Greece. In India the monotheistic tendency manifested itself at every time in the elevation now of one god and now of another to be the highest of all, while at a later time it attached itself chiefly to the name of Pragapati, or Lord of Creatures. In Greece, Zeus was placed by poets and thinkers so high above the other gods, that his name could be used for the notion of the deity in a manner almost approaching monotheism, while the other gods sank to the mere

instruments and manifestations of his will, like the angels of the religion of the Bible. But by the side of this movement in both religions, we see in both the working of the monistic tendency of Indo-Germanic thought, in the philosophical appeal from the multiplicity of phenomena to one primeval principle, one substance underlying and comprehending all things. The Indians called it the great self, or the world-soul, which is at once the self of man and the soul of prayer, Atman and Brahma; and the Greek philosophers Xenophanes and Parmenides called it the one, which is at the same time the all, the alone, indivisible and unchangeable being, which, at the same time, is thought, and outside of which nothing exists. This pantheistic view of the world appears everywhere as the natural reverse of popular polytheism; it is just opposition to the multiplicity of the gods that drives philosophical thought, when once awaked, to lay hold with all its force of the idea of unity, which being taken abstractly is quite as one-sided as the other, having no room not only for the difference of God and the world, but for any difference at all. Besides this, the naturalistic basis of polytheism is still at work in the pantheistic identification of God and the world.

The exact parallel is also interesting, which may be seen in the dialectical advance, both with Indians and Greeks, from naturalistic pantheism to Acosmism and Atheism. In both countries the primal principle was at first conceived as the primal germ which unfolds itself by a process of emanation into the real world of many elements. Then a stricter notion of the unity and unchangeableness of being led in both cases alike to the denial of the reality of the many and of the becoming, to the assertion, that is, that the world of appearances is an unreal show, an illusion of not knowing, as the Vedanta taught, in verbal agreement with Parmenides. How explain this show of sense-illusion or not-knowledge, if there is only one being, which is perfect and unchangeably one with itself? To this obvious question Brahmanic speculation had no answer to give, any more than that of the Eleatics. Hence in India as in Greece there rose up against abstract monism, which cannot solve the riddle of the world it declares to be an illusion, a system of abstract pluralism; Acosmism

was followed by Atheism. Each of these positions had two forms. First, there was opposed to the unity of being the multiplicity of substances, which the Sankhya-philosophy conceived in a spiritualist manner as souls, Greek atomistic doctrine (Leucippus, Democritus) in a materialist sense as atoms, as unbegotten and unchangeable primitive bodies into which the one being of Heraclitus is as it were split up, as the one world-soul of the Vedanta into the many souls of the Sankhya-philosophy. But then there was also set up against the eternal rest and self-equality of being, the eternal flux of becoming, in which all persistent being, all substance, perishes, and nothing remains but the flux of phenomena, in which the one permanent element is the law of their connection with each other, or causal necessity in the sequence of cause and effect. At the very time when in India Buddhism was substituting for the infinite being of Brahma the law of infinite substanceless becoming, the Ephesian Heraclitus also was opposing to the rigid being, without distinction or motion, of the Eleatic all-one, his "all-flows," the infinite becoming and change of phenomena, the antithesis and conflict of which are what make the reality of the world, and the one persistent element, in the constant change of which is the divine law, fate, the common reason, or the ruling deity. But where and how, if there is no unity of the nature of a substance that sits above the flux of phenomena, are we to conceive the governing reason? If it is not the thought of an absolute subject, it can exist ultimately nowhere but in the thoughts of finite subjects, and so even it will come to be a mere finite, fortuitous, thinking and deeming. Thus there resulted from the dialectic of one-sided systems, which mutually destroyed each other, the sceptical tendency of the sophists, according to which man is the measure of all things, all truth is merely subjective and relative, and even the belief in God is a mere product of human invention and tradition. Even where scepticism did not advance to a radical denial of the existence of the gods, the illuminati doubted their power or their action upon human affairs, or even their goodness, in a way which practically amounted to a denial of the gods; thus, for example, the notorious phrase about the "envy of the gods" was undoubtedly

the product of the sophistic illumination of the fifth century B.C.[1] A scepticism quite analogous to that of the Greek sophists appears to have been widely disseminated in India also about the time of the rise of Buddhism: and in fact Buddhism itself takes up a somewhat sceptical attitude with regard to the question of the gods and of the other world.

The thinking of the Indians, deficient as it was in vigour, and apt to lose itself in fanciful wanderings, never got beyond these abstract antitheses of the systems, or the sceptical position of admitting the legitimacy of both indifferently. Greek thought, on the contrary, reached a greater depth in the Socratic school, and arrived at a much purer idea of God. *Socrates* concluded from the purposeful order of the world to its origin in an all-wise and all-good being, whose reason transcends ours as much as the size of the world which is its habitation, exceeds that of our body, whose providence embraces all, both small and great, and guides all to our advantage, and to whose guidance we have therefore unconditionally to submit ourselves. He did not deny the many popular gods, but he saw in them only the intermediate agents of the one divine government of the world. *Plato* went further on the same road; he called the deity the highest idea, which was both the ultimate ground of being, and of knowledge, and at the same time the ultimate end or the good. The idea of the good is, according to Plato, the standard to which all statements about God must be brought; all envy is far apart from his goodness; it desires to communicate itself, and cares for all in the best way; his wisdom arranges all in the most useful manner, his justice leaves nothing good and nothing bad unrecompensed; only he is well-pleasing to him and can enter into fellowship with him, who resembles him in goodness. This view of the nature and the work of God is an eminently pure one, and does all honour to Plato's religious insight, yet it is difficult to harmonise these predicates with the notion of the "highest idea," which is as such the

[1] Compare the interesting investigation by Hoekstra: "*De wangunst der goden op het geluk ook der rechtvaardigen.*" Printed separately from the Transactions of the Royal Academy of Science. Amsterdam, 1883.

most universal being, and indeed transcends both being and knowing; in such an extreme abstraction all predicates, those moral predicates too, are dissolved in an empty indefiniteness; there is no real subject, existing independently, to whom such predicates can attach themselves. With *Aristotle* the notion of God gains in definiteness; according to him God is the first cause, from which all motion proceeds, and the highest good to whom all becoming tends; the perfect pure activity subject to no pain and to no change, bound to no matter and having its end in itself, God is the "thought of thought;" in this self-contemplation, which rests immutably in itself, consists the perfection and the blessedness of God. But this spirituality, and, so to speak, this dignified repose of the Aristotelian God, is dearly purchased by such a deistical renunciation of all real relation to the world; for not only does it render his causation of the world at the beginning quite incomprehensible, it also makes it impossible to have any practical religious relation with him. In his abstract transcendence the Aristotelian God possesses but little more practical importance than the God of Epicureanism.

But this defect only reveals to us the limitation of the Socratic philosophy generally, the dualism which was the weak side of the idealism which was its strength. By the latter it materially furthered the development of the God-consciousness; it first taught, with the definiteness and clearness of the notion, the pure spirituality of God; and in doing so it made an end of that confused mixture of sense and spirit which not only adheres in general to the popular idea of God, but which was part and parcel of the whole of pre-Socratic speculation. But great as this service was, which as a matter of history Socratic thought rendered to philosophy, and certain as it is that the idealism of the system prepared the way most effectively for the religion of spirit, it yet showed itself inadequate in this, that it conceived spirit as opposite to and exclusive of the phenomenal world, not as the overmastering and dominant power of that world. The idea of God was gained here only in the way of abstracting thought, and so it remained itself a mere abstraction, an idea of species of the most general kind, pure thought; the living reality was still wanting of the

spirit which both has power over itself and governs the world, a reality which is not reached by logical abstraction but by real experience. Hence, while this idealistic philosophy was able to provide a very serviceable critical standard to regulate and purify an idea of God which came from another quarter, from religious experience, it had no power to replace this idea or to engender it: it could not satisfy the religious consciousness by creative production; it had no compensation to offer for the dying nature-religion of the popular faith.

The consciousness of this deficiency and of incapacity to overcome it from within, betrays itself in the Stoic and Neo-Pythagorean combination of philosophical speculation with the mythology of the popular faith. The *Stoic* doctrine of God was in its essence a somewhat rude Pantheism, which went further back than the Socratic idealism to the pre-Socratic naturalism. The Deity is the primal matter and the primal force; the former, he is a substance like to fire, which by changing into the different elements causes the world to proceed out of itself, and by burning takes it back into itself; the latter, he is also an active spirit, reason, law, the government of the whole, Providence. With the later Stoics, who came under the influence of Plato, the latter side predominated greatly over the former: they conceived of God almost after the fashion of monotheism, as the spirit who arranged and governed the world in accordance with rational ends with a view to the good of man; but they did not, like Plato and Aristotle, remove him to a dualistic beyond. On the contrary, it was always a fundamental point of the Stoic system that the divine reason was immanent in the world, as the guiding power of the world's course, and the creative principle of human reason, which was allied to the divine. By insisting on the bond of kinship which connects men with the deity and with each other, Stoicism prepared the way not less than did Platonism for the Christian religion of the "Sonship of God," and of brotherly love. At the same time, however, the immanence of the divine in the phenomena of nature gave the Stoics a very natural opportunity for admitting into their system the gods of the popular religion, whom Plato and Aristotle had regarded as poetical fictions; the

Stoics declared them to be special forms of the manifestation of the one divine power, and so derivative gods. Thus they came to be, as against scepticism and Epicureanism, apologists of the popular faith, the mythology of which they sought to justify to reason, not certainly without frequently changing its meaning by means of a bold and artificial allegorising treatment. What led them to adopt this line was not merely conservative piety towards the tradition and customs of the fathers; by this procedure they met a want which was present and irrepressible in religious minds, because the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy had removed the gods to an inaccessible distance—the want, namely, of intercourse between the world beyond and this world by means of beings who stood near to each and could be mediators between the two. But with the *Neo-Platonists* still more than with the Stoics the whole system turned upon the satisfaction of this need, which indeed was the more pressing in their case, as they had gone back to Plato, and made the divine that which is above, that which is beyond, an undeterminable and unknowable being, remote both from thought and from feeling. As the world proceeds from this primal being in a definite series of stages of the eradiation of power, we must, they thought, rise up to him step by step by the definite means and mediators of the positive religions. The gods of the popular religion are the mediating spirits (demons) who bring about or at least prepare for, our relation and elevation to the Deity beyond. And so the Neo-Platonists applied all the acuteness of their scholastic speculation to the task of creating an inner connection between the most abstract notions of idealist speculation on the one side, and the grossest beliefs and usages of the popular nature-religion on the other, a romantic mixture in which was patently demonstrated the bankruptcy both of the religion and of the philosophy of the ancient world.

Meanwhile the monotheistic belief in God which was to supersede all those gods of nature and of the notion, had long been ready, having matured as the ripe fruit of the religion of *Israel.* It had not been present from the first in this people, neither as a tradition from a common primitive religion and revelation, nor as

an innate instinct of the Semitic race. It was laboriously wrought out, the dearly-purchased result of a long history rich in conflicts and in sorrows, of the martyrdom, extending over centuries, of men of God and of the people of God. The beginnings of it lie in the national henotheism of the Hebrew belief in Jahveh, which, though connected even by Moses with the elements of law and order prevailing in the conquering nomad race, seems to have had at first a close affinity with the analogous henotheism of other tribes, especially the South-Semitic. It was only at the hands of the prophets of Israel that the belief in Jahveh, surrounded at first by national limitations, underwent so mighty a development; they understood the majesty of the "Holy One of Israel," not as the fearful power merely which manifested itself in fearful judgments on the enemies of Israel,—this was how the people thought of it,—but as consisting principally in moral righteousness, which turned in judgment against all evil, whether in Israel or elsewhere, and which realised the promises to God's own people only by sifting judgments, in which the nations of the earth were compelled to co-operate as servants and instruments. The idea therefore of moral law and purpose in the arrangement of history, was that by which the God of the people rose in the belief of the prophets to be the God of the world.

True, the limits of particularism were not entirely got rid of in this advance. Not only was Jahveh still regarded as in a special sense the God of Israel; even the gods of the heathen peoples were not deprived of all reality. They were however conceived as entirely inferior in power to the God of Israel, who was the God of gods; they were related to him as vassals to an over-king, and this was enough to secure for the religious consciousness of the present at least a practical monotheism. But besides this, the prophets pointed to a future term in history, when the world of the nations would also draw near, and together with Israel recognise and worship Jahveh as the one true God. In the practical hope of a future victory of the God of Israel over the world-powers lay the conviction that in the future the monotheistic belief in God would prevail alone among mankind.

We must also acknowledge that the view of God held by the earlier prophets was far from being entirely spiritual, but was quite content with very realistic views of God as being like man, both in his form and in the affections of his mind. But this likeness of God to man was the means by which they raised the belief in God above the rude Semitic naturalism, which represented the deity after the form of an animal, to the idea of the moral will of a ruler, the "Holy One," who is exalted above all creaturely weakness and impurity, whose power is terrible, whose moral purity is spotless. Certain as it is that the notion of the divine holiness did not at first contain a positive moral element, but merely expressed the negative relation to the creature in general, yet it is also certain that this characteristic proved an effective guard against the dangers which commonly accompany anthropomorphism. That degradation of the divine being to human weakness and immorality, which commonly resulted among the Indo-Germans when the nature-deities were made human, was made impossible in Israel by the fact that Jahveh was the "Holy One," therefore not a man, not a partaker of human weakness, sensuousness, passion, or fickleness. This was the reason alike of his fearful wrath at, and judgment of, human guilt and faithlessness, and of his own faithfulness and long-suffering to the people he had once chosen. This latter side of the idea of God, which was based on his covenant relation, the condescending goodness and grace which led him to invite man to his fellowship, is the converse and the complement of his sacred majesty, and in the spirit of the greatest of the prophets these two sides are so intimately bound up together as to make it hard to say which element predominated in the consciousness of God of these great men, his supra-mundane majesty, or his condescending grace.

It is characteristic, however, of the belief in God of post-exile Judaism, as it took shape in the theology of the synagogue, that it laid stress exclusively on the former of these two sides. This was brought about not only by the sharper antithesis Judaism was compelled to take up towards Gentile polytheism, but also by the disap-

pearance of the living consciousness of revelation which belonged to prophecy, and the increasing tendency to a hard legal piety. This led, it is true, to a certain advance in the way of spiritualising the belief in God by purifying it from earlier anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms; but at the same time God was carried off to such an abstract distance, as to render his continued action in history, his living and revealing presence, no longer conceivable. To compensate for this loss, those mediatory beings now appeared which Jewish speculation created out of the personification of the divine attributes and forms of revelation; wisdom, the word, the glory (Shechinah). Jewish thought had thus arrived at a position exactly similar to that which Greek philosophy had worked out in the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of God, and it lay therefore in the nature of the case, that at Alexandria, where Jewish religious science and Greek secular science came in contact with each other, the supramundane God of Judaism should be combined with the god above of Plato, the Jewish intermediate beings, wisdom and word, with the Platonic-Stoic world-framers Nous and Logos, as we find in Philo. But the system of Philo itself shows how little the shadow-forms from the world of the notion were able to satisfy the thirst of the human heart for the living God, except they were endowed with life and language by the warm blood of human personality, with its historical acts, sufferings, and sacrifice.

What *Jesus* did was to go back to the prophets and to see in the Holy One of Israel his Father and the Father of us all. In his feeling of the divine love he knew as a matter of experience that the kingdom of heaven was near, and by the words of a Saviour which he spoke, the acts he did, the sufferings he underwent, he revealed and secured that kingdom to the world. In the Christian belief in God, therefore, the two sides of the prophetic notion of God were united afresh in a yet purer form and a more perfect synthesis; first, the supramundane holy *spirituality* bound to nothing but itself and absolutely exalted above all the limits of sense, those of nationality included; and second, that *love* which manifests itself in a living way within the world, and enters into communion with the poorest of the

children of men. The historical saving acts of this love now furnish, in the moral life of the human spirit, a connection and a purpose exceeding in significance and value the purpose visible in the natural cosmos. In respect of its notion of God, therefore, Christianity appears as a new thing both towards heathenism and towards Judaism; to the disjointedness and vagueness, the sensuousness or emptiness of heathen polytheism and pantheism, it opposes the unity and the moral purity of God, and to the narrowness and haughtiness of the Jewish belief in God it opposes the love of God, which embraces the world, and bends down to the depths of human need. It was unavoidable that this new faith should seek new forms of expression, and wrestle to set forth the fulness of its contents in such stammering language as the attainments of the age provided.

The Trinitarian controversies of the Greek church are far from pleasing to modern taste, yet they must not be judged, as a superficial view sometimes does judge them, to be quite meaningless. They arose out of the need which was felt, to see in the historical representative and mediator of the divine love, the fulness of the Godhead dwelling bodily, and to gather from him as a type the certainty of the admission of human life generally into communion with the life of God; and this need was both natural and legitimate. But if this was not to give rise to a new polytheism, it was necessary that the likeness of substance and the unity of the God who was manifest in Christ, and revealed and present to believers in the church ("Son" and "Spirit"), with the other-worldly and concealed world-ground, the creator God ("Father"), should be doctrinally settled and guarded against polytheism as well as against abstract monotheism. To put it shortly, the problem was to unite the supramundane with the intramundane character of God, his dwelling in himself with his entrance into history, his necessary thinking of the eternal truths, which is expressed in the reasonable and constant order of the natural world, with the free will of his love, which reveals itself in historical acts of salvation for the redemption of men, as well as in the progressive life of salvation of the Christian church. These two sides had to be united in an inner and essential unity. That this was a

proper object to pursue, no one will question, but at the same time it cannot be denied that the solution of the problem proved an inadequate one. And it is easy to understand how this came about; for the work had to be done with presuppositions which, from the very outset, contained insoluble contradictions; on the one side the axiom received from Plato of the absolute simplicity of God, which excluded all differences and determinations, and therefore all real life, in God's nature; and on the other side, the identification of the divine logos with the historical person of Jesus, which involved an exaggeration of the differences within the deity, so as to make a trinity not only of functions, forms of being and of manifestation, but of independent subjects or "persons." All dialectical attempts at a solution were bound to suffer shipwreck on this cardinal contradiction. The church's doctrine of God is therefore pervaded from this time forward by the contradiction between the abstractly simple divine being, without any differences or determinations, of which not even the attributes can be predicated as objectively distinct qualities, and the trinitarian doctrine of the real differences of the three persons within the one divine being. Nor did the attempts of individual Fathers to trace these trinitarian differences up to psychological moments of the intelligence and the will of God, ever get beyond analogies and unreal metaphors. Such attempts could never be seriously carried through to an issue; they were opposed to Christology, and not only to Christology, but in an equal degree to the theology which had come down to that age, since both the Platonic notion of the "simple substance above existence," and the Aristotelian of the "*actus purus*," made an end of all differences between the being of God and his knowledge, his will, and his activity—leaving nothing but the palest and emptiest uniformity. The nominalism of later scholasticism broke with this idealistic position, but only to fall into the other extreme, its absolute arbitrary will of God making away with all eternal and essential truth, the truth of morals too, and degrading goodness to the fortuitous decree of a mere positive declaration of the will of God, without any inner connection with the nature either of God or of man.

A well-grounded antipathy to this unethical positivism of the nominalist notion of God, which lent itself to the support of any and every Catholic superstition, drove the Protestant theologians to take up once more the Platonic notion of substance. Following closely in the steps of Augustine, Scotus Erigena, and Thomas Aquinas, the Lutheran dogmatists, Gerhard and Quenstedt, described the nature of God as being so simple and immovable an identity that it is hard to conceive it to be a living, far less a personal, being. It is but a short step from this ecclesiastical notion of God to the substance of Spinoza, which is denied to have any such thought or will as to set up a purpose, because these, like all determinations, appeared to be a denial of the divine infinity, an infinity indeed in whose empty unity, just because these are denied it, the world of the manifold, and especially of personal and historical life, passes away like a mere phantom-world. It was just this near relation between the Platonic-ecclesiastical notion of God and the abstract monism or acosmism of Spinoza, that enabled Schleiermacher, setting out from the presuppositions of the latter, yet to construct his doctrine of God close to the lines of the church formulas, thus setting up, under the ægis of ecclesiastical tradition, a notion of God which is far from satisfying to the religious consciousness.

The abstract *monism* of the infinite substance is always closely accompanied by abstract theism, or, as it is commonly called just because of this defect, to distinguish it from true monotheism, "*deism*," a system which conceives God as the thinking and willing "highest being," but removes him to so distant a majesty, so high above the world, and ascribes to the world such an independence of existence and activity as against God, that God comes to stand on the same footing with the finite beings of the world, as a being like them. He is lowered to an idle spectator, of no importance to religion, of the course of a world which does not in the least depend on him ; he only gives a sign of life now and then in an occasional miracle. Of this nature is the notion of God of the Socinians, of the Leibniz-Wolffian Illumination, and of Kantian and Herbartian rationalism. The step is very easily taken of making this *inactive*

god, who has been brought to rest, an *unreal* product of the imagination. The world-ruler and legislator was only wanted for the beginning, and it cost but little to reduce him to a mere personification of the moral and natural world-order, which has no basis but itself, and is a mere subjective fiction and reflection, therefore, of the self-glorifying human mind. Thus abstract deism passes readily into Pancosmism and Atheism; as we may see from the historical progress from the deism of Kant to the idealism of Fichte and the Anthropologism of Feuerbach. The same process took place before, from English Deism to French naturalism, which is continued in the Positivism of to-day.

Thus on the one hand abstract (Pantheistic) monism, which knows only an absolute substance but no living subject, and on the other abstract (deistic) theism, which knows a highest subject but no absolute or infinite, turned out to be equally one-sided antitheses, each equally ready to pass into the other. The problem was thus set before modern speculation *to combine in a unity, in the notion of God, the absolute substance of monism and the unconditioned subject of theism.* What had dimly passed before the profound divining mind of the *philosophus teutonicus* Böhme, was attempted with the aid of modern dialectic, in the speculative systems of Schelling and Baader, Krause, and Hegel. The latter were too much entangled in logical idealism, which with Hegel turned to a Panlogism in the dialectic flow of which God and the world melted into each other, as with his Greek predecessor Heraclitus. The consequence was that the "Becoming-subject of substance" was turned in his school, against the intention of the master indeed, into an atheistic anthropologism. In Schelling and Baader we find the necessary insight into the fact, that logical idealism must find its complement in will-realism, and that the infinite subject must be pre-supposed to the finite one as the cause to the effect; but the working out of this idea was lost in the transcendental matters of mythical theogony. Present-day speculation seeks to avoid the mistakes of those older systems by taking account more carefully of the facts of consciousness at the outset, and drawing its conclusions in accordance with

analogies; no longer constructing the world *a priori* from the notion of God, but setting out from our consciousness of self and our consciousness of the world, and seeking in the notion of God the embracing unity in which both the intellect may find the ground and explanation of the world, and the heart the purpose of life for which it has been sighing. The paths taken may still be different, the results of a procedure which is as it were experimental may be still uncertain; yet it cannot be denied that in the majority of those who venture to attack the problem of the knowledge of God, there is a certain agreement of tendency, namely to that reconciliation of theism and monism which Krause and Baader called Panentheism and Schelling concrete monotheism, a position which combines the transcendence of the Semitic, and the immanence of the Indo-Germanic, notion of God, in the Christian synthesis of the God who is above all, and through all, and in all (Eph. iv. 6).

Having traced the belief in God from its origin, and through the most essential forms of its historical development, we must now seek to *prove the objective truth of this belief*, not of course of all the ideas which may happen to occur under it, but of its essential and permanent kernel. We have to show that it is not an arbitrary idea nor a mere product of human weakness which might melt away before maturer knowledge; that the idea of God is, on the contrary, an essential and necessary feature of our consciousness, in which we find that unity of our consciousness of ourselves and of our consciousness of the world, which our reason, being itself a unity, and thinking according to a law which is a unity, feels itself obliged to seek for. The subject with which we have now to deal is, accordingly, that of the so-called "proof of the existence of God." These proofs have been very variously estimated at different times. At the present day they have fallen very greatly out of favour: it is said that they are unnecessary, since they would never produce the belief in God where it did not exist already: it is also said that they are impossible, because no inference from experience can reach as far as to the extra-mundane cause of the world.

It appears to me that the depreciatory estimate which is now in vogue of the arguments in question, is a striking instance of the precipitateness with which men sometimes throw away the good because the bad displeases them; and that those who judge thus fail to draw the proper distinction between the scholastic forms in which these arguments are clothed, and the substantial thought that they contain. That they cannot be so entirely unnecessary must, I think, appear to every one who feels even a moderate respect for the historical spirit of humanity, from the simple fact that they make their appearance in one form or another, wherever men begin to reflect upon their immediate religious consciousness. Kant notwithstanding, they will always occupy human thought. And it is right that they should do so. They certainly cannot, and are not intended, to engender the faith of the heart; yet they certainly serve a need of reason, which requires that faith be justified to thought. Especially when the reasoned view of the world comes to be in conflict with the belief of the heart, as is very commonly the case at the present day, reason demands, for the sake of her own unity, some solution or adjustment of this discord, without which no complete satisfaction or security can be attained or preserved even for the heart. As for the asserted *impossibility* of these proofs, it will appear in detail how far the assertion is correct, and in what points it is not. It must by no means be supposed that such general phrases as "transcending experience," "the conditions and limitations of our finite thought," etc., really prove anything. Every act of thought is a transcending of immediate experience, which only affords the raw material of separate sensations; and every general notion, most particularly that of "law"—the fundamental notion of all scientific thought—is an unconditioned which sets itself above conditioned phenomena; and any act of thought that is conscious of the finiteness of the individual objects it deals with, has therewith at once transcended the limits of the finite, and has along with the notion of finiteness embraced also its correlative, infinity. The critical philosophy of Kant, it is already a historical fact, did *not* speak the last word on these questions, and it is quite illegitimate to appeal always to him, as if

philosophy had come to an end with him; because on this very question of the objectiveness of the idea of God he is thoroughly inconsistent with himself—the Critique of Practical Reason teaching very much the opposite of what he had said in the Critique of Theoretical Reason. I am of opinion with Herder, that the proper way to honour the master of criticism is not to set him up uncritically as a new dogmatic authority, but to apply his criticism critically.

What the proofs of the existence of God really amount to is a retracing in thought of the way in which the human mind first rose to the consciousness of God, not in thought, but in an anticipatory and pictorial fashion. If there is reason in human history at all, we may expect to find it in the history of religious thought; and if it is a characteristic of reason to become conscious of itself, we may venture to hope that what it has done immediately in history it will be able to summon to consciousness in thought, so as to comprehend it as its own, that is to say, as rational and necessary. In the genetic narrative given above, we have seen that the belief in God has two springs, on the one side self-consciousness, and on the other the consciousness of the world, whether in the form of contemplation in fancy, or in that of thinking contemplation of the world. We saw how the former of these two factors very largely dominates the views of the Semites, the other those of the Indo-Germans; while the Christian God-consciousness appears to be a balance of the two factors, because the two lines of development of the Hebrew and the Hellenic God-consciousness, setting out from points far distant from each other, meet in it to form a unity. Thus the historical development of the idea of God itself points out to us in a clear and simple manner the way in which we have to prove the truth of this idea. From our consciousness of the world, the cosmological and the teleological arguments (which are intimately connected with each other) lead us up to one great spiritual power in the manifoldness of fortuitous appearances; from the moral self-consciousness the moral argument shows that that power is identical with the good which announces itself to us as moral necessity or as the law of freedom; and the ontological argument finally points back from the relation

of the Ego and the world, to a common ground of both, the entrance of which into the double consciousness becomes to us an atoning unity or the idea of God. It is easy to see that the first two of these arguments (the twofold cosmological and the teleological argument) answer in a wonderful way to the distinctive character of the Indo-Germanic consciousness of God, the second (the moral) argument to the Hebrew, and the third (the ontological) argument to the Christian God-consciousness. It is also clear that the arguments are all connected together in such a way that each succeeding one presupposes the preceding one as its basis, while each preceding one finds in that which succeeds it, its complement, in which its result appears deeper and more impressive.

The *cosmological* argument concludes in its oldest form, in which we find it in Aristotle, from the motion in the world to a first mover. This argument, after being repeated with a number of variations by the Church Fathers, underwent a certain modification at the hands of the Wolffian school. Here the conclusion is from the fortuitousness of all the things and occurrences in the world, the sufficient cause of which is not in themselves, to a necessary cause of the world in an extra-mundane God. Against this Kant raised two objections: first, that it was a misapplication of the law of causality, which is only valid for the world of phenomena, to use it to arrive at a first cause beyond the world; and second, that it is an unwarranted assumption that the world was an accidental thing, which must have its necessary cause outside itself in a most perfect being or an extra-mundane God; for though every detail in the world is accidental and determined by something else, it by no means follows that this is the case as regards the world as a whole, as if it also must have its cause outside itself; indeed the world can be regarded very well as a thing essentially necessary and having its cause in itself. These objections must be admitted to be sound; yet they are far from destroying the truth of the cosmological argument, and indeed only clear the way for presenting that argument in a more accurate form. The assumption is not only incapable of proof, it is distinctly incorrect, that the world is a mere fortuitous aggregate of fortuitous

particulars, for which it is necessary to look for an external cause. On the contrary, the world presents itself to us as a well-ordered, law-impressed whole, all the parts of which stand in an inviolable nexus, each of them having the cause of its definite being and activity in connection with the rest, in the collective order of the whole. But while the phenomena of the world by no means point to an extra-mundane cause, the law and connection in which they stand to each other as members of one great whole, most certainly compel us to infer one *intra-mundane* cause as the real productive ground of the law and order of the whole. And such an inference, called for as it is by thinking contemplation of the world, the law of causality by no means prohibits us from drawing: indeed when we consider what is implied in the notion of that law, we see that it itself brings us to the same point. The law of causality declares in the first place that every change is the necessary consequence of a preceding change, and the necessary condition of a change to follow; it expresses the nexus which can never be broken, which holds together the manifold phenomena of the world both in space and time. But that this whole of phenomena is itself a thing that had a beginning, the origin of which is also to be regarded as the consequence of a preceding impulse from without, like the becoming and the change of individual things inside the world; this the law of causality does not declare: it even appears to contradict such an assumption. For if the world as a whole came into being, then it had a beginning in time, and this is to assume a time when it did not exist. But the cause which produced the world must have existed before, else the world could never have come into existence, and so the cause of the world would have existed before the latter without its effect; but this, in whatever way the cause be conceived, is opposed to the law of causality. Accordingly the law of causality does not lead us to an external originator of the world, because the origin of the world, for which he is required, is itself a thing which cannot be proved. This is the truth of Kant's criticism; its proposition that the law of causality is only valid within the world of our experience, and not beyond that world, is so far

quite correct. It is quite a different matter, however, if this proposition is understood to mean that our thought cannot go beyond the phenomena of the world, which are the raw material of our experience, to their supersensuous ground. Such a limitation of our thought meets with a clear refutation in the notion of the law of causality itself. Is this law anywhere given to us as an immediate object of perception in the phenomenon? Or is it abstracted from phenomena, and a merely subjective rule of the connection of them in our knowledge? It is clear that this subjective conception of the "law," which Kant, it is true, often seems to hold, by no means answers to the actual notion of it, as logical considerations compel us to conceive it, and as it forms the working basis of all the sciences. We everywhere understand by the law of causality that objective necessity in the connection of real phenomena which corresponds to the subjective necessity present in the relation of cause and effect. And if we look a little more closely than is commonly done into this thought of a necessary real connection between different phenomena—this is the notion of the law of causality—it leads us unavoidably to further conclusions. How does it happen, we must obviously at once proceed to ask, that a change which takes place in A is at once and necessarily followed by changes in B, C, D? and that each of these changes takes place exactly in that particular way which is prescribed by the preceding change, so that as soon as we know the law, we can calculate beforehand from the first given cause the whole series of effects? If it be said that this is due to the natural constitution of the active powers A, B, this is undoubtedly true, but the statement does not give the solution of the problem—it only thrusts it somewhat further back. For if the various active powers are a plurality originally destitute of connection with each other, it is difficult to understand how they ever came to act upon each other and to receive influences from each other; still more difficult to understand how each particular exertion of force gives rise to a corresponding definite reaction; and most difficult of all, how all these infinitely manifold actions and reactions have come to produce not a meaningless chaos but a reasonable order

of the whole. All this is only comprehensible when we assume that the manifold acting powers are not originally a plurality of independent primitive beings or substances, but only the manifold appearances of an original real unity, the primal force, which forms both the producing *ground* of all particular things, and in each particular thing the bond which compels it to work in unity with the others, or, in a word, its *law*. This law therefore is what the cosmological argument arrives at, not from the fortuitousness, but from the law, which forms the character of the world-whole.

The *teleological* argument, which concludes from the purposeful arrangement of the world to an originator who prescribed that purpose, was commonly used even in ancient philosophy, from Socrates to the Stoics; Kant calls it the oldest argument, the clearest, the most level to human reason, and says that it deserves to be mentioned always with respect. Weighty objections, however, have been raised to it, both by Kant and by others. Not much attention need be given to the difficulty, that the argument only takes note of the forms of things, and can only lead to an originator of this form, to an Architect of the world, not a Creator; the cosmological argument would make good anything that is wanting in this respect. The further difficulty, too, that experience does not show us unmixed utility in things, but many things also which are contrary to utility, would weigh for a great deal where an anthropomorphic idea is entertained of the divine pursuit of ends, but does not really touch the pith of the argument. The decisive point lies in the question as to the legitimacy of a teleological view of nature. May not such a view turn out to be a mere subjective illusion, reading ends into nature by looking at her after the analogy of human actions, which are done with a view to ends, while in nature all the time everything takes place by the mechanism of causality, which knows no ends? Truth and error are closely bound up together in this objection, and for the interests of our question everything depends on making a clear separation between them.

That the law of cause and effect rules strictly and everywhere in nature, we have already fully admitted in what was said on the

cosmological argument. The question, therefore, will be whether causality and teleology are such opposites as to exclude each other? As the two are commonly understood, the former as a blindly working law of merely mechanical movements or place-changes of the smallest bodies, the latter as the arrangement of particular things by a will external to them according to preconceived purposes,—understood in this way, I say, they are certainly exclusive of each other, and appear to require that we should choose one or the other of them as our explanation of the world. But that this view of the two principles is wrong, and that causality and teleology must when understood aright be reconcilable with each other, appears extremely probable from the very fact that in our contemplation of nature we cannot really put out of sight either the one view or the other. Kant declared this with the greatest emphasis. He places the maxims of the mechanical and the teleological interpretations of nature side by side, and declares them to be equally legitimate, equally indispensable. "To exclude the teleological principle," he says, "in favour of the mechanical, and where utility undeniably presents itself as a reference to another kind of causality, to pay heed to mechanism alone, this is to condemn reason to flit about fantastically among shadowy semblances of powers of nature which thought refuses to entertain; just as a merely teleological explanation which pays no regard to the mechanism of nature, reduces reason to a visionary." For a union of the two principles Kant takes first the subjective road, declaring them both to be merely regulative; yet he cannot conceal from himself that even such a subjective capacity for combination points to a common objective principle, in which the unity of the ends and of the efficient causes must be based; and he finds this principle in a "supersensuous real-ground for nature" under which perhaps there may lie an "intellectual view" (Anschauung) for which the parts and the whole do not fall asunder as they do to our discursive reason, but coincide.[1] The path entered by Kant in the maturest of his works was followed up by post-Kantian speculative philosophy. Schelling says in his *Transcendental Idealism:*

[1] Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (Hartenstein's edition, v. p. 422 *seq.*).

"The peculiarity of nature rests on the fact that with all its mechanism it is yet full of purpose. The difference between the products of art and those of nature is, that in the former the notion is only impressed on the surface of the object, while in the latter it has entered into the object itself, and is absolutely indivisible from it;" and he explains this peculiarity of the organic from the action of the world-reason which is immanent in it. In the same way Hegel adheres to the Aristotelian dictum which Kant had repeated, that what has life is to be regarded as working after a purpose. "The living being, he says, only is, so long as it makes itself that which it is; it is an end going before, and the end itself is only the result." The world itself is "an organic life, a living system; all that is makes up no more than the organs of the one subject; the planets which revolve round the sun are only the giant members of this one system. This, however, is to affirm no more than that it is alive, not that the world-soul as spirit is different from this its life."[1] The philosophy of Schopenhauer is generally opposed, decidedly enough, to that of Schelling and Hegel; yet he is entirely at one with these philosophers in his rejection of the merely mechanical interpretation of nature, and in the stress he lays on the inner teleology, which, he says, can only be explained from a metaphysical (ideal) principle. "In fact, every good and sound head must be brought by the contemplation of organic nature to a teleological position; though it is by no means necessary, unless preconceived opinions so direct him, that he should land either in physico-theology or in the anthropo-teleology condemned by Spinoza."[2] Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious* might be called a metaphysic of teleology, which is here demonstrated inductively by a rich collection of empirical material. But according to Hartmann too, teleology, properly understood, inner teleology, by no means excludes causality, but rather necessarily presupposes it, since "at the root of the

[1] Hegel, *Encyclopädie*, par. 352, 360. *Religionsphilosophie*, xii. 458, 462.

[2] *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, ii. p. 389. We may also mention, as bearing on this point, his work *Der Wille in der Natur*, in which, *inter alia*, the polemic against the Lamarckian (Darwinian) theory merits special consideration (*Works*, iv. 43 *seqq.*).

matter both these principles are mere moments of a logical process set up by themselves, and endowed as it were with independence: logical necessity is the one principle which appears when looked at from one side as (seemingly dead) causality of the mechanical law of nature, while, when regarded from the other side, it appears as teleology."[1] In the same way Teichmüller says in his interesting work on *Darwinism and Philosophy:* "The interaction of all the elements presupposes laws which go beyond the existence of each separate element, and embrace all particular things in a unity. Whoever, therefore, assumes any laws of nature whatever, must also assume a system of laws, and must consequently refer the different laws to one ultimate unity or to an ultimate end. Every student of natural science, therefore, if he seeks for laws of nature at all, is inevitably from that time forward a teleologist, *i.e.* he assumes a unity or an ultimate end, from which all laws can be explained, as from the simplest principle." In the same way Zeller[2] declares, that while everything in the world proceeds from natural causes according to natural laws, and nothing is to be explained by the intervention of a purpose different from the necessity of nature, and directed to this particular result, we are not to conceive *natural* causes to be purely mechanical ones, which never could account for organic and conscious life. With reference to life, we must call the world as a whole, in spite of the necessity of nature which rules in it, or even because of that necessity, the work of absolute reason.

It is cheering to observe how, on a question on which so much depends, the judgments of philosophers of the most various tendencies meet in a rare unanimity. As they with one voice reject the idea of an external teleology, according to which nature would be the artificial production of an external architect, so with one voice do they declare it to be impossible to understand nature from the mere mechanical laws of nature which lead to the grouping of atoms in this way or in that. The composition of parts can never adequately

[1] Ed. von Hartmann, *Wahrheit und Irrthum des Darwinismus*, p. 160.

[2] *Ueber teleologische und mechanische Naturerklärung*, in his *Abhandlungen*, ii. p. 549.

explain an organic whole, the very essence of which is this, that the unity of the whole has a determining influence on the special character of each of the parts, so that it is not the parts that make the whole, but the one whole which makes itself by means of the parts, which owe to it their place and nature. Never will any mechanism of movements in space afford an explanation of sensation or of an act of consciousness, which consists just in this, that a central unity distinguishes itself from its states or the determinations of its parts, and refers those to itself, positing them as its own: this unity, which manifests itself in distinguishing and referring that which it distinguishes, how entirely remote is it from any mere aggregate of parts distinguished in space! Now as the world incessantly produces organic, sentient, and conscious life, and that not fortuitously but with a manifest tendency, a striving of its whole process of becoming to this production, the cause of the world must be conceived as answering to this effect, not therefore as dead matter or blind force, but as purposeful reason, and as will realising a purpose, or as the omnipotent reason which we call God. And the notion of *development* which dominates modern science, conducts us the more inevitably, the more thoroughly we think it out, to the assumption of the idea of God. All development is a constant change of states in a being which is persistent, guided by a law of formation which tends towards a definite end. Now it is true that this law of formation is implanted in each being itself, and manifests and accomplishes itself through that being's own activity; but the sufficient cause of the law is not to be looked for in the individual being, which has no consciousness of the law of its development. Nature-beings know nothing of it at all, nor does man as a nature-being know anything of it;—as an intellectual being he knows something of it, but little enough;—and yet all beings follow the law of development which governs their lives. It must therefore surely be *given* to them, prescribed to them. But from what quarter? Is the law of its formation given to each individual being by all the rest? But these other beings are all in the same position; they know nothing even of their own law of formation, and how could they ever come to

give laws to each other? And how could they ever have come to frame the different laws of different beings with such wonderful co-operating wisdom, that all together form a well-ordered system, a fit harmony, such as we know from experience that the world is? And if the simple fact that each being develops itself according to a law which tends to a definite result, of which the being itself is not aware, is itself so wonderful, the riddle not only is not solved, it is increased a thousandfold by the further fact that each individual being, while it appears to be doing nothing but follow the law of its own life, yet at the same time serves unconsciously the ends of the others, with which it stands in some relation of interaction, and that the lower life-sphere is always fitted to subserve the purposes, far transcending it, of a higher sphere, and ultimately the general ends of the whole. Unless we are to set all this down to chance, renouncing entirely, if we do so, any reasonable explanation, there remains nothing for it, so far as I can see, but to take this whole of individual beings, which develop themselves according to law and purpose in interaction with each other, back to a substantial spiritual unity, in such a way as to conceive the law of development, or the "what," to be based in the purpose-setting thought of that unity, and the powers of development, or the "that" of all individual beings, in its purpose-realising will. Thus the notion of development, the principle of the genetic science of the real world, points, when we consider all that it involves, to the creative divine world-ground. The same thought, only in a special application to a higher sphere of life, is also the basis of the moral argument.

The *moral* argument naturally falls into two parts. From the existence of the absolute moral law in our consciousness, we arrive at God as absolute *lawgiver*, and for the possibility of the realisation of the moral law in the visible world, we postulate God as absolute *ruler* of the world. It is a common objection to the first of these conclusions, that the moral law cannot be regarded as a commandment given from without, since it rather belongs to man's own nature, and is really moral only as arising out of this autonomy; to trace it to an outward lawgiver is to destroy the moral self-determina-

tion, and therewith the proper dignity, of man. We may allow the force of this objection, and if we do so, must of course give up the popular way of putting this argument; but we may still maintain it in substance. While we admit that the moral law is the expression, varying with the varying conditions of history, of the innate reasonable constitution of human nature, we may still find that the reason of the presence in man of this moral constitution, and the guarantee for its realisation, cannot be looked for anywhere but in the creating and governing will of God.

From what quarter should man derive the consciousness of a law unconditionally restricting his freedom? From that freedom itself? His freedom is restricted by the law, and feels it only too often as a binding limit, a grievous judge whom it would fain shake off if it could; it knows the law as an unconditioned power above itself; it never made the law. Or should the law proceed from infra-human nature? But the moral law requires of man that he emancipate himself from the lower unspiritual natural impulses, and rule over them, their lord and master; how could it proceed itself from the low levels above which it seeks to raise man? Or does it arise out of human society? is it an institution, an invention, a prudent measure of security society has adopted? It is certainly true that the moral law only rises to our consciousness in society, and only there receives the form it is to wear from time to time, but that is not to say that society is its cause and gave it birth. On the contrary, no law of society could obtain our recognition as a morally binding power, did there not exist in us from the first a disposition to moral consciousness, the cause of which lies far deeper than all positive laws, which are related to it only as the manifold human interpretation and formulation of an essentially unconditioned, "holy," normal will. It is no doubt quite true that both the objective law of social custom and right, and the subjective law of personal conscience, are on one side historically and naturally conditioned and imperfect, for the simple reason that each of them is formed along with the other and by means of the other, and so each of them suffers from the limitation of the other, the personal conscience

of individuals from the imperfection of the moral conditions and opinions in surrounding society, and the latter from the weakness and want of clearness of the moral judgment of individuals. But just because both these correlative manifestations of morality are always imperfect, it is the more certain that if the unconditioned and universal obligation of the moral law is to be upheld, it must receive its sanction from a deeper source, it must proceed from a higher power which has a purpose in view, a power unconditionally transcending everything individual, above every form of the development of society in time. It may indeed be said that this power is to be sought primarily in our reasonable nature as human beings, which is the determining law of development underlying our whole growth, our moral growth included. But this, it must not be overlooked, is no solution of the problem as to the sufficient cause of the moral law—the question is only thrust a step further back. For we must ask once more: where did men get this rational impulse which enables and obliges them to leave behind them the original state of nature, and to enter on the process of civilisation, to form social unions and set up moral norms, norms which claim an unconditioned and universal authority with respect to the will and the acts of individuals, and which, as a rule, all men accept, norms which indeed may, as civilisation advances, change their contents, and advance themselves in purity and comprehensiveness, but all the same never part with any of their importance in point of form except perhaps in temporary situations of partial social degeneration? The explanation of this fact, which forms the quintessence of the history of the world, has always been found by the religious consciousness to be simply that in the laws of the nations we must recognise a revelation of the will of the deity who rules the world, and in the individual conscience the law of God written in the heart, or the voice of God. I consider that this, the oldest explanation, is also the true one, and that all science has little that is essentially new or better to put in its place. The fact that we now conceive of the revelation of the divine will not as a positive supernatural miraculous act, but as accomplished in a natural way by the reasonable constitution of our race and its

development in history, this fact makes no material difference; in the one view as in the other the unprejudiced religious consciousness is right, when it sees in the "sacred order" of law, and in the voice of conscience, a revelation of the God who both prescribes to the stars their courses, and writes his law in the heart of mankind.

The moral proof in its *second* form postulates the existence of God as governor of the world in order to the realisation of the moral law in the phenomenal world. Kant presented this argument in a way which cannot be called happy, when he asserted that practical reason postulates the existence of God for the realisation of the highest good, which, he said, consisted in the union of perfect virtue with perfect happiness: for the former, man is himself responsible, but the latter is not in our power, and can only be procured for us in a way answering to our virtue by an almighty God. In this reasoning, it has often been remarked, and not unjustly, both the critic of pure reason and the rigorist of the categorical imperative sadly forget their parts. *Fichte* protested very emphatically against the eudæmonism of such an argument: "The system in which happiness is looked for at the hands of a being of superior power is a system of idolatry. A God who is thus to minister to desire is a contemptible being, for he upholds and perpetuates human ruin and the degradation of reason. Whether this being of superior power be a bone or a bird's feather, or whether it be an almighty and all-clever Creator, if happiness is expected from him, he is an idol: the difference between the two systems lies merely in the choice of expressions; the essence of the error is the same in both, and in both alike is the heart perverted."[1] Though we should not go with Fichte to such an extreme, we may yet agree with *Schiller's* verdict on the Kantian demand that virtue being difficult is to be ultimately rewarded with happiness by a divine arrangement, and see in it a "moral position for slaves." Even Spinoza had said that "salvation is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself," consisting as it does in love to

[1] In the *Appellation an das Publikum wegen Anklage des Atheismus* (*Works*, v. p. 219).

God; while the view of the multitude that piety and religion and all that belongs to the proper state of the soul, are burdens, for the painful bearing of which a man has a claim to be rewarded after death, failing which he would do better to live to his lusts; this view appears to him to be absurd.[1] To Schelling, too, a man is still immoral who regards virtue and happiness as opposites, since true morality consists in this, that in the elevation of the soul to the infinite the antithesis of freedom and dependence, virtue and happiness, disappear, and blessedness is no longer an accident of virtue, but virtue itself.[2] Hegel objects to the argument of Kant, that morality consists in action, but that action is the realisation of moral ends, and therefore the restoration of harmony between the moral idea and the reality, and that in this its action with a view to this end it brings with it immediately its own happiness, its own satisfaction.[3]

The postulate of a world-governor to restore an outward harmony of virtue and happiness is therefore untenable, resting as it does on impure eudæmonistic views; but we may learn from these critical judgments to give the argument another turn, namely, that the possibility of the realisation of moral ends in the phenomenal world proves the latter to have been organised originally with a view to the moral idea, and thus points to a common ground of the moral law and of the world of nature. Since goodness—the argument may be formulated very simply—has the highest right in the world, it must also possess supreme power over the world; but no such absolutely victorious power resides in the will, always limited, of individual good men; the guarantee for the victorious consummation of goodness must therefore be sought in a higher, divine power which rules over the course of events. So far this reasoning is no more than a simple and obvious truth; and the only question which can arise is, how we are to think of this power which guarantees the accomplishment of the purpose of good?

Fichte, who was the first to give the Kantian postulate this better turn, in his essay on the ground of our belief in a divine govern-

[1] *Spinoza*, Eth. v. Prop. 41, 42. [2] *Philosophie und Religion* (*Works*, vi. p. 53).
[3] *Phänomenologie* (*Works*, ii. p. 450).

ment of the world, was of opinion that the moral government of the world was the only divine, behind which we cannot go further to a substantial ground, cannot even wish to go further, without destroying our inner man, *i.e.* without parting with the consciousness of our moral autonomy. The latter assertion is now again brought forward in characteristic paradoxical fashion by the Neo-Kantian Hermann (ii. 188 *seq.*). It must be admitted that there is a grain of truth in this extraordinary and untenable opinion. It is true that we must not represent the world-ordering power to ourselves as a *deus ex machina* interfering with arbitrary acts of power in man's moral action, in order to bring about desired consequences in favour of good men and to the injury of the wicked. This view, common as it is, suffers shipwreck on the plain facts of experience, for it is notorious that the good suffer and are defeated countless times by adverse fortune, while the wicked conquer and succeed. Such a mechanical supernaturalist view of the divine government of the world, moreover, would be rather injurious than helpful to the purity and vigour of the moral consciousness. The expectation of such divine acts to recompense goodness and badness in external good and bad fortune, would necessarily exercise a disturbing influence on the purity of moral motives, and would foster a eudæmonistic spirit of looking for rewards. If the expected help did not arrive, moral self-certainty would be impaired, and with it the joy of patient perseverance in well-doing. The divine interference being quite incalculable, methodical and quiet action towards a certain end would be rendered vain, and the indolent would turn the hope of direct divine action into a welcome pretext to excuse his own want of energy. From all these considerations we can very well understand how an energetic moral idealism such as that of Fichte, might entertain grave objections to the assumption of a God different in substance from the moral world-order, and declare it necessary to go no further than that order itself.[1]

But this view, which proposes to see in a mere formal principle the power which rules the world and guarantees the victory of good-

[1] Compare M. Arnold's "Law which makes for righteousness."—Tr.

ness, was too glaringly insufficient to satisfy permanently even Fichte himself. An order is no more than a relation of actual existences, not an actual independent existence itself, and cannot be conceived to be a power in the proper sense of the word, a power which acts and maintains itself; and a law is only operative in so far as it acts within living beings as a function of their nature. The moral law therefore can only be a power so far as it is felt in the consciousness of men as the reasonable impulse of specifically human development and activity. Were we obliged to regard the presence of this impulse of which experience speaks (the presence, *i.e.* of conscience), as a mere psychological fact, admitting of no further explanation and no deeper proof, then our faith in the prevalence of goodness over the formidable power of the sensual and selfish impulses in man by which it is opposed, would be destitute of any ultimately fixed and certain confirmation; then there would be no certain means of overcoming that pessimist resignation which sees in goodness no more than an ideal of fine souls which can never be realised in the actual world; since the proofs furnished by experience of the prevalence of good over evil have no more than conditional truth, and appear at times to possess no truth at all. The case is very different when we refer the law of goodness, which we feel in ourselves as an unconditional demand, to an unconditioned, therefore a superhuman being, to the real creative ground of human personality and of the world generally, that is, to God. Then we have in him not only (what the moral argument in its first form led to) the explanation and the cause of the existence of the moral law, and of the specific obligation with which its demands assert themselves in the subjective conscience; then we also find in the God who governs the world the impregnable guarantee that the demands of conscience are objectively valid in the world, and that they are certain to be triumphantly vindicated in the whole great course of the world's affairs. Thus faith attains an absolute *a priori* certainty, which again is to a certain extent confirmed by experience, on a review of the great epochs of the development of the world's history; for that history proves ever and again to be the judgment of the world, in which evil

ever destroys itself at last by working out its own consequences, and goodness arrives at last at victory and rule, or, to speak more accurately, at a predominance which is never perfectly stable, but always liable to fall.

Thus even in this second form, as postulating a moral governor of the world, the moral argument has a sound meaning and an abiding truth. This truth, however, will appear both purer and more incontrovertible, when it is taken along with the results of the former arguments, and referred to that law of the development of human reason which helps to constitute the universal teleological world-order, and is the form in which the moral revelation of God is brought about. In the very existence of this reasonable nature of man God shows himself to be the holy lawgiver, or Creator; in the preservation and the growing activity of its laws and powers, as it conquers the world, God proves himself to be the righteous and gracious governor of the history of mankind.

The *ontological* argument in its scholastic form (Anselm, Descartes) concludes from the notion of God as the most perfect being, his existence as one of the qualities or realities included in that notion. Kant, with reasons drawn from sound common sense (like the monk *Gonilo*, who was contemporary with Anselm, in his *liber pro insipiente*), set this argument aside as a meaningless scholastic subtlety, and no one would now think of reviving it in this scholastic form. Though Hegel in his criticism dealing with Kant's criticism of it, rehabilitated this argument, this applied, as every one would expect, only to the fundamental thought of it, not to its untenable form. According to Hegel the idea or thought is itself the absolute, and this of course implied for him that it includes being: the idea, he said, is not so poor that not even the poorest category of being should belong to it. This certainly was cutting the knot with the sword; and the consequence of this idealistic Panlogism which at once declares thought to be the absolute, was that no distinction was drawn between the creative thought of God and the creature-thought of man, a defect which supplied Feuerbach and Strauss with an apparent justification for their atheistic misinterpretation of

Hegel, according to which the absolute is only in human thought, and is therefore first produced there, and our thought therefore is itself the absolute—a really senseless distortion of Hegelian idealism, which was far removed from this deification of man. Human thought is manifestly very far from being the absolute: it is conditioned and limited round and round: it is dependent on the gifts of nature in man himself and on the world as the object which he did not create, but which was given to him as it is: it accomplishes itself only in painful toil and gradual progress towards the truth; in constant struggle, and constant entanglement in error; and is therefore never completed, never absolute.

But it is certainly true—and this is the truth of the turn given by Hegel to the ontological argument—that thought is a spiritual act on man's part, in which he announces in the most unmistakable way his being spirit, his going beyond the world of sense. If even sensation and consciousness are states of a subject which cannot be explained from matter, from mechanical movements of atoms, then thought proper, the setting of the universal for the Ego and by the Ego, is the most direct antithesis to all material mechanism, the negation of the quality of outsideness of the latter by the function of the ideal synthesis of it in the Ego. Now as material nature, out of which our human thought develops itself, and the help of which it never can dispense with, manifestly cannot be the sufficient cause of this spiritual act, which so entirely transcends the physical and sensible, the ultimate ground of man's spiritual act must lie in that spiritual principle which is also the ground of nature, that is in the infinite spirit. We are led to the same point by another way of looking at the matter: Thought is the spontaneous activity of the Ego, which follows in it its own logical laws, in-dwelling in the Ego from the first, and which it by no means received by perception from the outer world: as all experience, being a regularly connected knowledge of the world, only comes to pass by the raw material of sensations being worked up by thought according to its own logical laws, these laws themselves cannot possibly be derived from experience, which indeed is only made possible by them, but are the

necessary *a priori* forms of the connection of all the contents of consciousness. But thought, connecting its materials together according to the forms or laws inherent in it, comes to know even objective truth, *i.e.* not merely to know the phenomena of the world individually, but also to understand the forms or laws of their connection with each other. Now this manifestly leads us to suppose that the subjectively necessary forms of the ideal connection of the phenomena of consciousness (the logical laws) accurately correspond to the objectively necessary forms of the real connection of actual events and things (with the laws of being, physical and metaphysical); for otherwise thought might be ever so accurately in correspondence with its own laws, but could never have the slightest guarantee that it was true, in harmony with existing things; indeed, if the laws of thought were not at concord with the laws of being, the possibility of knowing reality must be entirely given up. But experience itself shows that this is not the case, that, on the contrary, the laws which our thought, taking of its own things, imports into the phenomena of the world, are really present there, nay, that the phenomena which we calculate beforehand and expect on the basis of the laws we are acquainted with, never fail to put in their appearance, whether the conjunctures of the stars in the universe or the behaviour of mechanical instruments in daily life. The agreement, therefore, of the ideal laws of thought, which are not drawn from the outer world, and the real laws of being, which are not created by our thought, is a fact of experience of the most incontrovertible kind; the whole certainty of our knowledge rests on it. But how are we to account for this agreement? There is only one possible way in which the agreement of our thought with the being of the world can be made intelligible; the presupposition of a common ground of both, in which thought and being must be one, or the assumption that the real world-ground is at the same time the ideal ground of our spirit, hence the absolute spirit, creative reason which appears in the world-law on its real, in the law of thought on its ideal side. The connection of thought and being, subject and object in the finite and derivative spiritual being, points back to the unity of the two in the

infinite spirit, as the ground and original type of ours. This is the meaning of the "ontological" argument, as indicated even in the word. We may find it anticipated even in *Plato*, in the thought that the highest idea or the deity is the cause both of being and of knowledge; and Augustine follows him in this, frequently and in a number of turns of thought tracing back our faculty of knowing the truth to the fact of our participation in God, who is the substantial truth, the unchangeable law both of the world and of our thought. In modern times this thought forms the foundation and corner-stone of speculative philosophy; and the criticism of the theory of knowledge, too, as I showed in my discussion of Kant, can find the solution of its difficulties nowhere but in that assumption in which the religious consciousness has always found the solution it sought; it also must simply confess: "In *thy* light we shall see light."

The kernel of the ontological argument thus belongs to the theory of knowledge generally, and we have found it to amount to this, that we are obliged to assume the being of God as the ground and guarantee of the truth of our own thinking. This is a truth which has always forced itself on the religious consciousness also; only that religion, not having to deal with the question of knowledge generally, gave this truth a more special application to its own interests, declaring that our *knowledge of God* rests on a revelation of God, and therefore implies the most immediate proof of God's existence. How closely connected this religious argument is with that from the theory of knowledge and the ontological one, in fact that the two are originally one, may be seen very plainly from the Confessions of Augustine, but also from the later Monologion and Prologion of *Anselm;* it was only afterwards, when the ontological argument had stiffened into its scholastic form, that the religious argument branched off from it, and then also assumed the external supernaturalistic form which it has, *e.g.* in *Descartes,* who thinks the consciousness of God can only be explained from a positive divine revelation. Against this form of the argument the very obvious objection was raised by *Bayle,* that the human consciousness of God does not indicate the existence of any supernatural manifestation of

God, but admits of a sufficient explanation from the natural equipment of the human mind. This statement is confirmed by the whole modern science of religion, which, indeed, rests just on the genetic principle according to which the formation and transformation of religious ideas is to be understood as being from the first the outcome of the law of the development of man's mental nature. But if this is granted, can the consciousness of God in no way be considered to have proceeded from a revelation? Only the most wooden Deism would assert this; the religious consciousness, with which deeper thinking quite agrees, is assured that the manifold factors of the process of religious consciousness, the inner motives and the outer suggestions and incentives which enter into its composition, are no more than the correlative means which point and refer to one ground and end, which can be nothing but the creative ground of nature and of mankind. It is God himself who has founded in our race the thought of God, by implanting in our nature that sense, that reason which perceives in the objective reasonableness of the works of creation the "eternal power and Godhead" (Rom. i. 20) of the Creator. And it is God himself who has caused the God-consciousness of humanity to develop historically to ever richer and purer forms, speaking as he has done to the hearts of men "at sundry times and divers manners in time past" (Heb. i. 1; Acts xiv. 17, xvii. 27), by the suggestive signs and wonderful forces of the world's history (of which the miraculous legends of mythology are but the childish and stammering expression). If we of to-day estimate more accurately than did past generations the immediate psychological motives which make the belief in God necessary to us, that surely can be no reason for doubting the reality of the idea of God; on the contrary, we should imagine that the deeper insight we have gained into the strict teleological connection of the world-order, in which every natural need and desire points to a correlative object which can satisfy it, might warrant the belief that the deepest and most universal need of the human soul, its thirst after the living God, has a corresponding object, which can be nothing else than the highest truth, the reality of God. And if, as is undoubtedly the case, we of to-day are

able to see more clearly than our predecessors the historical stages by which the human consciousness of God has come to be what it is, that manifold wisdom must impress itself upon us the more strongly, which knows how to weave together the tangled threads of the fortunes of the peoples and of the heart-experiences of individuals, into that wonderful tissue which we call the history of the religion of mankind.

Thus the same observation is repeated here, only with more striking force than formerly, which impressed itself on us when considering outward nature, viz., that we need nowhere shun the clear light of knowledge, nor carry off our faith to darkness as a refuge: we can take up our position with an easy mind on the basis of science, can unreservedly appropriate to ourselves the modern point of view of the genetic principle of development; in spite of science, or even by science herself, we are led from every point of the world of nature and of man, with the same irresistible necessity, to the one ground to which all things refer, the one end of all development, to the God from whom, and through whom, and to whom are all things!

The result of these arguments accordingly is the objective truth of the belief in God, *i.e.* not only the conviction *that* God is, but also the knowledge of *what* he is. These two things, frequent assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, can never be really separated from each other. Of an object of which I was quite ignorant of the "what," I could not know even the "that." I arrive at the latter through experience of the effects of an object, but its effects are the manifestations of its essence, the appearance therefore of that which it is. Did the nature of it not appear in the manifestation, did it remain hidden behind the appearance as a thing-in-itself or an x quite separate from its manifestation, then the manifestation too would be no more than an empty show, it would be impossible to conclude from it to a cause of it; we could not even affirm the "that" of a thing-in-itself as its cause. In these abstractions of scholastic subtlety reflection revolves around itself in a constant fruitless circle, in a fashion which is positively ridiculous.

If the phenomena which are given to us in the first place as mere facts of consciousness, are to be any more than empty show, we must see in them signs which point to a being who is independent of us, and declare that being to our knowledge. True, this being cannot coincide altogether with the phenomena in our consciousness, since this is constituted partly by the organisation of our senses. The red which we see in the rose, the sound which we hear from the string, do not exist outside us as this sense-perception, but are only produced by our sense of seeing, our sense of hearing; yet at the same time the different sensations of colour and of tone are not mere show, but signs which point to particular relations of existing things in such a way that these relations are able to become the object of our thinking knowledge. Without thought which goes back beyond the immediate phenomenon and asks what underlies it in existence, no knowledge of any kind can come to pass; for thought, however, everything existing can become the object of knowledge; it would be a most arbitrary proceeding to fix absolute limits anywhere which the impulse towards knowledge was never to exceed, before which it was always hopelessly to lay down its arms. If the nature of God be said to be unknowable because it lies outside of our experience, it is scarcely clear what this statement is intended to convey. Taking it strictly, it would imply that the nature, nay the very existence, of other human personalities outside myself, are to me unknowable. Does the personal existence, thinking, feeling, will of other men ever enter into my immediate experience? What I experience is nothing but the sense-perceptions of certain forms, colours and tones, which connect themselves before me into representations, pictures of bodies in motion analogous to my own; but that there is any being-in-itself answering to these pictures, and that this being has a living soul similar to my own, that these souls have feelings, thoughts, desires, similar to those immediately known to me from my experience of myself, all this can never be the matter of "experience" to me. I can only infer it by a process of analogy from my own inner experience; and this is an inference which we all make from the very beginning of our lives so often and so regularly, and which so

rarely deceives us, that we have long ceased to be conscious that it is an inference at all. The opinion therefore that the supersensible, and that God cannot be known, because not an object of experience, rests on the sensualistic prejudices of the naïve consciousness, and falls with these before the criticism which sees that even in the daily intercourse we keep up with our fellow-men the experience of the senses is no more than the sign-language from the interpretation of which alone we know by means of thought the life and the existence of others of which the senses alone could never bring us any knowledge. If this is the case with *all* our knowledge, if it all rests on combining together and interpreting the signs given in our inner and our outer experience, then there is no reason that can prevent us from carrying the same procedure a step further, combining and interpreting the whole of the signs given in all human experience and inferring thence the divine being which underlies the whole world of these phenomena.

With the difficulty with which we have been dealing, that our knowledge cannot apprehend God, there is often combined with more or less confusion of thought, a metaphysical objection of quite a different kind, the origin of which goes back to Plato, and which still plays its part in the theology of Schleiermacher. The divine being, it is held, withdraws itself from thinking knowledge, because it is the simple infinite being which is quite above all antitheses, differences, and determinations, while all thought moves in differences and relations. But this assumption is based on an erroneous notion both of the infinite and of being. The "infinite" cannot be the abstract generality which is in no way determined; were this the case, it would not be the ground of determined finite being, and would not therefore have the latter in itself but outside itself, and would thus be limited and rendered finite by it. The true infinite can only be the whole, which is in itself the ground of all its determinations and differences, and therefore also the ground of everything particular and finite comprehended under it. Of that false infinite in the sense of abstract generality we could not even with truth predicate existence. For if we take "being" to denote not something imaginary

predicated as a function, a quality, a relation, or other accident of that which is, but an independent substantial actuality, then it is easy to know that we have acquaintance with such a being in one single form only, namely, in the self-experience of our ego. This ego, the first acquaintance of every human being, contains in fact the original norm according to which we must measure our notion of being generally, because obviously we can only transfer that being of which we are immediately aware in our experience, to other things outside us, for no one can give what he himself does not possess. Measured by this normal standard, empty generality without determinations is at once seen to be quite insufficient for the notion of being. The ego is, on the contrary, the filled-up unity which in itself both distinguishes and combines together the plurality of its activities and states; it is quite and altogether present in all its ideas, feelings, desires, and acts, and yet is never lost in them, but asserts itself as the independent unity which presides over and unites all these particulars; it experiences the change of its states as a constant becoming other, and yet remains amid this change in constant identity with itself. It distinguishes its states which have elapsed from its own persistent being, as states which no longer are, and at the same time takes them up as "memory" into the enduring element of its inner life. So wonderful a thing is the being of the ego, and yet it is to us that which is indubitably certain, the primary fact of all knowledge, the type of all being.

From this it may be seen clearly enough that the objections to the knowableness of God drawn from the traditional (Platonic) notion of "the infinite being" rest upon a twofold misunderstanding —since, in the first place, the true infinite is not empty generality, but the filled-up whole, and true being is not stiff singleness, but the unity of the self existing for none but itself, and asserting itself in the multiplicity of its activities. Thus the road is positively marked out, on which every attempt at the knowledge of God by thought will be obliged to proceed; if it is to have any result, we must set out from the analogy of our own ego, the substantial being which alone is immediately known to us; which though a limited whole

composed of parts, yet includes in itself a little world; and from this we may conclude to the being of God as the Primal ego of the all-embracing whole of the world. And here we must take heed in equal measure of two dangers. On the one side we manifestly must not conceive of God as only one whole of several, or one particular being after our limited manner, having other particular beings outside him, co-ordinated with him, and so no longer the unity of the whole which connects together all its particular parts, but having need himself to be combined with other co-ordinate particular beings in a higher whole. As little must we, on the other side, blot out those determinations of being which we find present in our own ego, or weaken them down till they are meaningless, with the view that we can only preserve the "absoluteness of God" by removing all clear distinctions till nothing remains but monotonous uniformity. The latter danger is wont to beset dogmatic constructions of the notion of God, the former accompanies the popular way of thinking rather. But a notion of God which is to satisfy both the demands of thought, which seeks in God the one ground and purpose of the world, and the religious need, which seeks to find in him the supreme object for the practical direction of life, must be one which does full justice on the one hand to his all-embracing *Wholeness*, and on the other to his independence as an *Ego*. If the latter is what is understood under the notion of "Spirit," the nature of God may be not inaptly described as "infinite Spirit;" only we must be on our guard against the manifold misinterpretations of which such a phrase is susceptible, and see that inadequate and vague notions do not creep in under it again, such as that of a living causality, or blind will, or of the unconscious, this dreaming world-soul, or of the logical idea, which is a mere thought, not a substantial being, etc.

Against all this we must set out from the position, and must resolutely hold to it, that we can only know the nature of God after the analogy of our own ego. Now every one knows it to be one of the main characteristics of the ego, that it is conscious of itself. Self-consciousness may be clearer at one time than at another, as the states of the person vary, but it is always present in some

degree, indeed it is the foundation of the assertion of the inner unity of our being amid the change of states, and of activities. From this it results at once, that a characteristic which belongs indissolubly to the nature of our Ego, but belongs to it in varying degrees of perfectness, can neither be entirely denied to the unlimited Primal ego of God, nor affirmed of it in a limited degree of clearness (as a dream-consciousness, for example), but that we must assert it here in unlimited perfection. The perfect self-consciousness of God religious faith maintains as a matter admitting of no question, for the simple reason that an unconscious God could not be the object of any religious relation whatever. If, notwithstanding, many have denied the consciousness of God, they did so certainly not from religious but merely from theoretical grounds, drawn partly from idealistic, partly from materialistic assumptions. *Fichte* had supposed that the consciousness of the ego only arises out of the antithesis to the non-ego, and so was only possible to a being affected by this antithesis, *i.e.* to a limited being. But on this Krause aptly remarked, and here Lotze followed his lead, that to distinguish an object from one's self as non-ego, it is necessary first to possess the ego, and that one can only become aware of the ego in an immediate "ground-view" conditioned by nothing else, this self-awareness being the necessary condition of all other apprehension and knowledge. In fact, every careful act of attention teaches that the self-consciousness of the ego is not based on an external antithesis, in fact itself posits this antithesis by an act of thought, but only on the inner distinction and reference between the one persistent ego and the manifold and the changeable of its activities and states. Self-consciousness depends certainly on this inner self-distinction, but on it alone, by no means on an opposition from without, which in fact is rather the result than the condition of that inner distinction. From this it follows that we could not well assume self-consciousness in God if we conceived his being as simple unity, whether as indeterminate being or as pure thought of thought; but, on the contrary, that we not only can but must assume self-consciousness in God so soon as we distinguish

in him a plurality of activities, such as thought and will; because otherwise these two would have no relation to each other, and would fall entirely asunder—the will would know nothing of the thought and the thought would know nothing of the will, if they were not related to each other in the unity of the ego which is identical with itself in thought and in will, and conscious of that identity. In the same way it would not be easy to conceive a self-consciousness followed by no change of states because its activity was identical with its being and equally unchangeable; but if, as seems proper on other grounds, we introduce a distinction between God's unchangeable being and his changing activities and states, then the assumption of self-consciousness in God becomes an imperative necessity, because only in it can unity of being maintain itself amid change of states; otherwise it must be lost irretrievably in the flux of becoming. All this appears to have been insufficiently considered by E. v. Hartmann, who concedes the principles stated above, and yet denies the consciousness of God. He also goes back to materialistic grounds, and declares memory to be impossible with God, because experience tells us that memory always depends on the impression made on the molecules of the brain. Here, however, he is guilty of the confusion which has always, it is well known, prevailed in materialistic circles between the ministrant function of the organ and the dominant function of the ego; he ought to explain how it comes to pass that the molecules of the brain communicate their impressions to each other so as to bring about that constant connection of the earlier with the present states of consciousness which we call memory: if it be the case that the molecules of the brain could scarcely accomplish this without a miracle, then we must still consider that it is not the material brain but the supersensuous ego that forms the real ground and explanation of memory; and in that case there is no reason why memory should be less possible to a divine ego, which is not tied to the conditions of the brain, than to the limited human ego. And finally, it is rather too much to ask that we should represent to ourselves a perfect wisdom which creates and rules the world—for Hartmann's "unconscious" is just this—

without consciousness and memory. Is it not everywhere the case that work with a certain end in view is based on a process of reviewing, connecting, and combining means and ends, the *prius* and the *posterius*, which is not possible without the synthesis of consciousness? We can only regard Hartmann's "All-wise unconscious" as a failure, a ghost with which philosophy and religion need not long detain themselves.

If then we are entitled to think of God as a self-conscious ego, we must not retreat from the consequences contained in that assumption. If self-consciousness is everywhere based on the correlative of the one persistent ego with the manifoldness and changeableness of that which is in his mind, consistency requires us to assume that this is the case in God too. But then we must not conceive of the consciousness of God as mere *thought*, the contents of which were just itself again, as Aristotle called God "thought of thought." This would be to set in the place of the whole living contents that fill our consciousness with the many-sided play of ideas, feelings, desires, and acts, the emptiest and most monotonous abstraction; we should have conceived God not as the most perfect type of the ego but as the poorest shadow of it. But even if we assumed the idea of the world to be the contents of the divine thinking, it would help but little; for though the idea of the world is a whole with many members containing all possible ideas of ends and all eternal truths, and so embraces at least ideal differences, yet these differences are ideal merely, they are only pictures of possible realities, not the realities themselves; the full life-energy, which arises just from the relation of the ideas to the motives of the will, would not be attained, and a change of the divine state of consciousness would still be inconceivable, because the ideal picture of the world would remain always the same, and so it would still be questionable if the analogy of our self-conscious ego could be applied to God at all. A further point, however, is that if we set out from such a one-sided idealistic notion of God it would be impossible to explain the actual world. For all the determinations of thought are notions, nothing more, and how mere notions are to change of themselves into solid reality, into sub-

stances, is a question, as Fichte once very correctly remarked, on which the first rational word has still to be spoken. It was just the sense of this want that moved the Greek idealists to associate with the pure idea or the divine thought, matter as the unlimited, the not-being, possibility, or however else they named it; and it was this also which led Spinoza to associate extension and thought together under the common term of substance. Nothing of course was gained by this, for however ether-like matter might be supposed to be, it was still as regards thought an entirely foreign, unrelated, intractable stuff, of which nothing could be made, and the world of course could not be founded.

It is a very remarkable circumstance that this cosmological difficulty finds its only possible solution in the very quarter to which we are directed in our attempt to work out consistently our idea of the divine ego. The manifoldness and changeableness of the contents of the divine consciousness, which must necessarily be assumed for a solution of that difficulty, cannot be understood, any more than the transition from the idea of the world to the reality of the world, from the mere thinking of God. But we learn from a critical contemplation of ourselves that it is the experience of our *will* and its active and passive stimulations, out of which the consciousness of our own reality indirectly arises for us, and indirectly the consciousness of reality outside us. We simply follow the course previously set up, of arguing by analogy from our own ego to the nature of God, when we find that in God also the moment of reality is in the will; and this is not as if we saw in the will merely another form or direction of thought, as idealism would have it; we consider it to be a specifically different function of the ego beside and over against thought. Thought in all its forms is once for all a setting of pictures, whether types or copies of the real; only the will is a primary reality and the source of all reality. The will needs, it is true, the ideas in which it holds its contents, its definite "what;" but the idea needs the will, in which it comes to reality, to the "that." The will is the energy of action, which helps thought to being; thought as such is not yet energy, as energy as such is not yet thought;

but thought without energy can never attain to *actual* being, any more than energy without thought can attain to *definite* being. That it ignored the former was the mistake of idealism from Plato down to Hegel; that it ignores the second is a mistake of materialism from Democritus to the positivism of the present day. The necessity of combining both was first seen with a prophet's genius by the *philosophus teutonicus* Jacob Böhme; and the task of the present day consists just in carrying out in earnest this true real-idealistic monism, and finding in it the atonement of the brothers who have till now been enemies.

But how? Can we really speak of "will," will in the proper sense, in God, will being a desire which indicates a want, and finds satisfaction by acting with reference to an outward object? This objection was raised, *e.g.* by Spinoza, and is not less plausible than that of Fichte against the consciousness of God. We must not, however, be frightened at this objection any more than at the other. If we look at the matter quietly and do not forget the analogy by which we are being guided on this subject, we shall soon see that the objection, though at first it appears a forcible one, yet derives its strength in the one case as well as the other from a confusion between the immediate and the mediate, the original and the derivative. The objection to the consciousness of God was disposed of by our seeing, when we looked more closely into the matter, that the consciousness of the ego is a quite original and immediate awareness, which does not depend on our consciousness of the non-ego, but rather makes the latter possible; and the case will be the same as to this new objection with regard to the will in God. We must distinguish between will in its immediate inner stirring, as it appears to us primarily as the original fact of our experience of ourselves, and will in its mediate outward appearance, known to us like all phenomena mediately, as a cause operating on objects in the world. In the former sense will is, as Leibniz simply and aptly defined it, nothing but a striving directed to ideas, which in its positive aspect is called desire, in its negative abhorrence, the former associated with the feeling of pleasure, the latter with that of pain. The feelings are intimately bound up with this inner will, as the exponents of the

relation of desire to the ideas from time to time presented to it, only this inner willing and feeling—to distinguish it from external activity we may call it the mood (gemüth) or the heart—is immediately given to us as an original experience of ourself; but in this experience we remain entirely by ourselves, for it is only by means of ideas that definite motions of the will and states of feeling are set up in our heart. Now if we stop here and ask what there is to prevent us from ascribing to God will in this sense of immediate inwardness, I certainly am not aware of any valid objection to our doing so. To say that there is in God a striving which is directed to the ideas or thought-pictures which are also present in God and associated with corresponding states of feeling, how should this assumption make the nature of God finite? Only he can assert that it does so who has made up his mind to see in every determination of a function a limitation of the being concerned—the old Platonic and Spinozistic error which we disposed of above once for all.

But it is possible to enter into some particulars as to this willing and feeling of the divine mood. His will is directed to the realisation of the ideas of his intelligence, which, in virtue of their reference to the will, are to be called end-ideas. These, along with infinite manifoldness in detail, are bound together in a systematic whole because they are all related to the one ground and end in the divine ego, which in this whole, the world-idea, beholds in a picture and develops its own perfect life-contents. The world-idea is the reflection, posited in the divine intelligence, of the perfection of the divine being, which, being at the same time the object of the divine will, is the prototype of the perfect world which is to be realised. Now a will which is directed to the realisation of the idea of what is perfect is to be called a will of good; but the divine will lies exclusively in this direction, since for it there is no other object but the world-idea posited in the divine intelligence, and thus we must predicate *perfect goodness* as the fundamental determination of the divine will. Again, the divine will, being the primary reality, is also the original unlimited and inexhaustible power or capacity of working; there is therefore to be attributed to it *perfect power* to

realise its ends, because all power for work proceeds from it alone, and no foreign power is able to hinder it in the accomplishment of its ends. With the divine will there is also connected the feeling of pleasure, in proportion to the certainty of the realisation of its ends and the importance of these ends themselves; and hence there must also be connected with the divine will which is assured of perfect power to realise its perfect end, the feeling of *perfect blessedness.* These determinations, which flow of themselves from the inner nature and mutual relations of the will and the intelligence of God, are therefore essential, *i.e.* necessary and unchangeable, attributes of it.

From this will, however, we have carefully to distinguish, as we indicated above, the appearance of the will in its outward operation. What this distinction means we learn in ourselves as often as we do not carry out what we wish, and do not inwardly wish that which we yet do. As for the relation of the two sides to each other, it is important to observe, that only the inner will, the excitation of our feeling, is known to us from direct experience, while the appearance of our will in act we only know at second-hand from the pictures arising out of our sense-perception of our bodily motions, and of the changes brought about by these in the state of objects appearing to us, while of the exertions of the will of others we only know at third-hand, concluding from the analogy of the known connection between the excitations of our will and the movements of our body to a similar connection of the movements we perceive of other bodies with corresponding excitation of will in other souls. Now if we ask how the inner movement of will passes into the effect which we can see, it must be confessed that what we know of the process amounts to little more than nothing; all that is certain is that the act of will never comes into view immediately as such, but is always accompanied with complicated movements of the nervous and muscular organism, which are necessary to the very smallest action, *e.g.*, to the writing of these words. But how are these movements set to work? It is usual to say that the will makes use of the bodily apparatus of motion as its "instrument." But this image explains little, and is itself misleading. It is quite obvious that while the pen is the in-

strument of writing, and also the hand, the former is quite differently related from the latter to the will to write. The former merely is moved, while the latter, that is to say, the apparatus of nerves and muscles, moves itself, each vein and cell yielding its proper quantity of work, as we see from the waste of their energy or from the fatigue that follows their long-continued exertion. Thus it would manifestly be more correct to say that the simple inner act of will translates itself into the multiplicity of the special functions of the organically connected powers, each of which yields its own work in interchange with the rest, and which yet all together only bring to actual manifestation the one inner act of the will. Nor is it the case that the inner act of will is lost in the multiplicity of the actions of the organism which carry it out: it remains in the inner region of the self-conscious ego, and is the ruling ground and object of all those ministrant activities; but as little does this ground ever enter specially, by itself, into the outward action, so as to become a co-operating member of the organic common action; as the general remains in the background of the army, and victoriously carries out his will through the totality of the will-activities which he directs, without ever needing to move a hand to interfere personally in the action, so is the inner will related to the multiplicity of the active powers of the organism which bring it to actual appearance.

Applying those remarks to the manifestation of the will of God, the analogy is seen once more to be extremely instructive. As our inner will never comes to appearance directly as such, but always only mediately, translating itself into the many special functions of the organic powers of our body, we must assume that just the same is true of the inner will of God. It also must, to come into operation, translate its infinite power into the many finite powers, each of which is a relatively independent subject of functions (a "monad," or will-centre), and stands in a relation of co-ordination and interaction with the rest, but which all together, by the contributions they all make, only bring about the one single homogeneous manifestation of the one will of God. The operation of the divine will is brought about by means of the totality of finite powers interacting

with each other, it does not come into action specially for itself so as to be a co-operative member of the interaction of the finite. The popular view that the infinite will, or the omnipotence of God, operates as such, or as a particular cause, strict thought judges inadmissible from the following simple consideration. All action is directed to objects in which it seeks to effect changes, but from which it necessarily, so certainly as they possess an independent existence, experiences a reaction at the same time, an opposition of some degree; and so all action is in strictness to be regarded as an interaction. From this it follows at once that the immediate agent can only be conceived as being in each case a particular being, co-ordinated with other independent beings, *i.e.* as a finite cause, while the infinite is not to be conceived as acting itself, but as being the one ground of the interaction of all finite beings. This result, here attained by a new path, from the analogy of our own inner will in relation to the instrumental functions of our organism, has long been familiar to thought, and has been put in various ways, often, it is true, in connection with the abstract monistic misunderstanding, as if the divine will were lost in the multiplicity of finite forms and functions, or as if these faded away in God to an unessential and unindependent show. From this error the analogy of our ego, if we strictly adhere to it, may guard us. The ego remains perfectly conscious and master of itself, in its unity and self-identity, while clearly distinguishing from itself the multiplicity of its functions, and referring them to itself as means to an end: the ego is present altogether in each of its ideas, desires, and acts, and at the same time projects beyond each of them, both separating them from each other, and combining them into unity in itself. It also includes in the system of its own life the ministrant functions of the bodily organs, while leaving them in full possession of the relative independence they must have in their action upon one another. So too the divine ego always remains conscious of his own independent being in perfect goodness, power, and blessedness, while at the same time he distinguishes from himself and refers to himself the whole system of interacting forces, or the world, as the means, set by himself, of his

self-manifestation. In all of them he is quite present, and he quite projects beyond them all, he separates them all from each other in relative independence, and connects them all together in himself again as the embracing whole. God is thus at the same time the ego who is in himself and distinguishes himself from everything finite, and the all-embracing whole, who has all things in and under himself, nothing outside himself: he neither disappears in the world nor is he excluded from it, he comprehends it in himself as the unfolded system of his own thoughts and powers. This, I conceive, is *true, complete monotheism*, in which deistic and pantheistic abstractions are alike transcended. Whether, indeed, the notion of "Personality" is to be applied or not to the nature of God as thus described, can be left to each one to determine according to his views of the use of language; in point of substance it matters nothing, provided only that those who apply this notion to God do not compromise the all-embracing wholeness of God, nor make him again (as indeed theologians, at least, usually do) a particular being who is co-ordinate with other persons; and that those who do not consider the notion a suitable one to apply to God do not compromise the ego of God, and (as indeed philosophers usually do) empty him of all contents, leaving nothing but a vague pantheistic ghost, devoid of all reality and all character.

The further development of this notion of God, and at the same time the best test of its correctness, may be found most simply in a discussion of the notions of the qualities ("attributes") which dogmatics usually assign to God. True, these predicates do not arise out of philosophical speculation on the nature of God, but out of the religious consciousness of God which they seek directly to describe. But inasmuch as the God of philosophic thought and the God of religious faith are the same being, only apprehended from two different sides, it must be possible to trace an agreement between the various sides of the notion of God and the religious declarations as to his attributes. The notion of God must show itself to be correct by affording a basis for these statements, and the dogmatic statements again must, when

referred to the stricter notion, find a touchstone to detect in them any ways of thinking which come short of the truth of the subject.

Two things are indissolubly joined together in the religious consciousness—dependence on God as the absolutely higher power, and communion with him as the spiritual being who is of the same nature with ourselves. The dicta of religion as to the divine attributes similarly describe the divine being as on the one hand the free power which rules the world, and is itself outside the limits of the world, and on the other hand as a spirit who is perfect in point of intelligence and will. The determinations on the first side are *omnipotence*, eternity, and omnipresence. The incomparable superiority of the power which is not bound in the conditions of our existence is a fundamental characteristic of the deity in all religions, and even at the earliest stages of religious consciousness, where indeed the true notion of omnipotence is still wanting, because the nature-gods are still limited beings who find limits to their power in each other, or in fate, or in matter. A remainder of this natural limit survives even in the idealistic philosophy of the Greeks in the dualism of spirit and matter, the latter of which remains, however sublimated, an irrational something with which the divine power can never come to terms. Only in the God-consciousness of the prophets of Israel did the thought of the divine omnipotence entirely prevail. Here God is the sole unlimited power, from which everything is that exists, and which can create whatever it will : without requiring any stuff or any instrument God produces the universe by his mere will and by his word, and keeps it in existence as long as he will (Ps. xxxiii. 6, 9 ; cxv. 3 ; civ. 29 *seq.*). This noble expression of a profoundly religious feeling of dependence is entirely in agreement with the notion of God developed above ; for we recognised in the divine will the primary reality, and the source of all reality, and we saw that this will has for its contents the divine ideas, the ends conceived and framed into the " word," which give the will its definite " what," as it helps them to their " that," their actual existence. Again, we showed above that the divine will does not come to its manifestation immediately, but mediated by the finite powers itself

has posited, and that therefore every particular effect has its cause within the nexus of finite action and reaction, which again has its cause in the will of God ; and these thoughts we can see are by no means strange to the religious consciousness. The Psalmist says (civ. 4) God "makes the winds his messengers, his ministers flaming fires;" the elemental powers themselves are executant mediate causes of his will. Now it is certainly true that the immediate religious consciousness is not usually disposed to bestow special attention on the mediate causes of divine omnipotence, and very frequently overlooks them altogether, and refers an effect which has been experienced to the immediate causality of God, especially if that experience has aroused the religious sentiment in a special and energetic way. But to say that the immediate religious consciousness pays no special attention to finite mediating causes, is to imply that it does not expressly deny them ; what it calls for in every case is the assurance that all that is, and all that happens, has its ground in the divine will; religion does not immediately require to have it decided whether an event is mediated by finite causes or not. It is only dogmatic reflection that inquires as to this, and it has declared the voice of the religious consciousness to indicate that divine omnipotence works in part by secondary causes, or in a systematic way, and in part without secondary causes, in an extraordinary, unconditioned, or absolute way. But it has long been observed that such a division betrays a lack of practised thought, because it ought not to require to be explained that the working of divine omnipotence is in one respect always unlimited and absolute, inasmuch as God, who is not conditioned or limited by anything foreign to himself, orders the whole of the world purely out of the power of his own will, while in another respect it is always a conditioned and regular working, inasmuch as every particular effect inside the world is conditioned by the connection of the interacting causes. It is the same with regard to the similar distinction between the free and the necessary working of divine omnipotence : it must not be understood as if this working were partly free and partly necessary ; on the contrary, it is always free, inasmuch as it is the pure expression of the self-activity

of the divine will, which is determined by God himself alone; and yet at the same time it is always necessary, inasmuch as the will of God is never an indeterminate, accidental, arbitrary will, but is always determined by the thoughts of divine reason, which are entirely rational, systematically connected with each other, and therefore eternal truths which God cannot change, because he cannot wish to change them without contradicting himself. That God's almighty will is determined by his all-wise reason is a cardinal point of every speculative doctrine of God; and in this speculation agrees in principle with the religious consciousness, which understands itself to be reasonable, though religion seldom has either the ability or the desire to draw the consequences involved in this position.

The religious assertion of the *eternity* of God implies that God is free from the limits of time, that he has no beginning and no end, and undergoes no change of his perfect being; but it does not of itself imply that time is nothing whatever to God, and that no change takes place in the contents of his consciousness. This interpretation has been put upon the religious assertion of the eternity of God only by dogmatic reflection, but unjustly, it must probably be held, as it is liable to serious objections in various respects.[1] If we consider that we ourselves only possess the consciousness of the persistent identity of our being in correlation with the consciousness of the constant change of our states and activities, we shall not find it easy to conceive of God's self-consciousness of his eternal being without a correlative consciousness of changing states: to assume that the contents of his consciousness were constant and unchangeable would be seriously to imperil the very reality of his self-consciousness. To this we must add, that under such an assumption we could scarcely believe God to take a living interest in the course of the world in time, or in fact, even to have any real consciousness of it: his consciousness of the world can only be real if he knows it

[1] These difficulties, the consciousness of which is not generally appreciated by theology, are discussed with acuteness by *Dorner* in his suggestive essay on the unchangeableness of God (*Gesamm. Schriften*, p. 188 *seqq.*). Of the philosophers, *Krause* was the first to bestow attention on this question.

as it actually is, that is as running on in time, if therefore its past states are to him also states no longer existing, but preserved in his memory, and its future states not yet there, but only about to become actual. If time did not exist for God, then it appears to me we should have to accept one of two alternatives; either God must occupy an attitude of indifference to the life of the world in time, like the gods of Epicurus, and then he could no longer be either the God of religion or the explaining cause of the world's time-life; or time must be no reality for the world either, time must be a mere optical delusion, an accident of our human way of regarding things, without any essential truth. The latter has actually been asserted by critical philosophy. But the assertion labours under too serious difficulties to be accepted as correct, especially when we see how Kant himself, in spite of the asserted ideality of time, yet does not hesitate to draw his argument for the reality of the outer world from the succession of the states of consciousness (Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, iii. 29 *seq.*, ed. Hartenstein). Time, it is true, is not a real being, existing for itself, it is merely the form in which various states succeed each other in a being which is persistent; but if it is this succession, it must be true and not a mere appearance, for the simple reason that the various states mutually exclude each other, cannot therefore be together, but must come one after another. But under this lapse of states there lies the constant being of that in which they are, and the lapse of states thus forms a constant succession of changes, a continuous development of the one out of the other, and it is just the form of continuity in the sequence of states that we call time. Thus time is the underlying form of all life, the divine as well as that of the creature. But the great difference is this: in the life of the creature the states of each being run their course in co-ordination and dependence on the states of others who are independent of it, and hence the time of each individual is interwoven with the causal connection of universal time; each individual therefore stands in time and feels it as a limitation. In the divine life, on the contrary, the states do not run in co-ordination with other beings outside God, he includes in himself the whole course of the

correlative states of all beings—these are the moving manifestation of his unmoving being, and he refers them all together to his continuous self as the constant centre or eternal ground of the whole movement. Hence God is not in time, but time, with all that is temporal, is in him, and he is its eternal Lord, the "King of the Ages." The thought must be abstract and nothing more, which considers the eternity of God to be exclusive of time; to concrete thinking such as is true to life, the eternity of God includes time, supports and governs it: his eternal being is the constant ground of the incessant course of time, and as such is revealed in the unchangeableness of the laws according to which all the change of phenomena takes place, it is "the steadfast pole in the flux of phenomena," the guarantee of all unchangeable truth and all continuance of the order of the world; hence to the religious consciousness the eternity of God is recognised as his faithfulness, on which is based his reliability and trustworthiness, the rock and the refuge of faith.

The *omnipresence* of God, which the religious consciousness immediately asserts, amounts in the first instance to no more than the negative statement that God is not confined in his working by limits of space; but this does not prevent him from being represented as being at a particular place and as moving in space—which, indeed, is the most natural way of thinking for the naïve consciousness, and is to be found to a great extent even in the Old Testament. It is only at an advanced stage of reflection that the discovery is made that God is not at a particular place, but present, independent of space, in all parts of space alike, and this not in the way of a bodily extension or reaching out to different parts of space, but in such a way that he is everywhere wholly because everywhere in himself. The difficulty which this thought undoubtedly presents to the mind seeking to realise it, might seem to be most easily solved by denying the reality of space; if space is, as the critical thought of Kant teaches, merely the form in which we view things, then for God it is simply not there. But are we entitled to assume this? It is certainly the case that the idea of space arises for our mind in the first instance from the function of our own consciousness which regards the pictures

presented to us at the same moment by our sensations of sight and of touch as a set of objects outside of each other and beside each other. But granted that our idea of space is subjective in its origin, does it follow from this that space itself is purely subjective? The laws of space-dimensions, as taught by geometry and stereometry, and the laws of movements in space, which form the subject of mechanics and of astronomy, are in the first instance no more than thoughts which we ourselves have produced; but do they possess validity in our thought only, and not also in the real world of the existing? The heavenly phenomena calculated beforehand by astronomers on the basis of relations in space and of the laws of motion, take place to a second before the eyes of various kinds of men; is not this a proof from experience that space is not a mere form of our subjective way of seeing things, but also a form of the existence of the things themselves? This is not to say that we take space to be a real thing, possessing a separate existence of its own; it is not this any more than time. But it is the objective relation in which co-existent and interacting beings stand towards each other, it is the universal ground-form of the mutual relation of all independent separate beings, of the being together of all things which are outside each other. Now it might perhaps be said that a form of relation can only exist in a referring consciousness; and then the question would arise, whose consciousness this is? The mutual relatedness of all beings could not rest on the one-sided referring function of *our* consciousness, nor on any function of consciousness in individual beings, none of which can have more than a subjective consciousness, and even the whole of whom taken together cannot themselves provide a foundation for the objective relation of their mutual reference to each other, which is a thing given them, in which they find themselves. For the form of relation of space we therefore require a consciousness capable of referring, or of positing space; and if this is not to be met with in individual beings, there seems to be no alternative but to transfer the space-positing function to the consciousness of the Primal ego or of God. Thus the simplest explanation of the riddle that space is our subjective form of view, and at

the same time the objective relation of the co-existence of all things, would perhaps be that this is just the original form of view of God, or the ground-form in which the creative reason of God separates and unites again the finite powers or will-centres. Here we may remember that it was no less a man than Newton who called space the *sensorium Dei*. However this may be, so much is certain, that as space is a relation of co-existence, only finite beings, such as stand in co-ordination to each other, can be in space, while God is neither in space nor outside of space, but himself spaceless, founds space, *i.e.* embraces in himself all that is in space as mutually related, and connects it in himself to the unity of the articulated whole.

In the omnipresence of the conscious deity his *omniscience* is at the same time implied, and it is only in conjunction with the latter that the former possesses any religious significance: an unconscious which was omnipresent would of course be without any religious value. But the religious consciousness sees in the divine omniscience not only the unlimited character of the divine knowledge, but also the immediateness of it, or that God knows everything without the intervention of reflection, immediately sees it and is aware of it. Under the usual assumption of God's existence as a separate being outside the world we could not take this to be the case; for we cannot deny that immediate knowledge is only conceivable to us in one form, the form in which we know it in ourselves, namely the knowledge the ego has of the contents of its own consciousness; everything else, whatever exists or happens outside of us, can only become matter of knowledge to us mediately, by thinking interpretation of the signs given in our own consciousness. From this analogy I think it incontrovertibly follows that if God is what the ordinary (abstract theistic) view makes him, an "extra-mundane" separate being, co-ordinate to the beings of the world, he cannot possibly have any immediate knowledge of anything that exists or occurs in the world, but can only have a knowledge mediated by reflection, such as our knowledge of what is outside us. If this were the case, the divine knowledge of the inner ideas and states of the creatures would be arrived at like our own knowledge of such things by reflection

(induction), and could scarcely be infallible any more than ours. But as soon as we accept the position, with all that it involves, that God is the one whole being outside of whom nothing is, who embraces in himself all finite things, and is related to them in the same way as our ego to the manifold contents of its consciousness, we are at once led to the position that the whole world is the object of his immediate intuitive awareness, just as the little world of our consciousness is to our ego. As all special functions, perceptions, passions, and actions are with respect to each other independent and closed, while with respect to the ego which embraces them all in unity, and which is entirely present in all of them alike, they are thoroughly open and known, in the same way finite beings are, with respect to each other, exclusive and independent, and therefore only mediately and imperfectly known; but to the ego of God, which embraces them all in the unity of its own consciousness, they are all perfectly and immediately open and known: not only the phenomena, but the inmost conceiving and yearning of all hearts lies open to his gaze, and every sigh of the creature goes through his heart too; he is the intimate fellow-feeler of all hearts, the fellow-knower of all consciences, and hence too it is that our conscience, which knows of this fellow-knowledge of God, derives its unique certainty, its exalted authority and power, whether to comfort or condemn. It is here that the decisive test of every notion of God is to be found; if it cannot explain this the deepest and most powerful experience of the human heart—and neither the deistic nor the pantheistic notion of God can do this,—then it is at once proved to be false; that the *true monotheistic* notion of God as here developed, which combines the conscious ego of the Deity with his all-embracing wholeness, perfectly satisfies the test, I have, I trust, made clear. Hence this notion of God is the *only right* one, and will be more and more acknowledged in the future to be so, however philosophers may ridicule it and theologians denounce it, for the present.

The omniscience of God is related to His *perfect wisdom*, as contemplative intelligence to that intelligence which sets up ends to be

aimed at. The two are not identical: for who would seriously maintain that everything that is an object of God's omniscient contemplation, evil not excepted, is also a purpose of his wisdom? The purposes of the divine wisdom are not copies of the actual, changing with its changes in time, they are prefigurations, types, and laws of what is to become actual; they therefore belong to the unchangeable contents of the divine consciousness, they form the "eternal truths" of his reason. Thus they give the will of God its manifold contents, but they are not themselves conditioned by his will or dependent on it. It is not a matter of arbitrary choice with God, what ends he shall set before himself: on the contrary, his will cannot will anything else than the realisation of the eternal purposes which are thought by the reason of God. These preconceived thoughts of the divine wisdom manifest themselves to our later thinking in the laws and types (forms of life) of the world-order, which show such manifold gradations and so systematic a connection, and which culminate for us in man, the end to which the development of life in the natural world has manifestly been striving from the first. So again, the end of history is the always more perfect development of the capacities deposited in the human type, as the knowledge, feeling, will, and action of mankind grows more and more reasonable, and mankind thus actively realises its likeness to, and communion with, God. Thus we may say, on the one hand, that the highest end of the world is to be found in man, in the realisation of true humanity as the copy of the perfect essence of God; and on the other hand, we may say that it is to be found in God, whose glory consists precisely in this revelation to and in man. It is in the fact that the whole development of the world is arranged with a view to this highest end in such a way that everything in nature and everything in history is compelled directly or indirectly to help it, it is in this fact that the perfect wisdom of the divine government of the world is seen. The perfection of it accordingly consists simply in this, that it does not require to seek out special means for special ends, because the whole is already so wisely ordered that the world reaches its end as a whole, as an organism, just by the regular course of all its inter-

acting functions; and of this also we can see the analogy in our own microcosm.

If the perfect wisdom of God consists in this, that his reason only thinks perfect ends, his *holiness* consists in this, that his will goes forth to these perfect ends alone. As his reason is free from all doubting and uncertainty in respect of the knowledge of the true ends, so his will is free from all wavering and struggle in respect of their accomplishment. The antithesis between the particular private ends of the individual will and the universal ends of the reasonably ordered whole, that antithesis which keeps our will in conflict and struggle between inclination and duty, freedom and law, obviously does not exist for the will of the primal ego, whose self is not a particular self beside others, but is itself the all-embracing whole, and with whom, therefore, the *own* end and the general end absolutely and at once coincide. This immediate coincidence, which excludes *a priori* all possibility of wavering, of the independent free will and the universal end of reason, is in fact possible with God only; hence it is true, in the strictest sense, that there is none good but one, that is, God. Under this point of view it is not difficult to find the answer to the much-debated scholastic question whether a thing is good because God wills it, or whether he wills it because it is right? The question is a trap, it is based on the erroneous assumption that there is an essential difference between the divine will and goodness, or the universal reasonable end. In that case, either the latter would be subordinate to the former, *i.e.* goodness would be reduced to a positive arbitrary determination of God, or the divine will would be lowered to the position of a subject of the law ruling above it. But this alternative can only stand so long as God is conceived as a particular will, who could have ends of his own in distinction from the whole and over-against the whole. The dilemma falls to the ground, there is seen to be nothing in it, as soon as we come to see that it is equally impossible for God to set his will above the good or to subordinate it to the good, because he has no separate will at all as distinguished from the good, because when he is to will at all, he can will nothing else than the reasonable end of the whole, which he

himself is. And here the widely-felt difficulty is solved that, if the moral law is traced to the divine will, it may be in conflict with human autonomy, with the self-legislation of our reason. This could only be the case on two assumptions, that the divine will desired something different from the divine reason, and that the divine reason was specifically different from ours. The former we have already seen to be impossible; but the latter assumption is equally mistaken. There are not various reasons in the world (even language refuses to lend its aid to such a monstrous thought), but only various degrees of participation in the one reason, which is that of God; the eternal truths which it thinks are the fundamental laws of being for all existing things, the fundamental laws of thought for all thinking beings, past, present, or to come. If we find present in our reason laws not only of logical, but also of moral judgment, both of which, and specially the latter, impress themselves upon us as objective norms for our theoretical and practical conduct, we cannot help recognising in this inner legislation of our reason an expression of the reasonable purpose of God in its unity with his creative will, *i.e.* we find in it a revelation of God's holiness. The more are we obliged to do so when we consider that not only do individuals find such a norm present within them, but that under the pressure of the same necessity the common moral ordinances of society have arisen, and maintained and developed themselves wherever human life has normally developed itself. If the nations have everywhere declared these ordinances of justice and of custom to be holy, and placed them under divine authority and protection, what they have thus arrived at is essentially the truth of the matter. In point of form this venerable idea may be mistaken, as in assuming a direct and positive manifestation of God the natural psychological and historical steps are overlooked by which such laws were arrived at. But this oversight is a very venial error compared with the enormous error, in point of substance, committed by sophists and sceptics, who affix so much importance to these natural steps as to deny altogether the sacred character, and the divine foundation, of all moral order.

As the divine holiness manifests itself in the foundation of the

moral world-order, so does the divine *righteousness* in the maintenance of that order and in the assertion of it as against individuals. There dwells in the natural organism, in virtue of the teleological reference of all its functions to the unity of the soul, a self-preserving and recuperative power, which reacts against all interruptions and obstructions of the normal functions, restoring the balance and setting right what was wrong; and in the same way there dwells in the moral world-order, in virtue of the causal and teleological relatedness of all the interacting wills to the unity of the reasonable will of God, a power of reaction against abnormal tendencies of will on the part of individuals, or against evil—a power which vindicates the universal end of the whole, or of goodness, in spite of the opposition of individuals, against them and through them. In particular, the will of God reveals itself immediately within the moral personality as the voice of conscience judging him, as the pain of self-condemnation and self-dividedness, in which the religious consciousness justly sees and feels a division between the man's own self and the divine self, to his exclusion from living communion with God. To this inner judgment of the divine righteousness are to be added the external reactions against the evil will, which are brought about through the natural and social order of the world. The abuse of nature punishes itself by the destruction of that which is abused, the maltreatment of our fellow-men by civic punishments; the selfish purposes of bad men always come to appear as vain and idle, and mutually destroy each other or turn into instruments of good, since that only can have continuance in the life of the whole which harmonises with its law of life. That evil therefore shall come to nought, and good prevail and continue, this is what the divine righteousness unconditionally and infallibly aims at bringing about. In so far as man still clings inwardly, with his will, to evil, to abnormal ends, in so far he feels the condemning reaction of divine righteousness directed against himself, knows himself to stand under its condemnation, in whatever form he has come to know and feel it; and this is no mere subjective imagination on man's part, but the full and fearfully earnest truth of the matter. Since, however, this condemning, judging reaction, is

not an end in itself, but only a means for the positive end of goodness, which is the one end and aim of the all-wise government of God, it is not directed to the destruction of the sinner, but only the removal of his sin. As soon, then, as the sinner, experiencing the punishing righteousness of God, detaches himself from his sin or from the abnormal direction of his will, the righteousness of God, which is only directed against evil, is no longer against him, ceases to be felt by him as a judging and punishing power, because he himself ceases to be an object calling for punishment from the divine will. The righteousness of God remains unchanged; what is changed is only man's relation to it, according as he is inwardly one with evil or detached from it. We shall afterwards see how this change in the phenomenology of the religious consciousness appears in its detail, and why it here appears as a change, or a replacing of justice by mercy. It must, however, be said even here, that the divine righteousness, taken in its essence as it is by itself, can never be in conflict with the love and grace of God, because it is nothing but the means and instrument for realising the good ends of God, the "ordinance of his love," its educative and chastening wisdom.

That the will of God is a will of good, not only in the sense that it makes the demand of good upon our will, but also and much more in the sense that it causes us also to take a real part in the good which itself is, and makes it become the contents of our own lives, the power and the good of our ego, this is implied in the attribute of divine *love*, "the bond of perfectness," as we may well call it, even in application to God. A certain sense of this, however dim and confused, has been present to the religious consciousness from the beginning; for if men had not credited the Deity with favourable views towards them, they could not have sought for communion with it, or formed any religious relation with it. In the thanksgiving prayers of the oldest monuments of religion we find many an expression of the intimate sense of the divine goodness, which shows itself in the manifold blessings of nature (comp. Acts xiv. 17). Over against the blessings of nature, it is true, there were always the evils of nature to be accounted for—a formidable objection, not by any

means to be overcome from the point of view of nature-religion. In the ethical religion of Israel the revelation of God's holy will was regarded as the highest proof of the divine mercy; but the view continued to subsist, and in various ways to create confusion, which measured that mercy by the amount of natural blessings supposed to be conferred by it. Besides this, it belongs to the nature of the case, and history attests the fact, that the consciousness of the positive will of God in the form of law has as its reverse the consciousness of man's own insufficiency and unfreedom as against God, and therefore the feeling of fear before a God who is angry, which prevents confidence in God's love from growing to its proper stature. It was only Christianity which taught distinctly, as a principle, that God is love, that he is to be known as the heavenly Father, who not only gives individual good gifts, and who does not reveal his will of good only as a law, but who gives us himself, the very power and holiness of goodness, in his Holy Spirit, in whom he enters into a life-communion with us. It has lately been proposed to interpret the notion of the love of God as signifying that God makes human ends his own. This view proceeds on an inadequate conception of what is implied in love; but apart from that consideration it is quite beside the mark, because it does not take account of the relation of God to man as his creator; the ends of men (the true ones, that is; the mistaken ones cannot come into question here) are for God by no means a thing externally given which he could proceed to appropriate; he it was, on the contrary, who placed them in the nature of man, and they are thus from the first his own ends, and such as he can no longer appropriate as his own. It would be more correct to invert the statement and to say that God's love consists in his causing his own ends to become ours, the contents of our own personal will. This would amount to saying, that he has deposited his own ends in us from the first as our endowment of reason, and causes the rational impulse, this divine potency of our nature, to become the ruling principle of our whole knowing, feeling, and willing ego; this is, from a psychological point of view, the nature of the "Holy Spirit." Now as the realisation of such an endowment is to be

regarded, wherever it occurs, as the operation of the principle of development, while the principle of our reasonable endowment is the end-positing reason of God, it follows that the arrival of the divine reason at supremacy in our heart (the "Holy Spirit") is to be conceived as a work of God, who, by thus engendering God-like life in man, brings to fulfilment his original creative purpose, and gives man a personal share in his own perfect life. Thus and thus only is justice done to the notion of love; for love is everywhere, in the religious relation no less than in the relations of human society, will directed to community of life. The mystic element, which is certainly present in this view, is no doubt not to the taste of the "Neo-Kantian" theology of the Göttingen school,[1] which is accustomed to speak of such conceptions as "heathenish nature-mysticism;" but those who speak thus should consider that the reproach applies to the New Testament; for what we are seeking to express is clearly stated in 1 John iv. 13: "Hereby we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit." And even the Old Testament believer says (Psal. lxxiii. 25): "If I only have thee, I ask not for heaven and earth."[2] Thus what he seeks for in God is not a means to establish his rule over the world: he is seeking in all earnestness for God himself, just for him and for fellowship in his life, in comparison with which all the world's goods dwindle to nothing in his eyes. But while the believer thus thirsts for communion with God, and finds in that communion his chief good, he is also certain that this desire which God himself has implanted in him is not illusory, is not directed to a utopia or to heathen superstition, but to a complete and supreme reality, that therefore his seeking for God has for its counterpart God's letting himself be found, or the being known and loved by God (1 Cor. viii. 3). And why should it be less possible for God to enter into a living fellowship with us, than for men to do so with each other? I should be inclined to think that he is even more capable of doing so. For as no man can altogether read the soul of another, so no man can altogether live in the soul of another; hence all our human love is and remains imperfect. But if we are shut off

[1] A. Ritschl its head.—Tr.

[2] Luther's translation.—Tr.

from each other by the limits of individuality, in relation to God it is not so: to him our hearts are as open as each man's own heart is to himself; he sees through and through them, and he desires to live in them and to fill them with his own sacred energy and blessedness. Not only therefore can he love as well as any man can: he alone is simply and truly "*love*," perfect, unlimited, typical love itself, which keeps nothing shut up in itself and finds nothing locked up in us, which takes us up into full communion with its own life, and in this purifying flame of divine feeling sets our hearts also free from the crust of selfishness, and teaches us truly to love one another, and to have fellowship, like that of God, with each other. For "God is love, and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and he in him" (1 John iv. 16).

CHAPTER II.

THE BELIEF IN ANGELS AND DEVILS.

PRIMITIVE mythology regarded nature in a poetic way as filled in every part with souls like those of men; and this view of nature afforded a basis both for the belief in God and for the belief in spirits. These spirits are distinguished at first from the gods of primitive mythology not in kind, but only in the degree of their power, and the extent of the circle in which they operate; the gods are *principes inter pares*, the spirits are *dii minorum et minimarum gentium*. But how their relation to the world of the gods may shape itself to the religious consciousness, and what importance they may there gain for religion, this depends from the first on the side of the life of nature which they represent, whether they represent nature on her beneficent side, as helpful and pleasing to man, or on her pain-giving, destructive side; in other words, do they belong to the good spirits or the bad?

The good spirits are everywhere related to the high gods as their subordinates, their servants, assistants, messengers, representatives, officials, and satraps. The bad ones occupy from the first a hostile position to the gods as well as to men. This dualism presents itself in all the religions of the nature-peoples.[1] The motive of it is clearly described even by Plutarch, who says that as nothing can come into existence without a cause, evil must have a separate origin as well as good; that this is the view of most and of the best philosophers, some of whom assume two divine beings who are, as it were, opposed to each other, and one of whom creates what is good, the other what

[1] Comp. Roskoff, *Geschichte des Teufels*, i. p. 22. This admirable book has been of great service for the following chapter.

is evil; while others call what is good, God, what is evil, demon.[1] We need not here enumerate the various names and forms under which the evil spirits are represented in the various nature-religions, but there are two points which at the very outset merit our consideration; the first is the relation of the evil spirits to the world of the gods, the second their relation to human worship. In both respects we may observe the greatest differences between one nature-religion and another—differences which lead to the most dissimilar developments lying far apart from each other.

In one class of these religions the evil spirits never come to concrete personification, nor to any arrangement under a monarchical head; they remain mere isolated, mischievous beings of indefinite form and uncertain individuality, such as the spectres of the desert, of night, of sickness, of death; or they are represented in animal form, with special frequency in the form of the snake or the dragon, or also as semi-human monsters such as giants, titans, medusæ, and chimæras, all of these being forms in which fancy embodies the destructive effects of particular phenomena of nature, such as the freezing cold of winter, the withering glare of summer, the heaven-storming thunder-clouds, etc. In all these cases the particular destructive beings are so far inferior in power to the good gods and their permanent and connected world-government, that while they may give them some trouble in small matters, they cannot do any serious harm either to the world of the gods, or to the world of men which stands under the protection of the gods—cannot, at least, overturn the world of nature, or the world of civilisation. It is therefore natural that in such religions men should not care too much about the powers of evil, should at least pay no respect to them in the way of worship, but at the most should only assist the gods in their struggle against them, and celebrate with due observances the divine victory over the monsters. Thus the custom prevails, *e.g.*, in some tribes of the Indians, that when formidable phenomena, such as an eclipse of the sun or moon, appear in the heavens, the warriors march out as if for battle, to come to the assistance of heaven, which

[1] Plutarch, *De Is. et Osir.* 45.

is thus threatened by the powers of darkness, with battle-cries and the discharge of arrows. In the same way the ancient inhabitants of India considered that they were called to help Indra in his struggle with the dragon of darkness (Ahi) by placing before him the intoxicating Soma-offering to increase his courage and strength. Our German forefathers must have held a similar view, since the manifold religious usages of the twelve nights about the winter solstice, which in part maintain themselves to this day in the form of (Christianised) popular customs, manifestly arose out of the intention of rendering help and service to the gods of light at the critical turning-point of their struggle with the powers of darkness and cold. Such a view may appear very naïve in our eyes, yet I should not be inclined to call it irreligious or irrational; on the contrary, I see in it the very pious and most reasonable idea that man is called to co-operate in his own place with the divine world-order; this active participation in the contest between gods and demons expresses a strong and healthy religious and moral *optimism*. And if my observation is correct, this optimistic attitude towards the world of evil spirits is to be found chiefly in races and tribes of healthy and strong physical organisations placed in not too unfavourable outward conditions of existence, as is the case with all the Indo-Germans, with some of the Semites, with the more happily organised and situated tribes of the American Indians, the Polynesians, etc.

In other nature-religions we find the bad spirits occupying exactly the opposite relations both to the gods and to men. The origin of evil consolidates itself over-against the divine power in as marked personification, and as regular monarchical rule, as the latter, and hence takes its place side by side with the divine power as an equal or even as a stronger rival. If it has not in fact the upper hand of the deity, it is yet more prominently present to the feelings of man, who here feels himself rather exposed to the malice of the bad god than protected by the shelter of the good one. It is natural that men who feel in this way should not only not be indifferent to the bad deity, but should even feel more interested in it than in the good one, and seek to ward off its malice by doing its will with such

slavish abjectness as is showed to a mischievous despot. This cannot properly be called a religious relation, as in the latter the worshipper rather seeks the helpful communion of the higher being, and the prevailing sentiment is a respectful confidence. The service offered to the evil deities is rather a caricature of genuine worship, to which it is related as in the theoretical domain superstition is to faith. The psychological motives of such devil-worship are very aptly set forth in a prayer of the negroes of Madagascar: "Samhor and Niang created the world. O Samhor, we direct no prayer to thee! the kind god needs no prayer. But to Niang we must pray, Niang we must appease; Niang, bad and mighty spirit, let not thunders terrify us any more! Bid the sea remain in the depths! Spare, Niang, the growing fruits! Scorch not the rice in the blossom! Let not the women bring forth on days which bring ruin and misfortune! Compel not the mothers to kill in the river the hope of their old age (as a sacrifice of ransom)! O spare the gifts of Samhor! Let not all, all of them, perish! See, thou dost already rule over the bad; great, Niang, is the number of the bad; torment the good, therefore, no more!" The last sentence is very remarkable. Those who pray are the good; they feel no inward connection between themselves and the evil god; they stand outside the sphere of his proper rule, to which only the evil belong; as regards him they are strangers and enemies, who do not in the least recognise him as their rightful lord, but only know the fact of his superior strength, and hence pray, like conquered enemies, that they may be spared. Who does not see that this is a totally different relation from that in positively religious worship? And the latter, we are to believe, grew out of that opposite! This I cannot possibly believe. It appears to me far more probable, that in this devil-worship we have the outcome of a shy and gloomy *pessimism* which is not an original congenital mood of sound human nature, but rather a symptom of disease, of discouragement, of general retrogression, of the grave danger, or of the unavoidable ruin, of whole peoples, or at least of particular generations and epochs of civilisation. As a fact, we find the devil preponderating over the good god just in such nature-peoples as the

African negroes, with whom every other symptom also points to the conclusion that they are in a state of decadence, of retrogressive development, or in a civilised people which has been ill-treated by a barbarous priesthood, such as were the Mexicans at the time of the discovery of America, whose religion consisted of little more than the most inhuman slaughter of men in honour of the bad god, the "terrible" Huitzilopochtli. That history has many a retrograde development to show, and that often on a large scale, no "theory of development" can deny which has not quite lost the eye for fact by giving itself up to blind optimism. Phenomena, which are entirely analogous to these, are to be found even in the highest religions, where they are symptoms of the sickening of whole epochs of history. This was undoubtedly the case with regard to the terror of the devil which marked the later Middle Ages.

Between this pessimistic attitude to the world of evil spirits and the optimistic attitude described above, a certain middle position is to be found in the nature-religions of the Egyptians and of Western Asia. According to the Egyptian myth Osiris, the god of the beneficent sun, the dispenser of blessings, is slain by Set and his seventy-two companions. This Set, or, as the Greeks called him, Typhon, signifies originally the destroying fire of the sun, but also whatever is hurtful to the Egyptian, as the hot wind and the sand-storm of the desert, the unfruitful sea, the dangerous crocodile; and finally, also what is morally evil, such as lies, denial of God, foreign customs, etc. The power of the hostile Set is so great, that in conjunction with his seventy-two companions, the hot dog-days, he can destroy the work of the fruitful sun, namely, vegetation; but in Horus, the son of Osiris, the latter receives its avenger; the returning life of the succeeding year destroys again the temporary victory of the evil principle. This constant change, based on the circle of the life of nature, between life and death, between the victory of the good and that of the evil principle, is represented in a number of forms in the *West Semitic* nature-religions. At one time it is represented as the defeat of the good sun-god by a hostile power,—thus in the legends, which are closely related to the Osiris-myth of

Adonis, or of Heracles or Sandon or Samson. At another time the two hostile principles appear as the two opposite sides in the nature and the life of one and the same God, who at one time appears as a power which is friendly to life, and fertilising (the sun in spring), at another as a power hostile to life and scorching up (the sun of mid-summer), and thus manifests himself alternately as beneficent and as maleficent, and claims from man a *cultus* alternating so as to correspond with his own double character, now consisting of luxurious indulgence and now of bloody asceticisim and human sacrifice. In this circle of the life of nature the good and the bad principle are placed on the same level; there is no battle that can lead to a decisive victory, and as little is there any co-operation on man's part to bring about the victory of the good; here we see an attitude of man to the evil of the world which is purely naturalistic, æsthetic but in no way ethical or teleological.

In the two Indo-Germanic peoples, the *Persians* and the *Germans*, we find a very different view. These peoples do not on the one hand think of the world of spirits in the optimistic fashion of the Greeks, who regarded the battles of the gods as having been decided once for all by the victory of the Olympians in the remote past; nor do they think of it in the pessimistic fashion of the devil-worshippers who consider the bad god to be actually stronger than the good one; nor, once more, in the indifferent fashion of the Western Asians, with whom the rule of the two alternates in an eternal circle. They, on the contrary, regard the struggle of the two hostile divine powers as still going on, and only to arrive at its conclusion in the future, at the close of the present age of the world; and the ultimate issue is to be, that after developing all its power to the utmost, the evil power is to be finally destroyed. In detail the views of the two peoples differ in various ways from each other. The *German* view is more natural, more of the soil; the dualism here is not yet defined in two hostile kingdoms separated from each other from the first, and the difference between Loki and the other gods who confront him is not one of principle. Each of the two sides has in it something of the other; they belong to each other inwardly as being of the same

essence, only that one represents rather one side of the world's existence and the other the other side. Loki, the god of the devouring flame (Lohe, *Scot.* "lowe"), is the father of the death-goddess Hel and of the wolf Fenrir, all-devouring time; he represents therefore the finiteness of all earthly life, and at the same time the finiteness of the power of the friendly gods who rule in time; he robs the earth-goddess of her jewels, the green vegetation, the storm-god Thor of his hammer, the fertilising power of summer; he is the cause of the death of Balder, the mild pure sun-god. But he also represents the moral limitation of the gods; he is their bad conscience, the betrayer of their weak hours; he reminds them of their impending fate. For this he is hated by the gods, and indispensable as he seems to be to them as a clever counsellor, they yet find it necessary to guard against his tricks by putting him in chains. Still they are in danger every moment, Loki may get rid of his chains. Should this happen—and it is certain to happen some day—then he will rise up with all the hostile powers for the last decisive battle against the good gods. In this battle the opposing parties will mutually destroy each other, and then the present world will perish in fire. At last, however, a new world will rise again out of its ashes, in which a new race of gods will carry on a peaceful rule. This tragic prospect of the ruin of the whole world of the gods was no doubt a late product of North-German heathenism when retreating before Christianity: there is nothing of a corresponding nature with the South Germans. Yet even granting that it is so, we have here a testimony to the moral character of this religion, which regarded the struggle of the gods with the hostile powers as a very serious matter, and one in which men were called to take an active part in assisting the good gods and maintaining their world order, the subsistence of which seemed to be constantly threatened by the wicked foe.

In the history of the doctrine of the devil a prominent place is due to the Zend religion of Persia, in which the old Indo-German antithesis of beneficent and maleficent nature-powers, an antithesis which the local circumstances of Iran tended to make even more marked, was developed more distinctly than anywhere else, and

assumed the greatest importance both for the view of the world and for the conduct of life. According to the doctrine of the Zendavesta the realm of the good spirit and wise creator Ahuramazda is confronted since the very beginning of the world with the realm of the attacking spirit, Ahriman, who, while he cannot create anything himself, spoils the world which Ahura made good, by mixing with it both physical and moral evils. The conflict of these two realms fills the whole of the world's history. In the first period of that history the destructive power of Ahriman grew, till with the mission of the prophet Zarathustra a turn for the better took place. The good word of Ahura which he revealed is now the victorious weapon which assures the final victory of the good god over his adversary, which will form the consummation of the world's history. In the meantime, however, it is man's duty, placed as he is between these two hostile powers, himself to take a part in this world-struggle, to work for the ends of the good god against the ends of the bad god, to keep himself pure in body and soul, and everywhere diligently to foster life, especially by diligent cultivation of the soil. In such activity he approves himself an adherent of Ahura, while impurity, indolence, and lying bring man into the power of Ahriman. It is also taken for granted that the servant of Ahura is rewarded for his good conduct by the good lord of the world, while the servant of Ahriman receives righteous retribution in the frustration of his evil purpose. "He who brings this actual life to the greatest perfection, receives as a reward the life of the body and the soul: to those who do good comes good existence, to the men of naught, nothingness; let us therefore work as preservers of this life!" According to this the positive power over the world belongs to Ahura only, while Ahriman is merely the personification of "nothingness," a negative magnitude which destroys itself by its own inner contradiction. Thus the dualism of the Zend religion is not absolute, but approaches nearly to monotheism. Yet it was the source, not only of the demonology of Judaism and Christianity, but also of the pure dualism of heretical systems such as Manichæism.

Even old *Hebraism* was acquainted with spirits of higher and of

lower rank, both divine and impure. The former are doubtless what are meant by the "hosts of heaven," though the phrase may also suggest the stars, which were regarded by the whole ancient world as living and personal beings. The higher spirits are also called "sons of God," but they are not too far above the world to find pleasure in the daughters of men, and to beget by them a race of giants.[1] Monotheism, when it arrived, disposed of these forms of old Semitic nature-mythology in a very simple manner, making them servants of the one God; they form his heavenly retinue, his council, his camp, his messengers, the instruments of his activity, and in the latter character they are not seldom simply the mode of God's revelation and omnipotence, and not personally distinguished from God himself. The belief in angels took more definite form in the period after the exile, and under Persian influence; we now find special names for angels; a body of seven angels is mentioned (after the court of Ahura); there are suggestions of a hierarchy of angels. At the same time the distinction began to be drawn between good angels and bad. Old Hebraism was acquainted with unclean spirits, for example, with the spectres of the wilderness, of whom Azazel may have been one, to whom the scapegoat was sent; but these had as yet no religious significance. Of more importance for religion were those angels who had to execute the divine punishments in the world ("destroying angels"), or who filled the post of accusers of the wicked before God, as Satan in the Book of Job, or in the prophet Zechariah. Satan seems to take pleasure in casting suspicion on the saints, and is thus almost a bad angel, yet he does not stand in hostility and opposition to God, but is rather strictly subordinate to him and serviceable to him as an instrument of his rule (attorney-general, as it were, of his system of justice); his place is among the "sons of God," *i.e.* the angels. From the accuser he is here, he becomes in the Book of Wisdom the envious calumniator, through whom death entered into humanity. There can be no doubt that foreign influences co-operated in the elaboration of Jewish demonology; in the book of Tobit, for example, Asmodeus, the demon of lust, is opposed to the angel

[1] Genesis vi. 2-4.

Raphael, and even the name reminds us of the Persian origin of that demon.[1]

At the time of Jesus the belief in demons was an essential element in the popular belief of the Jews, and we must not undervalue its importance for *primitive Christianity*. The more distinctly conscious the Christian church was of its antithesis to the non-Christian world, and the harsher its experience of that world's enmity, the more natural was it for the Christians to see in this world, which was hostile to Christ, the realm of the devil, who accordingly is called the "Prince," or the "God of this world."[2] Not only does the apostle Paul connect the heathen worship of the gods with the demons; in the unbelief of the Jews also the fourth Evangelist saw a sign that they are children of the devil.[3] But Christians, too, have to be constantly on their guard against the snares of Satan, who is incessantly studying how he may destroy the church of Christ, and seeks to do so both by stratagem and by force, both by influencing men's minds and by bodily pains and persecutions in the world. But all these assaults of Satan have no substantial success, for Christ came just in order to destroy the works of the devil, and by the work of his life, by his founding the church of the children of God, the power of Satan over the world is already broken in principle, and a complete victory assured to the Christians over him and his kingdom, so that they both can and must with the greater confidence resist and defeat his assaults upon them in detail. This battle will be finally decided only at the end of the world, when Satan will be overcome by Christ at his return, and thrust down to hell for ever.[4]

The ancient church believed itself to be on the eve of this last decisive struggle, and saw in the manifold conflicts which it had to support against foes without and foes within, the prelude of that last act of the world-drama. It therefore traced all the evils from which it suffered to the activity of its arch-enemy. True, means were devised to guard the interests of monotheism against extreme dual-

[1] *Vide supra*, p. 85.
[2] John xii. 31; 2 Cor. iv. 4.
[3] 1 Cor. viii. 5; x. 20; John viii. 44.
[4] Rev. xx. 2-10.

istic heresies; it was taught that Satan had been made good by God at first, and had fallen in the exercise of his own freedom (from greed or envy and jealousy, or arrogance); but after assuming this, dogmatics and ethics took up in all seriousness the idea of an anti-divine world-ruler, who contends with Christ and his church for the government of the world. Redemption by Christ was construed from this point of view now as a battle, now as a legal contest, not conducted in the most honourable way, between Christ and the devil; the church's means of grace were represented as magical drugs, by means of which the miraculous power of Christ and of the church got the better of the miraculous powers of the demons; the life of the world as a whole, with its secular interests, came to be regarded in the gloomy light of a Satanic state, hostile to God, from which the prudent Christian had best flee away entirely, to save his soul in solitude or behind the walls of a cloister, or at least in entire withdrawal from the public intercourse of the world; and even on these terms his soul was not entirely unvisited by Satan's temptations.

With the extension of Christianity to the Germanic nations, the belief in the devil received fresh nourishment. The church identified the Germanic world of the gods which she had overcome, with the kingdom of the demons; but as the legends of the departed popular faith survived as well as its customs and its local attachments, the kingdom of the demons assumed a number of new and peculiar features. The hills and valleys, where the old gods had walked in mystery, or where the sites of their sacrifices had been, now became the unholy meeting-places of the diabolical army and its human accomplices. The vow in which the German had been accustomed to bind himself, both to his earthly lord and to his gods, for defence and offence, was now transferred, partly to the saints of the church, but in part also to the demons, and thus became the root of witchcraft with all its terrible abominations. In the old idea of "possession," man had been no more than the passive party against the preponderating power of the demons, which he on his part did nothing to assist; but the stronger personality of the Germans makes itself felt even in the attitude now taken up towards the devil,

whose connection with a man now seemed to be based on an alliance freely entered into on both sides, and including mutual obligations of personal service. Thus instead of being a mere affliction, as possession had always been considered before, it became a crime, a piece of personal guilt, and guilt of the very gravest kind, because it involved an act of faithlessness, a felony, against the highest rightful over-lord of the world, against Christ. Thus the belief in witchcraft and the criminal procedure in respect of phenomena connected with it, are a natural result, not of Christianity in general, indeed, which for a millennium had not known these things, but certainly of Germanic Christianity. But the evils connected with this fatal superstition were still further intensified when about the turn from the Middle Ages to modern times the shaking of the foundations of the old religious structure spread over Christendom a feeling of insecurity, and the conscience, made anxious by pressure of every kind, no longer appeased by the church's means of grace, saw the snares of evil threatening the souls of men on every hand. When Luther sings :

> "And were the world with devils filled,
> All eager to devour us,
> Our souls to fear should little yield,
> They cannot overpower us—"

the faith in God of the concluding lines has a very real counterpart in Luther's distinct conviction, that the world actually was full of devils, which threaten in every way to swallow up Christendom : "A Christian must know, that he sits in the midst of devils, and that the devil is nearer him than his coat or his shirt, or his own skin; that he is all round about us, and that we are constantly at grips with him, and bound to fight against him." The intensified fear of the devil and of witchcraft in those centuries may no doubt be explained from causes similar to those which multiplied cases of possession in the first Christian centuries; times of religious crisis, when an old faith is breaking down and a new one struggling with the old which will not yield, seem to shake and darken men's minds to a profound degree, and the unsettlement shows itself most readily in pathological conceptions of this kind.

The belief in the devil led to such frightful consequences in the matter of witchcraft, as to awaken in men of clear perceptions and humane dispositions about the end of the seventeenth century the most serious doubts of the truth of the whole idea.[1] The practical objections of Spee, Becker, and Thomasius were soon followed up by the historico-critical investigations of Semler as to the position of demonology in Scripture, when the discovery of the extra-biblical influences which had contributed to it appeared to withdraw from it the authority of revelation. This made it easy for rationalism, which Schleiermacher also followed in this, to reduce the dogmatic importance of the doctrine by tracing it to ideas which had cropped up at particular periods, and to which the biblical teachers had accommodated themselves. This, however, was no explanation either of the origin or of the far-reaching historical significance of the belief.

The belief in angels in the Christian church has played a much more innocent and simple part. In the popular belief of the early church angels, being the "brothers of the genii and the representatives of polytheism" (Hase) were readily received, and no doubt did much to facilitate the approach of the heathen to monotheism. Nor could theologians help paying them some attention. The question of the creation of the angels was attended with some difficulty, as the Bible contains no statement bearing on the point—the Old Testament history of creation in particular containing no mention of those beings. To meet this difficulty some of the earliest of the Fathers declared that the angels were not created, but had proceeded from God like the Logos; and this showed a true perception of the fact that the angels are originally the same as the Logos, namely, the divine on the side of its immanence in the world, only regarded not in its unity but in its multiplicity; in view of this it involves a contradiction to speak of them as created. But as the angels grew in the popular belief in definiteness and concreteness, the interests of monotheism seemed to require that as they were the most distinguished creatures of God they should have been created first. They

[1] For an account of witchcraft in this country, see Lecky's *History of Rationalism*.

were represented as pure spirits without bodies, or provided with purely ethereal bodies; they served the religious fancy of the ancient church as welcome types for the efforts of the saints after spirituality and freedom from sense, and at a later period the Roman tendency towards an organised hierarchy laid hold of them and made them the types of the hierarchy on earth, dividing them into various ranks, analogous to the degrees of dignity among the clergy of the church. They were also conceived of after the analogy of the officials of the state, and the various business departments of the divine government apportioned among them, partly on a geographical principle on which they were conceived as presiding over the various lands and peoples as their "guardian angels," partly on a business principle, Gabriel, for example, being the guardian angel and the patron of matters belonging to war, Raphael of medicine, Michael of worship. Thus conceived, as representative instruments of God in the government of the world, and as types of the saints and priests, the angels were of course objects of veneration in worship; and the theological distinction between "honour" and "worship," the latter of which is not to be paid to them but to God only, had little practical importance for the popular mind. It was on account of this dangerous affinity to polytheism that the reformers rejected the *cultus* of angels, which at the same time brought all dogmatic interest in them to an end. The only dogmatic interest remaining in connection with them was as to their mediating instrumentality in miracles; and rationalism, in disposing of miracles, disposed of this also. In general, however, rationalism did not attack the existence of angels, *i.e.* of the higher spirit-world, only it converted them into something quite different from what they were originally; instead of supramundane ideals of faith, it made them intromundane realities of cosmological speculation; inhabitants of other spheres, who while they surpass us earthly spirits in point of excellence, stand in other respects on exactly the same line with ourselves. Such beings there no doubt are, for it would be too much for us to assume that our earth is the only world fitted to be the dwelling-place of reasonable beings; but the existence of such similar beings on other stars has

nothing to do with the religious significance of angels, nor generally with the objects of religious belief at all. The rationalising treatment of the subject, therefore, comes to the same thing as a denial of the belief in angels, and is of no service whatever in the way of explaining the religious significance of that belief.

The belief in angels and the belief in devils stand and fall together, since they represent the two opposite sides of the religious view of the world, which—in reality inseparably one—are placed over-against each other in those two products of religious fancy, each of them made abstract and personified independently. *Angels* represent the ideality of the religious view of the world, or the world on the side of its unity with God, or, what is the same thing, the immanence of God as the omnipresent, almighty reason in the world, and the will making for holiness in man. The idea of angels contains the same religious motive, only in another form, as that of miracles; as miracles are supernatural occurrences in nature, so angels are supramundane beings in the world; logically considered, each of the two involves a contradiction, but from a psychological point of view they are both alike natural and legitimate expressions of religious idealism, which knows the defects of the world and of man's own ego to be overcome in God and by him, and makes this victory of faith over the world visible to itself, both in ideal occurrences (miracles) and in ideal forms (angels). Hence angels have their natural place in the visible setting forth of the religious life of the soul, wherever that may take place, viz., in the symbolism of worship, the picture language of which can scarcely do without them. But if the angels are personified miracles, supramundane beings in the world, immaterial and yet with space-limits, and acting upon matter, miracle assumes still greater dimensions in *devils*, who personally represent evil and what is contrary to God. Evil, being a self-contradiction, can only be in a being, can never be itself the substance of a being, as negation can only be a feature of a positive being, never a positive being itself. The absolute antithesis to God, moreover, must manifestly, if existing as a substantial personality, limit God's absoluteness; though God were omnipresent in all besides, he could in

nowise have existence in the devils, because then there would be good in them, which would necessarily work as a power to overcome the evil in them. But a devil who can be converted is, as church dogmatics very justly saw, no devil at all; for the devil is nothing but the very notion of evil in a personal shape, and not only of moral evil, which is self-contradiction within the personal mind, but also of natural evil, which is the contradiction of the finite existence of the world generally.

The idea of the devil, then, represents the other side of the world from that represented by the angels: as these represent the world on the side of its unity with God, so the devil represents it on the side of its antithesis to God, the side of its finiteness, or of the centrifugal selfish activity of the particular, which manifests itself as evil both of a physical, and more specially of a moral nature. It is the experience of natural evil which brings home to us, more than anything else, the sense of the finiteness of the world's existence and of the discord connected with that finiteness. And so the belief in demons naturally arose out of this experience. But as the moral consciousness is developed, and moral evil, or badness and guilt, come to be felt to be the greatest of all evils, the idea of the demons advances from that of mere spirits of mischief or representatives of natural evils, to that of contrivers of moral and religious ruin, seducers to sin and godlessness, or representatives of the moral evils of the personal spirit. And as the religious consciousness comes to see both these forms of evil, sin and natural evil (death), to be the manifestations of one and the same cause, namely, of the powers of individual beings which are acting selfishly and so far independently, and therefore partly in collision with one another and with the normal type of their species,—that symbolical personification advances to one great principle of oppositeness to God, an "anti-God," in whom religious consciousness sums up in one ideal unity all that it has come to know of those unavoidable obstructions of life, or of those negative exercises of power which are to be met with in the action and reaction of individual beings on each other. All these are summed up in a unity, just as religion finds in God the real

unity, source, and goal of the positive exercises of power which we know to be furthersome to our life. Hence it admits of a ready explanation, that in Christianity there grew up side by side with the consciousness of the redeeming and atoning revelation of God, the idea of the "Prince of this world" as the representative of all the natural limitations, the finiteness and the consequent division, of our existence. This is what the idea of the devil will continue to signify in the symbolism of worship; it represents reality, with its repugnance to the idea, in its antithesis to the religious ideal, that natural state of perdition which is to be overcome by God and changed into a state of salvation, the empirical point of departure, therefore, the *terminus a quo* of the redemptive act which produces religious elevation, of which act the angels or the saints are the ideal goal, the *terminus ad quod.*

CHAPTER III.

THE BELIEF IN CREATION.

On this question various views have confronted each other at all times both in the beliefs of peoples and of individuals; and it may help to guide us to a clear, honest understanding of these if we first of all seek to comprehend the motives of various kinds which have determined, whether singly or in co-operation with each other, the views men have taken of the origin of the world. The first main factor we may call for brevity's sake the religious postulate of the heart, the other the theoretical interest of knowledge; and in these we have at least indicated the principal points of view from which the various historical phenomena in this sphere of faith are to be understood and estimated. We must however premise the remark, that a great number of *nuances* of view are here to be met with, the result for the most part of different combinations of the motives now named.

That the Deity, in whatever way we represent him to ourselves, is the ruling power over the world of our experience, is to the religious mind a self-evident truth, since it forms the principal contents of the consciousness of God. But God's power over the world is only perfectly guaranteed to faith, if God is himself the originator of the world. Hence faith requires that the world over which God is to have power, even in its origin, shall depend in some way on his causality. The belief in the creation of the world is therefore primarily no more than the postulate or the assumption which the practical need of the heart requires, and by which the religious man assures himself of the possibility and reality of his liberation from

the world by God. But this postulate, thus nakedly put, is quite indefinite, and admits of various interpretations in detail. Even the "world" which the religious mind is interested in, is primarily only that of his immediate practical experience, the world of nature and of man by which he is surrounded, and so for a narrow sphere of vision merely a man's own land and people. The notion of the all-embracing world-whole is more or less remote from the original religious consciousness; the naïve belief in creation of many of the nature peoples extends only to the world of their own homes, their own land and people, not to the world in general. But even in higher religions the religious belief in creation is subject to local limitations; either the earth is identified with the world, or it is placed in the centre of the universe, a geocentric mode of view with which religion parts reluctantly even when scientific theory has long left it behind. Then again, the dependence of the world on the Deity appears to the naïve religious consciousness to be quite secure, if only its form, the form it now wears, comes from God as its cause, while the matter of it is assumed not to have come into existence. This attenuated theory of creation, which is limited to the impressing on the world its form, occurs with the greatest frequency; and this is quite natural when we consider the analogy of human making, which is always just the fashioning of a given material. Finally we must observe that the religious postulate of the dependence of the world at the beginning on divine causality, predicates nothing as to the How? of its origination, and in this respect affords free scope whether for poetic pictures or for cosmological philosophising.

But the question as to the origin of the world is something more than a matter of faith, to be dealt with by religious feeling; it is also a question of theoretical knowledge, and has doubtless been so from the first, from the time when men began to inquire as to the causes of things and to rise from particulars to the whole. When man sees how everything on earth has a ground on which it is based (the physical support of one thing by another most readily suggests to him how everything rests upon its cause), he naturally proceeds to

ask on what ground the earth itself rests. The Iroquois answer this question by saying that the earth rests on the back of a great tortoise; which only shows how quickly and how easily the search for a cause is satisfied in childish thinking with a fortuitous and unreal explanation, as we may observe any day in children. If again man sees everywhere about him one thing arising out of another, and one thing passing into another, it is very natural that this general experience should lead him to draw a conclusion as to the whole world of his experience, and that he should assume that the earth beneath him and the heaven above also rose out of something else, and inquire how and whence and by what means the whole came to be what he now sees that it is? To this question of the intellect, religious sentiment supplies a ready-made answer: God, it says, made the world. But this answer, we cannot help seeing, rather crushes the desire of the intellect for knowledge than really satisfies it; for it has nothing to say as to the "How?" of the process, the means and acts, and the advance from one point to another, in which alone a process of becoming is really put before our eyes so as to be known by us. To satisfy the desire for knowledge, therefore, even to the most moderate extent, this gap would have to be filled up in some way from the analogy of human processes. But is the analogy of a human making of works of art (we are speaking of what the intellect, considered by itself, requires, not of the postulates of the heart), is this analogy the only way or the most natural way in which to make the origin of the world intelligible? Is there not another analogy which is as suitable for the purpose, if not more suitable, namely that of natural products, the genesis of which is a rising up from within, a development of germs, a growth from an impulse of their own and according to a norm peculiar to themselves? If the intellect knows becoming, inside nature, to be a separation and mixture of materials, or a development and growth of germs, it is a simple and a logical extension of this particular experience to the whole, if it also conceives the becoming of nature herself to be such a *natural process of development.* And thus we cannot think it strange that wherever the theoretical desire of

knowledge predominates over the postulates of religious sentiment, *cosmogonic theories* take the place of the belief in creation.

It is impossible, however, that the two interests, the theoretical and the religious, can go on side by side without any connection being set up between them. We may therefore expect at least that some connection and some mode of agreement will appear between cosmogony and creation. This is done in the simplest way when the creative divine activity is made to consist in founding, rendering possible, and bringing about, the cosmogonic process. To nature-religion, however, for which the being and the life of the gods almost disappears in the life of nature, the most natural solution is that the share of the gods in the cosmogonic process is represented as rather passive than active; the rise of the whole of nature is at the same time the rise of the nature-gods, *cosmogony is at the same time theogony.* In this solution the interest of the doctrine of creation is safeguarded to this extent, that the gods, though they themselves came into being, yet far transcend all other things in rank and power, and take an independent part in forming them. It must not be supposed that the various theories the notions of which we have here distinguished are found precisely separated from each other in the history of religion, one belonging to this religion, another to that; in the nature-religions themselves they cross each other in the strangest way, as the following examples may be adduced to show.

Among the Polynesians various legends are found side by side, pointing, no doubt, to various strata of the mythological development.[1] According to one of these legends, Tangaloa, who was originally the highest god of heaven, with his wife Papa (earth) produced all the gods, from whom then the moon and stars, the sea, the winds, and lastly men, were descended. According to another legend, God at first lived shut up in a mussel or an egg; when he burst it, the two shells became heaven and earth, and out of the perspiration which he shed in his efforts, came the sea. Or again; at first only the gods lived in heaven, under them was the sea, but no land; then Tangaloa threw a piece of earth down from heaven, which

[1] Comp. Waitz-Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, vi. 233 *seqq.*

became the island of Tonga, and grew larger and larger; or he fished the earth up out of the depth of the sea with a fishing line, but when it was half-way up, the line broke, so that only certain points,—the Polynesian islands, to wit,—project out of the sea. To people the land he had thus made, he sent from the abode of the gods his two sons with their wives. The younger of these two sons was clever and diligent, and made a number of useful articles; the elder was lazy, and accomplished nothing, which led him to envy his younger brother and at last to kill him. Then Tangaloa came and led the children of the murdered one towards the East into a great land, and gave them, because their hearts were pure and good, a clear skin and many arts; but to the murderer he said, Thou shalt be black, because thy heart is wicked, and thou shalt be miserable, shalt possess little and carry on no trade; and thy brother shall be able to come to thee when he likes. Another turn of the legend, this no doubt the latest, is found among the Maories; heaven and earth lay for thousands of times so close together that everything was buried in darkness; then their children resolved to separate them, and the god of the woods did so by putting his feet against the earth and stretching upwards against heaven. Then it grew light, and the children of heaven and of the earth were seen. But the wind-god was angry with his brothers, and began a fierce battle with them; the others all bowed to him, only the youngest, man, remained standing upright, and became lord over his brothers (the powers of nature). But in mist and dew heaven and earth still shed tears on account of their separation. It is easy to see how in the various turns taken by the legend in the circle of the same people, the cosmogonic, the theogonic, and the demiurgic[1] form cross and recross each other.

The question of the "whence?" of the world, was taken up very earnestly by the brooding mind of India, but the answers returned to it were very varied, and in no case satisfactory. In the old-Vedic nature-religion heaven and the earth were still themselves the

[1] We apply this term to denote the theory of a divine forming of the world out of materials ready to hand, after the analogy of human artificial production.

supreme pair of gods, and produced the other gods and beings out of themselves. When a more definite distinction began to be drawn between the deity and the natural element he was connected with, the ground of the all was sought partly in the world-forming activity of individual gods who came by turns to the front, specially of Pragapati, who is often adored in a way strikingly near to monotheism, as the originator of the world and lord of all the creatures, only that he himself came into existence from a golden egg, and has a ground of his existence beyond himself; while in part the origin of the world was conceived as a material process of emanation, the elements issuing in definite sequence out of Brahma the world-germ, and flowing back into him again, so that in place of a beginning of the world at one definite point of time, there is a continuous circle of issuing and returning, becoming and passing out of existence. The advanced speculation of the Vedanta declared both of these accounts, that of the fashioning of the world by a personal god or lord and the emanation-theory of the perpetual circle of beings, to be mere exoteric opinions, only admissible at the stand-point of not-knowing, while esoteric knowledge comes to see that the world does not really exist at all, but is a mere illusion conjured up by Brahma, which appears as existing only to the soul which is entangled in the deception of the senses. This got rid certainly of the question of the origin of the world, but in its place arose the question as to the origin of the illusion of the world, which could not be solved by merely appealing to the sorcery of Maja. The multiplicity of the phenomena of the world could in no way be explained from the simple unity of Brahma, and so the Sankhya-philosophy set out from an original plurality of souls, and placed matter by their side as an equally original principle. The souls themselves are perfectly simple and unchangeable, but they become entangled in matter, which is changeable, and thus there arises in this philosophy also the illusion of the senses, which chains the soul to the world of sense, which it regards as its own world, though having in reality nothing in common with it. This theory shares the abstract, unspiritual notion of substance of the Vedanta; as there the all-soul

or Brahma, so here the individual souls are the stiff, simple one, devoid of all action and all motion, which excludes becoming from itself as an illusion. The natural reaction from this followed in Buddhism, which set up against motionless being, restless becoming, set aside the notion of substance in the law of becoming, and saw in the chain of causality, in the order of retribution, the only persistent and unconditioned power of the world, all further questions as to the beginning and origin of this circle of life being simply declined.

Among the *Greeks* too, philosophical arose out of mythological cosmology. The fundamental thought of the latter is the same as that of the former; "the world did not come into existence all at once, but rose by the way of organic development from dark and elementary beginnings, to this its last form as a beautiful and perfect cosmos; and this took place in various stages and advances, the final point and accomplishment of which is to be seen in Zeus and in the world of gods and of nature which he rules; so that the perfect is not the first but the last, and this explains the battles of the gods, for whatever is perfect is the natural end of the less perfect" (Preller). Of the manifold forms of Greek cosmogony that of *Hesiod* is best known, and was probably always the most widely current. According to it the beginning of all things was chaos and Eros. Chaos was divided into Tartarus and the earth; the earth produced out of itself heaven and the sea. This is pure cosmogony, and comes before the theogony; only at this point does the former pass into the latter, Eros beginning to act in the primal beings. Heaven (Ouranos), seized with the impulse of love, fertilises the earth (Gaia), and from them proceeds the race of the Titans, Cyclopes, and Hekatoncheires (giants and monsters). Ouranos, however, is mutilated and deposed from his rule by one of his sons, the Titan Kronos, whereupon the earth enters on its golden age, under the rule of Kronos. But Kronos is growing old, and swallows his children, the youngest of whom, Zeus, overcomes him with the help of the Cyclopes; and so the rule of the world passes to the sons of Kronos, of whom Zeus is the head; the Titans are cast into Tartarus, and heaven, sea,

and the under-world portioned out among the brothers, Zeus, Poseidon, and Aidoneus, the earth remaining the common scene of their activity. With the battle of the Titans, of which the battle of the giants is a later echo, the Greek sees the rude elemental powers of nature subdued under the orderly rule of the gods. The human race too, according to Greek legend, sprang from the earth, from the familiar soil, the soil of Greece—the accounts varying as to whether the first men came forth from trees or from stones or from water. The legend was widely spread, which distinguished two races, the first (the Pelasgic) was destroyed by a great flood all but one pair, Deucalion and Pyrrha, who found safety on the summit of Parnassus; and from stones which they cast behind them, the second (the Hellenic) race proceeded. It is evident that we have here local legends of natural catastrophes, mixed together with genealogical traditions of tribal ancestors in a free style which can have no claim to be considered historical. It is generally true of all these myths, that "They contain but little thought; what there is in them that transcends immediate perception is not based on reflection as to the natural causes of things, but on an activity of fancy, behind which there is little to seek for even when it produces what has an appearance of deep meaning. As little can we discover in the way in which the myths are strung together—this is no doubt principally the work of the poet—any leading thought of more profound significance" (Zeller). The general thought of these legends, the development of the world from an initial chaos, was worked out in various ways in the Ionic natural philosophy. Among the various theories of this philosophy those of Empedocles and Democritus possess a certain interest as being the precursors of modern hypotheses. *Empedocles* conceived of the formation of the world as a periodical separation and mixture of the elements, brought about by hatred and love; the organisms proceeded out of the earth, cast up by the subterranean fire; at first they were unformed lumps, but later they became articulated, at first in strange forms which had little capacity of life, and perished again, till at last, in the manifold play of chance, it happily came about that harmonious forms appeared, which were

capable of life—an antique theory of selection. *Democritus* is the founder of mechanical atomistic doctrine; he considered the atoms to be the fundamental constituent parts of the world, being simple, indivisible, ungenerated, and unchangeable primitive bodies, in point of substance like each other, but in point of form, quantity, and gravity differing from each other; separated from each other by empty space, they move with unequal rapidity, and therefore impinge on each other and coalesce into greater and smaller masses, out of which the corporeal world arises. The souls too of the animals and men who have arisen out of the earth-slime are, according to Democritus, a corporeal matter, which consists of the finest atoms or fiery particles—the oldest logically worked-out materialism. The unsatisfactory nature of this old-world positivism, its inability to explain the unity and order of the world, early impressed itself on men of deeper insight. The Eleatic philosophers accordingly attempted to reach an explanation of the world from the other end; in place of the many and of chance, they made the one, which they held was both primal matter and primal reason, the principle of the world. But they still held in fact the same stiff and lifeless notion of substance as their atomistic opponents; *Parmenides* ascribed to his all-one the same simple and unchangeable being which the atomists predicated of their atoms. He could not, of course, explain the real world out of this empty abstract being, any more than the Vedanta-philosophy could from Brahma; and as the latter declared the world of the many and of the becoming to be a delusion based upon not-knowing, so also did Parmenides. As, again, in India the Brahmanic one Being came to be confronted with the Buddhist law of substanceless becoming, so *Heraclitus* opposed to the Eleatic sole being, universal becoming, or the perpetual circle of the becoming and the passing away of phenomena according to the permanent law of the world-reason, which, at the same time, he held to be a fire-like matter. And to make the parallel complete, the demiurgic notion of creation represented in India by Pragapati and Isvara, is not absent from Greek philosophy. *Anaxagoras* was the first to represent the world as formed out of a chaotic primal matter by the ordering

divine spirit, which, it is true, he conceived as a power of nature resembling matter, which was supposed to interfere in the mechanism of the other forces in a quite external way, to fill up the gaps of the mechanical explanation. *Plato* held the world to be formed by the world-soul, which he conceived as something between the pure idea and matter, and to which he ascribed a function of connecting the two together, certainly in so mythical a way that it is difficult to know what he really meant. *Aristotle*, too, found it necessary, in order to account for the motion and the purpose of the world, to assume the existence of a God as its first moving and its final cause; but as he conceived of God as pure thought, and placed him outside the material world, he was not able to arrive at a clear notion of the divine creative activity. He makes the first impulse of the circling motion of the world proceed from God, and seeks in him, the final cause who is himself unmoved, the stimulus for the development of matter; but both of these ideas are wanting in clearness, and verge on the mythical. Add to this, that even within nature the teleological principle is not with him the sole ruling principle, but finds a limit which it cannot overcome in the blind necessity of matter. The *Stoic* cosmology, too, never got beyond this point; in the earlier stoical pantheism God and matter are identified, and the formation of the world is represented, just as by Empedocles and Heraclitus, as a material efflux of the elements from the arch-being. This grossly sensuous emanational view was only in part transcended by later Stoicism, in spite of all its attempts to spiritualise the notion of God and that of Providence (comp. p. 115).

The purest notion of creation on Indo-Germanic ground is that of the *Persians;* it is true that dualism still asserts itself here, but it takes a peculiar religious turn which allows the hope that it may at some time be transcended, and encourages moral effort to bring about that result. According to the Zend-Avesta, Ahuramazda made the world by his "excellent word," the expression of his reasonable will. "I invoke"—so we read at the beginning of the Persian religious document Jazna—"and praise the creator Ahuramazda, splendidly shining, very great and very good, very perfect

and very energetic, very prudent and very beautiful, pre-eminent in purity, who possesses good science, spring of pleasure, him who created us, who fashioned us, the most perfect of reasonable beings." The creation is represented as follows in Persian dogmatic. From the beginning the kingdom of Ahura and the kingdom of Ahriman stood over-against each other, as "uncreated light" and "uncreated darkness," absolutely separate, unmixed, not touching, and not contending with, one another. This state, of the pure separation of the two kingdoms in the intelligible world, lasted three thousand years. But as Ahura saw from the first that the collision and the battle were unavoidable, he created the material world as a kind of rampart which lies half-way between the two kingdoms. This creation of the material world took place exactly in the period of a solar year of 365 days, and in six stages. First heaven and the lights of heaven were made by the word of Ahura; then the water, then the solid land, then on it the plants, the animals, and at last man. One of the peculiarities of the Persian legend of creation is that each class of creatures is formed from and after a heavenly type, which type itself, however, is also represented as an individual existence, and is capable of becoming the head of the beings formed after it. The first human pair, Maschia and Maschiana, Ahura caused to proceed out of a twin tree in the following way: first the bodies of man and woman were developed out of it, and then Ahura implanted in them souls which he had made beforehand. As we saw above, the creation of Ahura was spoiled by Ahriman from its very beginning; among the wheat Ahriman sowed tares, among the useful animals he mixed such as are noxious; beside fire he made smoke, to everything beneficent he made the evil reverse; yet the preponderating power is on the side of Ahura, and the battle between him and Ahriman, which goes through the whole history of the world, ends in the defeat of the latter.

Some fresh light has recently been cast on the *Chaldean* creation-legend by the deciphering of the cuneiform inscriptions. According to Schrader's translation of the Assyrian original text (*Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, vol. i. p. 1-19), the Chaldean

legend is as follows: "When above the Heaven had not yet announced, beneath, the land had not yet named a name,—for the ocean was their first generator, the surging sea the mother of their whole,—then their waters embraced one another and united; the darkness, however, had not yet been withdrawn, a sprout had not yet sprung forth. When of the gods as yet none had arisen, had not yet named a name, not yet determined destiny, then were the great gods produced, the gods Lachmu and Lachamu proceeded forth, and grew aloft also; the gods Sar and Ki-Sar were produced. The days were stretched out—he gloriously set up the abodes of the great gods, the stars he caused to come forth. He ordained the year, established decades for the same; he caused the twelve months, each with three stars, to come forth. . . . When the gods in their assembly produced, then they set up in glory strong tree-stems, caused living creatures to come forth, living beings, beasts of the field, great beasts of the field and vermin."[1] The meaning of this narrative, which is set together from several fragments, is in the main clear enough. In the beginning heaven and earth did not yet exist in separation from each other; there was nothing but the deep and the water of chaos, over which lay darkness; from this, by sexual mingling of the waters, the all was generated and born. And first there arose, but they were from chaos, the context shows, the great gods, who, when they grew, created the host of heaven and of the earth (Sar and Ki-Sar), while they (now in concert, now the supreme God Bel) first appointed to the stars their places and functions in heaven, and then created the vegetation and the living beings of the earth, and all in a splendid manner.

If now we compare with this the biblical account of the creation as given us in Gen. i., we are equally struck with the likeness and the unlikeness of the two. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth; the earth was waste and void, and darkness was over the deep, and the Spirit of God moved over the water, and God said, Let there be light," etc. Here, then, just as in the Chaldean

[1] The version here given is from Mr. Whitehouse's translation of Schrader in T. T. F. L. The German as given by Pfleiderer varies from it in some points.—TR.

account, we set out from a chaotic primal state, water and darkness the only features of it; but while the Chaldean legend places the life-generating principle in the waters of chaos themselves, from which the gods issue first, who then proceed to bring about the formation and order of chaos, the biblical narrative makes the Spirit of God brood over the water from the first, and the first separation comes about at his word of command; the creative principle here accordingly is not to be looked for in the generative powers of chaos, but in the living breath (spirit) and the will (word) of God, who on his part does not require to come into being and to grow before he can create, like the Chaldean gods, but is in himself from the very first a complete spiritual power above chaotic matter, and is therefore the free, thinking, and willing cause of the formation of the world. This is the essential difference between this monotheistic doctrine of creation and that of the Semitic nature-religion, a difference which is the more noteworthy, as it is impossible to doubt that the biblical narrator had the Chaldean legend before him, and derived a number of suggestions from it: a fact which no theology which understands its own position can feel any interest in denying. Then the narrative of Gen. i. proceeds methodically from the original state of chaos through the six days' work; it begins with three acts of separation between light and darkness, above and below, wet and dry, which afford the general basis for the particular beings. In the second half of the week it then proceeds to the formation of these beings; first the space of heaven is filled with the various light-beings (conceived perhaps as living rulers of time), then air and water receive their population, and finally the earth her inhabitants, among whom the human pair are the most distinguished, and come last. The concluding day of rest provides a divine type for the institution of the Sabbath. Here everything is well considered, there is a regular advance, systematic and purposeful, from the general to the particular, and then again from the lower to the higher—it is all one plan; and accordingly it is added at each act of creation that the result answered at once and perfectly to the design of the Creator, and was "good." In this systematic arrangement it may possibly be the case

that the narrator had before his mind as his model not only the Chaldean, but also the Persian, theory of creation, which sets out, like the biblical one, from the antithesis of light and darkness, then makes the dividing Spirit of God separate the lower waters from the upper ones, and the dry land from the sea, and then divides the whole work of creation into six sections (not days), and concludes with the creation of the first human pair. Whether or not this was the case we are not called on to decide; it is quite possible that the correspondence of the two narratives is accidental, and arose from similarity of motive on the part of the two narrators.

In addition to the narrative of the creation in Genesis i., however, the Bible has another in Gen. ii. 4-25, which varies so widely from the former that we see at a glance that the two are of different origin, and proceed on quite different ideas of the world. It is not the formation of the world-whole which is here narrated; the matter in question is simply the preparation of man's earthly dwelling-place and environment. The procedure too is quite different; what in the former case was last, is here the beginning, namely the formation of man, that is to say of the male, for the female is not yet thought of; then the plant-world is made, for the purpose of human nourishment, while in i. 11 *seq.* it comes into existence as the natural accessory of the surface of the earth without any view to human nourishment. Then God finds that not enough has been done for man's sustenance, in surrounding him only with the plants, and makes the beasts to help him. Finally, when this too fails to meet his wants, the woman is made for a help for him. Here evidently there is no such thing as a connected plan and a systematic advance; no more is created than what is necessary, as one emergency after another arises, and there is always another want behind which calls for fresh creative efforts. This of itself betrays a much more naïve mode of view than that of the first narrative, where the construction of the world advances methodically from point to point; but we have to add, that the divine work in creating is here represented as a kind of human handiwork, a conception which the narrator of Gen. i. has long left behind him. There God brings everything to pass simply

by his word, but here he has to put his own hand to the work; he plants a garden, he sets man together out of the dust of the earth, and breathes his own breath into his nostrils; afterwards he takes from man while sleeping one of his ribs, and constructs the woman of it, and later still he makes man, with his own hands, garments of the skins of animals, etc. We recognise these childishly innocent anthropomorphisms as belonging to the earlier prophetic writing of history. The second account of the creation belongs to this period of literature, and is therefore of older origin than the account of the first chapter, which belongs to the (post-exilic) priestly law-book.

The Old Testament legend of creation determined the position of the Christian church on the subject, but did not prevent profounder spirits among the Fathers, such as Origen or Augustine, from treating the letter of the narrative with some freedom, in which they were helped by the allegorical style of interpretation then in use. Material changes were not ventured on, except by the heretical Gnostics of the second century, who replaced the creation of the Bible with theories partly of emanation, partly of dualism, giving expression to essentially the same interest as the mythological and philosophical cosmologies treated of above; seeking, namely, to find in the principles of the origin of the world an explanation of the imperfection experienced in it, of its physical, moral, and religious evils. The church, however, had good reason for simply repressing such speculations, since the physical and the spiritual processes of nature and religious processes of the mind were so thrown together and mixed up in them, that justice was done neither to one side nor the other. In the arbitrary fantastic figments of this syncretistic mythology,—for the whole of the Gnosticism of the second century amounts to nothing more than this, and its intellectual value has been vastly exaggerated —the intellect was far from being satisfied, and the claims of religious feeling were seriously endangered. The proposition was advanced by the church, and the conflict with the Gnostics helped greatly to harden it into a dogma, that the world was made out of nothing by an act of the will of God in time; and the religious idea was thus invested with such a one-sided supra-naturalist form as could never satisfy

thought. *Origen*, who was half a Gnostic, could not satisfy himself with a beginning of the world in time, and assumed instead a series of worlds succeeding each other without beginning and without end; and even *Augustine* sought to give the beginning of the world in time a dialectical turn ("created not *in* time, but *with* time"); and a *Thomas* was honest enough to confess that reason could only be satisfied with the assumption that the world had no beginning; the contrary was only to be believed out of deference to church authority. And as deeper thinkers could not satisfy themselves with a beginning in time, so neither were they satisfied with the notion of the abstract freedom of the act of creation. *Scotus Erigena* stated expressly that in God his working was equally eternal and equally essential with his being, and that he preceded the universe not in time but only in the notion, as its cause. The "*theologia Germanica*," that profound mystical and speculative work of the later Middle Ages, asks, what a will could be which did not actually put forth will? and shows that God must always have had a creature, so that his will might have something to do in it, which otherwise would be in God without work. And a *Jacob Böhme* adds, that a hidden will which did not become present to itself in the object of its creation, would not attain to manifestation for itself, and so would remain unconscious, for "how can there be in a will which is nothing more than will, a knowledge of itself?" According to *Spinoza* the traditional theory of creation makes the nature of God arbitrary, and the existence of the world a matter of chance. To escape this *Leibniz* proposed to assume at least a moral necessity, by which God was determined by himself to create the best possible world; but in the case of the most perfect being this can scarcely be distinguished, as Leibniz desired, from metaphysical necessity. *Fichte* protested emphatically against the traditional doctrine of creation; he calls it the root-error of all false metaphysics and religious doctrine, the primary principle of Judaism and heathenism (?) by which the notion of the Deity was perverted from the very first, and invested with a caprice, which then passed into the whole religious system. To the same effect *Hegel* says, "They say, God made the world; this is put

forward as a statement which may be so, or may not; it is, so to speak, an arbitrary, fortuitous thing, which does not belong to the notion of God. But God is spirit, therefore he is essentially self-revelation, he does not create the world once for all, but is the eternal creator. This eternal self-revelation, this act, this is the notion of God. It belongs to his being, to his essence, to be a creator, and where he is not this, he is understood imperfectly." *Schleiermacher*, too, declared a God outside of and before the world to be an empty phantasm; according to the "Dialectic" God and the world are not to be thought separately from each other, they are merely two forms for the same being, apprehended in its unity and in its multiplicity, and accordingly in his "System of Doctrine" he regards the work of God as Creator as one with his work as Preserver, and the two together as identical with the totality of the causality in nature.

Modern natural science however comes into collision with the church doctrine of creation both more frequently and more sharply than does philosophy. Some preludes of modern conflicts are to be found even in the sixteenth century. Not only did the Inquisition of Rome make Galileo suffer in prison for asserting that the earth moved; Protestant theologians too, Melanchthon at their head, regarded the discovery of *Copernicus* as a godless innovation, which the magistrate must make it his business to suppress. From the modern point of view that was a reprehensible policy, but we must in fairness acknowledge that those theologians were correct in their apprehension of the width of the chasm between the belief of the church and the Copernican system of the world. The discovery of the revolution of the earth round the sun is not only quite plainly at variance with the biblical history of creation, which is thoroughly geocentric; the antithesis extends further than this, and affects the old dogmatic mode of thought which is based on the old geocentric view of the world. When the earth, supposed at rest, becomes a rolling heavenly body, and the firm vault of heaven is changed into the endless space of the universe, religious fancy has no longer an above and a below to dispose of, and thus parts with the frame in which the principal acts

of the divine and human drama of salvation from paradise to the second coming of Christ were localised. And if these acts are deprived of their external scene in space they cannot so easily be thought of as external events, and it becomes necessary for religion to conceive what was hitherto represented as an external transaction in space, as an inner experience of the human mind. In this change, taken by itself, there is certainly no loss, but on the contrary a valuable step in religious knowledge; yet this of course does not prevent the necessity thus imposed on religion from exciting painful feelings, and appearing to threaten faith with the loss of its dearest treasures. To this we have to add that the change of view with regard to the position of the earth in the universe must necessarily be followed by another and a more modest view of the relation of man to the order of the whole. If the earth is no longer the fixed centre about which the world revolves, if it is only one small body among many, among countless others, many of which, it is highly probable, are populated like this one with living beings, with reasonable beings, how shall the citizen of this small province put forward the claim that the arrangement of the universe was framed solely with a view to his particular ends, or has sometimes, in favour of his ends, at a particular time been changed, suspended, interfered with? Such arrogant claims may equally well be put forward by the inhabitants of other spheres; but what of the law and order of the whole, on which the welfare of all parts of the universe alike depends? Thus the Copernican view of the world teaches man to regard himself as an individual member of the organism of the whole, to adjust himself modestly, as others also have to do, to the universal order, the world being far too great to direct its course according to the fortuitous wishes of the children of men. It is hard however for human arrogance to simply accept this modest situation. The majority, the theological majority too, is apt to be overcome with rage and zeal when the simple practical consequences of a position which all theoretically accept, are stated, as has here been done. The proposition is self-evident, that the order of the universe as we know it since Copernicus, imposes iron

barriers on the wishes of the selfish human heart, and to state this can only give offence surely to those who think that religion or God exists for the purpose of guaranteeing to us the fulfilment of all our wishes. To those who think so, the earnest advice may be tendered, quietly to reflect on what is here said, and to take it seriously to heart, so that their religion may be purified from a selfishness which is neither pious nor reasonable. Once for all, such persons should seek to understand that the beginning of wisdom is the fear of God, *i.e.* the sense of unconditional dependence on the sovereign and never-to-be-shaken divine world-order. Only when this elementary truth has once been grasped, do we advance to the perception, that it is no misfortune, but the greatest blessing, to be citizens of the well-ordered divine State, in which fixed laws, which cannot be broken, rule without any respect of persons, laws in which we do not see the arbitrary statutes of an unreasonable individual will, but the expression of the purposeful reason of God, which has foreseen in and with the wise ordering of the whole, also our reasonable ends.

Compared with this foundation of a new world-consciousness, the contradictions between particular features of the Hebrew account of the creation and modern natural science are of subordinate importance. Where the earth and man are made the centre of the world it will not appear so strange that the sun was made after the earth and for the exclusive benefit of the earth, impossible as this must appear from the point of view of the Copernican system. And where once the making of the world is represented as an absolute miracle, due to the abstract will of God working without means, and apart from any immanent development, it can create no surprise that this miraculous act turned out the whole world ready-made in six days of twenty-four hours each; although this manifestly contradicts the science of the present day, which sees the formation of worlds and even systems of such worlds now going on, and reads in the strata of the earth's surface the record of millennial periods of this world's existence before man appeared on it. It can serve little purpose therefore to enter into laborious attempts to harmonise the details of the Bible narrative of creation with the results of modern

science; no such harmony exists or can exist, because the two views of the world which are in question are entirely dissimilar. It would evidently be a far honester course, and at the same time far more serviceable to true apologetics, to recognise that what the Bible history of creation gives us is simply antique legends and primitive speculations on natural history, the details of which can be of little importance for us, and the permanent value of which lies in the doctrine they teach, that the sole cause of the world lies in the will and the reason of God. To show the harmony which exists between this fundamental monotheistic idea and modern science is the only course to be taken with regard to this question which can further the interests of a theology which understands what its interests are. This can be done, it appears to me, in a better style than that of those theologians who seek to gloss over their own inconsistencies by casting the reproach of heresy on earnest and honourable scientific inquirers.

One great point of controversy between the traditional doctrine of creation and modern science is the question, raised afresh by the investigations of Darwin and his followers, of the origin of man. The doctrine of development is now, in its main ideas, exactly a hundred years old; its originator—as is still too little remembered—is no other than *Herder*. In his *Ideas towards the Philosophy of History*, he regards man as the goal towards which the organisation of the earth was tending, "when the form of organisation rose from the stone to the crystal, from the crystal to the metals, from these to the vegetable kingdom, from plants to animals, from the animals to man, while the impulses and forces of the creatures were becoming more manifold, and at length were all combined in the form of man." Throughout this series of beings there obtains a similarity of the principal form, which, changing in countless ways, approximated more and more to the human form, while at the same time the inner impulses and powers grew ever more refined, and resembled more and more the human capacity of reason and human freedom. Thus the animals are "the older brothers of men," the early stages in which nature tried her hand and showed in detail what she was seeking to

realise in man. Hence man, when he appeared upon the world, found other species already there, which disputed with him the sole rule of the earth. This rule by no means fell to him without any trouble from the beginning; he had to fight for it. For "all things are at strife with each other, because all things are themselves hard pressed, and have to defend their skin and to cater for their lives. Why does nature do this? Why did she press the creatures thus upon each other? Because she desired to create in the smallest space the greatest number of living creatures in the greatest variety, so that one overcomes the other, and there is peace in the creation only by the balance of forces. Each species cares for itself as if it were the only one; but at its side stands the other which hems it in; and only in this relation of opposed species did the creator (nature) find the means to preserve the whole. She weighed the forces, she counted the limbs, she fixed the impulses of the species one against another, and let the earth bear what it could."

We are at once struck with the resemblance of these ideas to the Darwinian doctrine of development. But Herder went no further than the general idea; he did not enter on the question how the origin of man, thus prepared for in the animal organisation, had as a fact come about. The natural philosophy of a Herder, as of a Goethe and a Schelling, was less concerned with the actual genesis of man than with the view of the unity of plan, the ideal connection, the fundamental type-form in the ascending line of organisation. That this ideal connection required, almost as a matter of necessity, that one member of it should be actually descended from the other, was an inference which those poets and thinkers left to be drawn by natural historians themselves. Of these *Lamarck* was the first to propound, at the beginning of the present century, the theory proper of development or of descent; he conceived all the more developed organisations, including man, to be descended from the simplest organisms which arose by primary generation, by means of gradual transmutation; and he sought the reasons of this transmutation in changes of the conditions of life, and accommodation of the organs to those changes. His theory, which was actively combated by his contem-

poraries, and soon fell into oblivion, has been revived in our own days, and supported by new and original arguments by the English naturalist *Darwin.* Darwin sets out from the two general facts, that the individuals of a species have, in addition to the common properties of the species, individual characteristics of their own, and that they transmit the latter as well as the former to their posterity. By virtue of these two laws the artificial breeding of domestic animals and cultivated plants is able to produce great varieties; by employing only individuals with special characteristics for propagation during several generations, they at last form common and stable varieties of species. In the same way, Darwin concluded, the origin of all the organic species one from another may be explained by a "natural selection" on the part of nature. This natural selection he considers to be brought about by the circumstance that, in the incessant "struggle for existence," in which each living being has to contend with all the rest for the conditions necessary to its life, only those individuals survive which are most suitably equipped for the struggle, their organs having most completely adapted themselves to the environment and the conditions of life in which they may happen to be placed. This adaptation then brings about in the superior individuals certain variations from the common type of the species; and these variations of the superior individuals which survive in the struggle being then transmitted from one generation to another, and constantly increased, new species arise, entirely different from the old ones. A further ancillary hypothesis to this theory of natural selection was added lately by Darwin in his theory of sexual selection, according to which the attractive force of beauty is of decisive influence in securing the transmission of definite varieties, and so reinforces the results of the struggle for existence.

That these two theories, however—that of natural selection by thinning out in the struggle for existence, and that of sexual selection by the attraction of beauty—do not suffice to explain the development of one species from another, is already recognised by the all but universal consent both of friends and foes, and Darwin himself has lately admitted this. But it by no means follows, because the Dar-

winian explanation of the development of organisms one out of another is inadequate, that the organic life of the earth cannot be ascribed to one single development. It is by no means the case that this *general* theory must stand or fall with the *special* attempt of Darwin to set it forth; many other explanations of the process of development are conceivable, and have actually been adopted by various inquirers. The great majority indeed of the natural historians and philosophers of the present day accept the general doctrine of descent and development, but dissent more or less decidedly from the special Darwinian theory of selection. They point, and certainly with justice, to the absence in it of any real *inner* principle of development, though both the motive power, or the impulse of progress, and the law of transformation, must ultimately be found in such an inner law. The theory of selection seeks to replace this decisive inner factor, this agent, an ideal or psychical, it is true, or, better still, a metaphysical agent, by merely external causes (changed conditions of life, adaptation to these conditions, thinning out in the struggle for existence), the fortuitous coincidence of which is said to bring about variations of species by the gradual accumulation of their effects; and this is recognised both by natural historians and by philosophers as the great defect of the theory. The Darwinists, says Teichmüller,[1] make a mistake, in seeking to reach the differentiation of a species and the transition to another species, by a mere quantitative change of some part or other of the organism by the influences of the environment, as if this would gradually lead to a variation. But in a system it is not possible to change a part without either changing the whole system at the same time or else destroying it. Within a species the difference of the sexes cannot arise by mere quantitative change of one part; it can only result from a general co-ordinate change of all the parts, *i.e.* by changing the principle of the whole system; and so we must not hope that the various forms of the species now existing side by side can be produced by action from without. To the same effect, *E. v. Hartmann*:[2]—"To whatever

[1] *Darwinismus und Philosophie*, pp. 72-80.

[2] *Wahrheit und Irrthum des Darwinismus*, pp. 114, 145.

extent the Darwinian principles may be true in their application in detail, they can never in any circumstances be any more than co-operative explanations, technical aids to the effectiveness of the principle of orderly inner development according to a plan, the planner or subject of which must be held to be a metaphysical creature or formative impulse." In the same way *Planck*[1] shows that in most cases the higher endowment affords no furtherance whatever for the struggle for existence; that, on the contrary, it very frequently represents an unpractical mixed form, which could never be explained from practical adaptation to external conditions of existence, but rather shows the existence of a new inner living impulse. Snell[2] expresses himself in a similar strain: "Exclusive study of the external conditions of life is as incapable of comprehending anything of the development of nature as a whole, as a mere narrow pragmatism in history can understand anything of the development of the peoples and of mankind, if it does not ally itself with an inner law of the metamorphosis of the human spirit in history." "A development can only take place when something within transcends the existing outward circumstances." Snell therefore proposes, in direct opposition to Darwin, to regard, as the moving forces of progressive development, those individuals of each epoch who have a mixed and a less fixed nature, and therefore bear in themselves a future richer in forms capable of development, which therefore appear more awkward to the external world surrounding them, remain in a certain inner reserve, and follow rather a dim tendency which is directed to the future than present gratification; while those beings, on the contrary, which best accommodate themselves to the environment at each time, obtain more extended influence and rule in their own immediate time, but as their inner life closes in and grows narrower, sacrifice the possibility of higher development. It is certainly very characteristic of the difference between the German and the English inquirer, that the former seeks the steps of development in the richest inner life, the latter in the most useful adaptation to the outer world.

[1] *Wahrheit und Flachheit des Darwinismus*, pp. 75, 168, *et passim.*
[2] *Die Schöpfung des Menschen*, pp. 46, 51

That in spite of these objections an element of truth is to be recognised in the Darwinian theory, is admitted on all hands. The only question is where we are to look for this truth, and how we are to combine it with the ideal truth of the religious belief in creation. Natural history is in its own right in insisting on the notion of natural *development*. It contains a contradiction to say that anything living is made: whatever lives is distinguished from what is dead and from what is produced artificially, just by having its principle of life in itself: it makes itself what it is; realises its endowment by its own activity, develops its germ into a separate whole; all life is immanent development, a becoming from within outwards and by the living thing's own impulse, and thus altogether precludes the notion of being made from without. This is most strikingly apparent in the case of the highest life, the life of man; what practicable conception can we possibly form of the production by a miracle at a certain point of time of a personal mental life, when all our thought and will is what it is only because it has worked itself by its own activity out of the sensuous life of mere sensation and impulse, has gathered from the interactions of the inner powers with impressions from without a mental furnishing of a certain stamp and range, and has realised its own mental endowment in these possessions which it has laboured to obtain? Without this mental furnishing a soul is not a spirit, a personal subject, at all; but this furnishing can in no way be poured into it, or created as an addition to it, or be formed in any way whatever without its own spontaneous action, not even by a divine act, because such a making would be an inner contradiction. But should it be assumed, in order to avoid this difficulty, that the first men were made by God only as children, who still stood in need of development, the psychological difficulty is merely exchanged for a physical one; we could not conceive such children to be preserved without parental care and protection, any more than we can conceive them to be born without parental generation; and so there would be added to the miracle of creation a constantly recurring miracle of preservation. And in that case too it would have been far more to the purpose that men should have been created before the lower animals, so as to save them from supporting from the very first the hard and dangerous struggle

for existence. Instead of this, the earth bears testimony that man appeared last as the highest member of the series of organisms, which visibly aimed with more and more distinctness at the representation of the human body, which are all, as it were, variations of a primal type, preliminary studies of an ideal, which was at last realised in man. Does not this suggest the hypothesis, that the origin of man will be brought about not only in ideal but in reality by these species of animals which prefigure him?

This also must be conceded to science, that this whole development, from the beginning to the formation of man, was accomplished under the strict rule of the law of causality. This follows in fact from the very notion of development; for development consists just in this, that each successive state proceeds with inner necessity out of the state which precedes it. As little as the development of a living being can be made from without, so little can a norm be given it or an end fixed for it from without, which did not reside in it already. It cannot serve foreign ends, but is absolutely bound to its own law, which is based on the inner constitution of the development-germ and its relation to the external conditions of life. Only we must not forget here, that the law of causality is by no means identical with the mechanism with which material particles outside each other in space act on each other, and are themselves moved and determined. Should causality be taken in this limited sense, which knows no more than the mechanism of bodies in motion, it is impossible to understand organic life at all, and the origin of it remains a quite insoluble riddle. "To trace the origin of anything that has life to the dead chemico-physical material world, is and must always be a piece of coarse supernaturalism, such as must prove the end, the death of a sound philosophy of nature."[1] *Strauss* considered that motion might be converted, according to circumstances, into sensation as well as into heat. But this view overlooks the fact, that no motion of material particles (which are) separated in space, ever can engender that inner unity of a subject, which controls the determinations of its parts, on which sensation and consciousness are based. "In the

[1] Snell, *Schöpfung des Menschen*, p. 71. Compare here the passages quoted above, on the teleological proof of the existence of God (p. 260 *seqq.*)

former case (the conversion of motion into heat) there is merely a translation of a movement of mass into a movement of molecules, and this is as intelligible as the communication of motion; in this case a translation is asserted of movements in space into ideas, and for this not only is there no pertinent analogy, but a plain contradiction is met with; the gathering up of the manifold in the unity of consciousness is to be explained without the subject, consciousness, to which the unity belongs." "Between the occurrences which we are accustomed to designate as mental sensations, ideas, thoughts, feelings, acts of will,—and those movements in space to which physics reduces all natural phenomena, there is no such relation as to enable them to be compared, so that we might regard the former as mere modifications or combinations of the latter."[1] Among sober students of natural history, too, the admission is all but universal that the mechanical explanation of organic life is an impossibility.

If we are not to renounce all attempts at an explanation of it—and such an explanation certainly does not now belong to the empirical study of nature but to the philosophy of nature—there can scarcely be any course left open to us but to conceive of life as pre-formed in the very elementary principles of reality, *i.e.* to represent these principles to ourselves after the fashion of the Leibnizian monads, as active and passive subjects of the nature of souls. Then the various forms of life, higher and lower, may easily be understood as the stages of development of the functions of these monads, the occurrence of which at definite points is brought about according to the law of cause and effect by the mutual action of them all upon each other, while the independent development of each individual being is co-ordinated and connected in point of law and in point of purpose with that of all the rest, and this whole system of correlative activities is governed by one great and persistent law of development. But we have already convinced ourselves above (p. 262) that such a system of individual beings developing themselves in correlation to each other is not to be conceived without a real ground and purpose to which all may be referred, and that this is only to be found in the reason and the will of God. We are by no means obliged, there-

[1] Zeller, *Abhandlungen*, ii. p. 533, 535.

fore, to give up the doctrine of development in order to save our belief in creation; on the contrary, we only need to think out the former in a thorough manner to be brought to the conclusion it demands in the creative divine world-ground. We must, certainly, conceive of the relation of God to the world in such a way that both the independent development of the individual beings and the correlative law or harmony which they observe, continue to be possible. The former is not the case in abstract monism (pantheism) which makes individual beings part with their relative independence, and therefore also their particular development, in the All-One; the latter is not the case in abstract theism (Deism), which places God outside the world, and in so doing sacrifices the bond which makes the world a unity, and so makes the correlation of individual beings, according to law, inexplicable. The only notion of God which harmonises with the doctrine of development is that concrete monotheism set forth in an earlier part of this work, which sees in the thinking and willing Ego of God the permanent ground to which all the inter-related development of the world is related alike, and in all the individual beings the organs, each independently performing its function, of the general life of God.

We do not assert that the traditional dogmatic statements of a creation in time out of nothing by an undetermined free act of the divine will, can be upheld. But what do we lose in parting with these assertions of theological scholasticism (which are not even founded on the Bible)? Even should we reconcile ourselves to the inconceivable idea of a creation out of nothing (*ex nihilo nihil fit!*) out of deference to the miraculous omnipotence of God, the suspicion could not be suppressed that such a world made out of nothing must be desperately like an enchanted Nothing, a "delusion of Maja," and however depreciatingly we may be willing to speak of the world, however modestly to think of ourselves, we never can divest ourselves of the consciousness that in our ego which wills there is a true reality, which must prevent us from ever seriously believing in a creation out of nothing. Equally difficult is it for us to think that there ever was a time when the world did not exist, and that its existence had a certain definite beginning in time.

What once did not exist may come not to exist again; and while we can conceive with respect to every individual phenomenon that it came into being and will pass away, the thought that this becoming and passing itself, this change of phenomena itself, had a beginning and will have an end, is a thought we have no power to entertain. Wherever we fix the end, we at once ask, and what then?—we think in spite of ourselves of change which still goes on, *i.e.* we at once remove the limit of the world which thought had just set up; and this is not, as many philosophers would seek to persuade us, a weakness of our human way of thinking, it is the sound instinct of the understanding, which feels itself incapable of abstracting from the existence of the world, because that would be to abstract from the possibility of thought, therefore from itself. And theological speculation, too, confirms us in this conclusion. If the world be conceived as an eternal purpose of the divine reason, what should have prevented the divine will for the whole eternity preceding the act of creation, from realising this reasonable purpose? The impediment could not lie outside of the divine mind, for there is nothing outside of it; as little could it lie in the divine mind, because the divine will can have nothing else in it but the thoughts of the divine reason; as little as it can will anything which that reason has not thought, so little can it not will any purpose the divine reason has conceived. If therefore there was never anything to hinder his creative activity either outside God or in him, then the divine will, since a causeless inactivity of it would be entirely inconceivable, must have been from eternity a creative activity, an acting cause of the real world, and in that case the existence of the world has no beginning. To this we must add, that unless we are to drop the guiding analogy of our own ego, we cannot think of the self-conscious ego of God devoid of reference to a manifold and changeable contents of consciousness, and where should we look for this, in the absence of a real world? If therefore we conceived of the world as at one time not yet come into being, and at another time not existing, then neither to that extent could we think of God as a living, willing, and self-conscious ego, *i.e.* if we thought the world away we should think God away with it. From these reasons which make against a begin-

ning of the world in time, it also follows at once that we must not think the ground of the world in God to be such an arbitrary act of will as might not have taken place, so that the world should owe its existence to an unaccountable accident. Were that the case, we could scarcely free ourselves from the fear that the same groundless caprice which once called the world into existence might hurl it back again into nothing; in other words, we could place no confidence in the faithfulness and unchangeableness of a divine will, the fundamental act of which had been an act of groundless caprice. If it be said, with Leibniz, for example, that God was morally determined by his goodness and wisdom to the creation of this as the best possible world, but that this moral necessity is to be distinguished from metaphysical necessity, the answer must be that in the case of a perfect being who cannot but will the good, this distinction falls to the ground. If we have reached the conclusion above, that the holiness of God consists just in the fact that there is no choice for him as there is for us between the reasonable ends of goodness and the unreasonable ones of self-will, but that the former are for him the only possible and necessary ends, it necessarily follows from that doctrine that we cannot think of the creative will of God as the freedom of groundless caprice, but as the freedom of perfect independent activity, which is not determined, conditioned or obstructed by anything outside him, but is determined in everything to which it turns, by the eternal thoughts of the divine reason, the realisation of which is the one end of all his activity.

As for this working of the divine will, we have already convinced ourselves (p. 288) that it is not to be conceived as immediate but mediate, as brought about by the multiplicity of finite powers. If it be asked how it comes about that the divine will, which in itself is one, translates itself into the multiplicity of the interacting individual powers, we must confess that we cannot tell; but we may at once go on to say, that we know just as little how it happens that our own inner will translates itself into the multiplicity of our nervous and muscular apparatus; and yet that it does so is the most original and the most undoubted fact of our consciousness. If this fact which we experi-

ence in ourselves can vouch to us for the possibility of an analogous translation of the will of God into the multiplicity of the powers in the world, though the mode of this we can as little discern as that of the other transmutation, it may also serve to make this relation clear to us as far as it is essential for us to understand it. We know that the inner stimulus of our will is not dissipated in the multiplicity of the organic functions, but while ruling them persists in itself, while on the other side our inner will never steps into action by itself as a co-ordinate and separate member of the organic interaction, but always remains, like the general in command, in the background, behind the organs which execute its bidding. From this we may infer with perfect confidence, that when the divine will is active and translates itself into the multiplicity of the interacting special powers it is by no means dissipated or lost in them, but presides over them and dominates them, as the power to which rule belongs; it is the all-embracing and persistent ground of them all alike, and maintains the connection of them all, as they succeed each other in time and act together in space, with the unity of the whole. On the other hand, we may also conclude, that it never proceeds into action for itself alone as if it were a particular cause working on the level of finite beings, but always makes its unconditioned power and wisdom appear, or manifests its "glory," only in the totality of the finite creatures, and in the whole sum of their mutually related and conditioned activities. Were we to seek for further analogies to illustrate this relation of the one to the many, we might think of a feature of organic life, how the mother cell articulates itself in the whole number of individual cells which are embraced by it and depend on it though independent of each other; or, we might think how in a solar system the separate bodies assume an independent existence and motion of their own, and yet remain indissolubly bound to their system as a whole; or how in a social organism the wills of individuals have each a sphere in which it acts independently of the wills of others, while in their mutual co-operation they both depend on the central power and will of the community, and subserve the ends of the community. These, it is true, are mere illustrations, in which we must not forget that *omne simile claudicat*, and the value of which for the researches

we are pursuing every reader must estimate for himself. So much at any rate is clear, that starting from the notion of the divine activity we have here been led to a result as to the relation of God to the world, which is identical with the assumption we found above to be the necessary condition of any independent and harmonious development of the beings in the world. Such a meeting at the end, of lines of thought which started from quite different points, is a strong confirmation of their truth. Nor is the confirmation less strong which we derive from observing that in this theory the interests of science and those of faith are equally attended to, and are harmonised with each other. The interests of science are safeguarded by the recognition of the orderly interaction and uninterrupted development of all the individual beings, the interests of faith by the recognition of the entire dependence of this whole system of finite causes on the one reason of God which fixes the ends of the world, the one power of God by which these ends are realised.

The opposition between creation and nature being thus removed, the question as to the origin of mind is solved in the simplest way. So certainly as man is a creature of God and not a chance product of the mechanical play of material forces, so certainly he was not created by God immediately by a single miraculous act, but mediately, by the whole process of the development of organic life on the earth, which rises up gradually from the very simplest organisms. And how should the tracing of his origin to such natural processes cast doubt upon the divine source from which he sprang, or the godlikeness of his nature? Does any man doubt the divine origin and purpose of his existence because he knows that his appearance in time is due to purely natural causes? Does any man consider a stain to be cast on the nobility of his human birth by the fact that in his embryonic development he had to pass through a series of animal transformations, beginning with the very lowest, that of the worm which swims in water? Why should it trench upon the divine dignity of the human race, if it also had to pass through such preliminary embryonic stages in animal transformations during the millenniums of the existence of the earth before man?[1] That for

[1] This very obvious as well as, in my opinion, very cogent argument in favour of

the race the stage of animal pre-existence may have lasted as many millenia as it now lasts days for the individual, surely cannot make any difference to the theological estimate of the matter, when it is remembered that with God a thousand years are as one day! If it be asked however, how, on the assumption of such a constant development, we are to conceive of the beginning of what is properly human, where the line is to be drawn between man and the pre-human? I answer that we have nothing to do here with the outward aspect of the earliest human existence—that we leave to anthropology and palæontology —but that in essential respects the notion of man was undoubtedly realised from that point onward at which the difference between self-consciousness and world-consciousness, a difference which begins to dawn even in the higher animals, reached such a point of definiteness, that the subject began to wonder at the world and to ask how he should interpret it, how find his proper place in it? From the moment when this difference first moved a human soul and drove it to seek for the answer to the riddle, from the moment, that is to say, when the first presentiment of the God-consciousness, the solution of the riddle of the world, shimmered like the earliest ray of morning light across the dawn of an earthly soul, from that moment "*man*" was there, *i.e.* "the thinker," ἄνθρωπος was there, *i.e.* "he who looks upwards."

the theological recognition of the doctrine of development, was first pointed out, so far as I know, by *Rud. Schmid,* in his instructive work, *Die Darwin'schen Theorien, und ihr Verhältniss zur Philosophie, Religion und Moral* (1876). The theory set forth in the text, according to which man begins with his consciousness of God, has drawn down on me, from theological opponents, the charges of Darwinism, materialism, Pantheism, and atheism! This I mention as a curiosity, leaving the reader to form his own conclusions.

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
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